The realist/constructivist paradigm: U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and India

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Introduction

This paper analyzes the interplay of the U.S., Pakistan and India relationship; more specifically, it analyzes U.S. foreign policy towards India and Pakistan contextualized in the constructivist and realist schools of thought. To illustrate the differential relationship, the paper looks at three major issues common to both India and Pakistan: (1) the nuclear issue, (2) U.S. supply of conventional military weapons to the two countries, and (3) U.S. role in the Pakistani and Indian economies.

The purpose of setting out these three examples is to make the point that while India fits in with the constructivists (in terms of, e.g., plural and popular democracy, secularism, victim of Pakistani/Islamic terrorism, global economic player and a responsible nuclear power) and the realists (emerging economy, strategic ally against China); Pakistan essentially serves short-term American realist interests (ally in the 1970s and current conflict in Afghanistan), while offering negligible if any constructivist scoring points (nuclear proliferation and the threat of the ‘Islamic Bomb’, long periods of military rule with short stints of democracy, deeply religious and intolerant society spouting rhetoric that is anti-West in general and anti-America in particular and vis-à-vis religious and ethnic minorities, genesis of the Taliban and a society seen as deeply sympathetic to the rallying banner of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, a ‘failed or failing’ State/failed to stabilize, the Kargil incursion).

The U.S.-Pakistan divergence in constructivist principles coupled with only short-term realist harmony in stark contrast to the U.S.-India long-term convergence of both realist and constructivist ideals translates into the differential treatment meted out by the U.S. to India and Pakistan. This is not to say that there is no divergence between Indian and U.S. ideals embedded in both schools of thought or that there is absolutely no convergence in the U.S.-Pakistan case, but that, relatively, India fares better than Pakistan on both counts. Nor does this paper claim that all the ideas currently popular about Pakistan in the West are an accurate depiction of ground realities in the country; rather, the paper attempts to sketch out how Pakistan is seen by the international community – as such it is not the scope of this paper to seek the veracity of ideas; rather, it seeks to explain views, behaviour and policies predicated upon such (predominant) ideas.

The first section of this paper deals with the theoretical aspects of the realist and constructivist schools of thought and lays out the theoretical framing of

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foreign policy analysis; Section II is an overview of U.S. foreign relations with Pakistan from the partition (1947) till the presidency of George H. Bush, concluding with the present foreign policy of President Obama (Section IV). Section III analyzes the discrepancy in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and India on the issues of nuclear weapons, conventional arms and the economies of the subcontinent. Section IV integrates theory (Section I) with politics as it unfolds in practice (Section III) for a more cohesive picture and provides recommendations on how to improve the dynamics between the U.S. and Pakistan.

I

“...the natural condition of man is a state of war.” 1

Realism sees the international order as anarchic; the State is a unitary actor adopting instrumentally rational policies in the pursuit of power. Not only is the State the most important actor in the realm of international politics, it is the “only really collective actor in the world, recognizing no authority above its own.” 2 Power and power relations are fundamental aspects of realism: both national and self interest is defined in terms of power. The power assumption dictates that States seek power and calculate interests in terms of power. World politics may be understood by treating States as unitary and rational actors, each trying to maximize expected utility – in other words, through competing power interests.

Realists argue that the limitations posed on international politics by ‘human nature (primarily egoistic and inclined towards immorality) and the absence of international government’ mean that international relations are essentially a sphere of power and interest. Realism is thus power-centric in its underlying belief that power and its pursuit are inescapable and ubiquitous. It is State-centric in its emphasis on the ‘State’ as the most important actor in the world, embedding State action in the rationality assumption.

In a (realist) realm where “[it] is important not to have faith in human nature” 3 and where there exists a “tragic presence of evil in all political action,”4 the primary force propelling a State is that of survival. States possess the wherewithal to inflict harm and possibly destruction on each other. There is no certainty that another State will not use its military capabilities/ offensives and as such any measure required for self preservation is justified. Effectively, realism operates under assumptions of a worst case scenario, given the “ineradicable tendency in states to evil.”5 The condition of anarchy not only permits but encourages the “worst aspects of human nature.”6 Realists believe that the latter defines the basic and major problem of politics and that “statesmanship (is) dominated by the need to control this side of human nature.”7

The political sphere is autonomous, is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature allowing no room for moral aspirations of States or of the universe
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and one where universal moral laws cannot be applied to the State. Realist diktats maintain that necessity and reason triumph over morality and ethics. ‘The fundamental unit’ of social and political affairs is the ‘conflict group’, where men organize into groups for conflict – reason cannot resolve conflict. Realism is sceptical of international law, institutions as well as ideals that go beyond nationalism.

Significantly, realists see security through a prism of conflict and anarchy – i.e., in strictly military terms. Its primacy emanates from the interaction between anarchy and egoism. “Security’ thus means a somewhat less dangerous and less violent world, rather than a safe, just, or peaceful one. Statesmanship involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict.”

The principles of the universal moral structure cannot be applied to the actions of a State. According to Hobbes, ‘in a world of competition and scarcity, to acquire anything of use is to tempt others to “come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.”’

Although competition along with glory and diffidence can only be controlled by a superior power (the government), such elements cannot be eliminated altogether.

“A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and enemy is social, not material, in relationship.”

In contrast to realists who assert that States have only one identity – sovereign, self interested and competing for power – constructivists emphasize the definition of identities and the role of shared ideas as central themes in understanding the machinations of international politics. The emphasis flows from the argument that actors in the international arena understand self-interest largely in terms of “their identities in relation to those of others in the system.”

As such, identities are the basis of interests and are inherently relational. Identities and impressions of identities are materially as well as socially determined, where the latter is intersubjective and capable of change.

In fact, constructivists give a higher priority to social or cultural factors in the structure of State systems than they do to material ones because actors act on the basis of the meanings that they have attached to objects, and meanings in turn are socially constructed. The international system is no longer static nor does State power alone moulds history; instead, “assumptions, belief, and values of international actions exert a critical influence on events.” The belief about the connection between interest and policy is at least as important as the nature of the policy itself.

The interpretation of ‘national interest’ and ‘power’ may vary from individual to individual facing the same situation. Not only is rationality itself constrained by beliefs, values and views of policymakers and represented societies; in practice, policymakers will not draw clear-cut distinctions between ideas and interest but will combine and coalesce the two. The premise that States
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are self interested and rational actors is not necessarily in contradiction to constructivists’ diktats “but require(s) ideational framing to fully explain policy outcomes;” threats and opportunities are not “self-evident and objectively meaningful” as they are in the realist framework but require social structures based on shared knowledge to understand them. Collective meanings constitute social structures (which organize our actions), which in turn comprise three elements: shared knowledge, material capabilities and practices, shaping not only the behaviour of actors, but their interests and identities as well.

Ideas in turn are shaped significantly by historical perceptions: history matters. Although situations may be unprecedented in which case we construct meanings for them and our interests either anew or by comparison, more often than not they have recurring qualities to which we assign institutionally defined roles. Interests are defined and redefined in the process of defining situations in a social context. An institution is “a relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests” and although “often codified in formal rules and norms… (rules and norms) have motivational force only by virtue of actors’ socialization to and participation in collective knowledge.” Even though institutions may sometimes confront us as “more or less coercive social facts,” they are essentially an embodiment of what we collectively know, given that they internalize new interests and identities. As such, institutions may be conflictual or cooperative.

“Foreign policy is what states make of it.”

From a constructivist standpoint, foreign policy too is a reflection of social and cognitive process through which State leaders comprehend that reality and not exclusively the product of objective reality and material concerns. Both sets of concerns define who we (the State) are, our friends and enemies and what we decide is possible and what is threatening. Identity-constructivists argue that perceptions on how international actors regard and define themselves and others in the realm, how they define the environment and a nation-State’s place in the world tend to determine policy. Cumulatively, effective foreign policy is based on a shared sense of national identity.

These perceptions or assumptions are entrenched in “national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.” Significantly, identity and identity perceptions become a “psychological frame of reference in international relations …provid(ing) a system of orientation for self-reference and action.”

Wendt argues that even in a situation where States encounter each other for the first time (State 1 and State 2 for simplification), decisions concerning the course of action will be based on probabilities which are founded in interactions – “by what actors do” – rather than following the realist assertion that States should operate on the basis of a worst case scenario regarding the assumptions of the other “in view of probability of death from making a mistake.” As such, he
maintains that “social threats are constructed, not natural” because they depend on the interpretation actors choose to attach to cross-country signals.

To qualify further, such an inference depends on (1) the physical capabilities of both parties (in part produced by State 1 – since it makes the first gesture in terms of signalling – through, for example, direction of movement, numbers, the direct outcome of the gesture), and (2) what State 2 would have intended had it made the same gesture itself. To reiterate, although it may make an error in its interpretation, there is no reason that State 2 will make a negative inference from the gesture by State 1, unless such an inference is based on previous interactions and the process of signalling and interpretation that such interactions involve. What creates or cements concepts of self and the other in regard to issues at stake are "reciprocal typifications" by States. On the basis of reciprocal typifications, States create relatively lasting social structures; such constructions are intersubjective in nature and lend definition to our identities and interests.

