Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process
Inaugural Statement by Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai®,
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Ambassador Masood Khan, ladies and gentlemen. Assalam Alaikum. I deem it a special privilege to have been invited by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad to deliver the Inaugural Statement to this very important Seminar on 'Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Security Summit Process'.

At the outset I would like to commend the intellectually superior role that the ISSI has played over the years in the development of Pakistan's strategic thought by focusing on subjects of national and international concerns. As DG SPD for over 15 years, I followed the discourses at this forum with particular interest because these contributed directly and indirectly at self-education at the SPD itself. I am particularly aware that after the appointment of Ambassador Masood Khan as the Director General, the ISSI has moved strongly in actively leading the Islamabad family of strategic think tanks in areas of strategic analysis with renewed vigour, clarity and energy. His appointment brings to Islamabad an extremely rich mix of diplomatic, intellectual and hands-on experience of international diplomacy that he has so successfully conducted in the service of Pakistan in important Capitals. I always considered him and a few other key Pakistani Diplomats as our warriors on the first line of defence while safeguarding the interests of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme. Knowing him personally and professionally for about the same time as I was DG SPD, I have the highest respect for his abilities and intellect and have no doubt that under his stewardship, ISSI will continue to retain its first rate status as Pakistan's leading think tank.

The selection of the subject of 'Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Security Summit Process' is a good example of keeping with the times on important developments as the fourth and last Summit is being held in Washington next week. This Seminar in many ways is therefore
designed to showcase Pakistan's strong credentials on nuclear security and its commitments to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. Coming as it does as the brainchild of Ambassador Masood Khan, I have no doubt that the Seminar will be enriched by his personal stewardship having being Pakistan's Sherpa for the previous three Summits with extensive knowledge of the inner workings of the preparatory meetings. I know personally that he and his team of professionals have worked most astutely to balance Pakistan's interests with the sometimes conflicting interests of the international community.

Ladies and gentlemen, when a state becomes a nuclear power, its first priority is to ensure and demonstrate that its nuclear capability is credible and effective. Simultaneously, the national command and control system has to ensure that its nuclear assets, facilities and personnel are safe and secure. After becoming a nuclear power, national security becomes closely intertwined with nuclear security and hence a nuclear weapon state's most pressing priority. As is well recognized by now, during the development of our nuclear capability and after demonstrating it, Pakistan has attached the highest importance to nuclear security.

When President Barack Obama took the initiative, in 2009, to launch a Nuclear Security Summit process, we were fully prepared because Pakistan had already taken a series of strong measures to strengthen its nuclear security in a comprehensive manner. As I mentioned earlier, we equate nuclear security with our national security. Therefore, there could be no compromise on the security dimension of our nuclear programme.

Over the years, the Strategic Plans Division that I had the privilege of heading for over 15 years, conceived and developed a rigorous nuclear security regime. After Pakistan successfully tested nuclear weapons following India's tests in May 1998, our first task was of course to operationalize nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles at priority, raise tri services Strategic Forces as the end users while ensuring one hundred per cent security. This was done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and therefore, while we consider our operational
deterrence capability to be Full Spectrum, I will also say that Pakistan's nuclear security is Full Spectrum as well.

Another important and simultaneous task was to establish a National Command Authority (NCA) which matured in 2000. Today, the NCA, supported by the SPD as its secretariat, and the Tri Services Strategic Forces Commands, exercises full control over policy, procurement, employment and nuclear security. The SPD, through its Security and Intelligence Divisions, has incorporated the most stringent physical and technological solutions, runs a strict Personnel Reliability Programme, and has developed security and intelligence capabilities to deal with all issues impinging on national security, including proliferation, insider and outsider threats, accidents, precluding any possibility of WMD terrorism.

Pakistan's nuclear security regime deals with the full spectrum of any nuclear threat - insider, outsider or cyber threat. Reinforcing the very sizable numbers of security troops, a highly professional Special Response Force works round the clock to secure our assets and facilities. An integrated intelligence system has been instituted to provide depth in defense.

Nuclear security is not just about protecting nuclear assets and forces. It is a complete cycle of threat assessment, vigilance and response mechanisms. That is why we created a comprehensive nuclear regulatory regime that encompasses not just physical protection of materials and facilities, but also fissile material control and accounting, transportation security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies.

Overtime, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), an autonomous oversight body, has developed a sustainable nuclear safety regulatory system with established response and recovery capabilities for radiological sources. It has earned the confidence and respect of the IAEA because of its close coordination with the world body.

Early on, Pakistan also created a comprehensive export control regime. The legislative, regulatory, administrative and enforcement measures we have taken are at par with the multilateral export control
regimes. We have revised the National Export Control Lists, on the basis of the European Union's integrated system, and harmonized them with the controls maintained by the NSG, Australia Group and MTCR. Our National Detection Architecture also includes use of detection devices at several entry and exit points as well as other random check points to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

As I mentioned, nuclear security is a full spectrum and full cycle business. In 2012, we established our Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security which imparts security training based on international best practices and standards. At the Seoul Summit, we felt confident of our professional and infrastructure capabilities and therefore the Prime Minister of Pakistan made the offer of utilizing the Centre of Excellence as a regional and indeed an international training centre. After some hesitation, the IAEA accepted the offer and today four years down the road in cooperation with the IAEA, this Centre of Excellence is functioning as a regional training hub on all nuclear security aspects. High level visitors to the Centre have admired the high standards of training developed by the Centre. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, during his visit to the Centre in March 2014, said: "It is very impressive that you organize the training in a very systemic and operational manner." The United States leaders, during their meetings with Pakistani counterparts, have repeatedly appreciated Pakistan's proactive engagement with the international community, including through its hosting of IAEA training activities at its Center of Excellence. In fact it was quite satisfying the other day to hear the US Under Secretary Rose Gottemueller deeply appreciating the Centre of Excellence during a Congressional hearing in glowing terms.

