

Expansion of the United Nations Security Council

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The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was created under the UN Charter as the leading international watchdog, with the sole purpose of maintaining international peace and security across the globe. The UN Security Council has been a significant global actor since its inception and remains a key source of legality for international action as far as peace and security issues are concerned. However, due to recent changes in the dynamics of world politics and the shift in global power structure, the Security Council has been subjected to a lot of criticism. It is argued that with the changes in geopolitics realities, and with the number of UN member states having surged from 51 to 192, the UNSC needs to restructure itself as it is increasingly getting ineffective in its decisions, given its inequitable geographical composition.

For many, the reformation of the Council is a question of its continuing legitimacy. They believe that the expansion of the Security Council could help increase its authority. They stress that the UNSC composition has remained unchanged since 1965 despite significant changes in the international system. Those who argue for reform question its authority without the addition of new members.

There is a general agreement among the member states that the Security Council should be enlarged. However, there is extensive disagreement on 'how' it should be done. Security Council enlargement process has been under consideration with varying degrees of seriousness but with little progress for decades. The case of the expansion of the Council is a justifiable one, but has become a complicated process in the light of the conflicting positions of member states and the deadlock. There has been no convergence of views on the modality of the reform package. For instance, if one reform group calls for increase in both the permanent and non-permanent category of seat in the Council, the other is demanding equal representation in the Council for various regions of the world only in the non-permanent category.

Nonetheless, this paper explores the attempts that have been made from the time of UN's creation to the present to expand the Security Council, with special focus on developments since 2005. It describes the opposing positions of individual Members States and various interest groups on the issue of expansion of the Council. It also evaluates some

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major reform proposals put forward by various interest groups and describes the position of permanent members (P5) of the Security Council on the issue. Besides, it takes a brief look at Pakistan's position on the issue and explores the implications for Pakistan if there is an expansion in the permanent slot of seats, especially with regard to India. Finally, it includes a section on the way forward and the conclusion.

Introduction

The UN Security Council is an influential organ of the United Nations. The Security Council, according to Article 23 of Chapter V of UN Charter, comprises 15 members in all that are divided into two classes: permanent and the non-permanent. The permanent members, or the famous 'P-5' are: the Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation (former Soviet Union), the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The P-5 was given permanent membership in the Council by the framers of the UN Charter. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the UN General Assembly on the basis of the contributions made by the UN member states in the maintenance of global peace and security, and to ensure equitable geographical representation. These non-permanent members are elected for a two-year term.¹

The drafters of the UN Charter envisaged a Council that could maintain international peace and security in the post-World War II era. And, for that, the framers of the UN Charter endowed the Council with extensive political and legal authority. Its permanent members were also given a "veto power".

Nonetheless, due to the significant changes in the global community over the past sixty-six years, majority of the UN member states started criticising the structure of the UN Security Council, and demanded reform in its structure. The reform supporters aver that the Council is outdated, unrepresentative and increasingly failing in dealing with the current challenges of the world. They are of the opinion that current challenges like terrorism, climate change, proliferation, uprisings in the Middle east, conflicts in Africa, etc., require a Council that is more representative and has the ability to resolve these issues not only militarily but also through diplomatic channels. That, they maintain, can be possible only if the Council gets more representative. The proponents of expansion argue that the Council needs to extend its permanent membership to other emerging world powers, and regions as well; failing which they warn the Council will lose its global influence and will become illegitimate.

Expansion of the council

The expansion of the UNSC is only one part of the proposed UN reforms. However, it has gained a lot of attention from member states because of the special position of the Council on matters determining war and peace, sanctions, peacekeeping operations. Many efforts have been made in the past vis-à-vis reformation of the Security Council and are still in progress.

An overview of past and present reform efforts

1963-2003

Efforts to restructure the composition of the Security Council had previously been rejected by the permanent members. However, by 1963, the calls were too loud to ignore, and in 1965, following ratification by the required number of member states, resolution 1991 A (XVIII), on the expansion of the Council was approved and the number of non-permanent seats increased from six to ten.

Later, with the end of the Cold War in late 1980s, the issue of expansion of the Council was once again raised. Germany and Japan both started campaigning for permanent seats in the Security Council. Italy too projected itself as a serious contender for a permanent seat. However, with the development of European Union and the prospects of a common EU foreign policy, Italy decided to resist a permanent seat for Germany and work for increased European integration. The reason for opposing Germany as a permanent member of the Council was due to Italy's fear that German aspirations could create a new power centre in Europe and could have negative impact on EU's common foreign policy approach.

