Nuclear confidence-building measures and peace making in South Asia

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Introduction

The history of India-Pakistan bilateral relations offers a very grim and complicated yet dynamic picture. Annals of India-Pakistan history are replete with rivalry, animosity and warfare, where Jammu and Kashmir stands as a major bone of contention. There have been some brief attempts of reconciliation and creation of an atmosphere where peaceful coexistence may take place. Many voices have been raised and reciprocated from both sides of the divide to create an enduring stability. Nevertheless all such attempts have been unsuccessful one after another, leaving millions of people under the shadow of war and fear of nuclear holocaust.

Advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia has changed the regional dynamics to a greater extent. In Indo–Pak strategic calculus, nuclear optimism finds some place and many scholars are of the view that nuclear deterrence has been functioning in South Asia since the overt nuclearization of both the states. Kargil conflict of 1999 and the military standoff in 2002 are viewed as incidents supporting this argument where both states refrained from engaging in a full-fledged war.¹ However, nuclear optimists’ view that stable deterrence can exist, is primarily based on certain prerequisites that would contain a crisis if it takes place. According to Kenneth Waltz these requirements are absence of preventive war while a state is developing its nuclear capability. Secondly an assured and sufficient second strike capability by both states and lastly an assured reliability of command and control systems to avoid any accidental and unauthorized use.² However, according to Chris Gagne, none of these prerequisites of stable deterrence have been met by India and Pakistan.³ Furthermore one cannot ignore the possibility of escalation what according to

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Robert Jervis can be a rational choice in some instances motivated by “national honor, the desire to harm and weaken those who represent abhorred values and the belief that the other will retreat rather than pay the price which can be expected for victory.” There are chances that in due course a conflict may lead to such a situation where actors may lose their control over it and become hostage to its fast changing dynamics. As Robert Jervis has further pointed out:

“Although undesired escalation does not occur all the time, the danger is present. The room for misunderstanding, the pressure to act before the other side has seized the initiative, the role of unexpected defeats or unanticipated opportunities, all sufficiently great and interacting so that it is rare that decision makers can confidently predict the end point of the trajectory which an initial resort to violence starts”.

Such arguments refer to a greater need to develop some arrangements that would lead to a better understanding of each other’s concerns and consequently pave the way for a peaceful co-existence.

This study aims to analyze the nature of Pakistan-India relations and role of confidence building measures (CBMs) in the amelioration process between the two nuclear rivals. While analyzing the role of CBMs as means towards an end, this study attempts to understand their importance in maintaining regional stability and assuring a permanent peaceful coexistence by balancing the strategic environment of South Asia. While keeping main focus on Military and Nuclear CBMs, It tries to understand the viability of various such attempts and identifies the prime reasons behind their inability to bring a positive change. Furthermore, it tries to explore broader horizons to expand the scope of present CBMs and identify new avenues where constructive engagement can be built and peace may prevail.

Confidence Building Measures: A conceptual framework

Confidence building measures (CBMs) are regarded as “diverse arrangements that can help reduce tensions and promote good neighborly relations. Traditionally they are designed to make the behavior of states more predictable by facilitating communication among states and establishing rules or patterns of behavior for states' military forces”. It can be a set of unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions or procedures that acts to reduce military tensions between a set or sets of states, before, during or after an actual conflict.

There are four main components or areas where CBMs play their role in defusing tension and making the conduct of countries more open and reckonable. These components include communication, constraint, transparency and verification. Through these tools, CBMs play a role in minimizing the threat of
direct confrontation among the hostile groups by improving the social contacts thereby increase the level of trust.

Role of CBMs in lowering the hostilities

Barry Buzan has highlighted a social side of threat in the process of its identification, a process he calls as “Securitization” in which a threat gets constructed not only by its presence essentially in form of some tangible objects but also gets flared up when a society or group of people designate that object as a threat. This process involves behavior of people towards that object and gets reinforced when society in general repeatedly keeps referring to it in negative connotations. With passage of time that stereotypical thinking gets indulged in the psyche of general public and remains embedded in the strategic thinking of a particular society. It assumes a specific character and becomes inseparable part of the national character. In this way one can assume that social behavior constructs a threat and presents it as a security issue.