In the past several years, we have invested heavily in nuclear safety at the plant, corporate and regulatory levels. Following the Fukushima accident, we conducted a detailed assessment of the safety parameters, emergency preparedness and response, and operators' training protocols and procedures. All authorizations since then require
from the licensees to implement lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident.

In collaboration with the IAEA, we are implementing our Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) to manage radioactive sources, secure orphan sources, detect radiation, and prepare for emergencies.

We have also established a Nuclear Emergency Management System to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. Covering the entire range of activities, the mechanism has state-of-the-art equipment, mobile labs, technical guidance and countrywide connectivity. Several training courses and exercises for the first responders, emergency response personnel and front line officers have been conducted for emergency preparedness.

Legally speaking, nuclear security is a national responsibility, and Pakistan has been fulfilling it primarily in pursuance of its own national interest. At the same time, Pakistan has been proactively engaging in the international forums to promote norms and good practices for fostering nuclear security.

Pakistan has submitted four reports to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee that lists the measures we have taken for nuclear and radiological security as well as on controls over all forms of transfer of sensitive materials and technologies. We are now working on the fifth report.

As a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Nuclear Safety Convention, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Pakistan has been contributing to the nuclear security framework. Our consistent observance of the IAEA Code of Conduct and participation in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), have been highly useful. Pakistan has also now decided to ratify the CPPNM.

In recent years, we have also been working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas, including the development of the Initiative's guidelines on a nuclear detection architecture, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation.
Pakistan has held the positions of leadership in IAEA Board of Governors for 2010-11, Biological Weapons Convention, Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament and non-proliferations forums.

I would say that, with the possible exception of NPT, no conversation on nuclear security would be complete without Pakistan's participation.

I would also underline that Pakistan fully qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes. Pakistan's nuclear trade is one hundred percent legitimate and therefore all impediments in its way should be removed. Pakistan will most certainly never accept discriminatory treatment on this account.

Pakistan has a proven record spanning 42 years of safe and secure operation of civilian nuclear power plants, which are all placed under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan needs alternate, clean and sustainable civil nuclear energy for its burgeoning industry and to meet growing consumer demand. Our National Energy Security Plan includes a Nuclear Energy Vision - 2050, duly approved in 2011 by the NCA, to redress the existing energy deficits and to respond to the future requirements of our economy. In that context, we envisage generation of nuclear energy of 8,800 MWe by 2030 and 42,000 MWe by 2050. It is realistic, doable and under implementation with the near readiness of Chashma 3 and Chashma 4 Plants (each of 340 MWs) and the ongoing construction of KANUPP 2 and KANUPP 3 near Karachi (each of 1100 Mws). Nuclear energy is therefore an essential part of our national energy mix and the Vision 2050 is generally on track.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is high time that a discriminatory approach towards Pakistan is discarded and Pakistan is fully integrated in the international nuclear mainstream. This can be best done by removing restrictions imposed on Pakistan. In this regard, Pakistan looks forward to an equitable access to international civil nuclear cooperation. All reasons put forward by the international community for not doing the right thing by Pakistan have become outdated and have run their cycle of illogic by now. Pakistan has worked with the international community
to erect barriers against nuclear terrorism as a preventative measure and strengthen nuclear security. In this regard, Pakistan’s credentials are no less than any of the nuclear weapon states.

With its long and varied experience, Pakistan's inclusion will enable it contribute to power generation, non-power application of nuclear technology, nuclear security and nuclear safety, in collaboration with the IAEA. I would add that with an advanced nuclear fuel cycle capability, Pakistan is in a position to provide nuclear fuel cycle services under IAEA safeguards, and to participate in any non-discriminatory nuclear fuel cycle assurance mechanism.

Pakistan has also played a key role in elaborating the priorities of the Nuclear Security Summits and negotiating their outcome documents. Our contribution during the preparatory processes has been acknowledged as positive and constructive. The United States, the initiator of the NSS process, time and again has commended Pakistan's "constructive engagement".

We remain committed to pursuing nuclear security cooperation, through voluntary national actions in accordance with our international obligations.

That being said, I would like to clear the deliberately created fog of rumours about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. While I would not go into the skewed studies that would have the world believe that Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear programme, because the methodology used to draw such conclusions is seriously flawed and biased, suffice it to say that Pakistan would maintain the credibility and effectiveness of its strategic deterrent, which now includes a variety of short range low yield weapons. This Pakistani capability of full spectrum deterrence has helped in the retention of a strategic equilibrium in South Asia, and has seriously neutralized the use of the military as an instrument of policy by our adversary, ruling out war as an option – Cold Start or no Cold Start. It stands to reason therefore that the credibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons has contributed to peace and stability in the region. I like to call them weapons of peace.
Pakistan would not cap or curb its nuclear weapons programme or accept any restrictions. All attempts in this regard as recently made clear by the NCA are bound to end up nowhere. As the National Command Authority said, Pakistan would continue to respond to the threats to its national security without indulging in an arms race. We will continue to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with our policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is not about Pakistan but about international nuclear security culture and norms involving more than fifty four states. Pakistan as in the previous Summits is participating because it believes in the objectives of the NSS process and will abide by its obligations as a responsible nuclear weapons state.

In the end I would once again like to compliment Ambassador Masood Khan and the ISSI for organizing this Seminar on this important subject and timing it well with the NSS in Washington. I wish all the participants well and I am sure that your participation will enrich the proceedings of the Seminar.

I thank you.