The Italian-German rivalry for a permanent seat had made it clear that Security Council reform talks had the potential to flame up regional rivalries. Even as Nigeria, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Japan, Germany, and India all considered themselves entitled to permanent seats; their regional rivals preferred adding more non-permanent seats. Consequently, the debate has created three main groups.

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Uniting for consensus, a group led by Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea and Mexico, and including certain other countries, recommended increase in the non-permanent membership to 20 and keeping the number of permanent members to its present strength. The twenty elected members would be based on regional representation, with six from Africa, five from Asia, four from the Latin America and the Caribbean countries, three from Western European and other groups, and two from the East European countries.

Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, called the 'Group of Four' or G4, and their supporters favour the inclusion of new permanent members in the Security Council. They base their claim on grounds of the G4 countries' being major UN donors.

The African group, which represents the African Union (AU) at the UN, called for two permanent seats for Africa with the right to veto in the Security Council. The African group argues that as the major part of the work of the Council is concentrated in Africa, and that it is the only region which is not permanently represented in the Council.

Although it was apparent that the Security Council reform talks would stir up regional rivalries, the efforts for expansion of the Council continue. India and a number of other countries asked the General Assembly in a letter (A/34/246) to include the issue on its agenda as early as in 1979.² Then, in 1980, representatives from Africa, Asia and Latin America proposed increase in the number of Council members from 10 to 16. However, the suggested increase was in the non-permanent category, rotating between three regional groups in an unwieldy procedure.³ Nonetheless, their effort remains futile.

The 1979 and 1980 reform efforts were followed by the first-ever meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of state and government in January 1992. In September 1992, India and 35 other Non-Aligned states tabled a draft resolution (A/Res/4762) calling for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 48th session of the General Assembly an item called the 'Question of equitable representation on and increase in the Membership of the Security Council.'

Expansion of the United Nations Security Council

However, in December 1992, a new resolution (A/Res/47/62) co-sponsored by Japan was passed unanimously by the General Assembly. The resolution officially placed the item on the General Assembly's agenda. The resolution called on the membership to submit reform proposals to the secretariat by the summer of 1993 on ways to reform the Security Council. As a result, many reform proposals were submitted. The General Assembly subsequently passed resolution A/Res/48/26 which set up an Open-ended Working Group (or Working Group) on the "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the Membership of the Security Council." The purpose of setting up the 'Open-ended Working Group' was to provide a forum for consultations on expansion of the Council and working.

In 1997, the UN General Assembly President and the Chairman of the Working Group, Razali Ismael of Malaysia, presented a three-stage reform plan (A/AC.247/1997/crp.1 and A/51/47, Annex II) providing for enlargement of the Council from 15 to 24 members, including the addition of five new permanent members. This plan was also rejected by the membership of the UN. However, the direct outcome of the Razali-proposal was resolution A/RES/53/30 passed on November 23, 1998 by the General Assembly. The resolution was a kind of victory for Italy and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) because it instructed that any future resolutions on expanding the Security Council would require at least a two-thirds majority to pass.⁴

2003-2006

In 2003, Secretary General Kofi Annan advised the General Assembly (A/58/PV.7): "If you want the Council's decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the developing world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency." Later, he appointed a high-level panel of international experts on 'Threats, Challenges and Change'. In December 2004, the Panel released their report, "A more secure world: our shared responsibility" (A/59/565). The report incorporated 101 recommendations for change and a 'grand bargain for reform of the Security Council'. It proposed two models for reformation of the UNSC in its reform proposal entitled: 'In larger freedom'.

In 'Model A', it suggested the addition of six new permanent members to the Council: G4 nations plus one African nation and one nation representing the Arab League. It also recommended three addition seats for the non-permanent members. In 'Model B', it suggested that the permanent members should remained as they are, but called for the

addition of eight seats for member nations which would sit for four-year terms with the ability to renew, subject to approval of the UN General Assembly, and one additional seat for a non-permanent member with the traditional 2-year term.⁵

On February 16, 2005, the Coffee Club (Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea, Mexico, Colombia, Algeria, and Kenya) adopted a document entitled 'Uniting for Consensus, (UFC)' which later became the name of the group. The document was drafted by Italy, and the new name was meant to convey that the group supported a broad negotiated solution. The UFC group remained committed to their stand on the reform issue and backed the Model B proposed by the high-level panel. The group was later joined by Qatar, Turkey, Ghana, Costa Rica, Canada, Morocco, UAE, San Marino, Bangladesh and the representative of the Arab league. The 'G4' group, however, said that significant changes could take place through a vote and that seeking consensus or broad negotiated solution was just an excuse.