Applying this conceptual framework to South Asia, one may define the role of conventional CBMs on the premise that when social behaviors construct a threat, a change in behaviors brought about by application of various CBMs may deconstruct that previously held belief, hence pave the way for de-securitization. Nuclear CBMs on the other hand work at two levels. At one hand they serve the basic purpose of avoiding a nuclear exchange that may result from misperception or miscalculation. On the other, they try to maintain strategic stability in the region through timely and accurate exchange of information via strong communication channels, practice of restraint by realizing that in any offensive adventurism, costs may outweigh the benefits.

CBMs either military or non-military, find a role to play in the process of easing the tensions by helping change the mindset of general public and leadership. They help to provide sound and pragmatic measures to states in solving their outstanding disputes.
CBMs between India and Pakistan: A critical overview

Pakistan and India have passed through various peaks and valleys since their creation as they witnessed a number of issues followed by attempts to deescalate the tensions. In a retrospective analysis, one finds a number of attempts in form of various agreements aimed at reducing the tension between India and Pakistan. Right after their independence, a conflict arose over the State of Jammu and Kashmir that involved the United Nations intervention, where later called for a ceasefire through the Karachi Agreement on January 24, 1949.10

Then onwards, journey towards peace has witnessed a number of important milestones. From Tashkent to Simla and then from Lahore Declaration to Islamabad Accord following historic SAARC Summit, road to peace had been very bumpy. None of these agreements could sustain the peaceful environment, but only provided an interval. The basic issue had been that all these attempts were preceded by either a conflict (wars of 1965 and 1971) or crisis (1998 nuclear tests and 2002 military standoff). Major motivation and catalyst behind these agreements was the attempt to manage that conflict. This conflict management strategy restored the peace for the time being but failed to bring any permanent solution to the prevailing problems in the region and proved ineffective in the longer run. Hence the old disputes are enduring today despite many efforts towards finding a peaceful resolution.11 An overview of these agreements also highlights the dependency factor that none of these issues have been resolved bilaterally. It always attracted a foreign intervention that led to the ceasefire and subsequently maintained only a short-lived peace.12

During the peace intervals, both the states have brought forward various measures aimed at building confidence. Various conventional CBMs regarding increasing trade and establishing communication links, people to people contacts, easing travel links through bus service and trains etc have proven helpful in bringing people closer. However they could not eliminate a threat of war and fell victim to hostilities arising from every new crisis.

After the overt nuclearization, there was realization that there is need to take concrete steps for avoiding a nuclear exchange. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit was seen as a welcome development. The Lahore Declaration emphasized on peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues and subsequent Lahore MoU contained a comprehensive plan of engagement and had a number of nuclear related CBMs.
The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan agreed on the following points:

- shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict;
- undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard;
- are fully committed to undertaking national measures reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control;
- undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries; adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other;
- shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for notification of nuclear incidents;
- shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests;
- shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides;
- shall periodically review the implementation of existing CBMs and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs;
- shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g., between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications; and
- shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Lahore MoU was soon buried under the snow of Kargil. However, some of its elements were implemented later. Overall in the military and nuclear arena there are some success stories and there are certain agreements aimed at reducing the likelihood of nuclear war due to some misperception or miscalculation. Some instances of successful Military and Nuclear CBMs are as follows:
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- A Hotline between the Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) of both countries is in effect since 1965. It is one of the oldest CBM in place. Although it has not been very successful during the crisis time but its usefulness is acknowledged by both the sides. It has been reinforced in subsequent talks and has also been expanded. Its most recent use was after the incident of violent attacks in Mumbai to manage the crisis situation.
- Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities – signed in 1988 was ratified in 1992. This has proven to be the most successful agreement and both the states have respected it even during the time of highest tension.
- Formal ceasefire between India and Pakistan along the International Border (IB), Line of Control (LOC) and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Jammu and Kashmir began at midnight of 25 November 2003.
- Biannual meetings between Indian Border Security Forces and Pakistani Rangers – has been in effect since 2004
- Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests is in effect since 2005. Under this agreement both the states notify each other 72 hours in advance before testing any ballistic missiles within a 40km radius of the International Border and the LOC.
- Establishment of a Communication Link between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coast Guard came into effect in 2005. It was aimed to have an early exchange of information regarding fishermen detained into each other’s waters.14