For our purposes, the politics of identity play a crucial role in the formulation of foreign policy. The politics of identity "refers to a particular set of ideas about political community that policymakers use and draw on to mobilise a sense of cohesion and solidarity to legitimate the general thrust of foreign policy." Owing to their incorporation and institutionalization into the political culture, it is possible that they are further incorporated in the cognitive setup which is in turn used by foreign policy makers to make sense of political reality.

This explains why foreign policy speeches usually employ "subjective we-feelings" even as the policymaker in question may not agree wholly or in part with this public stand. They reflect the popular sentiment and not the individual understanding. Such sentiments are related to specific customs, groups, institutions, territory, myths and rituals and are an indication of how policymakers interpret the past, present and history as well as the political choices confronting them. When internalized, they become part of the popular political culture and lend definition to a State’s ‘national style’ in foreign policy making. Aggestam argues that high levels of interactions between States encourage fostering ‘we-feelings’ and a ‘common role-identity’.

However, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will tell us that such ‘high levels of interactions’ may be cooperative or conflictual and will not necessarily lead to a common role-identity or an interstate ‘we-feeling’. Indeed, as social constructivists argue, such interactions may lead to “new repertoires of action and behaviour” – allied or against. Even as such interactions lead to alliances, they may not be alliances in the true sense of the word; conversely, the interactions may further entrench old animosities as is the case with the U.S.-Pakistan relationship today.

This is where the constructivist emphasis on social learning, i.e., that “the actors involved begin to reassess their fundamental beliefs and values (complex
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learning)” is crucial. While we have seen such an effort at social learning between India and the United States, the effort is still wanting in the U.S.-Pakistan case. This in a nutshell is what promotes relations in the case of the former and constrains them in the case of the latter. We return to this theme in greater detail in later sections.

Aggestam argues that loyalty to a nation-State is not grounded in emotional allegiances alone but that a State must provide its people with security and welfare as well. In case it is unable to do so, the State will probably not remain stable. If we were to reduce his assertion to the foreign policy level (instead of maintaining Aggestam’s State-level argument), this has proved true: for example, in the case of America’s war on terror – following significant support in the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings where the initiation of conflict in Afghanistan was seen by many Americans as a necessary security measure. The same support saw itself deteriorating in the wake of growing American casualties in both Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic cost associated with both wars. The result: a shift in foreign policy from sustained engagement to time-lined withdrawal. Government statements and the rhetoric too changes.

II

This section lays out the historical and contemporary U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan, while highlighting important discrepancies in its relation with Islamabad vis-à-vis New Delhi. Although the paper starts off with portraying the Pakistani view; in contrast to most such studies, it relocates the onus of responsibility in changing the dynamics between the U.S. and Pakistan from the former to the latter. To avoid the label of myopia, I assert that the refocus does not imply that all Pakistani grievances against America are not valid (conversely, the same is true the other way round), rather that we need to look inwards in terms of developing our indigenous strengths to reach a stronger bargaining position. In fact, the focus of this paper is on what needs to be done on the Pakistani side of the spectrum to attract a more favourable and fruitful long-term alliance with the U.S. and on the global stage – needless to say, the U.S. needs to work on its side of the spectrum for the picture to be complete so that both the countries can establish a more fertile take-off ground.

From “Nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me” to Pakistan is “one of the most dangerous parts of the world.”

In spite of Pakistan’s pro-West alliance since inception, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been extremely volatile. In contrast, although estranged in the early decades after partition (of the subcontinent), the U.S.-India relationship has enjoyed greater stability. Kux argues that the instability arises not from “American fickleness or Pakistani stubbornness” but rather from the often divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests. Even when America has favoured Pakistan’s pro-West orientation to India’s neutralist stance, Washington has
always been diligent in its efforts to avoid antagonizing New Delhi. With the exception of Nixon’s ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan, the U.S. has never been willing to take Pakistan’s side against India.

The reason is obvious: the geopolitical reality borne in the perceived ability of India as a counter-weight to China gives greater supremacy to an American alliance with India than it does to one with Pakistan. Add to this the dimension of the Indian economy and the burgeoning power it has begun to wield in recent years, and we have the crux of the matter. Whereas Pakistani security has remained India-centric, the U.S. has never seen India as an enemy. In fact, far from the conventional policy of a developing country wooing a superpower, often the opposite is true in the U.S.-India case. Pakistan, on the other hand, remains enmeshed in the unenviable task of trying to court the U.S., especially vis-à-vis its security concerns, but with little success. This has been true from the Truman era right down to that of President Obama. Dean Acheson put it succinctly when he said, “The Pakistanis were always asking us for arms and I was always holding them off.”

Immediately after partition, the U.S. had little interest in the subcontinent or in establishing friendly ties with either country. It was embroiled in the Cold War, and regarding India and Pakistan as mere pawns, was content to let Great Britain worry about the emerging States. The Truman establishment, while preferring Pakistan’s pro-West alignment to India’s neutralist stance, was cognizant of the geopolitical realities of the region and as such avoided material support for Pakistan that would antagonize its much larger neighbour. That geopolitical realities trumped American foreign policy outlook was manifest in the fact that not only did Washington consider a non-aligned stance a pro-Moscow streak but India routinely voted with Moscow against Washington in addition to accepting symbolically important steel mills and public works projects and equipping its air force with MiGs.

Pakistan, for its part, whilst avoiding a policy that would put it firmly in the Western camp in spite of its pro-West orientation, continued to pursue efforts to establish closer security ties with the U.S., but with little success. That India was a more important priority than Pakistan was evident when Truman invited Nehru to pay the first-ever State visit by a South Asian leader to the U.S., rather than the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, at a time when Islamabad was an ally if not a ‘friend’, and a non-aligned New Delhi was on favourable terms with Moscow and in the person of Nehru, ‘found “vague and shifty.”’

Pakistan’s anticommmunist stance found some favour during the Eisenhower tenures. In seeking a coordinated defence against Communist aggression in the Far East, Pakistan was seen as “developing an Eastern area of substantial strength that can be vital to the whole of the free world. If Mr Dulles can bring about closer ties with this great young Asian State, he will have made an additional contribution to the cause of peace.” The rapid American response to the wheat
The crisis in Pakistan in 1953 was in stark contrast to the protracted wrangling over a similar shortage in India in 1951. The 1950s also saw Pakistan become a vocal supporter of the Western cause against Communism on the world stage. Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact and its successor the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) during the first Eisenhower administration. It was reluctantly admitted to the former by the U.S. – reluctant because no other South Asian country had acceded to the treaty. Pakistan joined SEATO with the hope that it would act as a shield against aggression from all quarters (specifically India); despite Pakistan’s best efforts, however, the U.S. refused to agree, reiterating the explicit proviso that SEATO would only act as a shield against Communist aggression.

In reality, SEATO was more a symbolic and political token than a pledge of real commitment. While it signalled the intent to oppose force, it did not commit signatories to do so and as such did not provide for an automatic military obligation. In CENTO, America played the role of an observer rather than a participant, even though it worked actively with the Organization and its committees, serving as the pact’s major constituent. Although neither SEATO nor CENTO translated into major military aid for Pakistan, both treaties allowed for stronger claims by Pakistan on U.S. resources and carved out larger stakes for the latter in the well-being of the former.

However, the fact remained that the Pakistani interest of containing India and the American aim of fighting the Communist threat were ultimately at odds with each other. Once again, Pakistan was more concerned with the threat from India rather than the Communist menace, whereas the U.S., wary of entangling itself in Pakistan's dispute with India, entered into the security accords with a specific anti-Communist agenda. Although swept under the carpet from public scrutiny, significant divergence in policy aims between the two countries was apparent. The relationship improved under the second Eisenhower Administration with Ayub Khan as the President of Pakistan. Pakistan received substantial economic and arms aid, including the provision of the controversial F-104 fighters.

The U.S.-India relationship improved as well, and although Pakistan was unhappy with growing U.S. support for Indian economy, essentially Pakistan and America were engaged in a solid bilateral relationship. Significantly, during this time, Pakistan was seen to be on course to tangible economic progress and as slowly moving away from a military dictatorship to a more open political system. Ayub Khan was seen by “officials in Washington (as someone who) might succeed in bringing stability to their wobbly ally.”

Although in the realist realm Pakistan was found wanting as a major strategic player; in ideational terms, the rhetoric around the country was favourable. This was demonstrable in the aforementioned quote in the New York Times, which then was the most influential newspaper in America. In fact, Kux maintains that Pakistan was then a ‘favourite’ of the paper. Did a favourable impression of
Pakistan help the country much? Yes - Pakistan’s ‘Decade of Development’ was largely financed by American aid to the country and her supplements in military stock were, among other reasons, the result of such a favourable ideational setting.

In the Kennedy era, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship began to unravel. A step up from the regular reservation on the issue of supply arms to Pakistan, Kennedy was bent upon supplying India with long-term military aid, seemingly regardless of the consequences for Pakistan. Although Ayub Khan did not want to lose American support, he branched out towards friendlier relations with China. The U.S. regarded the move as contrary to American interests and the obligations Pakistan was under vis-à-vis the U.S.

Relations that were at a stand-off at the time of Kennedy’s assassination became worse during the Johnson tenure, owing in part to Pakistani overtures towards China and its subsequent refusal to limit the relationship in spite of U.S. efforts. In 1965, Pakistan and India went to war, in the aftermath of which America drastically scaled down its military relationship with Pakistan. The suspension of aid and the fact that America had refused to come to Pakistan’s help against India in the war left a deep sense of betrayal amongst the Pakistanis and the relationship between the two was over in all but name. Nevertheless, the U.S. remained Pakistan’s largest source of economic aid.