In March 2005, the Secretary-General in his follow-up report to the high-level panel's report, entitled, 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all' (A/59/2005) urged the membership to adopt all of his proposals as a package and reach consensus in time for the 2005 World Summit. After the presentation of his report, serious consultations among member states began and each interest group looked for support. However, due to bickering of the states, little was achieved in the 2005 World Summit regarding Security Council reform.

In 2006, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi hosted a dinner for some 60 states with different views on membership reform. The reason for hosting that dinner was to review the potential for negotiated solutions under the guidance of General Assembly President and Chairman of the Working Group, Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa of Bahrain. The dinner was attended, among others, by Germany, Japan and Brazil.⁶ That, however, did not show any significant results.

2007-2009

In January 2007, General Assembly President and Chairman of the Working Group, Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, circulated a letter to the membership announcing the resumption of discussions on Security Council reform in the Working Group. The following month, she appointed five facilitators to assist her during the consultation process on

five issues: the size of an enlarged Security Council, the categories of membership, the question of regional representation, the question of the veto, the working methods of the Council and the relationship of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

After conducting consultations with member states and with different interest groups, the five facilitators submitted their combined report on “Notions on the Way Forward” (A61/47, SUP- Annex I) on April 19, 2007. In their report they called for: “(1) Extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, including the possibility of recall. (2) Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but with the possibility of re-election. The length of the terms as well as the re-election modalities should be decided in negotiations. (3) Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but without the possibility of re-election. The length of the term should be decided in the negotiations. (4) Non-permanent two-year seats with possibility of immediate re-election.”

However, reactions of the member states to the report were varied. The G4 said that the facilitators’ report did not indicate that a substantial consensus existed within the membership towards approving an enlargement in both categories of membership: permanent and non-permanent. The G4, with the support of a number of other member states, urged the Chairman to appoint new facilitators for the next stage of negotiations. The UFC group said there had never been a consensus on increasing the membership in both permanent and non-permanent categories. The group also rejected the demand of G4 for appointing new facilitators. The African group restricted their respective positions and called for the transitional arrangements proposed in the report to be further elaborated.

Later, in the 61st General Assembly session, the Chairman presented the membership with an amended draft report (A/AC.247/2007/L.1/REV.1) in which : “it was decided that the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council should be considered during the 62nd session of the General Assembly, so that further results may be achieved, including through intergovernmental negotiations, building on the progress achieved so far, particularly in the 61st session, as well as the positions and proposals made by all member States.”

With the 62nd General Assembly in session, President of the General Assembly, Sgrjan Kerim, convened a General Assembly debate (A/62/PV.47-51) in November 2007 on the way forward. Different groups of interest continued to back their respective reform models, with the main factions being the UFC, lead by Italy and Pakistan, the G4 and the African group. The UFC group urged the membership to continue to use the 'Working Group' as the main forum. The G4 asked the membership to act as early as possible in order to use the current momentum. Germany, Brazil and India showed their willingness to pursue a solution outside of the Working Group. Botswana, on behalf of the African Union, reaffirmed the African group's Ezulwini-Consensus.⁷

However, in September 2008, the UN General Assembly moved discussions of Council reform from the consensus-based 'Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)' established in 1993 to 'Intergovernmental negotiations (IGN)' in the General Assembly plenary, elevating hopes that the enlargement resolution might be brought to vote. According to Ambassador Zahir Tanin, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental negotiations (IGN), the purpose of this shift of negotiations' framework was to bring the process closer to a form that could potentially lead to a decision on the issue, even without a consensus.⁸

The process of the Security Council reform thus entered a new phase following the start of 'IGN' in the informal plenary of the 63rd UNGA. On February 18, 2009, the UN General Assembly President, Miguel D' Escoto Brockmann, presented a work plan which identified five key issues to be discussed: the size of enlarged security Council; the categories of membership; questions concerning regional representation; questions regarding extending the power of veto to additional member states; and the working methods of the Council and its relationship with the General Assembly. Furthermore, to resolve differences between members' positions, it was decided not to apply the General Assembly's rules to 'IGN,' which would mean that member states would not be asked for a vote until the end of the negotiations.