Apart from these agreements, Pakistan had proposed certain other measures before its overt nuclearization. Those were primarily aimed at neutralizing India’s nuclear test of 1974. Pakistan proposed a “South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” in UN General Assembly in the same year. Later starting from a formal proposal by Pakistan in 1981 to initiate bilateral talks to conclude an agreement on a mutually acceptable ratio of conventional armed forces, a series of proposals were given by Pakistan over the next few years, duly termed as “peace offensive” by the then foreign minister Agha Shahi.15 That included renunciation on acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan (1978), comprehensive mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities (1979), simultaneous mutual acceptance of IAEA “Full Scope Safeguards” (1979), simultaneous accession to the NPT (1979), a bilateral South Asian
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1987), and a mutual conference under the UN auspices on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia (1987). Pakistan had also been putting forward the idea of “Nuclear Restraint Regime” in South Asia without much development in that direction.

Reasons of failure of Confidence Building Measures

A detailed analysis of the Indo-Pak relations and efforts to create an atmosphere of trust through various CBMs both conventional as well as military and attempts to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRM) highlights that both the states do have a genuine interest in bringing stability in the region but according to their own terms. Both have initiated a number of proposals in this direction. A critical analysis of these attempts reveals that their approach had been different towards many issues and they still have not been able to find a common direction. Therefore many such attempts to establish peace have fallen victim to the strategic concerns of both the nuclear rivals that continue to fuel a trust deficit among the leadership and masses alike.

These strategic concerns stem from various geopolitical realities that exist in the region and continue to fuel the tensions. Both India and Pakistan have unique sense of insecurities that grows out from each others so-called strategic leverage in the region. Their respective conflicting objectives in the region and against one another fuel these insecurities to a greater extent.

For India, a rise to the status of global power is uncompromised objective that in India’s view is hindered and incapacitated by allegedly Pakistan sponsored terrorist infiltration into the Indian side particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. In relation to this, India is even more irked with growing pressure in Indian Held Kashmir where demands for freedom have increased and 2010 was seen as a year bringing Kashmiri struggle at a turning point. It poses a direct threat to Indian national identity as India is riddled with separatist movements and fears that any concession to Pakistan over Kashmir will have a domino effect on other parts as well. Therefore India uses the issue of terrorism as a hedge against the criticism over its Kashmir policy. India further uses the issue of terrorism as a tool to pressurize Pakistan at bilateral, regional and international forums and this oftenly becomes a stumbling block in defining the future course of action. India has linked future talks with the issue of terrorism and does not accept Pakistan’s position in this regard. As stated by External Affairs Minister...
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S.M. Krishna in the aftermath of Foreign Minister talks in July 2010, “We told them terrorism is the biggest problem in normalizing relations. Unless this is met, everything else will be futile”.17

Growing Pak-China collaboration is a nuisance for New Delhi and their cooperative development in Gawadar is a matter of great concern for the Indians. India believes that it has the potential to impinge upon her trade routes and an increased Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea offers a tougher - military as well as economic - competition to deal with.18 More troubling is the Indian concern that China is trying to encircle India by forming relations with all its small neighbors.19 Therefore, hostage to a bitter past and due to an existing border dispute vis-à-vis China, India is still unable to develop a better relationship with the latter. There had been some positive overtures lately, stemming from their mutual economic interests, but Sino-India relations are far from being termed as friendly and India continues to perceive and label China as a source of threat and a motivation behind its growing nuclear and conventional weapons arsenal. This thinking led the former Indian Chief of Army Staff boast of Indian capability of fighting a two-front war with Pakistan and China receiving an immediate criticism.20

Nuclear weapons have changed the strategic dynamics of South Asia. Numerical conventional superiority enjoyed by India over the years has been undermined by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. The fact that India’s attempt to gain an edge over Pakistan with its conventional superiority has been out maneuvered by Pakistan through its nuclear capability irritates the Indian policy makers. Such irritation has given rise to the unrealistic ideas of preparing and indulging in a limited conventional war with Pakistan and has led to the enunciation and exercise of Cold Start Doctrine by the Indian military.21

On the other hand Pakistan also feels handicapped by a number of concerns and views them as existential threat to its very survival. Negative overtures from India since its creation ignite the security threat perception. Having fought three major wars and a number of border skirmishes, Pakistan’s strategic thinking has sufficient ground to view every Indian move in negative connotation. Such fears are further aggravated by various moves of India vis-à-vis Pakistan and have led to the development of an Indo-centric strategic culture in Pakistan where a general view of India is largely negative.

