1. Pakistan in the Nuclear Global Order

2. Pakistan and India: Non-Proliferation Credentials

3. Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects

February 22, 2016
No. 1
Pakistan in the Nuclear Global Order

No. 2
Pakistan and India: Non-Proliferation Credentials

No. 3
Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects

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The Institute of Strategic Studies was founded in 1973. It is a non-profit, autonomous research and analysis centre, designed for promoting an informed public understanding of strategic and related issues, affecting international and regional security.

In addition to publishing a quarterly journal and a monograph series, the ISSI organises talks, workshops, seminars and conferences on strategic and allied disciplines and issues.

Editor-in-Chief : Ambassador Masood Khan
Editor : NajamRafique
Composed and designed by : Syed Mohammad Farhan

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Complied By

Malik Qasim Mustafa
Senior Research Fellow

Ghazala Yasmin
Research Fellow
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Pictures of the Event
Programme

10:00  Recitation from the Holy Quran
10:05  Welcome Remarks
Ambassador Masood Khan, Director General, ISSI
10:12  Chief Guest
Hon. Mr. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Foreign Secretary, Pakistan
10:27  Keynote Speaker
Mr. Khalid Banuri, Director General, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Pakistan
10:37  Speaker
Dr. Rizwana Abbasi, Assistant Professor, NDU
10:44  Speaker
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Mr. Malik Qasim Mustafa, Senior Research Fellow, ISSI
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Ms. Ghazala Yameen Jalil, Research Fellow, ISSI
11:05  Speaker
Mr. Tahir Mahmood Azad, Research Fellow, ISSI
11:12  Speaker
Dr. Naeem Salik, Distinguished Fellow, ISSI
11:22  Q&A
Moderator Ambassador Masood Khan, D.G. ISSI.
11:40  Concluding Remarks
Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Chairman Board of Governors, ISSI

Vote of Thanks by D.G. ISSI

Refreshment
The Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), Ambassador Masood Khan cordially invites you to a:

**Launch of Three Reports under ISSI’s Nuclear Paper Series:**

1. **Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order**
2. **Pakistan and India: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Credentials**
3. **Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects**

**Honourable Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry**
Foreign Secretary has kindly consented to be the Chief Guest

**Friday, February 12, 2016**
**1000 Hours to 1150 Hours**

**At the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, F-5/2**

**RSVP:**
**tahir.azad@issi.org.pk**
**Phone: 051-9204423-24 Fax: 051-9204658, www.issi.org.pk**
Executive Summaries of the Nuclear Paper Series
Nuclear Paper Series No. 1
Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order

Islamabad Papers 2016
Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order
Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi

Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
Executive Summary

India introduced nuclear weapons in this region in 1974, compelling Pakistan to pursue a similar path. Indian nuclear explosions in 1998 forced Pakistan to develop a more elaborate nuclear force posture, doctrine and command and control system. Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons programme for defensive purposes only and to address its acute security concerns against India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is India-specific and it will continue to play a deterring role in the national security of Pakistan to defend itself by thwarting both major and limited wars in South Asia.

The introduction of Indian war-fighting strategy — the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) — purports to exploit the space for war under the nuclear overhang. India buttresses this strategy by building Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and rapidly developing a nuclear triad which includes fighter-bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In response to the Indian war-fighting strategy, Pakistan has developed low-yield nuclear weapons along with short-range delivery vehicles such as Nasr (with the range of 60 kilometres) to deter a limited war. Arguably, India’s military Cold Start Doctrine appears to be offensive, aimed at waging a limited war, whilst Nasr is defensive to prevent India’s offensive strategy.

In parallel, Pakistan’s development of medium-range ballistic missile capability (Shaheen-3, 2750 kilometres) is to neutralise India’s second-strike capability from the Andaman and Nicobar Island bases. Pakistan says that it maintains a credible minimum deterrence; and that it neither seeks an arms race nor parity with India. Pakistan’s strategic policy is part of the perceived full spectrum deterrence, which remains consistent with broader contours of its credible minimum deterrence and is designed to deter all forms of aggression. The international community largely misperceives Pakistan’s declaratory statements on full spectrum deterrence by associating the concept with bigger numbers. Pakistan continues to pursue a policy of producing a smaller number of deterrent forces with no interest in pursuing a weapon to weapon equalisation strategy. It aims to sustain balance rather than parity and does not want to be part of an unending arms race.

The international community should not overlook the gradually changing South Asian strategic environment influenced by India’s CSD, its development of non-strategic battlefield weapons, its preparation for hydrogen/ thermonuclear weapons, its strides towards an assured second-strike capability in the form of nuclear submarines, and its known and unknown nuclear facilities/reactor outside the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection, including a secret-city project in Karnataka.

The development of ICBMs, Multi-Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and the BMD system has further accentuated strategic instability in South Asia. The changed strategic environment in South Asia puts greater pressure on Pakistan to upgrade and streamline its deterrent in order to sustain deterrence stability and avert a war.
Domestically, Pakistan has commendably worked to improve its legal order, fight terrorism in its all forms and manifestations, create a rigorous export-control regime and construct a nuclear security regime. Regionally, it is ready to work on these parameters with other countries. Internationally, Pakistan adheres to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). It is party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Container Security Initiative, and Incident and Trafficking Database. Moreover, Islamabad has established Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) that closely works with the IAEA. Other important institutions such as Pakistan’s National Centre of Excellence, Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences and the School for Nuclear and Radiation Safety provide world-class training and specialisation in the field of nuclear security and radiation safety.

Pakistan has serious concerns in regard to the Indo-US nuclear deal and the US-backed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver for India. This volte-face in American policy, which has always championed non-proliferation, has undermined the non-proliferation regime and fuelled India’s defence modernisation and expansion. Pakistan’s consistent diplomatic stance on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) does not mean that Pakistan would necessarily increase its deterrent forces. Despite not being a part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and non-signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pakistan unilaterally and voluntarily maintains a moratorium on nuclear testing, has a modest number of deterrent forces, follows credible minimum deterrence, keeps nuclear weapons for defensive purposes only and accepts the internationally verifiable, non-discriminatory and criteria-based non-proliferation endeavours.

Efforts should, therefore, be made to create an effective and enduring “criteria-based approach” for the non-NPT states to protect their right of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Inclusion of Pakistan in the NSG through a revised criteria-based mechanism to preserve its right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology would strengthen, not weaken, the nuclear order.