The Nixon era was exceptional in the president’s ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan. It was Pakistan’s foreign policy triumph in terms of realist aspirations vis-à-vis her role in bringing about a favourable change in U.S.-China relations and her special relationship with Nixon that strengthened the ideational architecture the relationship was based on. Nixon was considered an old ally of Pakistan, having visited the country twice as vice-president and thrice since he had left office. The minimum courtesy consistent with protocol that the Indians had offered him stood in stark contrast to the red carpet treatment Nixon received in Pakistan. In fact, in the letter he wrote to heads of State as president-elect, Nixon added a special note to the one written to Ayub Khan, “I shall always be grateful for the courtesies extended to me on my visits to Pakistan.”

Ayub Khan was regarded as a valued ally during Nixon’s tenure as vice president, doing a “credible, if not very democratic, job of managing his country.” Pakistan’s intransigence of moving towards an alliance with China transformed itself into Islamabad’s “cardinal virtue when Nixon looked for ways to communicate with the Chinese.” Other than this, South Asia had a limited importance in this ‘global Great Game’. The Pakistani channel to communicate with China, however, did translate into valuable assistance for Pakistan: a one-time exception to allow Pakistan to procure about $50 million worth of replacement aircraft and around 300 armoured personnel carriers in spite of the fact that India was upset at the development. Pakistan’s role as a conduit for rapprochement between the U.S. and China was as a successful realist coup, one
which coupled with Nixon’s favourable impression of Pakistan translated into material success in the form of military aid that had been previously denied to the Pakistanis and significantly (in departure to past policies) in spite of Indian opposition.

This is a classic example of what this paper argues all along: the development of new and more important realist aspirations, in addition to a favourable ideational architecture surrounding realist goals. That a favourable impression is a good launching pad for better alliances, coupled with the development of major realist importance, is a pipeline for great alliances was manifest in Pakistan’s relations with America during the Nixon administration.

Pakistan’s role in brokering a rapprochement between the U.S. and China to counteract Soviet power in the region was so important that the Nixon administration continued its support (albeit covertly towards the end) for Pakistan in spite of the crisis in what is now Bangladesh. The humanitarian crisis was relegated to a backbench at a time when the then President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, was playing a pivotal role in brining the U.S.-China-Pakistan exchanges to a climax. Even after an eventual ban on arms exports to Pakistan under tremendous pressure from State bodies such as the Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nixon refused to stop economic aid and added a personal caution: “To all hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.” In fact, after the ban on arms exports and the prohibition on any such efforts, Nixon, without the knowledge of the State Department, encouraged other countries to supply Pakistan with military spare parts and aircraft.

Furthermore, the U.S. played an immense role in backchannel diplomacy with India, the Soviet Union and China to ensure the survival of West Pakistan. Ultimately, how instrumental the American role in the survival of Pakistan was, is debateable – however, for our purposes, the exertion of American foreign policy in favour of Pakistan is of paramount importance. What would otherwise have remained only an “intrinsic tragedy”, the war between India and Pakistan took on a more profound dimension for the U.S., given its potential to disrupt Washington’s policy towards China.

In fact, Nixon warned the Soviet Union that if India insisted on trying to break up West Pakistan, it would ultimately lead to a confrontation between the Soviet Union and America, given that much like the Soviet Union had a treaty with India, America had one with Pakistan. Speaking in plain realpolitik, Kissinger maintained that “the new China relationship would be imperilled, probably beyond repair, and we would have a ‘very sticky problem’ with the USSR” if war broke out between India and Pakistan. In the ensuing war between India and Pakistan where Pakistan had struck the former first (even if India was planning to do the same), the U.S. took a pro-Pakistan stand, calling India the “major aggressor” and maintained that “(although) the crisis in its
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initial stage was not really of Indian making … India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities which have ensued.”

Kissinger told the Chinese that although barred from providing Pakistan with military aid itself, the U.S. would communicate to Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that though they would protest publicly against them providing Pakistan with arms, the U.S. would ‘understand’ if they did so. Significantly, what limited American help especially with regards to military aid to Pakistan was the latter’s poor public image following the debacle in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Pakistan’s initial (and later India’s) refusal to allow international humanitarian aid in the country and the Pakistani Army’s use of U.S. weapons in the suppression of Bengalis.

The principal source of bilateral tension between the U.S. and Pakistan came with the realization on the American part that Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations were not mere rhetoric. Because the administration under Ford had received flack from the Democrats for their slack attitude towards India’s nuclear test, Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme came under increasing scrutiny. Kissinger and Ford were under immense pressure to do everything they could to prevent Pakistan from doing the same. The issue continues to be a major source of tension.

India won favour with the Carter Administration because of its emphasis on the promotion of democracy and human rights, at a time when Pakistan was run by the military dictator, General Zia. Added to this was Pakistan’s refusal to back away from the nuclear path and the subsequent sanctions under the Glenn Amendment that barred economic aid, so that the cooling U.S.-Pakistan relationship was contrasted by strengthening U.S.-India ties.

More importantly, the Carter Administration suspended economic aid to Pakistan for a second time soon after Bhutto’s execution because Pakistan was unwilling to accept international safeguards or provide an assurance that it would not detonate its nuclear device. What rankled Pakistanis was the fact that India, which had exploded the device first, was not only exempt from such sanctions but, in fact, the U.S. was engaged in a strenuous and politically costly battle to continue the supply of enriched-uranium fuel for the nuclear power reactors in Tarapur, near Bombay. As a top-level Pakistani put it, “if the United States had applied sanctions against the Indians, we would not have minded so much. We could understand U.S. favouritism toward Israel as a special case, but not the refusal to sanction India while hitting so hard at Pakistan.”

The fact was that Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was looking to strengthen alliances with regional influential – as it happened, the regional influential was India and not Pakistan. Underlying the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from the end of the Nixon era, through Ford, Carter and eventually every American presidency, is friction stemming from Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations and what the West perceives as the threat of an Islamic bomb.
However, keeping in line with American see-saw policy as far as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons on the one hand and American foreign policy goals on the other were concerned; in 1979, Carter waived sanctions imposed on Islamabad following her nuclear ambitions and made Pakistan a U.S. base to support Islamic guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The Reagan Administration brought with it an emphasis on a more forceful response to Soviet advances in the developing world. In this context, it sought to re-forge its alliance with Pakistan, a country they saw as vital in countering Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Officials in the U.S. administration believed that Pakistan deserved more U.S. support than had been offered to it during the Carter years. In line with this policy shift, the Departments of State and Defence were instructed to assemble a bigger assistance programme – to the tune of a $3.2-billion-five-year proposal equally divided between military and economic assistance, for Pakistan under President Zia-ul-Haq.

In providing Pakistan with military and economic aid, the U.S. was seeking Pakistan’s cooperation in opposing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In fact, provided that Pakistan did not explode a nuclear device, the U.S. entered into a tacit agreement with the Pakistanis that the “Reagan administration could live with Pakistan’s nuclear program as long as Islamabad did not explode the bomb.”

Furthermore, in contrast to the Carter Administration’s stinging criticism of Pakistan military’s human rights records and military rule, the American secretary of state reassured the Pakistani government that “…your internal situation is you own problem.” During Zia’s visit to the White House in 1982, State Department officials replaced such criticism by an emphasis on Pakistan housing several million Afghan refugees despite the economic burden and danger they posed. F-16s, previously only provided to NATO and Japan, were made available to Pakistan despite the U.S. Air Force and the Office of Management and Budget being unhappy with the development. The Reagan Administration concluded that the inclusion of the planes was a “test of American earnestness” by the Pakistanis. In fact, the Americans juggled schedules so that Pakistan received the planes in 12 rather than 48 months, along with fighter bombers with more advanced avionics.

The conflict in Afghanistan was important to the Americans because they aimed to redeem their international status following setbacks in Vietnam, Angola, the Horn of Africa, etc. In the words of a senior U.S. intelligence officer, “It was payback time.” Zia was therefore able to bargain tough precisely because of the indispensable position that Pakistan had found itself in, owing to Soviet military expansion in Afghanistan. It was Pakistan and not the U.S. that took a stand for successfully mobilising international support for the Afghan cause, especially amongst the Muslim and non-aligned countries and was able to wrest the conflict from the paradigm of the Cold War.
By 1982, Pakistan was receiving $600 million a year in economic and military assistance from the U.S. – only Israel, Egypt and Turkey received more. The U.S. hoped that this, along with Saudi assistance, would allow Pakistan to thwart Soviet expansion in Afghanistan by fuelling the resistance against the expansion. Although the Reagan Administration hoped that closer security links would mean that Pakistan would desist or slow down its nuclear ambitions, it refrained from bringing the subject up publicly. However, the relationship was one of partners and not allies – it was a marriage of convenience, different from the relationship they had enjoyed in the 1960s. Pakistan was under no illusion that the U.S. would support it against India, whereas the U.S. had concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear programme simmering under the surface that kept coming up although under the public radar.