However, despite this compromise, negotiations suffered another setback on May 18, 2009, when Chairman of the IGN Ambassador Tanin presented his overview, in which he laid out options put forth in the meetings held since February for each of the five topics. The UFC group strongly opposed Ambassador Tannin's document and said that it would simply paralyze negotiations and impede possible compromise. In the last round of negotiation of the 63rd session on September 2009, Chairman Ambassador Tannin's role was opposed by Italy, a member of UFC group,

saying that he had made an arbitrary choice preferring a specific model over other proposals, namely, expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories.⁹

2010-March 2011

In January 2010, the G4 started a campaign of gathering signatures of member states on a letter asking the Chair of the IGN to produce a 'negotiating text' in order to provide a base for further negotiations. Pakistan, along with UFC, did not oppose the text but stressed on its inconclusiveness of all positions and proposals. Africa, the G4, the Caribbean Community, the NAM and the OIC sent Group-positions which were also included in the text. In May 2010, the Chair of the IGN (Ambassador Zahir Tanin of Afghanistan) compiled a document of 30 pages that listed all positions and proposals. In September 2010, the UNGA in its 64th session, decided to continue the IGN on Security Council in the 65th session.

President of the 65th session of the General Assembly, Swiss Ambassador Joseph Deiss, in his opening statement in the General Assembly, underscored the significance of continuing the reform of Security Council and the responsibility of the membership in this regard. He also reappointed Afghan Ambassador Zahir Tanin as Chair of the IGN, a position he had held since February 2009. Since May 10, 2010, when Ambassador Tanin sent out the first version of the negotiations/compilation text, the IGN have been based on a document which incorporates all submissions of individual member states and interest groups.

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states that support the G4), however, urged the Chair of the IGN to compress the second version of the negotiation text.

In February 2011, the IGN Chairman produced a third revision of the negotiation text based on the contributions from the membership. The third revised text did not vary from its earlier versions, maintaining previous positions/proposals. However, paragraphs under five clusters (representing five key issues) were regrouped under different sub-headings.

On March 2, 2011, another round of IGN took place in which Italy as a member of the group regretted that the third revision of the negotiation document did not interlink the five key reform issues but dealt with them separately. Italy said that the third draft needed further clarification as the proposed regrouping of the document had not been addressed properly. Germany, as a member of the G4, appreciated the third revision of the text for regrouping the positions of the member states, thus further clarifying the text. However, it felt that negotiation text was still too long. It was apparent from the member states' reaction that the third revised negotiation text did not enjoy their support and ownership.¹⁰

Currently, the matter is still in a deadlock. The UFC continues to slow down the process while the G4 is increasingly becoming impatient. There are reports that the G4 would soon insist on a vote on a short resolution, led by India, which calls for expansion of both non-permanent and permanent seats.

Reform proposals for expansion of the Council

Many competing proposals for reformation of the UN Security Council have been presented by member states and interest groups. Different groups have different ideas on how the Council should be expanded. The four major proposals are detailed below:

The G4 Nations

The Group of Four (G4) is composed of Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan. The countries that are strongly lobbying for permanent seats in the UNSC are these four. In its 2005 proposal, the G4 members put themselves up as potential candidates for permanent seats, together with an unspecified African country. Being an emerging world power, South America considers itself as a deserving candidate for a permanent seat in the Council. The G4 demanded veto right for the new permanent

members. Later on, they agreed to postpone the use of veto by any of them for fifteen years.¹¹

Uniting for Consensus

Uniting for Consensus; a group of some 40 countries, led by Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea, and Mexico; produced a counter proposal to the G4 nations' proposal. As already noted, this group wants to increase only the number of non-permanent members to 20. The twenty non-permanent members would be elected on the regional basis, with six from Africa, five from Asia, four from the Latin America and the Caribbean countries, three from the Western European and other groups, and two from the East European countries.¹²

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The African Union

The African Union Summit held in Libya on July 4-5, 2005, adopted a common African position known as 'The Ezulwini Consensus' in which it was decided that the AU would support the enlargement of the Security Council both in permanent and non-permanent categories and would ask for the same prerogatives and privileges for the new permanent members as enjoyed by the current P5, including the right to veto.