This paper offers five proposals that seek a delicate balance in the competing interests amongst various parties in achieving strategic stability in South Asia and preserving each state’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology without expecting Pakistan to compromise its legitimate imperative of maintaining credible minimum deterrence. The proposals are: 1) normalising the global nuclear order to make it consistent with emerging realities; 2) regulating India’s emerging nuclear modernisation by addressing the growing conventional force asymmetry; 3) addressing the issues that hinder arms control in South Asia; 4) re-considering strategic dilemma affecting South Asia; and 5) resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

The significance of these proposals is to assist international community in understanding Pakistan’s nuclear legitimacy and its consistent endeavours to join
international nuclear mainstream to be part of the evolving global nuclear order as a responsible nuclear weapons state. All the above mentioned recommendations are linked with the decisions of major states, mainly the US. Problems within the international nuclear order are not because of Pakistan. Major Powers’ double standards — application of more stringent rules towards one state and a lax approach towards other — have made the international nuclear order skewed. Trust and cooperation have been lacking due to non-fulfilment of the powerful states’ commitments to Article VI of the NPT. Pursuit of these proposals may help strengthen non-proliferation norms, promote peace, reduce the risk of nuclear weapons’ use in South Asia and support peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Also, it is important for India and Pakistan to rationalise their military plans under some budgetary regime and secure peace and stability in South Asia.
Nuclear Paper Series No. 2
Pakistan and India: Non-Proliferation Credentials
Executive Summary

Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapons state. It has always supported the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Pakistan has joined efforts to strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation regime and has put forward proposals ranging from a strategic restraint regime comprising nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution to nuclear weapons free zones to a regional test ban treaty. However, India has rejected all these efforts and has always tried to jeopardise regional peace and stability by nuclear and conventional build-up. India has destabilised strategic deterrence by its threatening postures and aggressive policies. Pakistan opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, but was compelled to acquire them to defend itself once India had tested weapons and nuclearised the region. Pakistan still opposes an open-ended nuclear arms race in the region and believes in maintaining a strategic balance. Pakistan has always assured the international community that it acquired its nuclear weapons capability only to address its security challenges. It has developed this capability to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan’s interest in peaceful nuclear technology dates back to the age of “Atoms for Peace,” but now this interest has become a necessity and a top priority to meet the challenges of energy security for economic development and prosperity. Pakistan’s nuclear energy goal of producing 40,000 MW by 2050 stems from its growing energy demands. Pakistan cannot attain this objective alone in this time frame. It requires a non-discriminatory and supportive international environment, specifically through a uniform criteria-based approach for its entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Like other nations, who aspire to enhance or develop their peaceful nuclear programmes, Pakistan wants to participate in the NSG with an assurance to promote principles of international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Claiming that it has a spotless non-proliferation record, India has demanded that it should be included in the nuclear mainstream countries and also made formal part of the NSG. However, a closer examination reveals that India’s non-proliferation record is far from exemplary. The most glaring example of its proliferation activity is the 1974 nuclear explosion, for which India diverted nuclear fuel from Canadian reactors, supplied for peaceful purposes, to conduct its nuclear test. As such, India became the first country to divert peaceful nuclear resources towards weapons use. Interestingly, the NSG was created in the wake of this explosion specifically aimed at preventing the diversion of civil nuclear technology for military purposes in future. India has also proliferated by indulging in illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear items, by leaking centrifuge know-how, and by running a poorly implemented national export control regime. The safety and security of India’s nuclear installations is also questionable because there are many reported instances of nuclear thefts and security breaches. With the US and other countries ready to enhance civil nuclear cooperation with India, the safety and security of its nuclear installations is a matter of great concern and urgency, as secure facilities and assets could lead to greater onward proliferation or nuclear terrorism. India’s non-
proliferation record is, thereby, far from unblemished, as it claims, as it has a long list of documented breaches.
Nuclear Paper Series No. 3
Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects
Executive Summary

India and Pakistan have a seven decades long history of hostile and acrimonious relations interspersed with three major wars and some serious border skirmishes within the first 25 years of their existence as sovereign states. Since 1971, however, there has been no major war between the two neighbours, though the uneasy peace between them has been dotted with some serious crises and a major clash of arms across the Line of Control in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir, in 1999. It was hoped, that after the overt nuclearisation of the two South Asian antagonists, a period of relative calm and stability would ensue in the region. However, strategic stability in South Asia has remained elusive and in recent years with the breakdown of the ‘Composite Dialogue’ process and growing frequency and intensity of firing incidents across the Line of Control as well as the Working Boundary, new challenges to strategic stability have emerged. The tendency, on part of the Indian media as well as some political elements in India, to term any terrorist incident happening on Indian soil as “Cross-border Terrorism”, and accusing Pakistani establishment of complicity, without even waiting for the outcome of their own official investigations, has repeatedly derailed on-going efforts aimed at reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

These trends, even after the passage of over a decade and a half since India and Pakistan conducted tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998, are disturbing to say the least. It was not unrealistic to expect that the two South Asian neighbours would curb their tendencies for sabre rattling and brinkmanship, and develop institutionalised mechanisms for crisis management and implement appropriate confidence building measures (CBMs), to stabilise their security relationship. Unfortunately, such hopes have not yet been realised, tensions run high, and the regional stability remains fragile. The Composite Dialogue initiated in 2004, with a lot of promise, has not yielded much, except some useful CBMs. The dialogue was unfortunately disrupted after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, and several efforts to breathe fresh life into it have so far failed to materialise.

Undoubtedly, there are elements on both sides which would not like to see peace and amity between the two countries and in the recent past, non-state actors and violent groups have, on several occasions, precipitated incidents that brought the two South Asian neighbours to the brink of war. The recent unprecedented stopover at Lahore by the Indian Prime Minister, though high on optics rather than substance, had raised hopes of resumption of the long-stalled dialogue and improvement in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The visit itself followed a series of positive engagements including the exchange of pleasantries between the two Prime Ministers on the sidelines of the Climate Summit at Paris, the meeting at Bangkok between the respective National Security Advisors, the signing of the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas pipeline) agreement, and visit to Islamabad by Indian External Affairs Minister to attend the Heart of Asia meeting. The Indian Prime Minister’s Lahore visit had created the kind of positive atmosphere that was needed for the resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks that had been scheduled for mid-January 2016. However, a terrorist attack at an Indian airbase a little over a week after the visit, has played straight into the hands of
hostile Indian media and the political opposition that had already been critical of Prime Minister Modi’s initiative. Pakistan, on its part, has not only condemned the incident, but has also offered cooperation to India. One would only hope that sagacity would prevail and the Foreign Secretaries talks would be rescheduled but not called off. With ‘peace and security’ being one of the ten core issues of the ‘Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue’, a stalled dialogue process between the two nuclear armed states would have an adverse impact on strategic stability in South Asia.
Launch of the Reports
February 12, 2016

Welcome
Remarks/Speeches/Presentations/
Concluding Remarks
Welcome Remarks
Ambassador Masood Khan

We are so pleased to have Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry in our midst to launch these three reports. He has ably led our delegations to nuclear talks with the US and to multiple disarmament and non-proliferation bilateral and multilateral forums as Foreign Secretary, and earlier, as Additional Foreign Secretary. He is our Chief Negotiator for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. We are proud of his achievements.

I also welcome Mr. Khalid Banuri, Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), who has been making solid contribution to Pakistan's nuclear policy for the past several years.

Today is a good day for the Institute we as we launch three reports under our Nuclear Paper Series.

I do not want to steal six proud authors' thunder who are going to present their reports today; but I will say a few words to set the scene for today's launch.

Pakistan wants peace and a peaceful neighbourhood. We want space to develop our country economically so that we can raise the living standards of our people. We need peace and stability to devote time to the issues of governance, education, health, employment, human rights and, in the process, create opportunities for development of individuals and communities and uninterrupted evolution of Pakistan as a modern state, a state that promotes respect for plurality and diversity within and outside Pakistan.

To achieve all these objectives, security of the state of Pakistan is paramount. It is the collective resolve of the people of Pakistan that we would defend our sovereignty, territory, and our independence at all costs. Our birth as a nation was the result of a prolonged struggle and traumatic experiences. Our genesis, and the ideals that inspired the creation of Pakistan, spur us to make Pakistan a great nation.

When striving for greatness in the 1950s and the 1960s, we were not seeking to become a nuclear power. In fact, during that period we ardently advocated peaceful uses of nuclear technology, diffusion of scientific and industrial knowhow for research and economic development, and nuclear non-proliferation. Under Atoms for Peace programme, we established our own rudimentary nucleus for nuclear research for peaceful purposes.