In fact, despite the importance of the Afghan conflict, the nuclear issue refused to go away, and Reagan had to sound ‘stern warnings’ to Pakistan. In spite of Zia’s claim that Pakistan was nowhere near developing a bomb nor did it have any intention of doing so, a new bill was sought which meant that the president would have to sign a yearly waiver certifying that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear bomb and that U.S. assistance to the country advanced nonproliferation goals there. The Pressler Amendment, as it came to be called, was seen in Pakistan as a way of averting harsher sanctions and an internal U.S. affair (part of the executive branch’s management of its nuclear problem with the Congress); the country-specific and thus discriminatory nature of the amendment was something that Pakistan did vociferously complain against in the 1990s.

In the words of Zia himself, “the two countries were a ‘union of unequals’ and ‘incompatible’ in terms of culture, geography, and national power, even though they had strong common interests.” The Americans too understood that Pakistan’s strategic importance extended only till the end of the Afghan conflict. That is what continues to lie at the heart of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship: short-term realist use of the latter that can be relied on even when discarded time and again, given Pakistan’s security and economic needs.

The Bush (Senior) era brought to the fore bilateral tensions between Pakistan and the U.S. emanating from the nuclear issue. Although the American leadership desired to maintain the ‘close security relationship’ between the two countries, the nuclear concern became a significant contention. That, coupled with intelligence reports about Pakistan’s support for insurgents in Kashmir, contextualized in the winding down of the Cold War era with America as the clear victor meant that Pakistan “had not only lost its strategic importance but had become a nuclear troublemaker and a source of regional instability.” There were no pressing mutual national interests between the two countries anymore, laying apparent bilateral differences all too clearly. In the words of Abida Hussein, the then Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., the U.S. “had as much interest in Pakistan as Pakistan had in the Maldives.”
However, few in the American administration were happy about the rupture in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, especially the Pentagon. The U.S. military liked their Pakistani counterparts and many in the Department of Defence and in the Bush Administration thought that Pakistan could promote U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and considered the country as a force of moderation in the Islamic world. For the Pakistanis, the imposition of the Pressler Amendment’s nuclear sanctions was evidence of the ‘fickle and unreliable’ nature of America, and in its turnaround in policy, demonstrated that it was not a ‘true friend’ of Pakistan.

Image-wise, too, these were not good years for Pakistan: had Nawaz Sharif not taken heed of the foreign office’s advice on toeing the American line and reigning in support for Kashmiri insurgents in the 1990s, Pakistan might have been labelled a ‘terrorist State’ by the U.S. as a sponsor of state terrorism along with States such as Libya, Iran and North Korea. The imposition of the Pressler Amendment itself was a shock to the Pakistanis and a reflection of the dispensability of the country for purposes of American foreign policy in the aftermath of the end of the Afghan conflict. Particularly galling was the fact that India, which had exploded a nuclear device in 1974, was not punished.

From the goalpost of ‘stay where you are’ as regards the nuclear programme, the Americans had upped the requirements to ‘roll back’ your nuclear capability by destroying bomb cores – making clear that with the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the policy dynamics on the nuclear front between Pakistan and America had changed. The Amendment ruptured the security relationship between the two countries, which although might have eroded over time anyway given the end of the Cold war, would not have been coming to such an abrupt halt. The loss of nearly $300 million in arms and military supply was a heavy blow to the Pakistani security establishment.

Clinton’s emphasis on human rights, nonproliferation and democracy had much in common with the Carter mandate. In 1993 Secretary of State Christopher Warren put Pakistan with Burma as two countries where free elections and greater human rights were much needed – on the constructivist score, Pakistan was already a failing candidate with no significant realist carrots on offer either. Clinton’s administration took a stronger stand on reports linking Pakistan to groups involved with insurgency groups in Kashmir, with the director of central intelligence, James Woolsey, publicly warning Pakistan that it stood “on the brink.”

In fact, the very same people who had fought the Afghan war for the Americans some 14 years ago had now been branded terrorists because they had joined the insurgency in Kashmir against India. Ethnic rivalries too had increased in Pakistan and the death of two Americans in Karachi did not help the Pakistani image abroad – the country was seen as racked with in-fighting and discord.
Sharif (during his second tenure) was more concerned with consolidating his power base than in tackling Pakistan’s numerous other problems.

The imposition of the Pressler Amendment meant that by 1992 economic aid to Pakistan had also run dry. Although the Brown Amendment (1995) removed the ban on economic assistance, the Amendment was more symbolic than it was concrete in terms of relief. It left intact the core of the Pressler Amendment which was the ban on American military assistance and government-to-government arms transfer. The U.S. administration decided not to enter into a bilateral aid programme with Pakistan, disbursing only modest funds. Although the F16 aircraft that Pakistan had paid for much earlier were finally released, little had been done to help Pakistan’s faltering economy, even though if it had wanted to, Washington could have provided greater relief.59

Thus, rhetoric pertaining to ‘enlarging democracy’ as a key foreign policy pursuit aside, the U.S. did very little to support the unsteady democratic government in Pakistan. Even though the Indians were very unhappy with the Brown Amendment, it became clear soon enough that the U.S. had little interest in Pakistan except to limit its nuclear programme, and by this point was not only critical of Pakistani support for the insurgents in Kashmir, but also of its support for the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Kabul. In fact, the major thrust of Clinton’s foreign policy was towards improving ties with India, especially towards the end of his tenure. In contrast, the Clinton Administration did little to improve bilateral ties with Pakistan.

Having entered a new era of economic liberalization as distinct from the Hindu growth rate produced by the previously closed economy, India was too large a consumer market with a vibrant high-tech sector for America to ignore: in the era of burgeoning globalization and the absence of a strong military interest in South Asia, economic imperatives played a greater role in capturing America’s commercial imagination – a supremely ascendant role India continues to enjoy to the hilt.

Pakistan itself had become more hawkish in its understanding of the Indian and Afghan situations, at a time when the U.S. was more inclined to lean heavily in favour of New Delhi as far as its foreign policy objectives were concerned. In fact, Pakistan was seemingly oblivious to the displeasure of not only the United States, but also of Iran, Central Asia and to some extent China with regards to its Afghan policy. The quest for ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan and the U.S.-Soviet style Cold War that Pakistan had entered into with India did little to broaden the country’s worldview in terms of internal development and international alliances.

The Taliban factor became a greater source of friction and concern for the Americans during the later Clinton years, owing to fears that a Pakistani populace, weary of inept and corrupt leaders and egged on by pro-Islamist parties and elements within the ISI, would be increasingly inclined towards Taliban-like
parties. Furthermore, attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania traced back to Osama bin-Laden who was sheltered by the Taliban increased the scope of the threat posed by the regime and in its wake further exacerbated relations between Washington and Islamabad. The disaster that was the Kargil incursion and the international and significantly U.S. opprobrium that followed, justified American leanings towards India in spite of the nuclear tests it had conducted and in spite of the fact that was India was not signatory to the CTBT.

The Bush era saw a strengthening of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Pakistan – more specifically, a strengthening of relationship between Bush and General Musharaff. As such, the U.S. was not engaged with Pakistan as a whole, but with key decision makers. Although a top recipient of U.S. foreign aid during the Musharaff era, the relationship was defined by coercion and strong threats, along side the usual carrots.

Casting Pakistan in an almost pariah-like light, the country was seen as a training ground for the terrorists involved not only in the 9/11 atrocity, but any Al Qaeda- or Taliban-related activity per se. In a shift away from the country’s role as a partner in the Soviet conflict, Pakistan was held responsible for worldwide terrorist activities perceived to be carried out by Al Qaeda ideologues and therefore had no choice but to ‘ally’ with the U.S., notwithstanding arms or economic aid packages. The situation continues to date.

In a parallel setting, U.S.-India relations changed significantly in the final years of the Clinton Administration and were provided with dramatic impetus during the subsequent tenures of President Bush, one of the hallmarks of which is the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal. While the U.S.-India relationship was instructed to transform into a close bilateral relationship based on shared values, interests and inter-societal ties, manifest in the areas of military-to-military-relations, counter-terror policies and public diplomacy; Pakistan was expected to achieve a ‘soft landing’ where nothing monumental was to be expected of the country in political, economic or social terms, in the second tenure of President Bush – the era of ‘de-hyphenation’ had started in earnest.

The U.S. administration was instructed to break away from past foreign policy of balancing the often conflicting demands of India and Pakistan and instead “pursue a differentiated policy toward the region centered on ‘a decoupling of India and Pakistan in U.S. calculations.’” The process of ‘de-hyphenating’ the two countries in the minds of U.S. policy makers consisted of three broad strands: 1) U.S. relations with both countries would be governed on the basis of the intrinsic value they offer to the U.S. rather than based on fears of how relations with one would affect relations with the other; 2) the U.S. would recognize India as a nation on course to “becoming a major Asian power of some consequence”, and as such merited greater appreciation of its ability in terms of collaboration and resistance, not only in South Asia but across a broader geographical spectrum; 3) the U.S. must recognize Pakistan as a country in
‘serious crisis’, requiring assistance to achieve a ‘soft landing’ to dampen disturbing economic and social trends.

This was to be achieved by reaching out to the Pakistani populace, rather than the Pakistani State alone. The discrepancy between the development path (economic, social and military) of India and Pakistan and as players on the international stage had never been realized in such overt terms before. Furthermore, in keeping with past trends, while Pakistan continued to be a recipient of U.S. economic and military aid, India progressed into the role of a much coveted economic partner.

