War or peace journalism in elite US newspapers: exploring news framing in Pakistan-India conflict

Syed Abdul Siraj *

Introduction

With the global character of mass media, citizens are becoming more informed and view a conflict from many angles. The literature on war and peace journalism suggests that portrayal of conflicts by mass media is a major concern to combatants, public, and media professionals. Media coverage shapes the course of events in war and peace. Conflict reporting aggravates with frequent and furious claims of bias from both sides (Galtung and Vincent, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 2003; Patel 2004; Lynch 2005). Policy makers, journalists and social scientists all point to the important role of the press in covering conflicts in Iraq, Kashmir, Afghanistan and the Israel-Palestine (Patel 2004). Besides political, ideological and others, war reporting is often sensationalized for the sake of boosting circulations and ratings (Allen and Seaton, 1999; Hachten, 1999; Toffler and Toffler, 1994). Lee, et al (2005) observe that war journalism is characterized by military triumphalist language, an action-oriented focus, and a superficial narrative with little context, background or historical perspective.

Peace journalism aims at focusing on the structural and cultural causes of violence, rather than a simple dichotomy. It explains the violence, frames conflict as involving many parties and pursues many goals. An explicit aim of peace journalism is to promote peace initiatives, from whatever quarter, and to allow the reader to distinguish between stated positions and real goals (Galtung and Vincent, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 2003; Lynch 2005).

This study aims to explore framing of war journalism and peace journalism in the Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir in two elite US newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, from January 2001 to December 2002. During this period, the conflict between the two countries was at its peak and they were at the brink of war including the danger of nuclear war. Kashmir has been the flashpoint between India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947 from the British. They have fought at least four major wars (1948, 1965, 1972 and 1999) and have signed as many declarations and agreements of peace (Tashkent, Simla, Agra and Lahore) without really coming to any solution. The violence now has spread from the borders to terrorist attacks in other areas. India blames terrorists from Pakistan for attacks and killings in the Kashmir valley which are almost a daily affair (Dasgupta 2006).

Siraj (2007), while analyzing image of Pakistan in the US newspapers, maintains that coverage of Pakistan-India relations was mostly focused on peace between the two countries. During the coverage period, from 2001 to 2002, Siraj argues that the US government never wanted war between Pakistan and India, rather wanted Pakistan to fully concentrate on the war against terrorism and mobilize its forces on the border with Afghanistan to combat terrorism.

In order to banish the threat of war and focus totally on economic and social prosperity, both India and Pakistan are moving towards peace initiatives. The composite dialogues that started in April 2003 led to the introduction of confidence-building measures so as to resolve the outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir (Kyodo News International 2005).

Pakistan-India Conflict Over Kashmir

Hindus and Muslims slaughtered each other during the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan (Malik, 2002). Soon after independence from the British, both the countries warred over the territory of Kashmir in the Himalayas. The claim over Kashmir goes to the heart of the identities of the two rivals states. According to UN records, Kashmir is the oldest conflict inscribed in the body of UN resolutions and one of the most serious (Burki, 2007).

The troubles began with the British, who were eager to quit India, and the dillydallying maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir—a Hindu ruler, not especially popular with his mostly Muslim subjects. Against the will of his subjects, the maharaja agreed to the annexation of Kashmir by India. Pakistan has never seen
the maharajah's decision as legitimate (Rahman, 1996). By Pakistan's logic of partition, Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, belongs to Pakistan (Ganguly, 1994). As Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister and later the president of Pakistan, declared in 1964, "Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning" (Malik, 2002).

Kashmir has also been essential to India from the start. "Many Indians think something would be diminished in our lives if Kashmir were to go," says Kanti Bajpai, an international relations professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. India claims Kashmir under the Indian Independence Act. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, an ardent secularist, who vehemently opposed division of the subcontinent along religious lines, was born to a Brahmin family from Kashmir. His sentimentality about the place infuses Indian feelings about Kashmir today (Ganguly, 1994).