But our neighbour, India, decided to divert US nuclear assistance to military uses and conduct its first nuclear test in 1974. This was after Pakistan had been dismembered in 1971 by India; and Indian leaders threatened to strike again to disintegrate the rest of Pakistan. Pakistan was exposed and vulnerable to aggression and annihilation as a state.
We had to save the remaining part of our state. It was under these circumstances and in this national frame of mind that Pakistan started its nuclear programme to protect itself.

Pakistan still did not believe that nuclearisation of South Asia was good for peace and stability. Therefore, for some 24 years till 1998, Pakistan presented a series of proposals at the United Nations to make South Asia a nuclear weapon free zone; but India rejected all these proposals.

In 1998, India tested again and Pakistan followed suit. After the test, we again proposed a number of measures to keep South Asia stable through a strategic restraint regime comprising nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution. India has not embraced these proposals yet.

India's nuclear programme is status-driven; ours is motivated by self-defence. Our programme is India-specific; India targets Pakistan, China, neighbourhood and regions beyond our region.

Pakistan is building a symmetric, credible deterrent vis-a-vis India; and it would be a full spectrum deterrent to encompass India's Cold Start, nuclear triad and tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan would not seek parity, but it would secure its full defence through the equaliser of nuclear deterrent that would offset conventional imbalance. That is why we need tactical nuclear weapons, short range delivery vehicles, and missiles that can reach the Andaman and Nicobar islands.

Pakistan has demonstrated a posture of utmost restraint and responsibility. That is why, we have engaged India on nuclear confidence building and effective communication; and both countries have made some progress in this area.

Let's us hope that there would be no war and that the diplomatic efforts to start dialogue and address issues of peace and security, including nuclear issues, would succeed. But, if there are hostilities against Pakistan, ever, we should be prepared and we would be prepared.

Pakistan does not play the victim. Our dignity does not allow us to do that.

But it is a fact that Pakistan has been discriminated. After its tests in 1974, India was treated indulgently, while all sorts of sanctions were slapped on Pakistan. All sorts of steps were taken to stop Pakistan from developing its nuclear programme. India tested again in 1998 and a decade later it was rewarded with a waiver for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a body that was created to counter India's proliferation. Pakistan has not been given similar reception. This gross discrimination must come to an end.

One argument often used for justifying discrimination is that India is lily white; and Pakistan is sullied. Not true on both counts. Empirical evidence contradicts such a generalisation. Pakistan has creditable non-proliferation credentials.
Pakistan and India, both non-NPT nuclear weapon states, should enter into the NSG simultaneously on the basis of a single criterion. Double standards should not be applied. Pakistan should be given space to pursue its legitimate nuclear trade and participate in the work of export control regimes.

Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state and that is a reality. We were told in the 1970s to the 1990s that Pakistan was bluffing. We were not. And then after the tests, we were told not to test, because if we did, we would be punished. We were punished; but we survived.

Pakistan should pursue a dialogue for a civil nuclear deal with the US, but not at the expense of the legitimate growth and refinement of its nuclear programme. There should be no pricey pre-conditions for Pakistan to get what India was given pro bono.

Pakistan would not accept any restrictions on its nuclear programme in regard to its battlefield nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles or its programme as a whole.

The six authors in the three reports are going to explore four main themes: (1) Pakistan is a legitimate, de jure, normal nuclear power in the global nuclear order; (2) Pakistan's non-proliferation credentials are better than India's; (3) Pakistan has legitimate needs for nuclear energy; and (4) Pakistan seeks strategic stability in South Asia.

I thank Dr. Zafar and Dr. Rizwan Abbasi of the National Defence University (NDU) for taking the initiative. They would no doubt be remembered for setting a new trend. I also compliment the Institute's three researchers - Malik Qasim, Ghazala and Tahir - for their hard work. And last, but not least, we are grateful to Dr. Brigadier Naeem Salik, who is an authority on nuclear matters, for his timely submission of his paper on strategic stability in South Asia, written in his capacity as Distinguished Fellow of the Institute.

All six have compelling narratives to tell which we will hear momentarily.
Inaugural Address
Honourable Mr. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry

The launch of Nuclear Paper Series is a welcome initiative by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). The papers being launched under this initiative delve into three inter-related themes and will help contribute to the debate on strategic stability in South Asia and how it is impacted not only by developments, but also by the approach of international community, in particular that of the major powers, towards the region.

Academia and think tanks have an important role to play in bringing a fresh outlook on issues, evaluating them from diverse perspective and thus broadening policy options for policy makers and enlightening the general public about issues in which it is a direct stake holder. I would like to congratulate Ambassador Masood Khan that under his leadership ISSI is endeavouring to perform these functions admirably. I would also like to express my appreciation for the authors of these papers for a job well done.

We are a peace-loving nation that was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of a grave threat that we could have ignored only at great peril to our national security and sovereignty. Pakistan’s reluctant entry into the nuclear club is well-documented. After 1974 when the first nuclear test was conducted in our neighbourhood, Pakistan made several proposals for keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons and missiles. The included simultaneous application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities and bilateral arrangements for their reciprocal inspections; simultaneous accession to the NPT; regional CTBT; Zero Missile Regime in South Asia; and signing of a Non-Aggression Pact. Unfortunately, none of these proposals met a favourable response. Neither did the international community intervene to assuage our security concerns. This left us with no option but to develop nuclear deterrence in the pursuit of undiminished and equal security which is a right enshrined in the final document of the UN General Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament.

In the wake of South Asia’s overt nuclearisation, we have demonstrated our commitment to peace and stability in the region by putting forward the comprehensive strategic stability proposal, which is premised on three interlocking and mutually reinforcing elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance. This proposal remains on the table. If pursued with sincerity, this proposal can lay the foundation of lasting peace and stability in the region.

As a nuclear state, Pakistan has always endeavoured to fulfil its international obligations. Despite not being a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have placed all our civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards with an impeccable and faithful compliance record. Pakistan has a four-decade long experience of safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants.
Our nuclear safety and security measures are in line with the best international standards and practices. Over the past fifteen years or so, Pakistan has taken a series of measures which include, establishment of a robust command and control system, an effective export control regime, and steps to improve nuclear security at all levels. We are also actively and constructively engaged with the international community including the IAEA, Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Our strong credentials as a nuclear state qualify us for being mainstreamed in the global nuclear order. The global non-proliferation regime also stands to gain from our membership.

In order to meet its exponentially increasing energy needs and to support sustained economic growth and industrial development in the years to come, civil nuclear power generation is an imperative necessity for Pakistan. Our energy requirements are expected to grow by a factor of 7 over the next two decades. Hence, our national goal to expand our nuclear energy capacity to 50,000 MW as envisaged by the Vision 2050. In order to meet this objective Pakistan needs to be granted NSG membership in accordance with a non-discriminatory, uniform and criteria-based approach. Pakistan's membership would also be of immense benefit to NSG’s credibility and effectiveness as a non-proliferation regime.

Strategic stability in South Asia has been negatively impacted by the Indo-US nuclear deal and the discriminatory waiver granted to India by NSG. The apprehensions expressed by us and shared by objective analysts are turning out to be fully justified by subsequent developments. The recent reports by NTI, ISIS and other assessments by international experts corroborate that the NSG waiver has allowed India to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks with grave implication for strategic stability in the region.