India’s aggressive posture along with its conventional superiority has undermined Pakistan’s strategic objectives. Pakistan also views every Indian move in the region as an attempt to encircle Pakistan.22 The sheer size of Indian forces on Pakistan’s border is a continuous threat and it further gets reinforced with emergence of offensive moves and statements from India every now and

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then. Such situation continues to sour the relations leaving less or no space for any positive action to take place. In this connection, growing Indian presence in Afghanistan is greatly troublesome for Pakistan and threatens Pakistan’s security with a nightmarish two-front war scenario. Furthermore, proven Indian involvement in creating internal instability particularly unrest in Baluchistan through Afghanistan also has worsening impacts and Pakistan has raised this issue at various forums. Other factors that reduce the functioning of CBMs emanate from growing Indo-US cooperation in defence sectors and Indian ambition to acquire Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, etc.

Pakistan has huge stakes in ongoing war on terror and the fear that it may be left alone by the US once its purpose is served along with the threat that India might move in to fill the gap, continue to exacerbate Pakistan’s security calculus, which is already facing huge economic and military losses in curbing domestic militancy.

Historical baggage of India-Pakistan relations offers nothing but lack of trust. This trust deficit feeds on contemporary strategic concerns and aggravates the situation, leaving less space for peace overtures. This has led to the development of countervailing tendencies and a general thinking on both sides that too much trust is dangerous. This is further aggravated by the negative role of media most of the time that has failed to create a flexible approach among the masses. Such behavior limits the options available to the ruling elite and under the pressure of rightist parties they fear that even a small concession on any important issue would be labeled as surrender by the leaders. The immense criticism leveled against BJP government in the backdrop of Lahore MoU and against former President Pervaiz Musharraf on his reference to the possibility of change in Pakistan’s long held position over Kashmir are two such examples. In such a scenario even a strong government cannot withstand the immense pressure from the religious parties.

Possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan at one hand has worked as a stabilizer by making war too costly and undesirable option and on the other it has also increased the bargaining capacities of both the states. That makes it difficult to offer concessions for peace and states tend to follow the policy of
brinkmanship and each state tries to test the nerves of the opponent to the maximum. This practice has also emboldened the rightist forces in both the states to enhance their inflexible agenda against each other.

**The way forward: Seizing the ripe moment**

It is important to highlight that CBMs whether military or conventional, are the mean towards an end and not end in themselves. They are used as a tool to bring the ultimate objective of structural transformation in the behaviour of conflicting states. A very important and necessary pre-requisite for initiating any substantial process is striking at the right time. William Zartman states “Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so - when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive”.

One such moment in India-Pakistan relations came at the time of Lahore Declaration in 1999, when there was a mutually shared feeling to discuss all outstanding issues and that led to the conclusion of Lahore MoU. Later, 2004 SAARC Summit also set the same momentum and commenced Composite Dialogue process. They were, however, preceded by a prolonged diplomatic effort to break the ice, but both failed to deliver the constructive results due to the uncontrollable chain reaction of allegation arising from Kargil and Mumbai crises respectively and went down into the history as the lost opportunities.

In the post Mumbai situation, India and Pakistan once again found themselves in a dark alley due to the securitized environment created in the aftermath of the incident, where India held Pakistan responsible for the event. On the other hand, India’s reluctance in sharing the details of investigation gave rise to the suspicion in Pakistan that New Delhi wants to use it as a pretext to discredit Pakistan politically. However, both the states now have started recognizing that the ultimate solution would come only through the dialogue and negotiations. One such instance of realization came in the meeting of Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan at Bhutan on the sidelines of SAARC Conference, where they vowed to resume the stalled peace process. They agreed to discuss all the eight issues covered in the composite dialogue process in 2004-2008 that includes peace and security including CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, counter-terrorism (including development on the Mumbai trial), Siachen, economic issues, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, promotion of friendly exchanges and humanitarian issues.
It was further improved with the formal commencement of dialogue process and talks on CBMs following the visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar. Both sides have held specific session on renewing the existing nuclear CBMs and looking at ways for new ones. However its fragility is still an issue. Working on that realization, there is a need to develop a mechanism for constructive engagement that can consistently lead towards a positive solution. The following points, in this regard, may act as a guidepost in bridging the trust deficit between the two nuclear rivals that would subsequently help in peace process.