Meanwhile, within Kashmir, a separatist movement emerged. India accuses Pakistan of waging a proxy war in Kashmir by arming and training militants. Pakistan says it provides only moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri freedom struggle (Harrimirza, 2007). About 65 percent of the territory of Kashmir is administered by India, the remaining 35 percent by Pakistan (http://www.flashpoints.info/countries-conflicts/Kashmir-India-vs.-Pakistan).

India and Pakistan are the world's most populous countries and with both having acquired nuclear capability, the Kashmir issue has the ominous potential of escalating into a nuclear war (Hussain, 1998). Human rights groups have repeatedly raised an outcry about disappearances and extrajudicial killings in the Indian held Kashmir (Human rights commission, 2001).

That first India-Pakistan war on the issue of Kashmir began in 1947 and lasted for more than a year. When it was over, Pakistan had seized a swath of northwestern Kashmir. India agreed to hold a plebiscite under international monitoring, to allow Kashmiris to choose which nation they wanted to join. The plebiscite never happened. It became the mantra for Pakistani outrage against India (Rahman, 1996). Pakistan and India fought another bloody war in 1965 over Kashmir. In December 1971, India helped East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to secede from Pakistan (Haq, 1997).

The rigged election in 1988 in the Indian held Kashmir caused the Kashmiri discontent to erupt into guerrilla warfare. The Kashmiri insurgency was radically transformed more than a decade ago with the introduction of militancy (Cohen, 1995). India accused Pakistan of assisting the militant groups; Pakistan denies the accusation (Harrimirza, 2007). In 1998, both India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests, which added a very dangerous dimension to the dispute. Efforts for peace bubbled up in 1998. A historic bus route was opened from Delhi to Lahore, and both sides pledged to talk about Kashmir (Malik, 2002).

In 1999, war broke out for the third time on the cease-fire line at a place called Kargil. More than 1,500 soldiers on both sides were killed. Afraid that the Kargil conflict might catapult into nuclear war, US President Bill Clinton pressured both sides to end the war. President Bill Clinton described the Line of Control (LoC), dividing Kashmir, as the most dangerous place on earth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmirconflict). SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) yearbook 2002 reports that South Asia is one of the regions that recorded the strongest growth in defence expenditures.

The end of the Kargil war intensified militancy in Kashmir. The 9/11 attacks on the US resulted in the US government wanting to restrain all kinds of militancy in the world, including liberation struggles. Due to Indian persuasion on US Congress Members, the US urged Islamabad to cease help to the Kashmiri militants. In December 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, linked to Pakistan, resulted in a threat of war with massive troops deployment on the border creating fears of nuclear war in the subcontinent. After intense diplomatic efforts by other countries, India and Pakistan began to withdraw troops from the international border and negotiations began again (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmirconflict). The competing claims over Kashmir have been complicated by the domestic politics on both sides of the Line of Control (Harrimirza, 2007).

**Literature Review**
Jakobsen (2000) observes that the media focus attention on a conflict only when manifest violence is about to occur. Drawing from this criticism, Galtung (1998, p. 7; 2002, p. 261), who has employed the term “peace journalism” since the 1970s, developed two opposing modes of reporting wars, namely “Peace or Conflict Journalism” and “War or Violence Journalism” (cited in Hanitzsch, 2004).

Galtung (1998) argues that media generally follow the ‘low road’ in reporting conflict-chasing wars. Galtung advocates an alternate route: the ‘high road’ of peace journalism that focuses on conflict transformation. Peace journalism tries to depolarize the conflict by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence. Peace journalism seeks to minimize the rift between opposed parties by not repeating facts that demonize one side and set the stage for conflict, (Lynch and Mcgoldrick 2001; Patel 2004). Galtung argues that “Journalism not only legitimizes violence but it is violent in and of itself” (Forums, August 25 - 29, 1997).

Galtung and Vincent (1992) criticize the criteria of news selection such as negativism, personalization and proximity to elite countries and elite persons (p. 7).