In order ensure Asia’s long term peace, stability and prosperity, it is essential for the international community to adopt an approach to this region that is even-handed and criteria-based rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations or political expediency.

Pakistan’s conduct as a nuclear weapon state will continue to be defined by restraint and responsibility. As we seek to ensure our national security, credible minimum deterrence remains our guiding principle. We will also continue to pursue constructive engagement with the international community including the non-proliferation regimes as a confident and responsible nuclear state.

Pakistan believes that the scarce resources of our region should be devoted to the socio-economic development of our people. We need a willing and constructive partner to tackle myriads of daunting challenges that beset our region including disease, poverty, illiteracy, climate change and environmental degradation. A peaceful neighbourhood is the **sine qua non** to build prosperous societies.
I would conclude my remarks by once again congratulating the Institute of Strategic Studies for producing these well-researched papers which will help further crystallize the discourse around nuclear issues in South Asia.
Keynote Speech
Mr. Khalid Banuri

I must commence with appreciation for ISSI’s discussion about balanced narratives that are representative of all contending perspectives. There is a need to know Pakistani perspective. We must keep in view that our better futures are intrinsically linked to billions others in an increasingly interconnected world. Dispute resolution, dialogue, military balance, equal security and non-discrimination, would enhance stability in our region, thereby bringing security to all.

Pakistan’s Perspective

The purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear capability is simultaneous pursuit of regional peace, national progress and prosperity. Pakistan was not the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia, nor was it the first to conduct nuclear testing. It has maintained modest force posture and rationality in its doctrine, to credibly deter one adversary that keeps expanding the spectrum of threat, for which Pakistan has to adjust, for its national security.

We desire regional peace, stability and security while remaining strongly committed to international non-proliferation norms. Our nuclear arsenal is meant to deter and defeat external aggression against Pakistan that emanates from our neighboring state. We have a firm resolve in maintaining the standards par excellence in safety and security, personnel reliability, material security, capabilities and knowledge or information.

Our nuclear capabilities are meant to maintain peace in the region by assuring both our nation as well as the world that we garner no ill will against any other nation, but are determined to prevent aggression.

Pakistan’s nuclear security has always received special attention. There is consistent effort to ensure that sensitive technologies, materials and equipment remain under stringent control in the international spirit of non-proliferation.

Pakistan considers nuclear deterrence, as a long-term and cost-effective factor of stability with India and any geostrategic, political or technological development that tends to undermine it, would impact regional security and stability thereby affecting the peace process in South Asia. The sole purpose of Pakistan’s concept of deterrence is to prevent war by preserving peace. The conventional and strategic capabilities are geared towards this national objective.

Pakistan continues to firmly pursue a policy of credible minimum deterrence. All other assertions simply reassert this philosophy. This remains our persistent policy. The threat emanates from our eastern border. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability is based on this security imperative and unlike India, are not weapons of prestige.
Our entire nuclear arsenal remains firmly centralized through an assertive command and control system under the National Command Authority, which is led by Prime Minister. Their sole purpose is to prevent external aggression and ensure defense of the State. Pakistan continues with its policy pillars of restraint and responsibility.

Pakistan’s nuclear policy is geared to ensuring regional security dynamics and our national resolve to devote sufficient resources towards our nuclear program, manifested in the form of Credible Minimum Deterrence. This means that only necessary national resources will be devoted to ensure that deterrence prevails against all forms of external aggression, irrespective of its speed, nature, scale or size.

As regards weapons development, it does, and continues to be, governed by our threat perception. States make their assessments on capabilities rather than intent. The frenzy of conventional weapons shopping in our neighborhood is an important factor, for us to do what we must.

**Challenges and Opportunities**

Regretfully the geo-strategic environment in our region has several negative indicators. There is an increasingly belligerent India, whose relations with most of its neighbors have deteriorated over time. On one hand, its weapons development continues with a frenzy – it is the largest buyer of conventional weapons, its strategic weapons continue to develop in their size, variety and scale – be it nuclear submarines, rising missile ranges together with canisterization and MIRV-ing, acquisition of BMD technologies military satellites, nuclear reactors out of safeguards – the list seems endless.

Due to Pakistan’s proactive steps, terrorism is decreasing in Pakistan and is growing elsewhere in the world – Pakistan is growing securer and stronger while some other States are raising this menace for themselves as well as their neighbors.

It is both in the interest of Pakistan and India to ensure that strategic stability prevails in South Asia but it is also equally imperative for the international community not to take actions that undermines it.

Strategic restraint through a comprehensive strategic stability approach cannot be unilateral or insensitive to the regional geo-strategic, political and technological trends.

The behavior of international community towards nuclear mainstreaming of any State should be based on uniform criteria-based approach instead of a country specific approach, which is destabilizing for both regional strategic stability and dangerous for international security.
Conclusion

Pakistan’s policy is shaped by strategic constraints that are quite structural in nature and cannot be wished away. Pakistan wants dignified and peaceful co-existence in South Asia. Any dialogue process sans conflict resolutions would not contribute to durable peace in South Asia.

Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power, which is not only confident of its capabilities but also cognizant of its international obligations and national needs. Like all peace-loving and determined nations of the world, we also desire peace, progress and prosperity for ourselves and true to the vision of our founding fathers, intend to help contribute towards the peace, progress and prosperity of the whole world and entire humanity. We will not accept any hegemonistic designs.

No country in the world has made greater sacrifices for international peace and security, particularly against the menace of terrorism, both on our own soil and also around the world, through our UN peacekeeping missions. The world must recognize our peaceful intentions; respect our strong and proven credentials and benefits from the knowledge, experience and resource, which we can offer to an increasingly interdependent world, for the common benefit of mankind and to our future generations.
Presentation
Dr. Zafar Khan

I will briefly be covering the central argument of my portion of the paper: the Deterrence Part; that is, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture in the Competing Strategic Environment,” before Dr. Rizwana who would then centrally cover the non-proliferation aspect of our joint paper entitled, “Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order” launched today under the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), for which we thank the Director General, Ambassador Masood Khan, and his entire team at the ISSI.

Let me say that Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons for security purposes as security remains the predominant factor in state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was not the first to acquire nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is India-centric. It credibly aims at preventing limited and bigger wars, avoiding the risk of nuclear war and averting the erosion of deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistan considers nuclear weapons for deterrence rather than for war fighting purposes, but at the same time it ensures that the essential ingredients associated with its nuclear weapons such as the capability, credibility, survivability and penetrability are not undermined by the growing and competing strategic environment in South Asia.

If nuclear weapons are considered as source of concerned, then it is also important to consider that nuclear weapons avoided the risk of major wars between the major and smaller nuclear weapons states no matter what nuclear strategies each nuclear weapons state followed. Nuclear weapons encourage strategic patience and strategic restraint between the two nuclear weapons states. Because of the risk and fear associated with nuclear weapons, these types of weapons promote rationality and a greater sense of responsibility to avoid miscalculation. It is because of this fear and a sense of responsibility linked with nuclear weapons that major powers behaved rationally and they intervene in the inter-state rivalry of other nuclear weapons states to avoid the risk of bigger military confrontation leading up to the nuclear level. Nuclear weapons ensure nuclear peace between the two nuclear weapons states if one is to revisit closely the Waltzian dynamics of nuclear optimism. No two nuclear weapons states have fought major wars. Even if they have fought one, that remained limited without crossing of the international borders.