III

The nuclear issue:

Historically, the U.S. has always been more comfortable with the Indian nuclear arsenal than it has been with the Pakistani arsenal. The U.S. considers India a regional, if not global, influential and improving ties with her is a top priority. Far from an influential of any sort, Pakistan is seen as an irritant and dumped with the Middle East precisely because of its problematic status for the U.S. Only recently has the U.S. grudgingly accepted the reality that the current war in Afghanistan cannot be won without Pakistan’s help. Even so, Pakistan is seen as a ‘headache’, something the U.S. wishes to do away with but can’t.

The war in East Pakistan (what is now Bangladesh), Pakistan’s proliferation history, support for insurgent groups in Kashmir and her part in the initiation of the Kargil crisis have only exacerbated the situation further. Whereas Pakistan is ‘tolerated’ as a nuclear power, India and Israel, the only other two countries to go nuclear outside the NPT, have been accepted by the U.S. as nuclear powers - the U.S. “conceded India as a de jure nuclear power and has long supported Israel’s program actively and passively.”\(^{62}\) India’s elevated status vis-à-vis its nuclear programme is essentially the product of its regional importance boosted by its reputation as a responsible nuclear power, such that nuclear capability will allow New Delhi to compete strategically with Beijing.

Rhetoric aside, Washington and Islamabad continue to have very divergent interests: Pakistan seeks to retain militant elements under the nuclear umbrella, whereas the U.S. wants Pakistan to do away with them in view of Washington’s, and significantly New Delhi’s, security needs. However, given the memory of the Soviet war as well as Washington’s unwillingness to accept Pakistan as a nuclear State that lend credence to Pakistani fears that the U.S. wants to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear programme, it is unlikely that the aims of the two will converge in the near future. For the most part, Pakistanis are convinced that America wants to do away with their nuclear programme; the civil nuclear deal between the U.S. and India is seen as a stark signal in lending truth to such fear.
Washington has time and again waived or swept under the carpet nuclear concerns when it has suited her needs in the region; examples: Nixon, Carter and Reagan. It has withdrawn such waivers and vociferously campaigned against Pakistan’s nuclear programme when her use for Pakistan as a partner has dwindled or been gained through coercive diplomacy; example: Ford, Bush (Sr. and Jr.), and Clinton. The U.S. stand on Pakistan’s nuclear programme is that they are worried about proliferation and what has been labelled in the Western press the threat of the ‘Islamic Bomb’; significantly, these fears go back to the beginning of Pakistan’s nuclear programme or rather when the Americans got wind of Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations and as such cannot be traced specifically to A.Q. Khan or the current ‘talibanization’ of Pakistani society.

India, on the other hand, although faced criticism, was not equated with such fears. In the end, India’s regional strategic influence and now global economic importance trumped concerns over her nuclear programme – its use as a bulwark against Chinese ‘expansion’ and the size and pace of growth of its economy mean that she has essentially been accepted as a nuclear power while Pakistan continues to face Western censure regarding its nuclear programme.

With the exception of China, Islamabad does not enjoy the global nuclear trade that New Delhi has been allowed to partake in, in current years. As far back as the Carter Administration, Pakistan saw itself imposed with heavy sanctions while India was wooed as a potential nuclear market. In a complete reversal of policy, America has time and again sounded displeasure with Chinese help for the Pakistani programme in spite of (recently) entering into civil-nuclear arrangements with India along with 45 other countries and the fact that Pakistan has maintained strict safeguards around its nuclear programme since 2005.

The U.S.-India nuclear deal (2009) will allow India to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, which includes materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, “potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs.” Furthermore, it will also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors. The opposition to Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is all the more puzzling for two reasons: 1) the Bush Administration invested huge amounts of political capital into lobbying the U.S. Congress to amend components of the Atomic Energy Act (primarily section 123 et seq). Previously, the Act allowed nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon States only after complete safeguards had been secured. After amending the Act, the administration, along with the government of India, made a concerted push to convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make an exceptional waiver for the latter to exempt it from the full scope safeguards clause.

The supposed rationale behind opposing the Sino-Pakistani deal lies in the fact that China is acting outside the mandate of the NSG, i.e., unlike the U.S., it is not seeking to exempt Pakistan from the regulations of the NSG, an exemption critics of the Sino-Pakistani nuclear deal know China will never be able to
secure, given Pakistan’s proliferation history. Equally important if not more is the fact that the Chinese move outside the NSG is seen as an indication of “China’s growing nuclear assertiveness.” As Henry Sokolsk argues, the deal essentially translates into “sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India - including yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make,” Indian promises of only using the material for peaceful use hardly prove comforting, given that it had promised to do the same, i.e., use the energy for civilian and peaceful purposes right up till it conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 1974.

Furthermore, the deal does not impose a cap on the number of nuclear weapons India can produce or on its fissile material production. As for meeting energy needs, there are certainly less costly ways of meeting the requirement, such as making India’s existing electricity grid more efficient, restructuring the country’s coal industry, and expanding the use of renewable energy sources. Also, the safeguards mandated by the U.S.-India nuclear agreement apply only to facilities and materials manufactured by India after the agreement was signed (so that it does not cover fissile production pre-agreement).

In contrast to Tellis’s argument that the U.S.-India nuclear deal meets with required safeguard and security rules, William C. Potter argues that the “agreement appears to have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant engagement of many of the government’s most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear plan for achieving its implementation … Indeed, it bears all the signs of a top-down administrative directive specifically designed to circumvent the interagency review process and to minimize input from any remnants of the traditional ‘nonproliferation lobby.’” How much the U.S. gains from such a relationship with India strategically is up for debate – however, the desire to placate the Indian “sense of deprivation” is something that will go a long way in solidifying relations between the two countries.

Fair argues that the rationale behind a U.S. nuclear deal with Pakistan will arise out of different dynamics and reasons than the one with India: “to reset bilateral relations that are bedevilled with layers of mistrust on both sides.” Significantly, the U.S. does not need to arm Pakistan to act as a counterweight to another giant – it only needs to do so to overcome the trust deficit. In contrast, the U.S.-India nuclear deal allows the latter to compete strategically with China on a global level and lends recognition to India’s non-proliferation and nuclear power status.

The questions Pakistan needs to answer are these: for how long will overcoming the trust deficit be a priority with the U.S.? For as long as the conflict in Afghanistan lasts? And, how long is that? In addition to the fact that the U.S. does not need, in fact does not want, Pakistan to be a nuclear power;
Pakistan has further tarnished its image worldwide by proliferating nuclear secrets to countries such as Iran, North Korea and Libya, and initiating the Kargil war. Pakistan is seen as an irresponsible State, and together with how ‘Islamic terrorism’ has taken over the Western imagination, the threat of an ‘Islamic bomb’ is something that even Pakistan’s most ardent supporters on the Western stage will have a tough time warding off.

Exacerbating the situation is Pakistan’s alleged support for international militant groups. In fact, because of such support, efforts that have been made to improve nuclear safeguards since 2005 have been overshadowed. Bush’s explanation of the discriminatory nature (against Pakistan and in favour of India) of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, that the two countries had ‘different histories’ lends explicit credence to the constructivist argument of “a gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy.” Whereas India is considered a ‘friend’, Pakistan is denied the same status even if one were to disagree with the stronger claim of the latter being considered an ‘enemy’.

**Conventional weapons**

Tom Captain, the Vice Chairman of Deloitte LLP’s aerospace and defence practice, asserts that India may very well be the most important market in the defence sales sector in the years 2010 and 2011. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for the years 2004-2008, India was the second largest recipient of major conventional weapons, accounting for seven per cent of total arms imports. While the main thrust of American arms sale to Pakistan has been to boost its counter-insurgency skills and significantly depart from its conventional emphasis on countering India, the Obama Administration has been busy trying to woo India away from the former’s decade’s old collaboration with Russia as a primary supplier of military equipment (about 71 per cent).

In toeing the line of Indian sentiments vis-à-vis maintaining the military balance in the region, the sale of F-16s by the U.S. to Pakistan was followed by a less publicized but similar sale to India as well. Fair asserts that “India is in some sense the long-term winner in all of this … Obviously, India gets a lot of stuff as well. But over the long term, India is very much our partner. If you look at the kinds of stuff that the Indian military is doing with the U.S. military, it is qualitatively different from the stuff that the United States is doing with the Pakistan military.”