Galtung (1998) viewed the objective of peace journalism as to “identify the conflict formation, the parties, their goals and the issues, and not fall into the trap of believing that the key actors are where the action (violence, war) is.” Galtung (1998) wanted to practice peace journalism the way a physician diagnoses the cause of disease, for example, “In medicine, no physician would make the mistake of seeing a swollen ankle as an ‘ankle disease’, she/he would be on the watch for possible disturbances in the cardiovascular system, and direct attention to the heart” (p 183).

Media usually promote an ethnocentric view of the world, which becomes especially blatant in times of crisis; therefore, (Bennett, 1990; Wolfsfeld, 2004) media reports are biased with nationalistic and ideological tendencies. Ozugun and Terzis (2000) quote a Turkish journalist saying, “I am always thinking of our national interest and the interest of my newspaper when I am reporting Greek-Turkish affairs. At the end of the day, I don’t want to criticize my government because my ‘objective’ reporting might be used wrongly by the other side” (p. 416). Regarding journalist objectivity in reporting conflict, Galtung (2000) comments, “I’d like to see objective journalists: by that I mean journalists who are able to cover all sides of the conflict” (p. 163; cited in Suleyman Irvan, 2006). Two factors usually influence reporting on conflict: the relationship of the media with governments and military authorities during a conflict (Aulich, 1992; Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Kellner, 1992; Liebes, 1992: 1997; Philo and McLaughlin, 1995) and, secondly, the influence of journalistic routines and practices (Conflict and Peace Courses, 1997; Williams, 1992; Wolfsfeld,1997b, cited in Fawcett 2000).

Wolfsfeld (2004) claims that the “default mode of operation for the press is to cover tension, conflict, and violence” (p. 156). Shinar demonstrates in a comparative study that the media prefer to use war frames even while covering peace negotiations (2004, p. 85); Fawcett (2002) shows that the Irish media find conflict frames more attractive than conciliation frames (p. 221). Lee and Maslog (2005) reach this conclusion: “Clearly, the coverage of the four Asian conflicts is dominated by war journalism” (p. 322, cited in Suleyman Irvan, 2006). ‘War journalism’ is a mode of reporting which contains a hidden bias in favour of violence. It renders conflict opaque, obscuring the structural factors driving the cycle of violence and occluding the political steps necessary to interrupt and divert it (Lynch and Mcgoldrick, 2005).

Peace journalism, according to Galtung, is to make ‘audible and visible’ the subjugated aspects of reality. Lynch and Mgoldrick (2003) noted that peace journalism has been criticized as ‘agenda journalism’ or an attempt to ‘get involved’ in our stories. They argue that the journalist’s gatekeeper role means any report has an agenda (Lynch and Mcgoldrick, 2005). The non-objective, self-conscious journalistic intervention is premised in the ideas of public journalism, development journalism and peace journalism. The indicators of war – patriotism, national interest, anger, censorship and propaganda – often conspire to prevent objective reporting (Carruthers, 2000; Iggers, 1998; Knightley, 1975; Pedelty, 1995; Van Ginneken, 1998; cited in the Lee, et al, 2005).

Hanitzsch (2004) argues that war journalism covers several parties in the conflict arena, causes of the conflict and solutions are sought on the battleground, it is zero-sum-oriented—one side wins and the other
Peace journalism and Development Journalism share similar characteristics—one saves society from devastations, the other saves it from miseries of poverty. Development journalism encourages journalists to travel to remote areas, interact with the people, and report back. This type of journalism also looks at proposed government projects to improve conditions in the country, and analyzes whether or not they will be effective. Ultimately, the journalist may come up with proposed solutions and actions in the piece, suggesting ways in which they might be implemented. Often, this type of development journalism encourages a cooperative effort between citizens of the nation and the outside world (Smith, 2007). Development journalism is also used in a manner similar to that of investigative reporting. Viewed in this manner, the role of a development journalist is to examine critically the existing development programs and projects of government, compare the planned project with its actual implementation, and report any observed shortcomings (Ogan, Christine L., 1980).