In this context, Pakistan’s nuclear capability ensures the defensive rather than offensive posture to avoid the possibility of war between the two South Asian nuclear states (i.e., India and Pakistan). Arguably, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability is for defensive purposes. Although it had a multiple nuclear policy options to opt for while closely observing the Cold War period, Pakistan rationally opted for a credible minimum deterrence. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrence has deterred the adversary in the past and it can deter in the future as well.

Pakistan is not interested in weapon-to-weapon arms race, but India’s competing strategies and its strategic nexus with major powers would make the other side rely
on nuclear weapons and proportionally increase its deterrence forces in order to sustain deterrence stability. However, it will not be a nuclear parity, but a balance that is essential for strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s deterrent forces still fall with the broader parameters of minimum deterrence as compared to other nuclear weapons states who possessed hundred and thousands of nuclear weapons. Some of them even do not confront the security threat, particularly after the end of the Cold War. Others are still in possession of world’s 90% of nuclear weapons. Still others have developed a significant amount of capacity and capability to produce many deterrent forces. Pakistan still officially states that it follows credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan’s pursuit of Full-Spectrum Deterrence is an essential part of these strategic endeavours to sustain deterrence stability that gets eroded from time to time by what the other side strategises. Conceptually, Pakistan’s treatment of full-spectrum deterrence is different from what the others perceive.

Full spectrum deterrence falls within the broader parameters of minimum deterrence; it suffices the minimum deterrence; it does not necessarily have to do with increasing the number of deterrent forces; it stays one of the essential pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear policy; it eases the unexpected pressures on command and control system; it endorses the nuclear peace; it strengthens the credibility of minimum deterrence; it avoids the erosion of deterrence stability in South Asia; it addresses the issues of increasing conventional asymmetry; it remains defensive; it plugs the missing gaps within deterrence; and it deters all forms of aggressions both at the strategic and tactical level.

Pakistan’s position is determined by how the so-called global nuclear order prevails. The contemporary global nuclear order is discriminatory and unjust that needs to be normalised. The gradual South Asian changing strategic environment such as India’s military Cold Start Doctrine that remains offensive, India’s development of non-strategic battlefield weapons, its strides for an assured second-strike capability in the form of nuclear submarine, the development of Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), plans for the development of Multi-independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system and possible preparation for the H-Bomb have further worsened and undermined the strategic stability in South Asia. This shows India’s grand nuclear strategy aspiring for a great power status and demonstrating power projection in the region. Pakistan’s nuclear posture, which falls within the broader contours of credible minimum deterrence, remains defensive against these growing and competing strategies in South Asia.
Presentation
Dr. Rizwana Abbasi

I will place my major focus on issues associated with the nuclear non-proliferation Regime and Pakistan’s Mainstreaming.

First of all, our contention is that the existence of the non-proliferation regime is a significant endeavour, but we also understand that Pakistan may not become part of the NPT and the CTBT or join lopsided negotiations on the FMCT that, at the moment, tends to be flawed, discriminatory and inconsistent. However, Pakistan continues to adhere to the highest standards of non-proliferation without compromising on its core national interests.

The first question arises, why does Pakistan not join the NPT? First, Pakistan did not sign the NPT because it has serious reservations about the structure of this treaty that promotes considerable division between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states on selective basis, and has led to arguments that the NPT is primarily focused on safeguarding the interests of the P-5 states. Second, the NPT has made no progress towards disarmament, thus perpetuating the crisis of trust. Third, the NPT did not offer any incentive to Pakistan towards safeguarding its national security interests against existential threat coming from India. Fourth, the NPT failed to constrain states’ behaviour that legitimise and maximise their absolute gains thus, compromising the spirit of the treaty. The Indo-US nuclear deal is a significant case in point. Fifth, there exist considerable ambiguities and confusion between the clauses on non-proliferation and right of peaceful uses of nuclear technologies that put substantial pressure on the applicability of the NPT in the 21st century.

The second question emerges, what are the difficulties associated with the FMCT and the CTBT?

Pakistan has a principled diplomatic stance on the FMCT. Pakistan insists that negotiations on all four items agreed to in the Shannon Mandate of 1995 - be pursued simultaneously.

For Islamabad, many factors deepen the impasse of the FMCT negotiations. One, the FMCT needs to be a non-discriminatory and universally verifiable treaty. Second, Pakistan does not agree with the term “cut-off” as it does not cover the existing stocks of fissile material. Third, the FMCT should be conceived as a genuine disarmament measure, not devoted merely to the goals of non-proliferation. Four, non-inclusion of “existing stockpiles” of fissile materials puts Pakistan in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis its adversary, India. Five, Pakistan believes that the US-India nuclear deal and the NSG’s special waiver to India have unquestionably given India an advantage.
On CTBT, despite not being part of the CTBT, Pakistan has already conformed voluntarily to its core purpose by not conducting more nuclear weapons tests. However, if India tests again, Pakistan could revisit its conditional moratorium.

There are many reasons for Pakistan not taking a unilateral approach to signing the CTBT: One, it is unclear whether India would follow suit at all, given its intention to build hydrogen bombs. Two, Pakistan will not be recognised as a nuclear weapons state by the NPT member states even if it signs the CTBT. Three, Pakistan may not secure substantial support for its peaceful nuclear programme unlike India. Finally, unilaterally joining the CTBT does not serve Pakistan’s interests, especially when India could possibly go for more tests. If Pakistan were to join and quit because of India’s possible tests, such a reversal would have a hugely costly strategic impact on Pakistan.

While not joining the NPT and the CTBT or the FMCT negotiations for obvious reasons, Pakistan is conducting itself as a responsible nuclear weapon state. This unilateral conformity of Pakistan with nuclear normalcy and responsibility necessitates an appropriate strategy by the international community to remove restrictions on Pakistan to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

We propose that the NSG need to redefine its guidelines with emphasis on nuclear cooperation with new nuclear weapon states based on equality and justice, which is consistent with current political realities.

Now the question arises: what is normalisation and mainstreaming? We believe that Pakistan is already a normal and responsible nuclear weapon state. Mainstreaming means: giving Pakistan its due recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Entry into the NSG alone, however, would not mainstream Pakistan. It is high time that the international community recognise Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state in the evolving global nuclear order based on mutual trust, mutual respect, transparency and dignity. We make the following five proposals that may help mainstream Pakistan in the international system.

1. **Normalising the global nuclear order by making it consistent with emerging realities:** One, we believe that there is an urgent need to envisage a new consensus on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation under the UN Charter, based the principle of “equal security for all” thus deploying relax and uniform criteria that binds all states. Two, attach India and Pakistan to the NPT as nuclear weapon states through a protocol or new regime. Three, efforts should be made to create an effective and enduring “criteria-based approach” for these new nuclear weapon states to join the NSG. Thus, in this process, inclusion of Pakistan in the NSG should strengthen, not weaken, the nuclear order.

2. **Regulating India’s modernisation by addressing the growing conventional force asymmetry:** Instead of creating imbalance by rewarding India with material support, the US can help construct a security regime to address the two states’ insecurities and political complexities.
3. **Addressing the issues that hinder the arms control regime between India and Pakistan**: Potential exists in South Asia for an arms control process, which would require a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral endeavours to pave the way for a peaceful strategic environment where India and Pakistan may rationalise their military plans under some budgetary regime.

4. **Re-considering strategic dilemma**: We call this a syndrome of extra-regional link. In this case, whatever strategically happens between the US and China, would affect the equation between China and India. Arguably, that would then affect Pakistan. Arms reduction and policy restraint at the top level i.e., the US and Russia including France and Britain reduce the pressure on the lower level i.e., China, India and Pakistan.