The African Union proposal desires an increase in Security Council size to twenty-six by adding six permanent and five elected members. The new permanent members would be distributed as per with the G4 scheme, but two new elected seats would go to Africa instead of one. The African Bloc proposal also yearns for full veto right for all new permanent members.¹³

Kofi Annan

Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, presented two models for reformation of the UNSC in his reform proposal entitled: "In larger Freedom". In 'Model A', he suggested the addition of six new permanent members: The G4 nations plus one African nation and one nation

representing the Arab League. He also recommended three additional seats for non-permanent members. In 'Model B', he suggested that the number of permanent members should remain unchanged, but there should be an addition of eight seats for member nations who would sit for four-year terms with the ability to renew subject to approval by the General Assembly, and one additional seat for a non-permanent member with the traditional 2-year term.¹⁴

Intermediate Approach/Model

Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) have generated the interest of member states and interests groups in the 'Intermediate Approach' (IA). The IA is a kind of middle ground between the models of expansion proposed by the G4 and the UFC. It recommends 'Long-Term Non-Permanent Seats'; through elections based on geographical representation, for an extended duration ranging from three to 15 years. However, the G4 and the UFC are interpreting the IA in terms which suit their respective positions. For example, the G4 would align the IA with their demand of the permanent seat status being reviewed after 15 years with negotiable status of veto. The UFC, on the other hand, promotes the idea of non-permanent seats of 3-5 years duration. The P5 has also shown interest in the IA, with Russia being its leading supporter.¹⁵

Evaluation of reform proposals

Will an enlarged Council deliver?

Reform supporters are of the view that the Security Council is not efficient in its current state and it needs restructuring. However, the question arises whether this inefficiency is due to its size or because of the divergence of the decision makers' security policy preferences in the Council that produces less collective action for the promotion of international security. Also, what is the guarantee that an enlarged Council of 20-23 members or of 23-26 members, as most reform proposals put forward the size of a reformed Council within this range, with or without veto right, will be more effective, cohesive in its decisions related to different world issues? Hence, to say that an enlarged Council will better serve the purpose of maintaining world peace and security is debatable.

Veto right

The G-4 and the African Bloc in particular that are vying for permanent seats in the Security Council, insist on veto right as well. The

African Bloc argues that for the sake of democracy and equality, it is important that new permanent members of Council should be given the veto right. The question arises as to how an enlarged council of approximately 11 permanent members would be efficient and unified if a Council of 'P5' fails to agree on many world issues? In fact, this enlarged Council would be at high risk of stalemate, as the new permanent members can develop a propensity to resort to their veto power just to make their presence felt.

It is important to understand that increasing the number of veto players in the decision-making process will not make the Council more efficient or competent. However, the element that will make the Council more efficient and effective is to guarantee the independent nature of Council decision-making and transparency in Council's proceedings, with widespread support. Each of the Council members should be allowed to work independently and take decisions without any influence or pressure from any of its permanent or non-permanent members.

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Size of the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation

Almost all reform proposals mentioned above call for an increase in the size of the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation because majority of the member states feels that the current distribution of permanent seats under-represents some parts of the world, especially Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. It is an entirely valid demand on the part of the aspirant member states that the Council should incorporate the broad regional composition of the organisation. The question arises, however, as to how any country can be a representative of its region in the Security Council. Regional representation can only work when all countries of a particular region choose a specific country themselves to represent them as a permanent member in the Council and that selected regional representative agrees to protect interests of the region over its national interests. And, giving

priority to regional interests over national interests will be a hard task for any aspiring state.

At the same time, when we talk of 'equal geographical representation', then Europe is already over-represented with two seats, and the addition of one more seat would give the region the upper hand in the Council. Similarly, in the case of Asia, one representation it already has in the form of China, but the addition of two more seats or even one more seat could, in the eyes of some, make it over-represented. Such a potential over-representation would render the approach of 'equitable geographical representation' questionable as, in this way, the inequity of regional representation would still stay. Also, if we talk of 'equitable geographical representation', then there is no mention of permanent seat for the countries from the Caribbean and Eastern Europe in any of the reform proposals. Hence, the notion of 'equitable geographical representation' also first needs to be defined in a clear manner by the countries that desire expansion of the Council on the basis of geographical representation.