Researchers found that development journalism could hardly gain a foothold among journalists in developing countries (Chaudhary, 2000; Murthy, 2000; Ramaprasad, 2003; Rampal, 1995). Thus it is, perhaps, more likely that the concept of peace journalism will experience the same fate as Development Journalism (Hanitzsch, 2004, pp. 487-495).

Theoretical Framework

This study is supported by framing theory—specifically, peace journalism frame and war journalism frame. Galtung (1986, 1998) employed the term “peace journalism” since the 1970s, developed two opposing modes of reporting wars, namely “peace or conflict journalism” and “war or violence journalism”. His classification of war journalism and peace journalism is based on four broad practice and linguistic orientations: peace/conflict, truth/propaganda, people/elites and solutions/ differences. In contrast, war journalism is oriented in war/ violence, propaganda, elites and victory (Lee et al, 2005). Peace journalism tries to condemn the conflict by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence. Peace journalism seeks to minimize the rift between opposing parties by not repeating facts that demonize one side and set the stage for conflict (Lynch and McGoldrick 2001; Patel 2004). War or Violence Journalism reports on the conflict arena, focuses on who gets the upper hand in the war. It has a zero-sum-oriented coverage; is mostly based on the visible violence and visible consequences (Hanitzsch 2004, pp. 483-495).

Frames are mental structures that help people understand reality as they perceive it. Goffman (1974) defines “framing” as “the principles of organization, which govern social events” (p. 232). According to Tuchman (1978), framing is some thing of subjective involvement in an event. Norris (1995) describes news frames as cognitive schemata, and journalists commonly work with news frames to simplify, prioritize and structure the narrative flow of events. Framing is unavoidable in the course of news construction. It is the stage at which journalists identify problems, analyze reasons and make moral judgments (Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad, 2000). Entman (1991) says, “News frames are embodied in key words, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative” (pp. 7).

Entman (1993) argues that Media frame building occurs as journalists “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (pp. 51-58). This can be achieved in the media by the “presence or absence of
certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993, p. 25).

Research Questions

The above information and an initial assessment of the newspapers’ coverage led to the emergence of the following questions:

RQ1: Was war journalism or peace journalism the dominant frame in the coverage of Pakistan-India conflict?
RQ2: Was there a relationship between war/peace journalism framing and story- specific characteristics such as story type, length and source?
RQ3: Was there any relationship between war/peace journalism and stories specific to Pakistan and India in terms of slant such as favorable and unfavorable?
RQ4: Was there any relationship between war/peace journalism and stories specific to Pakistan and India in terms of frame such as friend and foe?
RQ5: To what extent is the coverage dominated by the approaches of peace journalism or war journalism?

Method

The study is primarily a content analysis, examining the coverage of Pakistan-India conflict in the New York Times and the Washington Post from January 2001 to December 2002. This study is based on Galtung’s theoretical model and his categories classification on peace/war journalism (1986, 1989). This study also followed Lee, et al.’s (2005) pattern for data analysis.

The Washington Post and the New York Times were selected for the study because they are the leading American dailies and circulated widely across the country as well as across the world to an educated, intellectual readership (Kim, 1979). According to Merrill (1980), both papers are knowledgeable, serious, and independent. They are financially stable, professionally sound newspapers, with a large and technically proficient staff. They emphasize politics and world consciousness. However, according to Pool (1970) both the newspapers reflect, more are less, the points of view of the US government.

Population of the study is all news stories on Pakistan and India published in both the newspapers during the specified period. A list of stories was generated from Lexis-Nexis by entering the key words “Pakistan and India”. Next, systematic sampling was employed to select the sample. Altogether, 77 (57 percent) articles of the New York Times and 58 (43 percent) articles of the Washington Post were randomly selected by using a skip interval of one to create a sample of 135 (or 50 percent of the population).

Apart from identification information, each story was coded for number of words, type of story (news, feature, editorial, and other), byline (US, Indian, Pakistani and other), frames, (a. war journalism/peace journalism/neutral, b. friend or foe as Pakistan and c. friend or foe as India), and slant (favourable and unfavorable both to India and Pakistan).