5. **Resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan**: We argue that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is a question of international law, therefore, it requires intercession of the international community and support of the leading states, such as the US, to help find a lasting solution based on aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Any peace process will remain fruitless unless the issue of Kashmir is addressed based on the right to self-determination.

All the above-mentioned measures are interlinked with the role of major states, mainly the US. Thus we are arguing that problems within the international nuclear order are not because of Pakistan, but because of complex system level politics (that is major powers’ politics) and structural problems associated within the regime.
Presentation
Malik Qasim Mustafa

Honourable Foreign Secretary, H.E. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen; it is an honour and great pleasure for me to share my views at the launch of this nuclear paper series by the ISSI. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Masood Khan, Director General, ISSI, for taking another initiative by launching this series, and for his support, encouragement and guidance, which enabled us - the ISSI nuclear team - to timely prepare and present the second paper of this series titled “Pakistan and India: Non-Proliferation Credentials.”

Honourable chief guest, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is a well-known fact that Western media and think tanks have always criticised Pakistan’s nuclear programme, but they have hardly appreciated or acknowledged Pakistan’s non-proliferation credentials and its role in maintaining strategic stability in the South Asian region. But it is also an undeniable fact that after decades of efforts, Pakistan has emerged as a responsible nuclear state. Therefore, in order to counter criticism and to advocate for Pakistan’s rightful place among other responsible nuclear states, I have made an attempt to contribute a chapter by capturing broad contours of Pakistan’s non-proliferation credentials, during its pre and post-nuclear test phases.

When one revisits the pre-test phase, it becomes clear that Pakistan emerged as a progressive and responsible state with a desire to contribute towards regional as well as international peace and security. It adopted a normative approach to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons and their complete eradication, and advocated harnessing the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. Pakistan positively pursued these objectives at the UN and at other multilateral forums. Its support to establish UN Disarmament Commission; support for Atoms for Peace Initiative; support for nuclear test ban at UN and at other multilateral forums; signing of the IAEA Statute; and its support for the Irish Proposal were some of its earlier non-proliferation credentials.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is important to understand that from 1960s to the 1990s, Pakistan’s normative nuclear diplomacy faced many setbacks due to growing fears of horizontal and vertical proliferation; Indian aggression and its power maximisation against Pakistan after its so-called peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE); as well as western discrimination against Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. But Pakistan stood firm in support of non-proliferation objectives and made every effort to contain nuclearisation of the South Asian region. It signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT); supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) deliberations; initiated a campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia; proposed a joint declaration to renounce the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapon and mutual signing of the NPT. But India refused to follow these non-proliferation objectives.
In the meantime, although Pakistan initiated its nuclear weapons programme to maintain a balance and to reduce its vulnerabilities vis-a-vis India. But it continued to support UN resolutions for a nuclear test ban agreement and proposed a regional test ban treaty with India. It joined nuclear safety and security-related initiatives and conventions, and participated in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations despite its reservations with regard to fair play, non-discrimination and a comprehensive approach.

Similarly, recapturing the post-test phase again highlights that Pakistan even as a nuclear weapons state continued to improve its non-proliferation credentials, simultaneously, at national, regional and international level. There is a long list of these credentials as they broadly range from unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to a proposal of regional test ban treaty; from its advocacy for a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) to a proposal to de-nuclearise South Asia; and from establishment of a robust national command and control structure to practical measures to ensure safety and security of its nuclear assets.

At a regional front, Pakistan embarked upon a path to maintain a strategic restraint regime with an objective to arrest nuclear arms race and to avoid a nuclear war with India. It also offered several nuclear-related CBMs to India, but India hardly paid any attention.

At the national front, Pakistan formalised the administration of all of its strategic organisations, established its National Command Authority (NCA), and deployed more than 28,000 personnel to keep a tight vigil of its strategic assets. It also established new nuclear regulatory structures and made changes to its export control laws, which are regularly refined and updated in harmony with other multilateral export control regimes.

On the international front, Pakistan made a commitment to work as an equal partner to the goals of non-proliferation and a world free of nuclear weapons. Its contributions towards the UN 1540 Committee; Container Security Initiative (CSI); Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); Mega Port Initiative (MPI); and its participation in all three Nuclear Security Summits (2010, 2012, and 2014) are some recent examples of its non-proliferation credentials.

To conclude, past and present non-proliferation credentials clearly demonstrate that Pakistan has emerged as a responsible nuclear state. It wishes to maintain a strategic balance and does not seek parity with India. It has always urged a non-discriminatory and uniformed international approach, which can help promote the principles of international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Therefore, instead of a political bias, the regime should recognise Pakistan’s legitimate security and energy needs, and it should appreciate Pakistan’s positive contributions towards nuclear safety and security and non-proliferation. Pakistan is an equal and responsible nuclear partner and engaging it in a constructive manner will strengthen the regime, which will enhance international trade for peaceful purposes.
Presentation
Ghazala Yasmin Jalil

India has time and again claimed that it has a spotless non-proliferation record and that it should be included in the nuclear mainstream countries and also made part of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. However, it seems India’s non-proliferation record is not as clean as it would have us believe. One of the most glaring examples is the 1974 nuclear explosion itself, for which India diverted nuclear fuel from Canadian reactors, supplied for peaceful and civilian use, to conduct a nuclear weapons test. Ironically, the NSG was created in the wake of this explosion specifically aimed at preventing the diversion of civil nuclear technology for military purposes in future. India has always tried to take moral high ground by demanding “complete nuclear disarmament” and non-discriminatory approach in non-proliferation fora. However, it has pursued an aggressive nuclear weapons programme in order to achieve a major regional and global power status.

On its road to the nuclear weapon status, it has proliferated in many ways – by illicit procurement, centrifuge know-how leakage, and a poor implementation of national export control system. Moreover, the safety and security of its nuclear installations is also in question where there are many instances of nuclear thefts and security breaches.

Some brief details of India’s proliferation activities are:

1) Illicit Procurement

Over the years Indian nuclear entities and companies have procured nuclear dual-use material and equipment without revealing to the supplier that the end user is an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant. According to two reports by Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), India has a tendering process for acquiring equipment for it gas centrifuge programme. The Department of Atomic Energy’s (DAE) sub-entity Indian Rare Earths (IRE) uses websites and newspapers to invite companies for supply or manufacture of equipment without specifying that the end user is a gas centrifuge programme under the DAE. This went on for years.

The tendering process in turn results in Centrifuge Know-How Leakage. Interested bidders can purchase documents which contain drawings and precise specifications. The level of detail is such that these documents would be considered classified in supplier countries.

According to a 2008 ISIS report, India also used middle companies for illicit procurements of Tributyl Phosphate (TBP) from German and Russian suppliers. TBT is a dual use chemical used in nuclear programme to separate plutonium.
2) *Poorly-Implemented National Export Control System*

Indian export controls are poorly implemented with a greater possibility of onward proliferation. Under inadequate Indian export controls, once imported items are re-exported, it can be a great source of concern vis-à-vis onward proliferation. With the India-US civil nuclear deal coming through and many other Western countries engaging in nuclear trade with India, there will be a dramatic increase in nuclear dual use items. The issue of onward proliferation will become a more pressing one.