Assessing the G-4 and the UN Charter

The UN Charter maintains that the selection of countries for new permanent seats in the Security Council should be conditional upon a state's ability to defend or protect international peace instead of its position as a regional leader. Article 23 of the Charter considers regional parity as a secondary consideration and defending international peace and security as a primary consideration. If we see in this context, all the G-4 countries have both strengths and weakness.

Take the case of Germany. It is a democracy, having a strong economy and is a contributor to UN budget and to peacekeeping budget as well. It is also one of major troop contributors to UN peace operations. But, Germany's case gets weak on the point that Europe with the addition of Germany in the Council as a permanent member would get overrepresented.

In case of India, it too is a democracy and an emerging economy. It also is one of the major troop contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations. India is also world's second largest country in terms of population. However, unlike Germany, India has more weak points. India makes limited contribution to UN regular budget as well as to the peacekeeping budget. India has border disputes almost with all of its neighbours, in particular with Pakistan. India and Pakistan are the two major regional players in South Asia. Apart from other disputes, Kashmir

is a major dispute between the two regional rivals and it is on UN agenda too. So, for India to become a permanent member of the Security Council, it will be very important that it first resolves all of its disputes with its neighbours, and in particular the Kashmir issue with Pakistan and brings peace to South Asia first. How can any country be given permanent membership of the Council when it does not respect t UN resolutions?

In Japan's case, it too is an established democracy with high share of contributions to UN regular budget and to the peacekeeping budget. It is world's third largest economy. But, its weakness is that it is not a troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations. It is a modest military power and is dependent on the U.S. for its security and defense.

In Brazil's case, it too is an established democracy and an emerging power. It is also one of the major troop contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations. However, like other contenders, Brazil too has its limitations: it makes little contributions to UN budget and peacekeeping budget. Although, militarily, it is growing, it still lags far behind.

So far, these veto-weilding members of the Security Council are unenthusiastic to the idea of more permanent members in the as they feel that new permanent members would dilute or challenge their power.

Thus, at present, it is hard to envision how these countries will be able to embrace global responsibilities and help in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Position of the P5

Support by all the permanent members is essential for any change in the structure of the Council. So far, these veto-weilding members of the Security Council are unenthusiastic to the idea of more permanent members in the as they feel that new permanent members would dilute or challenge their power. The respective position of each of the P5 countries is given below.

The United States

The US has stated that it supports the UN Security Council expansion plan based on a number of criteria which include GDP, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to democracy and human

rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, commitment to fight WMD proliferation and terrorism.¹⁶ However, the U.S. has rejected the idea of ‘regional representation’. It is keen to support an ‘individual country’ on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria and on the basis of its international stature. That has been confirmed by President Obama’s support for a permanent seat for India during his visit to India last year. In his address to Indian parliament, President Obama said: “In the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”¹⁷

Even when it supports ‘country specific’ admissions, the U.S. opposes any additional permanent members with the veto power. Together with India, the United States supports Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Russia

Russia, too, like the U.S., has rejected the idea of ‘regional representation’ and stands for only country-specific admissions to the Security Council. Even in its support for country specific- admissions, Russia opposes additional permanent members with the veto power. Russia supports India for a permanent seat in the Security Council.

France and Britain

Both France and Britain endorse the G-4 proposal and support the expansion of the UN Security Council. In July 2005, then French permanent representative to the United Nations Jean-Marc de La Sabliere said that it was “indispensable to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council by ensuring that its composition better reflects the realities of today’s world.”¹⁸ Similarly, in July 2006, Karen Pierce, then deputy permanent representative of Britain to the United Nations, said the Britain wishes for “a Council fully representative of the modern world, and of today’s United Nations.”¹⁹ Britain and France both support India and Germany for permanent seats in the Security Council.

China

In May 2004, Chinese Foreign Ministry analyst Wu Miaofa said that following the ‘five principles’ should be given importance in any enlargement proposal to ensure Chinese approval. These were: (1) equitable geographic distribution of new members; (2) the recognition of developing countries’ wish for representation; (3) a commitment that

expansion would not exceed 24 total members; (4) the retention by the permanent members alone of the veto power; and (5) the separation of the ideas of permanent membership and democratisation.²⁰

Nonetheless, China supports additional elected members from Africa, but resists any inclusion of more permanent members in the Security Council. Chinese officials believe that the addition of new permanent members would only aggravate representation issues and annoy the next tier of countries.