Coding Scheme

Based on Galtung’s war/peace journalism categories classification (1986, 1998), nine indicators involved war journalism and nine indicators involved peace journalism. (See appendix). The entire story was the contextual unit; each paragraph of the story was the coding unit. Each story was initially coded for peace and war journalism indicators as given in the appendix. Next, based on the number of peace and war indicators, the story was coded for dominant frame as peace journalism or war journalism. For example, if a majority of the paragraphs in a story were war journalism indicators, the story was coded as a war journalism frame. In case both peace and war journalism indicators were equal—for example, if eight paragraphs in a story carry peace journalism indicators and eight paragraphs carry war journalism indicators—that story was coded as neutral.

For slant and frame b. and c., the entire story was the coding unit as well as contextual unit. That is, if a coding decision could not be made based on the headline, lead or a single paragraph, then more of the
story was read to make coding decision. Thus, the unit of analysis for the statistics was story. Detailed rules were created for measuring each variable and its categories.

The war journalism index ranged from 0 to 9, with a mean of 2.17 and a standard deviation of .65 (Cronbach’s alpha = .7235). The peace journalism index ranged from 0 to 9, with a mean of 2.35 and a standard deviation of .61 (Cronbach’s alpha = .7148). Intra- and inter-coder reliability tests were conducted with 14 stories (10 percent) of the total sample. The intra-coder reliability test using Holsti’s coefficient yielded 100 percent agreement for number words in stories, 94 percent for type of story, 98 percent for byline, 90 percent for frame a., 92 percent for frame b. and 89 percent for frame c. and 88 percent for slant. The inter-coder reliability test yielded 98 percent agreement for number of words in stories, 80 percent for type of stories, 84 percent for byline, 81 percent for frame a., 80 percent each for frame b. and c. and 82 percent for slant.

Cross tabulation, difference of proportion, and t-tests, were the statistical tests used to answer research questions.

Findings

Description of the Sample

The final sample comprised 135 stories, with 77 (57 percent) being from the New York Times and 58 (43 percent) being from the Washington Post. The New York Times published 37 (27.4 percent), 33 (24.4 percent) and 7 (5.2 percent) stories of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral respectively. Respective figures for the Washington Post were 35 (25.9 percent), 21 (15.6 percent) and 2 (1.5 percent). Of the 135 stories, most were bylined by the US reporter (94 or 69.6 percent), followed by the Indian reporter (40 or 29.6 percent) and other (15 or 11.1 percent) (other byline means stories produced by agency or more than one reporter). Not a single story was produced by a Pakistani reporter alone. The breakdown of the sample by type of stories was as follows: 90 (66.7 percent) were news stories, 40 (29.6 percent) were features, 3 (2.2 percent) were editorials and 2 (1.5 percent) fell into the other category, which included letters to the editor, etc. (Table 1).

Tests of Research Questions

Difference in war/peace/neutral journalism frames

RQ1: Whether War Journalism or Peace Journalism was the dominant frame in the coverage of Pakistan-India conflict?

The number of war journalism stories in both newspapers was greater (72 or 53.3 percent) than the number of peace Journalism (54 or 40.0 percent) and neutral stories (9 or 6.7 percent) (chi square = 46.800; p. = .000.) (Table 1).

Relationship of war/peace journalism in mean story length, story type and byline

RQ2: Was there a relationship between war/peace journalism framing and story- specific characteristics such as story type, length and source?

The overall mean story length was 854.85words (larger than one column length of the newspapers). The mean story length of war journalism (921.09) was significantly higher than the mean story length of peace journalism (812.20) and neutral (580.77) frame (t = 23.218; p. = .000) (Table 1).