3) *Illicit Heavy Water Acquisitions*

India’s nuclear programme requires a steady stream of heavy water. During the 1980s, India arranged illicit shipments of Chinese, Soviet and Norwegian heavy water to help start the Madras and Dhruya reactors. Between 1983 and 1989 India received at least 80 tons of Soviet heavy water under the table, and 26.5 tons of Norwegian heavy water through diversions.

4) *Nuclear Thefts and Accidents*

India has had a long history of thefts of nuclear material and mishaps or near accidents at its nuclear facilities. This raises concerns over onward proliferation of nuclear materials as well as the safety and security of its nuclear facilities. Many international reports in recent year have raised concerns over the safety of India’s nuclear installations and the potential for nuclear material to fall into the wrong hands and subsequent threats of nuclear terrorism.

There is a long list of incidents of thefts and security breaches and there is not enough time to go through all of them. However, just to give you an idea, according to an Indian parliamentary report, 147 mishaps or security-related occurrences were reported in Indian atomic energy plants between the period of 1995 to 1998. Out of these instances, 28 were of acute nature and 9 of these occurred in nuclear power installations. According to the 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Index which assesses the security of nuclear materials around the world, India scores below Pakistan, and is ranked only above North Korea and Iran. India ranks at 23, Pakistan at 22.

5) *Proliferation by Individuals and Entities: Links with Iranian and Iraqi Programmes*

India has a history of cooperation with Iran. During the period of 1980-3, India helped in building the Bushehr nuclear plant and also sent scientists and personnel to Iran.

The George W. Bush administration sanctioned several Indian entities for transferring technologies and know-how to Iraq and Iran that could contribute to chemical or biological weapons programmes. The US also sanctioned several Indian scientists for facilitating Iran’s WMD and missile-related programme.
Conclusion

The whole point is that India does not have an impeccable non-proliferation record as it, as well as its Western allies, claim. It has a dismal proliferation record. However, since India presents a lucrative nuclear business opportunity, its non-proliferation violations are swept under the carpet.
Presentation
Tahir Mahmood Azad

Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen, Pakistan’s energy demand is increasing and its current energy resources are not sufficient to meet that demand. Primary commercial energy supplies in Pakistan comprise of oil, coal, natural gas, hydro and nuclear electricity. According to Ministry of Development and Reforms of Pakistan, existing installed capacity of power generation is 24,830 MW, but production stands at a dismal 12,000 MW. Currently, the average industrial and consumer demand is 17,000 to 19,000 MW. In worst-case scenario, the shortfall could be as high as 8,000 MW.

Nuclear energy has become a significant alternative and reliable option for Pakistan to meet its industrial and consumer demand. Because of inadequate natural resources, Pakistan is seriously considering nuclear energy as an alternative source. Currently, there are three nuclear power plants operating in Pakistan. They are producing 725 MW that is only 4.70 per cent of the domestic power generation.

Pakistan is planning for nuclear power generation capacity of 40,000 MW under its Nuclear Energy Vision 2050.

To operate nuclear power reactors on a large scale, Pakistan needs nuclear fuel suppliers. Pakistan’s track record in maintaining nuclear reactors for civil use is unquestionable. Pakistan has maintained a safe and secure civil nuclear programme. It is a fact that all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities for civil use are under the IAEA’s safeguards.

Over the years, Pakistan has strengthened safety and security of its nuclear power plants and installations. After the nuclear incident of Fukushima in 2011, Pakistan carried out complete assessment of its own nuclear power plants and facilities.

Pakistan has almost 45 years of experience in safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards and safety protocols. It considers civil nuclear energy safe and sustainable as well as very essential for economic growth.

Unfortunately, discriminatory attitude of the global civil nuclear industry towards Pakistan is a source of concern and constrains development of the full potential of Pakistan's civil nuclear power generation programme.

A discourse has started whether the US would negotiate with Pakistan a civil nuclear deal similar to India and agree to an NSG waiver for Pakistan. Pakistan has made clear that it would enter into such negotiations without any preconditions, and would not accept any restrictions on its nuclear programme.
The 2005 Indo-US civil nuclear deal has already set a precedent for the kind of deal the US could have with another non-NPT Nuclear Weapon State. The bar cannot be higher for Pakistan, by any standard.

Pakistan will, in all probability, only accept an unconditional nuclear deal with the US roughly comparable to the Indian deal, other things remaining the same.

Nuclear trade between international civil nuclear industry and Pakistan will create an ideal environment for further cooperation and understandings.

Pakistan, a country with a population of 200 million people, and an important player in the South Asian region, cannot be left alone or ignored for a long time. If the Pak-US nuclear deal comes through, it will be a milestone and will create further opportunities between both states. Furthermore, the international civil nuclear industry’s cooperation with Pakistan will usher in a new era and that will definitely help Pakistan fulfil its energy needs. Pakistan’s entry into NSG will enhance its confidence to work closely with the international nuclear industry, end discrimination against it, and foster strategic stability in the region.
The current state of strategic stability in South Asia is tenuous at best, with several factors contributing to undermine it further.


- The growing strategic relationship between India and the United States seems to have reduced India’s incentives to deal equitably with Pakistan.

- Afghanistan continues to cast a dark shadow over South Asia where India is trying to create a niche for itself at the cost of Pakistan’s legitimate security interests.

- The regional security situation has further deteriorated due to aggressive posturing by the current Indian leadership and their proclivity to avoid any meaningful and serious dialogue with Pakistan aimed at resolution of outstanding disputes.

- Relations with Pakistan have also become a part of electoral politics in India and a belligerent posture towards Pakistan as part of the election rhetoric has proven to be a winning formula for the ruling BJP in the recent past.

- Reckless statements aimed mainly at the domestic audience are also frequently made by prominent political players in India. A case in point is the threats by key Indian Ministers to launch similar (mis)adventures in Pakistan in the aftermath of a raid by Indian special-forces inside Myanmar.

- India has been continuously challenging the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent at various planes.

- At the doctrinal level it has sought to seek space for limited conventional operations by adopting Proactive operations/Cold Start Doctrine and has been actively practising these precepts in major war games.

- At the technical level it is actively pursuing its ballistic missile defence programme to counter Pakistan’s ballistic missile delivery systems. It is conducting sea trials of its nuclear powered submarine and associated submarine launched ballistic missiles.

- On the politico-diplomatic front, it has hardened its positions on various bilateral issues and wants to dictate its terms vis-a-vis the agenda and the outcome of negotiations with Pakistan.
The Modi government has not only increased both the frequency and intensity of exchange of fire across the Line of Control, but has expanded the clashes to the Working Boundary in Sialkot-Jammu sector, thus posing a challenge to Pakistan’s conventional deterrence as well.

Pakistan has responded to these challenges by introducing short-range battlefield nuclear weapons to plug the gaps being sought by India in conventional defences.

It has been working to develop its own maritime deterrence capability and has been investing resources and effort to refine its cruise missiles capability.

It has also been trying to engage India into a sustained and result-oriented dialogue.

Given the long drawn out commitment of a substantial portion of Pakistani military in counter-terrorism operations along the Western border and the concomitant thinning of forces along the eastern border, Pakistan is under stress due to India’s persistence with hostile activities along the Line of Control and Working Boundary.

India’s ever increasing defence budget and a large scale force modernisation programme will further disturb the conventional equilibrium, forcing Pakistan to increase its reliance on its nuclear capability and lowering the nuclear threshold which militates against strategic stability.

The introduction of nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarines would complicate the maritime security environment and any accidental collision involving nuclear armed submarine with a nuclear or conventional submarine could create a serious crisis.