More recently, the Obama Administration has made a concerted push to convince India to buy jet fighters from America rather than Russia (with whom India has been engaged in talks over the sale of 29 MiG-29K carrier-borne jet fighters). Although the public rhetoric surrounding American overtures to India vis-à-vis the arms trade are cushioned in rhetoric about closer political and strategic alliances, the fact remains that a coup of such military contracts will be
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a huge boon to American defence contractors. Pakistani purchases are nowhere near the type made by India, both in terms of magnitude and type of equipment bought. In addition to purchasing weapons from the U.S. paid for substantially by American grants, Pakistan has been the beneficiary of U.S. military aid in equipment required to boost counterinsurgency operations such as night vision goggles and helicopters. The Indian defence establishment, on the other hand, pays for its purchases with its own funds and trades in more advanced weapons with the U.S. than does Pakistan, e.g., in 2009, India became the first ever international recipient of eight Boeing Co P-8I maritime patrol aircraft in the largest U.S. arms transfer to India to date. The P-8 is a long-range maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the purchase of which had followed India’s procurement of six Lockheed Martin Corp C-130J Super Hercules military transport planes valued at about $1 billion in 2008.73 The U.S. has been trying to convince Pakistan that the enemy at the gates is not India but the country’s internal situation; any equipment, military deal or alliance that jeopardizes Indian security or economic interests is unlikely to come about between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Amongst other potential deals, European, American and Russian companies are vying for a contract with India on its planned $10 billion purchase of 126 multirole combat aircraft for its air force; the deal would be a near record foreign sales coup for the firms. The growing arms trade between India and the U.S. is not so much the result of efforts to counterbalance the rise of China but the emergence of India as one of the world’s leading military markets. American defence contractors are competing with Russian and European arms manufactures to get a slice of the pie that is the Indian economy. In doing so, India and America are in the process of forming a closer strategic and security relationship that will take both countries into a long-term alliance.

In contrast, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is based significantly on arms aid, wrangling over equipment sometimes dating back decades (for example the F-16s and more recently, surveillance drones) and insufficient (in terms of quality and modernity) tokens of gratitude or acknowledgement of the latter as an ally in the ‘War on Terror’. While American military efforts in Pakistan concentrate on ‘ramping up’ Pakistan’s fight against militants, India sees a dramatic modernization of its defence industry through arms and equipment that are not on the table for Islamabad.

Tellis justifies the U.S.-India nuclear deal with the argument that India’s “growing technological mastery over different nuclear fuel cycles” will make the “international (nuclear) regime stronger through its inclusion rather than its continued exclusion.”74 The impression that India is a responsible nuclear power and one that showed great restraint in the Kargil incursion initiated by Pakistan in the wake of both countries’ testing their nuclear devices is a huge boost for lobbyists looking to further pave the way for such cooperation.
Pakistan on the other hand has no such economic incentives to offer; on shaky grounds already, the Pakistani economy has the added pressure of fighting insurgents on its western border as well as within the country. It is not in a state to buy arms on the scale that her eastern neighbour can, and if anything can only ask for supplemental assistance. The threat of religious extremism notwithstanding, the U.S. sees it fit to enhance or supplement the army’s counterinsurgency armament rather than trade with the country in terms of F18s or other advanced weapons as it is doing with India.

Compounding the issue of Pakistan’s unattractiveness as an international arms market is Washington’s effort to placate Indian security issues vis-à-vis Pakistan and contain the threat of the ‘Islamic bomb’ it perceives from the ‘failing’ State of Pakistan. Pakistan is unable to dispel the negative reputation it has gained vis-à-vis its nuclear history in spite of stringent safeguards around its nuclear programme since 2005. Realist compulsions to deal with Islamabad as the U.S. and in fact most of the Western world along with Russia look at the Indian market with vigour, collapse in view of an absence of such basic carrots.

The current ‘War on Terror’ that Pakistan is engaged in is no longer seen as the favour it was regarded as during the Soviet conflict; if anything, the world perceives this problem as home-grown in Pakistan and thus Islamabad, ‘the culprit’, has the responsibility of resolving it. The pertinent issue is not that Pakistan is not receiving arms aid or sales that it is asking for from the U.S. – the question is why it is not successful in receiving the weapons or enjoying the same levels of nuclear/military confidence as India.

We must move away from the aid paradigm to the realist/constructivist paradigm: what does India have to offer that Pakistan doesn’t. Ethical considerations such as being America’s ally in the war on terror are secondary issues; they are rhetorical platitudes that will not result in significant material benefits. That is the way of the world or rather the order of global politics. For too long, Pakistan has been stuck in a historical rut of complaints and injuries (real and imagined) when what we need is to get with the system to get more out of it. Develop our internal capabilities, shift away from a heavily securitized paradigm to a larger economic plan starting from a focus on Central Asia and onwards and most importantly understand that the way to counter-balance Indian military superiority cannot be attained by increasing the number of nuclear or conventional stockpiles but through boosting the economy.

Even if Pakistan were successful in fighting a limited war with India, let alone a full-scale war, the blow to the Pakistani economy will be far greater if not altogether fatal than to the Indian economy. In the end, military power must bow down to economic compulsions and that should be the drumbeat for the next couple of decades to come: the economy and more fruitful alliances that are the result of a regional and global view rather than the decades old focus on the U.S., China and Saudi Arabia alone. India has been successful in establishing solid ties
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with the U.S., Russia, Iran, Britain, Israel and Canada, among other countries, while Pakistan has looked primarily towards these three countries. Only when Pakistan gains stronger economic footing will it be able to partake in the arms (or even nuclear) trade as a full-fledged partner rather than an aid recipient.

The Indian and Pakistani economies

A separate section on the role of Indian and Pakistani economies as an agent in determining relations between the two countries and the U.S. is unnecessary, given that such a role has been one of the central themes of this paper and threads throughout the narrative. Nevertheless, this section will sum up the analysis of the two South Asian economies and the importance each has received from the American administration in terms of commercial interests.

The Indian economic growth rate has reached 8.6%, maintaining India’s spot as the world’s fastest growing large economy after China; while Pakistan is lagging behind at 4%. With the current flood disaster virtually wiping out irrigation systems, livestock and agriculture in large parts of Pakistan, the projected growth rate has gone down to an abysmal 3% or even less. Coupled with an inflation rate of approximately 12%, this spells disaster for the agriculture-based economy that is Pakistan.

The flood rampage aside, Pakistan was essentially an attractive liaison in the military realm rather than as an economic partner. Far from contributing significantly to U.S.-Pakistan economic ties, it has been a recipient of U.S. aid to bolster a frequently flailing and in recent times collapsing economy. The IMF package sanctioned to take Pakistan out of the economic doldrums now faces additional handicaps brought about by the July/August floods. In a world where the idea of free trade as a major component of globalization has run amok and where military supremacy almost concedes its privileged uno spot to the power of the economy, Indian economic prowess has derailed Pakistan in the race to become an emerging global player.

For all its usefulness, the nuclear deal between the U.S. and India is foremost a symbolic gesture of goodwill on the part of the former in an effort to placate past Indian grievances. In doing so, the U.S hopes that it will be better positioned to compete with European and Russian defence contractors in the area of conventional arms, and perceives a more advantageous footing for other American commercial interests in the Indian economy. The case of America and other Western countries, most recently Britain, clamouring for an arms trade with New Delhi follows the economic growth-based logic that Pakistan has denied itself for so long: India is a huge economy with the potential for further growth. An arms trade with India will reap huge rewards for Western countries in dire financial straits following the recent recession.
This is not to say that India faces no problems of its own; if anything, India faces one of the world’s largest divergences in the strata that are above and below the poverty line. Researchers at Oxford University have found that there are as many as 410 million people in India living in poverty, where the intensity of poverty equals if not surpasses the intensity in Africa. In fact, the study reveals that there are more poor people in eight Indian states than there are in 26 sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, a number of insurgencies, most significantly the Maoist insurgency, are sure to derail economic projects. The escalating Kashmir conflict is another thorn in India’s side.

However, for all its failings, the West has not taken heed of India’s numerous problems the way that a Pakistani problem comes under (almost ridiculous) scrutiny. Why? Because by and large they don’t pose a significant threat to American commercial interests and, more importantly, the image of ‘Shining India’ whitewashes all that detracts from the ‘shine’. India has been immensely successful in projecting an image of it that is vibrant, multicultural, secular, democratic, tolerant and almost exotic if not mythical, while Pakistan is perceived as the bastion of all things evil and related to terrorism, a ‘failing State’ with no economic or commercial interests that warrant American attention other than to save it from near implosion.

The constructivist assertion that an enemy or friend is a social conjure and not material should not be taken to mean that in the constructivist school of thought material capabilities do not matter: ideational structures provide an all-encompassing setting for the formulation of foreign policy; however, realist imperatives that are material by nature determine the thrust of foreign policy. If India was a secular and vibrant democracy with a multicultural population but without the incentive of a booming economy that could balance the rise of China, would American policymakers have had the same amount of interest in the country as they do now, other than essentially putting her in the top ranks of tourism brochures? Doubtful!

It is the possibility of material benefits in terms of the Indian economy and the ability of the country to act as a counterweight to China that makes New Delhi a ‘friend’. Ideas change over time and strong interest groups have a great stake in changing them in their favour – India as ‘India Shining’ is a great social idea to promote in view of American commercial and strategic interests. As such, the construction of ideas and their subsequent permeation may often follow the determination of realist interests. India has grasped this concept very well – can Pakistan do the same?

IV

The aim of this analysis was to draw out the realist and constructivist imperatives underlying U.S. relationships with India and Pakistan By focusing on the nuclear and conventional military weapons issue, as well as on the U.S. role
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in the economies of both countries, the paper argues that long-term U.S. policy does not consider Pakistan as favourably as it does India because the latter has more to offer both in ideational and realist terms.

By not focusing on issues such as developing its economy and political/State institutions, concentrating on a Pan-Islamic identity instead of creating a more secular ‘Pakistani’ identity, long bouts of military rule punctuated by an ill-developed democratic apparatus, a society increasingly given to violent portrayals of religious fervour (the cases of Danish cartoons, ban on Facebook, public flogging of women in Swat) and the proliferation of nuclear secrets that has added fuel to the fear of an ‘Islamic bomb’; Pakistan has severely damaged its image abroad. Its common border with Afghanistan means that Pakistan is only the ‘most allied ally’ when realism calls the shots – and such alliances have only proved short-lived and opportunistic for Pakistan.