Most US byline stories were in the peace journalism frame. Byline stories in the war journalism/peace journalism/neutral frames were as follows: 43 (31.4 percent), 44 (32.6 percent) and 7 (5.2 percent) were US byline, followed by 21 (15.6 percent), 4 (3.0 percent) and 1 (.7 percent) were Indian byline and 8 (5.9 percent), 6 (.4 percent) and 1 (.7 percent) were by other. The US byline stories were more in the peace journalism while India byline stories were more in war journalism (chi square = 10.108; p. = .09) (Table 1).
The breakdown of the sample by type of stories in war journalism/peace journalism/neutral frames was as follows: 47 (34.8 percent) 36 (26.7 percent) and 7 (5.2 percent) were news stories, followed by 23 (17.0 percent), 16 (11.9 percent) and 1 (.7 percent) were features, 2 (1.5 percent), 0 (.0 percent) and 1 (.7 percent) were editorials, and 0 (.0 percent), 2 (2.2 percent) and 0 (.0 percent) fell into the other category respectively. Comparatively, the ratio of news stories in war journalism frame was higher then other frames and types of stories, but statistical significance was absent (chi square = 8.859; p. = .182) (Table 1).

Relationship of war/peace journalism and slant in the coverage

RQ3: Was there any relationship between war/peace journalism and stories specific to Pakistan and India in terms of slant such as favorable and unfavorable?

Overall, Pakistan received a more unfavorable slant in the coverage (48 or 53.3 percent) than favorable (42 or 46.7 percent) but statistical significance was absent (chi square = .400; p. = .527). Specifically, Pakistan was covered unfavorably in the war journalism frame and favorably in the peace journalism frame. However, the unfavorable slant was significantly different in the war journalism then the peace journalism and neutral (chi square = 23.312; p. = .000). Similarly, the overall slant in the coverage for India was significantly more favorable (44 or 88.0 percent) than unfavorable (12 or 12.0 percent) (chi square = 28.880; p. = .000). Specifically, more stories favored India in the war journalism frame than peace and neutral, but statistical significance was absent (chi square = 1.256; p. = .534) (Table 1).

Relationship of war/peace journalism and friend/foe frames

RQ4: Was there any relationship between war/peace journalism and stories specific to Pakistan and India in terms of frame such as friend and foe?

In the overall coverage, Pakistan was framed more as a foe (19 or 47.5 percent) than as a friend (19 or 47.5 percent) but statistical significant was absent (chi square = .100; p. = .752). Specifically, Pakistan was framed as a foe in the war journalism frame and as a friend in the peace journalism frame. However, the frame as a foe was significantly different in the war journalism than the frame of Pakistan as a friend in the peace journalism and neutral (chi square = 12.687; p. = .002). Similarly, most stories framed India as a friend (23 or 85.2 percent) than as a foe (4 or 14.8 percent). The chi-square test was significant at p < 0.00. More specifically, India was framed as a friend in war journalism than in the peace journalism and neutral, but statistical significant was absent (chi square = .380; p. = .827) (Table 1).

Table 1

| Distribution of Stories by Number of Stories, Newspaper, Byline, Type of Story, Slant and Frame, and Mean Story Length by War, Peace and Neutral Frame |
Indicators of war and peace journalism

**RQ 5:** To what extent was the coverage dominated by the indicators of peace journalism or war journalism?

War journalism frame indicators exceeded peace journalism by a margin of 511-387. In the war journalism frame, the majority frequencies count of 94 (18.4 percent) was ‘here and now’ indicator. Whereas, in the peace Journalism frame, the majority frequency count of 90 (23.3 percent) was ‘solution-oriented’ indicator (Table 2).

The four most salient indicators supporting war journalism frame, based on a total frequency count of 511, were ‘here and now’ (94 or 18.4 percent), ‘differences-oriented’ (77 or 15.1 percent), ‘partisan-oriented’ (68 or 13.3 percent) and ‘use of demonizing language’ (66 or 12.9 percent) (Table 2). Regarding ‘here and now’, more stories focused on the conflict arena, militants’ activities, clashes and causalities. Through the ‘differences-oriented’ perspective, stories contained information leading to the conflict. In the
'partisan-oriented’ war journalism approach, the stories contained biasness for one side in the conflict. Demonizing language mostly consisted of words such as terrorists, fundamentalists, infiltrators, Kashmiri rebels, Pakistan as a theocratic state, harboring terrorism and militants.