Pakistan's stance

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar, in her address at the Ministerial Meeting on 'Global Governance and Security Council Reform,' held in Rome, on May 16, 2011, said that, "reform must make the Security Council more equitable, diverse, and plural in terms of representation, as well as more open and accountable to reflect the aspirations of the general membership. And, the dynamic and flexible proposal put forward by Pakistan, along with other UFC colleagues, are practical demonstration of our political will to make difficult compromises for the common good."²¹

Pakistan has played an active and constructive role throughout the UN reform process. On the issue of reformations of Security Council, Pakistan has a longstanding principled position against increase in the number of permanent members.

Pakistan has played an active and constructive role throughout the UN reform process. On the issue of reformations of Security Council, Pakistan has a longstanding principled position against increase in the number of permanent members. Pakistan supports the UFC proposal and believes that it offers the best basis for a solution that can accommodate the interests of all states. Also, Pakistan desires that any proposal prepared for the reformation of the Security Council should involve enhanced representation from the developing world; correspond to the legitimate position of Africa and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC); and provide greater regional role in determining their representation in the Council.²² Pakistan has proposed expansion only in the non-permanent category. It believes that expansion in the non-permanent slot of seats would best serve the goal of making the UNSC a more democratic, transparent and representative organisation. It feels that expansion in the non-permanent seats would give equal chance to all UN member states,

big or small, to have their say in the decision-making process of the Security Council. In addition, Pakistan, unlike the U.S. and Russia, does not support country specific admission to the Council.

Expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the UNSC and its implications for Pakistan

India, one of the major aspirants for a permanent seat in the Security Council, is a regional rival of Pakistan. Ever since their separation, both countries have fought three wars and are enmeshed in different conflicts. The Kashmir issue is a major source of tension between both states and has, on a number of times, brought both countries' forces face-to-face on the borders. Water is another serious issue between them. When India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998, that had forced Pakistan to go nuclear because of its security concerns from the Indian side.

Any expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the Security Council would have serious implications for Pakistan because if there is any enlargement in the permanent category, India may get a permanent seat as it enjoys the support of more than 120 countries, including four out of the five current permanent members.

Any expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the Security Council would have serious implications for Pakistan because if there is any enlargement in the permanent category, India may get a permanent seat as it enjoys the support of more than 120 countries, including four out of the five current permanent members. If given the veto power as well, India would be in a position to reject any proposal brought to the Security Council by Pakistan or any other country which does not suit New Delhi's interests vis-à-vis Islamabad. In addition, India as a permanent member of the Security Council could use its power and harm Pakistan by weakening its position on certain issues by exploiting its good relations with other Council members.

Also, being a permanent member, with the support of other Council members, India may be able to decide the Kashmir issue on its own terms. For example, it could ask Pakistan to turn the Line of Control (LoC) into a permanent and internationally recognised border. Such a resolution of the Kashmir issue would give most of the Kashmir region to India and a small part to Pakistan. This is unacceptable to Pakistan. As this is not in Pakistan's interests because the starting points of all major Pakistani rivers

are in Kashmir and accepting the LoC as an international border would put them under Indian control. If that happens, Pakistan, which has an agriculture-based economy, will face serious consequences if Pakistani rivers come under Indian control. Pakistan could also face water scarcity or floods.

Besides, as a permanent member of the Security Council, India will have a great say in global financial Institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF chief has already acknowledged that countries like China and India “deserve increased IMF voting power commensurate with their growing economic clout, and a fair shot at the emergency lending institution’s top decision-making posts.”²³ So, a permanent seat for India in the Council would increase its influence on the United System, including the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and IBRD). And Pakistan, whose economy is already in a far from healthy state, could face problem in getting loans from these global financial institutions due to Indian influence.

Consequently, expansion in the permanent category of seats in the Security Council would not be in Pakistan’s interests because of the India factor.

Way forward

For Pakistan

Pakistan must take India’s campaign for permanent membership of the Council seriously. For India, the most important obstacle is China, and New Delhi is actively engaged with Beijing on this issue. Other than that, India is focusing on two large voting blocs: the African Union (which has 53 votes) and the Least Developed Countries or LDCs (48 in numbers). India has already obtained support from 80 developing countries and is planning to add 20 more by the time the UN General Assembly gathers in September 2011.