The ‘most allied ally’ status is an elusive myth because Pakistan has been unable to translate the (short-term) status into a durable alliance, given her credential failures in constructivist and long run realist mark sheets. For the U.S., Pakistan is no less problematic: is it part of the security community or a security dilemma? Is it part of the problem or part of the solution? Is Pakistan a failing State ready to implode or a democracy on the bend? While realism might trump constructivism in the short run; for a more stable and fruitful alliance with the U.S., Pakistan must work on developing and improving its ideational foundations and institutions as well as moving beyond its narrow realist scorecard of a strategic corridor to Afghanistan.

While the patron-recipient relationship that previously defined U.S.-India ties has moved on to a relationship of (relative) equals, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has at best temporarily branched out (instead of forward) into one of reluctant allies, often based on threat and coercion (coupled with some incentives) by the former and recalcitrance and reluctance by the latter. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has essentially been of a transactional nature based on U.S. military and economic aid, especially during times when Pakistani involvement in U.S. foreign policy has been most active; namely, the Soviet and current Afghan conflicts. In an imitation of the Soviet conflict, General Musharaff like General Zia who was seen as a ‘dictator’ running counter to American political culture and therefore not fit to be engaged pre-conflict, became an indispensable ally during the conflict. In the early stages of Pakistan’s alignment with the U.S. in the current war in Afghanistan, the U.S. wrote off Pakistan’s $1 billion in debt for its role and provided significant military assistance. In 2006, U.S. arms sales to Pakistan topped $3.5 billion to facilitate Pakistan’s role in the ostensible ‘War on Terror’, thereby surpassing total cumulative arms sales to the latter during the 50 years prior to 2001. The assistance continues (coupled with economic aid, for example, in the form of the Kerry-Lugar Bill) to date.
Similarly, in 1981, General Zia signed a six-year, US$3.2 billion deal with the Reagan Administration, equally divided between economic and military assistance, along with 40 F16s. Today, that amount would be in excess of $6 billion. Five years later, both countries (during Zia’s tenure) entered into another deal equalling $4 billion, 60% of which went towards economic development. The Pakistani grievance of being abandoned by the U.S. once the (Soviet) conflict had come to an end, and especially for the nuclear sanctions slapped on her by the U.S. immediately after, are not wholly justified when one takes into account the fact that Pakistan was aware of the transactional nature of the alliance, and more than accepting of it, made full use of it. Furthermore, in both cases (Zia and Musharraf), the deal was significant in its recognition of the generals as legitimate heads of the Pakistani State; the economic aid packages made the pill of military rule more digestible for the Pakistani populace, yet again serving Pakistani aspirations and needs.

Similarly, Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan was a threat not only to America but to Pakistan as well; aligned with India, a successful Moscow would have denied Pakistan the strategic space it has so ardently sought in Afghanistan. The presence of militant groups in Afghanistan and within Pakistan today is similarly as much a threat to Pakistan as it is to the U.S., if not more. Both the conflicts must be viewed in terms of Pakistan’s self-interest to appreciate the threat they pose to national and regional stability, out sing the perception that ‘we are fighting this war for America’. This is not to say that Pakistan has not provided valuable assistance to the U.S., but rather that it is pertinent to remember that the U.S. assistance received in turn was equally valuable for Pakistan.

For too long, Pakistan has had nothing to offer but its geopolitical space – in the 61 years since partition, policymakers in the country have done almost nothing to invest in (realist) realms other than its geographical location. Not only has Pakistan overplayed this card to near exhaustion, the geopolitical card collapses when that space is no longer required. The inertia in expanding strategic and economic imperatives cannot be blamed on the U.S., given that Pakistani policymakers knew and accepted the political realities all the time that they have engaged the U.S. In fact, the geopolitical space that Pakistan has to offer is as much an opportunistic cash cow as it is realist.

The expectations of achieving a ‘soft landing’ in comparison to the great visions pertaining to India may rankle Pakistanis, but the fact remains that in retrospect even such an allowance wasn’t generous enough in view of what Pakistan faces today: increasing terrorism, sharp price hikes across the board, severe energy shortages and now the worst floods in the history of the country with aftershocks that will reverberate for years to come, especially in view of an extremely inadequate government response. However, Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict is something that cannot be underestimated, even if policymakers in the U.S. or the Indian administration wish it to be otherwise.
The help of the Pakistani army, in terms of manpower, counterinsurgency operations, army bases and intelligence in an area that the U.S. continues to have a very shaky handle on, is indispensable in bringing the current conflict in Afghanistan to some level of relative success or, for that matter, end. The retention of such a strategic trump card has kept Pakistan afloat in terms of American foreign aid and military assistance – but more is needed from Pakistani strategists and foreign policy makers in terms of different and more (economically and militarily) profitable alliances that branch out of Afghanistan (as opposed to discarding the Afghan card altogether) to acquire a stronger hand in moulding global politics rather than playing the role of an instructed.

This includes improving diplomatic and economic ties with neighbouring countries, including India, and adopting simultaneous regional and global approaches in that vein. Pakistan’s initiative in collaborating with Iran and Turkey to launch a tri-nation cargo railway system will go a long with in improving trade ties between the two countries by linking Pakistan to the Iranian and European markets. Similar rail links with China and other Central Asian countries will give Pakistan a further boost by improving trade and economic activity. Many more such projects are needed to set Pakistan on a growth rate that will haul it out of its present economic rut.

The constructivist assertion that ‘history matters’ is manifest in Pakistani grievances against the U.S. – the Pakistani perception that the U.S. has time and gain betrayed them by abandoning them from the first India-Pakistan war and every subsequent military crisis is an ongoing grievance, almost an expectation. The grievance is embedded in “national history and myth,”84 reinterpreted by Pakistan policymakers as it suits them. In doing so, the rhetoric that previously came from the government and now the media has so entrenched the grievance in the national psyche that State support for American policy is one of the central determinants of government’s (un)popularity. American aid is met with the utmost suspicion and any concrete American help in the past is either forgotten or becomes a case for conspiracy theorists. An anti-America stance has become a part of the Pakistani self-definition; used as a cohesive agent by ruling parties in the past, the stance has now become a segregationist tool for opposition parties and the media.

For a population almost continuously disenchanted with its government, anti-Americanism is further ingrained in the mind-set of the average Pakistani. All conspiratorial roads lead to Washington. The same is true about America’s perception of Pakistanis – both sets of ‘ideas’ clash in an arena that makes perceptions on both sides hostile to the point of animosity. If this issue is not dealt with as a top priority, the hope for a long-term alliance between America and Pakistan will be the stuff of hopeless dreams.
Exacerbating the problem of perception and history is the nature of U.S.-Pakistan alliances: in its dealings with Pakistan, America has pursued a relationship with individuals (persons and establishments) rather than a relationship with Pakistan per se. This is true of leaders starting from Ayub Khan to Musharraf. While it has sought to redress this imbalance during the present tenure of President Zardari and President Obama through pledges that include the Kerry-Lugar bill, such a lackadaisical policy of engagement has been critical in the estrangement of the Pakistani populace with America.

Estrangement here is not a relatively harmless synonym for indifference but translates into hostility that makes government support for American policies in the region a subject of derision, instability and divisiveness – even when such policies are in the interest of Pakistan itself. The (although now waver) support for the Taliban is one such example: despite the carnage and loss of property wreaked by the Taliban in the country, there is still a significant stratum in Pakistan that believes that the Taliban will return to their harmless (to Pakistan) ways once America leaves the region. Such outlooks are preposterous and mind-boggling in the wake of the recent spate of attacks to say the least – but they provide a critical insight into who the Pakistanis perceive as the greater enemy.

The situation is further exacerbated by reports of U.S. aid that the common Pakistani never sees. Unlike China where help is tangible in the form of the Gwadar port, highways and factories, for example, the intangibility is lost somewhere in the pipelines of American contractors and their Pakistani counterparts. In fact, Fair argues that not only do Pakistanis believe that America does not deliver on its promises, but that it wants Pakistan to be shackled into a constant state of corruption to keep it weak. Notice, that although most if not all Pakistanis will agree with the appalling level of State-level corruption in the country, in the matter of corruption in U.S. aid agencies, the onus of blame is entirely on the U.S. Although a part of this blame is justified, Pakistani establishments that are just as culpable are almost absolved of all blame. Lacking popular support and, significantly for our purposes, in pursuit of ‘strategic depth’, policymakers in Pakistan pick and choose among security and economic policies that they can be coerced into and ones where they can stand their ground. The result; American aid does not serve the Pakistani population even as the ‘band aid’ it is often disparagingly labelled. Pakistan gets away with this because it feels it is too valuable a strategic partner for the U.S. to do away with in spite of the huge divergence in policies between the two.

The lessons to take home from this are that (a) Pakistan needs to work on its ideational structures so that it can garner greater public support in its policies for fighting militants and to improve the state of the nation through development policies, especially in the wake of international aid; (b) Pakistan needs to redefine its security objectives (something that we do see in evidence today) as well as creating and diversifying the production of better physical capabilities to
become a *long term* imperative; and (c) aid must be used effectively and transparently to improve the lot of the common man, especially at a time when the recent floods, inflation and the energy crisis have ruined the livelihood of millions.