The four most salient indicators supporting peace journalism frame, based on a total frequency count of 387, were ‘solution-oriented’ (90 or 23.3 percent), ‘causes and consequences’ (83 or 21.4 percent), ‘multi-party orientation’ (67 or 17.3 percent) and ‘non-partisan’ (51 or 13.2 percent). Through the ‘solution-oriented’ perspectives, the peace journalism stories contained information about solutions to the conflict. ‘Multi-party’ coverage gave voices to many parties involved in the conflict. The ‘causes and consequences’ perspective dealt with the background and future effects of the conflict. ‘Non-partisan’ peace journalism stories were neutral—not taking sides in the conflict.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Journalism Indicators</th>
<th>N   (%)</th>
<th>Peace Journalism Indicators</th>
<th>N   (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible effects of war</td>
<td>53    (10.4)</td>
<td>Invisible effects of war</td>
<td>11    (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite-oriented</td>
<td>53    (10.4)</td>
<td>People-oriented</td>
<td>14    (3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences-oriented</td>
<td>77    (15.1)</td>
<td>Solution-oriented</td>
<td>90    (23.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Here and now</td>
<td>94    (18.4)</td>
<td>Causes and consequences</td>
<td>83    (21.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dichotomizes of good and bad</td>
<td>43    (8.4)</td>
<td>Avoid labeling of good and bad</td>
<td>51    (13.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party orientation</td>
<td>40    (7.8)</td>
<td>Multi-party orientation</td>
<td>67    (17.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan-oriented</td>
<td>68    (13.3)</td>
<td>Non-partisan</td>
<td>51    (13.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-sum orientation</td>
<td>17    (3.3)</td>
<td>Win–win orientation</td>
<td>7     (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses of demonizing language</td>
<td>66    (12.9)</td>
<td>Avoid demonizing language</td>
<td>13    (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>511   (100.0)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>387   (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

The coverage of Pakistan-India conflict in the New York Times and the Washington Post from January 2001 to December 2002 (one of the peak conflict times between Pakistan and India) was measured on Galtung’s theoretical model and his classification of peace/war journalism (1986, 1989).

The overall coverage in both the newspapers was more tilted toward war journalism than peace journalism. This result is in line with previous studies on war and peace journalism, such as Wolfsfeld (2004) who claims that the “default mode of operation for the press is to cover tension, conflict, and violence” (p. 156). Shinar found that the media prefer to use war frames even while covering peace negotiations (2004, p. 85). Fawcett shows that the Irish media find conflict frames more attractive than conciliation frames (2002, p. 221).

Regarding types of stories, overall, the ratio of news was higher in the coverage, followed by features and editorials. Most stories were bylined by a US reporter followed by Indian byline. Not a single story was
produced by Pakistani reporter alone. Usually the Pakistani reporter shared stories with either the US or Indian reporters. When comparing byline stories in war and peace journalism frames, the US byline stories were more inclined towards peace journalism and the Indian byline stories leaned were more towards war journalism.

In the overall coverage, Pakistan received a more unfavorable slant and was framed as a foe than as a friend. More specifically, Pakistan was covered unfavorably in the war journalism frame and favorably in the peace journalism frame. Similarly, the overall slant in the coverage for India was more favorable and was framed as a friend than as a foe. Specifically, more stories favored India in the war journalism frame than peace journalism. The unfavorable slant about Pakistan in the sample papers may be understood within the context of the larger picture of Pakistan as an Islamic country with nuclear weapons. It has an unfriendly relationship with Israel, but has a strategic relationship with China. And, today the United States has leaned toward India in international politics to a degree not often seen in the past and has partnered with India in the area of trade (Siraj, 2007). The favorable/unfavorable slant and friend/foe frame in the study support the Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) arguments that the "journalist's gatekeeper role means any report has an agenda." These results also support the Turkish journalist quoted by Ozgunes and Terzis (2000): "I am always thinking of our national interest and the interest of my newspaper when I am reporting Greek-Turkish affairs. At the end of the day I don't want to criticize my government because my 'objective' reporting might be used wrongly by the other side" (p. 416).