Pakistan through ‘Uniting for Consensus’ group should actively lobby for the expansion in non-permanent category in the Council. Along with that, Pakistan should make clear to the international community, particularly the major powers, that without the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and other issues between the two countries, India as a permanent member in the Security Council is unacceptable to Pakistan. And for that, Pakistan should aggressively pursue its case with its friends around the globe to compel India to resolve the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan must look for international support, particularly from the OIC, NAM and the P5, for the settlement of Kashmir issue in a way is suitable to both India and Pakistan. Also, Pakistan needs to take up the matter of India's campaign for getting a permanent seat in the Council with other South Asian countries which too have long outstanding border, water and other bilateral issues with India and share Islamabad's concerns on New Delhi's regional conduct and aspirations.

Pakistan should strongly follow up its case with the other regional countries and get their support for the UFC proposal for the expansion of the Security Council. As any amendment in the UN Charter for the expansion of the UNSC requires a two-third majority of the UN General Assembly membership as well as the willingness of the P5, the more support the UFC proposal gets, the stronger would Pakistan's case be. Apart from that, Pakistan and the UFC group should also approach East Asian and Arab countries to acquire the requisite support for their proposal in the UN General Assembly.

Moreover, Pakistan should exploit the Japanese and German displeasure over America's open support for India as a permanent member of the Security Council.

For UNSC expansion

Any expansion of the UN Security Council should be done in such a manner that it becomes more effective and legitimate in its decisions as transparency and legitimacy of the Council working are more important than its membership. If adding members reduce its effectiveness, enlargement would be of no use, rather, it would be counterproductive. Hence, the focus should not only be on making the Council more representative but on improving its efficiency and authority as well.

On the issue of making the Security Council more representative, one solution could be to increase the number of seats in the non-permanent category by awarding one seat to every region, and increasing their powers, except for the veto power, and duration of membership, coupled with awarding one permanent seat to Africa as their demand is valid because most of the UN work is concentrated in Africa.

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category by awarding one seat to every region, and increasing their powers, except for the veto power, and duration of membership, coupled with awarding one permanent seat to Africa as their demand is valid because most of the UN work is concentrated in Africa which does not have a permanent seat in the Council. The case of the other countries aspiring for permanent membership should be considered in the context of the Intermediate Approach (IA); that is, they should be elected for a longer term of three to five years as non-permanent members first through elections and then, after evaluating their performance, they could be given permanent membership. This way, the issue of equal representation for all major continents/regions would be resolved. Such a solution should be acceptable to a most of the member states, including the P5.

At the same time, a great responsibility lies on the shoulders of the P5 member states as far as the expansion of the Council is concerned. While endorsing support for any individual country, they should make sure that the addition of that country either in permanent or non-permanent slot would be positive and useful for the Council's working and effectiveness. It is necessary that the countries of a particular region must have a say in the selection of the country that represents them as a permanent member in the Security Council as it is a question of giving representation to a region and not to any specific country. Therefore, if the member states reach any consensus regarding increase in the number of permanent seats in the Council, it should be ensured that the country they desire to be a permanent member enjoy the confidence of other countries of the respective region. In addition, some of the P5 member countries should review their policy of supporting country-specific admission to the UNSC.

Conclusion

Expansion of the UN Security Council is an important issue, but the process would take time. It will require many rounds of thorough discussions and negotiations. Genuine negotiations will require compromises as well as clarity on defined positions.

The UFC has succeeded in slowing down the process but we have to see how far the group remains successful in its attempt as the G4 is getting impatient and India, one of the G4 members, is enthusiastically pressing ahead with its campaign. Also, there is not much unity in this group because while Pakistan is ready to give space to Africa as a permanent member, not all the other UFC members are willing to do that.

Similarly, the G-4 is also not united. They have made compromises on the veto issue, but the African Group has not. Brazil, Germany, and Japan are willing to go for the intermediary model solution, but India is not. The same is the case with permanent membership of the Council.

The P5 also carries difference of opinion on the issue of expansion of the Council. There is no agreement among them about who should be allowed to become permanent members. On the one side, France and Britain support the G-4 group, and on the other, China and Russia support the UFC group's position. Africa stands between these two divides; enjoying the support of France, Britain, China and Russia, whereas the U.S. has adopted the policy of supporting country-specific admissions to the Council for permanent membership. Thus, America supports the Indian and Japanese candidatures.

In a world where geopolitical rivalry is intensifying, the expansion of the UNSC will be a tough task. It will be hard to create a win-win scenario for all groups. No progress seems likely unless all groups agree to make compromises in their current standpoints.

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