To conclude, for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship to transform into a long-term and stable partnership of equals that serves mutual interests, Pakistan needs to take concrete steps towards improving its image (and, needless to say, ground realities where the ideas pertaining to it are borne in reality) and material capabilities (economy, development process, education, infrastructure, etc.) instead of concentrating on military objectives alone. Washington too needs to move out of the transactional bonds of this relationship and invest in Pakistan as a State, rather than Pakistan as a military ally. This needs to be done through concrete economic and social engagement rather than one-off aid or military allowances.

The U.S. has not played a more active role in the Kashmir conflict because it does not want to invest significant political capital in a situation where it believes India will not listen and where America will thus risk losing face as well as incurring Indian wrath. Browbeating Pakistan into lowering its expectations vis-à-vis the conflict with India will not bode well for security planners in Pakistan. The (il)logic of moving away from a military/security paradigm with a hostile neighbour at hand will not sit well with Pakistani defence planners, especially in the wake of the surging nuclear relationship between New Delhi and Washington. A concrete initiative in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is essential for regional stability and the U.S. must assume leadership role in that capacity, in spite of Indian objections. ‘Composite dialogues’ between India and Pakistan have shown a distinct failure to resolve and/or move beyond this issue.

Furthermore, a civil nuclear deal will provide a major boost to improving the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Such a partnership will increase capacity in the long run even if the reactors do not meet short-term needs. If it is not possible to extend such an initiative in the short run in spite of Pakistani safeguards around its nuclear programme and its support as an ally in the conflict in Afghanistan (and indeed within Pakistan itself now), at the very least the opposition to the Sino-Pakistan civilian nuclear deal must end. The opposition to the deal, in addition to excluding Pakistan from the global nuclear club, further discomfits policymakers in Pakistan so that ‘the trust deficit’ between the two countries gapes even wider.

A State policy based on national needs rather than dictated by an Islamic ideology will go a long way in forging stronger ties with other countries but, more importantly, greatly benefit Pakistan itself. Our alliance with the Taliban was a short-term gain that has now translated in a spiralling loss. We are witnessing a radicalizing society that goes against the very fabric of our culture. Our cultural centres, mosques, academia, civilians and armed forces have been
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the victims of attacks perpetrated by adherents to such an ideology. For that matter, Muslim countries have not been our only or even primary help lines: to give two important examples, military and industrial help has come from China, a non-Muslim country, and economic aid in the form of the Kerry-Lugar bill is an American initiative. Muslim countries were a boon during the 1970s because of the scale of remittances Pakistani workers sent back home – the same may be true of the Pakistani diasporas in Britain and America. This is not to say that Muslim countries have not helped Pakistan substantially, but countries have used allegiances other than religious to garner important alliances: Turkey is a prime example of such an initiative. In fact, going by Muslim allegiances alone, Pakistan has maintained a ramshackle policy in improving ties with Iran for fear of displeasing the U.S., even though the Pakistan-Iran alliance holds the potential for major economic activity and progress. To make matters worse, our reputation is at its absolute lowest owing to such a religious and more often than not dogmatic worldview.

The international response to the current flood disaster is partly a reflection of the horrific reputation we have acquired: although in part due to the financial constraints imposed by the recession, the commentary on articles published by The Guardian for example shows shocking apathy to the plight of Pakistani flood victims. Compared to the levels of aid and the timeframe that the aid was received in following the tsunami and the Haiti earthquakes, the initial response to the humanitarian disaster in Pakistan was dismal to say the least. This is not to say that the international community did not help Pakistan during the earthquake in 2005, but going by reader comments, the recurring theme in response to the present flood disaster is:

“‘It's a shame their govt spends a fortune on making nukes isn't it?’; ‘you reap what you sow surely... (as we in the West are told by our peaceful brothers.); ‘Yes, except India is multicultural. Wahhabi and Deobandi Islamists are busy making Pakistan monocultural.’; ‘Pakistan may be complex but it is not unfair to say that it is the current home of Islamic extremism and that elements of the Pakistani State have no wish to do anything about it’; I hear that six million children are at risk. Then I hear people saying ‘why should we help a country that can afford nuclear weapons?’; ‘How much did they spend on their nukes? It sounds like some poor spending choices if you ask me’.

These comments have been pasted here because an overwhelming number of readers brought these themes up. This in a liberal paper such as The Guardian!

Pakistan has at its disposal not only its resident population but a global Diaspora – a more concerted use of such a resource will be invaluable in putting forward the Pakistani agenda abroad. The Indian American Diaspora is vastly bigger and more influential than the Pakistani Diaspora – and they make better use of their strength. In a nation overrun by lobbies, the Indian lobby has played a significant role in advancing New Delhi’s agenda in Washington. They have
formed associations and political organizations with considerable political clout. Numbering more than 1.2 million in the 1980s and 1990s (ten times the number of Pakistani Americans and from fewer than 400,000 in the 1970s), the Indian Diaspora was more than ten times the number of Pakistani Americans at the time. They form a significant proportion of the Silicon Valley workforce: doctors, engineers and other professionals.

Not only had the Indians doubled their contributions to political candidates by the 1990s, but a bipartisan Congressional Caucus on India and Indian American grew from a mere eight to 115 members, more than a quarter of the entire House of Representatives, increasingly pushing Congress for leniency towards India on all issues that, among other causes, culminated in Congressional opposition to the CTBT. In the words of Senator Sam Brownback (Rep-Kansas), “By their sheer engagement and aggressiveness they are able to influence things beyond their numbers.” This is not to say that the Pakistani Diaspora has made no contribution to the Pakistani cause in U.S. politics, but that notwithstanding the sheer discrepancy in numbers, their Indian counterparts have been more successful and more assertive.

Malik argues that during the Cold War era when relations between U.S. and Pakistan were cordial, the Pakistan embassy felt no need to engage the Pakistani community in the States. An indication of official Pakistani use of the Diaspora was the Independence Day celebrations on August the 14th. While on the day itself the Pakistani embassy in Washington held a function for embassy staff and other (non-Pakistani) Americans, the Pakistani community itself was invited for celebrations the next day! Pakistan must engage its Diaspora all over the world and make a concerted push towards involving them so that they can better and more aggressively push the Pakistani agenda.

Islamabad needs to discard its policy of relying on American diplomats or leaders to lean in favour of Pakistan, given that whispers in the corridors of power result in favourable and adverse decisions – for too long now Pakistan has had too few Americans and fewer American Pakistanis still whispering in her favour like India does.

Both Pakistan and the United States claim that they are transforming their relationship into a long-term alliance: the focus today is on a shift away from an opportunistic/realist premise to a durable constructivist paradigm with an emphasis on Pakistani people and their needs, culture, aspirations and historical grievances. The purported thrust is to move Pakistan away from a narrow band national security State to a nation with a multi-dimensional agenda. Rhetoric aside, there has been some evidence of such a shift by the Obama Administration in the form of the Kerry-Lugar Bill and the current help in mitigating the crisis brought on by the floods in Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan has supposedly welcomed the shift in perspective and affirms its wish to move away from
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economic stagnation, intolerance, extremism and militancy rooted in economic and social backwardness.

How far both countries push for such a durable alliance is not entirely certain; what is certain though is that the onus of responsibility lies with Pakistan if it wants to survive as a viable State and improve internally to compete globally. An unstable Pakistan is a great security threat not only to the immediate region but the world at large – a realization of that is manifest in such a recent shift towards a realist/constructivist overlap rather than leaving the country to realist choices as was previously the case. More still needs to be done though, by Pakistan, the U.S. and the international community in general.

Notes and references

2 Ibid., p.7.
3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 Ibid., p. 7.
6 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 10.
11 Ibid., p. 4.
12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 399.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 404.
25 Ibid., p. 405.
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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
33 With the exception of Nixon, the 1970s war and the earlier phase of the current War on Terror.
34 Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947 – 2000 Disenchanted Allies, op. cit, p. 50
35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 America’s Secretary of State during the first Eisenhower administration.
38 Ibid., p. 103.
39 By this time America was engaged in the Vietnam War (which was at its peak) and had more or less lost all interest in the subcontinent.
41 Ibid., p. 178.
42 Ibid., p. 182.
43 Ibid., p. 190.
44 Ibid., p. 194.
46 Ibid., p. 200.
48 Ibid., p. 239.
49 Reports in America that Libya and other Arab countries were funding the program to make an Islamic bomb – Pakistan said such reports were pure fantasy.
51 Ibid., p. 257.
52 Ibid., p. 259.
53 Ibid., p. 261.
54 Ibid., p. 268.
55 Ibid., p. 320.
56 Ibid., p. 315.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 322.
59 When Pakistan approached the Agency for International Development, the organization claimed that it did not have the resources to resume a bilateral relationship; in fact, if the US wanted, they could have provided the Pakistani economy which was on shaky ground, some relief.
61 Ibid., p. 23.

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Look at Section I for a more detailed explanation of the constructivist take on forging alliances or disenchantment between states.


This is not to say that Pakistan has not threatened American policymakers (albeit with less rhetorical force than when delivered by the latter!) – A subject the paper mentions in later sections.

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