**Reinforcing the existing CBMs and reinvigorating the agreed frameworks**

In India-Pakistan context, the main emphasis should be laid on the reiteration and reinforcement of certain specific measures that have a clean record of compliance and that have actually proved helpful in time of crisis or during routine exchange of information. Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installation and Facilities, signed in December, 1988 is the most successful example in this regard, under which India and Pakistan have been exchanging the lists of their nuclear installation every year even during times of serious crises.

There are many others that are in place and have withstand the pressure of times. The hotline connection between the Director Generals Military Operations (DGMOs) of both the states is important in this regard that was established in the aftermath of 1971 war. Later it was not used very actively, however it was re-vitalized during 1990 and then in 1999 Lahore MoU. There is further need to develop and strengthen the existing hotlines between DGMOs, Foreign Secretaries and maritime security agencies and its use should not be only in post crisis management. There is need to strengthen their capacities and both states should introduce sophisticated technologies to facilitate a continuous communication to avoid any misperception in case of an emergency.

Lahore MoU may be considered as a model set of agreed principle to begin with. The essence of Lahore MoU should be revisited and reinvigorated with newer elements according to the requirement and that should serve as a base line for future developments.

**Institutionalizing the CBMs:**

An analysis of India-Pakistan bilateral relations reveals that with the emergence of any issue, big or small, peace process and most of the CBMs are rolled back. September 2008 Mumbai attacks are a recent example where India halted ongoing talks in all spheres followed by a collapse of all existing communication links. Sudden break down of communication links between the
two countries, in this way, jeopardizes the basic motive of such CBMs i.e. preventing inadvertent nuclear war. Therefore there is a dire need to institutionalize the confidence building measures. In this regard, a genuine debate must be initiated, which would acknowledge the nuclear related risks and find mutually acceptable solutions. For instance, strengthening and honoring bilateral agreements and establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers that can withstand the pressure of crisis and may serve the purpose.

**Adopting a normative approach towards CBMs**

A normative approach\(^{31}\) should be adopted in the South Asian context to set the ground for concrete action. There cannot be a one size fits all formula and hence Cold War practices cannot be prescribed for India and Pakistan. Thus it is more important to find out some common norms that may help to reverse the securitization process.

There cannot be an instant remedy to the decades old disputes. Therefore starting small and building up policy should be adopted with a relatively slow but consistent approach. In order to set the pace, both sides should adopt the norm to cease all adverse propaganda against one another and promoting genuine debates. Rightist forces on both sides should be taken on board and also be included in the negotiation particularly on conventional CBMs so that they would not spoil the process.

Another important step could be to establish a jointly acceptable lexicon of nuclear terms for a better understanding of prevailing nuclear debate.\(^{32}\)

**Doable steps**

Besides aforementioned ways to develop and strengthen the confidence building measures, there can be some concrete steps based on the common interests of the states and that may bind them in joint responsibility and help bring them closer.

- **Establishing joint nuclear power parks:** Pakistan has been advocating the possibility of establishing nuclear power parks in the country. Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, while addressing World Nuclear Association in 2003 had stated: “We would like to suggest joint ventures for setting up nuclear power plants in Pakistan ... Several NPPs could be constructed in a designated zone, the boundaries of which are specially secured to the satisfaction of all concerned. It can be ensured that the plant and the associated facilities are fully safeguarded”.\(^{33}\) The idea of joint nuclear power park was later integrated in one of the five ‘Multilateral

It may be proposed that Joint Nuclear Power Parks under the control of an international consortium may be established at India-Pakistan border. At one hand it would serve the energy demands of both the states on the other presence of international consortium and IAEA would serve as a guarantor for peace.

- **Bilateral agreement for early notification of nuclear accident**: India and Pakistan have signed the bilateral agreement on “Reducing the Risk of Accidents relating to Nuclear Weapon” on February 21, 2007. They have also signed “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” at the IAEA.