War journalism frame indicators exceeded peace journalism frame indicators. In the war journalism frame, the majority frequencies count was ‘here and now’ indicator. In the peace journalism frame, the majority frequency count was ‘solution-oriented’ indicator. The most salient indicators supporting war journalism frame were ‘here and now’, ‘differences-oriented’, ‘partisan-oriented’ and ‘use of demonizing language’. The most salient indicators supporting peace journalism frame were ‘solution-oriented’, ‘causes and consequences’, ‘multi-party orientation’, and ‘non-partisan’.

Most stories with a war journalism frame focused on the conflict arena, militants' activities, clashes and causalities in Indian held Kashmir, attacks on the Indian parliament. The newspapers noted that the countries were at the brink of war in December 2001. A terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament was linked to Pakistan, resulting in war threats, massive troops deployment and international fears of nuclear war in the subcontinent. In the perspective of demonizing language, mostly stories consisted of words such as terrorists, fundamentalists, infiltrators, Kashmiri rebels, Pakistan as a theocratic state, harboring terrorism and Islamic militancy.

Most stories with a peace frame focused on solutions to the conflict by giving voices to many parties involved in the conflict, background and future effects of the conflict and by not taking sides in the conflict. The newspapers specifically focused on the diplomatic efforts by countries, particularly USA, to defuse the tension and to withdraw forces from the international boarders. The newspapers repeatedly noted that US urged Islamabad to cease help to the Kashmiri militants. The diplomatic efforts by the US government to defuse tension between between Pakistan and India is supporting Siraj (2007) arguments that the US government never wanted war between Pakistan and India. Rather it wanted Pakistan to concentrate on the war against terrorism and to mobilize its forces on the border with Afghanistan to combat terrorism, etc.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) yearbook 2002 reports that South Asia is one of the regions that recorded the strongest growth in defence expenditures. Most of the world leaders described the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir between Pakistan and India as the most dangerous place on earth. Political scholars have noted that the competing claims to Kashmir have been complicated by the domestic politics on both sides of the Line of Control.

Appendix

Categories and Rules for War and Peace Journalism
### War Journalism

1. **Visible effects of war:**
   - Casualties, dead and wounded

2. **Differences oriented:**
   - Report leads to the conflict

3. **Elite-oriented:**
   - Focuses on leaders and elites as actors and sources of information

4. **Here and now:**
   - Reporting on the war arena

5. **Dichotomy:**
   - Good guys and bad guys or victim and villain

6. **Two-party orientation:**
   - One party wins, one party loses

7. **Partisan:**
   - Biased for one side in the conflict

8. **Zero-sum orientation:**
   - One goal: to win

9. **Uses of Demonizing language:**
   - Use of language such as vicious, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist

### Peace Journalism

1. **Invisible effects of war:**
   - Emotional trauma, damage to society, damage to property and culture

2. **Solution oriented:**
   - Report leads to solution to the conflict

3. **People-oriented:**
   - Focuses on common people as actors and sources of information

4. **Causes and consequences:**
   - Reporting on the causes and future effects of the conflict

5. **Avoid labeling of good and bad guys

6. **Multi-party orientation:**
   - Gives voice to many parties involved in conflict

7. **Non-partisan**
   - (neutral, not taking sides)

8. **Win-win orientation:**
   - Many goals and issues, solution-oriented

9. **Avoid demonizing language:**
   - Report on more precise descriptions, titles or names that the people give themselves

### Neutral

- Story that contains none of the two approaches, i.e., war and peace journalism in the paragraph's or number of neutral values: in a story are greater than the war and peace approaches, the story will be coded as neutral

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(These categories were adopted from the Galtung’s (1986, 1989) classification on peace/war journalism)

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