  It is proposed that they may extend the scope of the agreement on “Reducing the Risk of accidents relating to Nuclear weapon” and may add other kinds of nuclear related incidents into this category. Article 9 of the “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” has the provision that “In furtherance of their mutual interests, States Parties may consider, where deemed appropriate, the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral arrangements relating to the subject matter of this Convention”. In this spirit India and Pakistan should develop an arrangement that provides a direct and valid transmission of information in case of a nuclear incident by expanding the scope of agreement on “Reducing the Risk of Accidents relating to Nuclear Weapons”.

  India is aspiring to expand its nuclear industry and envisages acquiring 470,000 megawatts of power from nuclear energy by 2050. India has many of its nuclear installation close to Pakistan’s border and due to the geographical proximity and direction of winds from Bay of Bengal into the Subcontinent; radiation release may have a direct impact on Pakistan resulting from any nuclear incident. Pakistan’s civilian nuclear installations are not close to Indian border but one cannot rule out the possibility of transmission of radiation in case of an accident, due to the direction of wind from West to East. Therefore, both the states must work to mitigate the potential consequences in case of such an event by sharing relevant information.

- **Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material**: India and Pakistan, due to their location at important international trade routes and presence of nuclear powers in their close proximity, has specific concerns towards illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

  Pakistan shares a long border with India and due to the relatively poor record of radiation safety and security in India, it has a serious concern that
nuclear and other radioactive material might enter into the country. With the introduction of new technologies such as nuclear forensic that can track down the origin of nuclear material, one cannot deny the ownership of the material. Furthermore, both the states face serious threat from the non-State actors who may try to use nuclear or radioactive material for an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device. In a worst case scenario, if a nuclear or radioactive material stolen in one country, is used in the other as a dirty bomb, it may create a serious crisis particularly if that source is tracked down to be originating from the rival state. It may be viewed as a nuclear first use.

Therefore both the states should cooperate in their efforts of to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material and necessary information should be shared to interdict any malicious act aiming to generate a crisis by the non State actors.

Conclusion

The chain reaction of evil - war producing more wars - must be broken or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation”. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Some level of maturity is visible in India-Pakistan relations, particularly after Mumbai incident where India exercised some degree of restraint and did not go to the extent of initiating a war against Pakistan despite many voices within India favoring this option. This maturity can help to overcome uncertainty prevailing in South Asia. Both the states must realize that appalling relationship has incapacitated their ability to address their socio-economic problems. This social negligence carries its own dynamics and results in more violent social attitude and consequently poses a negative influence on the internal security of a state. Therefore, it is imperative that both states should resolve their conflicting issues rationally.

The latest amelioration, starting from Foreign Secretary level meeting on the sidelines of SAARC conference at Thimpu (Bhutan) and followed by conciliatory statements from both sides culminated in Pakistani Foreign minister’s visit to India last year and formal initiation of dialogue process. These are very promising developments and has raised the hopes for a positive solution of all the outstanding issues including Kashmir. Before the breakdown of talks in 2008, India and Pakistan had made sufficient development on a number of issues including Siachen and Sir Creek. New rounds of talks may start afresh while taking past developments into account.

In this back drop, there should be greater emphasis on reducing the trust deficit and efforts should be made to make it an irreversible process. Increased
people to people contact may propel the process in that direction. The conventional CBMs may help to create sufficient ground for a concrete development at military and nuclear level and both complementing each other may offer a better future.

**Notes & References**

11. *Ibid*
12. Feroz Hasan Khan, “Prospects of Arms Control and CBMs between India and Pakistan” Naval Post graduate School. www.npolicy.org/files/khan_presentation.pdf+strategic+restraint+regime+BY+PAKISTAN
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30 Record of use of hotline reveals that they have been used only after the crisis and were not used during serious situation arising from Kargil crisis, 1999 Indian plane hijacking issue and Mumbai attack 2008.
31 Normative Approach may be defined as a theoretical, prescriptive approach that has the aim of appraising or establishing the values and norms that best fit the overall needs and expectations of society. For more details: Sijo Joseph Ponnatt “The normative approach to nuclear proliferation”, International Journal on World Peace, March, 2006 , accessed at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6428/is_1_23/ai_n29298124/
32 Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, June 18-19, 2010
There are about 3210 Institutes having 62110 Installations of radiation equipment and sources. Sixteen (16) cases of theft or lose of radiation sources were reported since, 2000 and only three (03) of the sources were recovered according to Praful Bidwai article “Radiation dangers: Indian lessons, in The News, May 10, 2010.