Confidence Building Measures aside, there is no overarching strategic restraint architecture between India and Pakistan.

Institutionalised risk reduction and crisis management structures are non-existent and the two sides have failed to devise any mechanism to insulate and protect their bilateral dialogue process from the shocks of incidents perpetrated by non-state actors.

**Existing Stabilisation Measures and Suggestions for the Future**

Regular exchange of lists of their nuclear facilities at the beginning of every year as stipulated by their 1989 agreement on non-attack of each other’s nuclear installations.
• Agreement on pre-notification of ballistic missile flight tests has also been followed by both sides.

• Communications between respective DGMOs have been upgraded to fibre-optic links. A hotline has been established between the two foreign secretaries, especially for exchange of information in case of a nuclear crisis.

• There is an agreement on ‘reducing the risks from nuclear accidents’.

Some of the suggested CBMs /stabilisation measures for future negotiations could be:

• Agreement on Prohibition of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Command and Control and other nuclear installations.

• Negotiations for a South Asian ABM Treaty to impose restrictions on development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

• Restoration of ceasefire along the Line of Control.

• Joint declaration to refrain from adopting provocative military doctrines.

• Inclusion of provision to pre-notify cruise missile flight tests in the existing agreement on pre-notification of ballistic missile flight tests.

• Agreement on avoidance of incidents at sea.

• Up-gradation/expansion of foreign secretaries’ hotlines into Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) which should be manned round the clock.

• Negotiations on developing an overarching strategic restraint/stabilisation regime.

• Explore the possibility of working out an agreement on the lines of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement to place locational restrictions on offensive forces to reduce to the minimum the possibility of surprise attacks.

Analysis/Conclusions

In South Asia, most of the causes of instability are present that include arms race instability, acute trust deficit, unresolved territorial disputes, provocative conventional war fighting doctrines and lack of clarity on nuclear doctrines. There have already been at least three major crises since 1998, but the redeeming feature so far has been the recessed deterrence postures of the two countries, which are helpful during crises and provide a safety valve against accidental or unauthorised use. Potential for arms race instabilities is always there, since both India and Pakistan are busy in building up their respective fissile material stocks and are developing and flight testing ever more capable and sophisticated missiles. India is also actively working on the development and/or acquisition of BMD
systems, which would force Pakistan to introduce both quantitative as well as qualitative improvements in its arsenal. The India-US nuclear deal coupled and the pursuit of fast breeder programme has opened up a vast new potential for India to substantially increase its fissile material stockpiles. Pakistan has responded by enhancing its own plutonium production capacity.

The unrestrained R&D effort, by India and Pakistan, will provide an impetus for an arms competition. Growing influence of the scientific community and the undiminished public support for the expanding nuclear and missile capabilities will also generate pressures, for a sustained competition. Institutional mechanisms for crisis management such as Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) have not been established neither is there any overarching Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR). While avoiding the deployment of the potentially destabilising systems such as ballistic missile defences or the TNWs, both sides need to refrain from propounding threatening operational doctrines, such as Cold Start or Proactive Operations. A sustained result oriented dialogue process that is insulated from the actions of the non-state actors is the only way out for a peaceful and prosperous future for the two South Asian neighbours. It is important for both to understand that after their overt nuclearisation, war is no more an option as an instrument of policy. India should realise that by introducing nuclear weapons in South Asia and compelling Pakistan to follow suit it has itself neutralised its conventional advantage and it would be vain and dangerous on its part to seek space for the employment of its enormous conventional force to browbeat Pakistan. Both countries would also need to accept the reality that nuclear weapons tend to perpetuate the status quo which can only be profitably changed through negotiations.
Question and Answer Session

A number of questions were put to the Honourable Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry.

One question was on how Pakistan could reap benefits from the NSG membership in the off chance that it was rewarded the membership?

Another question was on the why Pakistan was the focus of attention as the fastest growing nuclear weapon state while in reality India was the fastest growing nuclear power?

The foreign secretary said that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state and it has invested heavily in nuclear safety and security, nuclear exports and an august command and control structure. He said that the US does not have any concerns regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He referred to Pakistan-US security, strategic stability, non-proliferation joint statement of June 3, 2015 in which the US clearly acknowledges Pakistan’s contribution to enhancing its credentials as well as its efforts to ensure that there is no proliferation. There was also a joint statement by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and US President, Barak Obama, on October 22, 2015 which also reflects this recognition. Therefore, the US has no concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

On NSG, Pakistan’s view stems from the belief that discriminatory approach towards South Asia adversely impacts strategic stability. So Pakistan has always called for a balanced approach. Pakistan should be a member of the NSG, just like any other nuclear state, Pakistan has legitimate uses of fissile material in the civil nuclear field. Pakistan has, therefore, consistently called for a criteria-based approach to membership of NSG. This would positively serve the strategic stability of South Asia.

On reports that Pakistan is the fastest growing nuclear programme, he said that it is important to distinguish between propaganda, disinformation, and motivated reporting. Pakistan is not in an arms race, neither does it believe in one. Pakistan believes in credible minimum deterrence. National Command Authority’s September 2015 statement clearly states this. Pakistan has every right for self-defence. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, therefore, is for self-defence, it is not status driven. Therefore, there is no credibility to these reports that sometimes appear.
Concluding Remarks
Ambassador Khalid Mahmood

In his concluding remarks, Ambassador Khalid pointed out that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was driven by its security needs. Pakistan’s insecurity is aggravated by India’s aggressive policies and the discriminatory attitude of the international community. He elaborated that Pakistan’s insecurity was exacerbated by Indian policies like Cold Start, plans to fight a limited conventional war under the nuclear overhang, its development of a nuclear triad, and development of ballistic missile defence. All these, combined with the discriminatory attitude of the international community where India is being favoured by bringing it into the fold of the NSG and by negotiating deals like the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation, heightens Pakistan’s threat perceptions and impels it onto the path of development of nuclear and conventional weaponry.

He presented a number of recommendations in order to bring stability to South Asia. These included the establishment of an overarching restraint regime and resolution of outstanding disputes like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek.

He thanked the six authors of the papers for their valuable contribution to the home grown objective narrative on nuclear Pakistan and strategic stability in South Asia.
Press and Media Coverage of the Event
‘Discrimination with Pakistan on nuclear issues impacting regional security’

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry Friday said discriminatory approach towards Pakistan on nuclear issues had impacted strategic stability in South Asia.

He was speaking at the launch of “Three Reports under ISSI’s Nuclear Paper Series” organized by Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad.

Aizaz said Pakistan was a responsible nuclear state and a peace-loving nation and was compelled to acquire nuclear weapons after explosions by India.

He said Pakistan offered many proposals including a non-aggression pact to India, which it did not respond favourably.

As a nuclear state, Pakistan always endeavoured to fulfill its international obligations, he stressed.

He pointed that nuclear programme of Pakistan was working under safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

“We have invested heavily on nuclear safety, export control regimes and robust command and control structure.”

He said during the last strategic talks, the United States acknowledged in unambiguous terms, credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

He said Pakistan should be given membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), adding Pakistan had legitimate uses for fissile material.

Pakistan had been consistently and constructively engaging the international community, members of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and IAEA, Aizaz said adding a criteria based approach for membership of NSG would serve the purpose of strategic stability.

He said Pakistan had not indulged in nuclear arms race and had only acquired minimum credible deterrence.

Pakistan believed that scarce resources should be used for socio economic development, alleviation of poverty and economic growth, he added.

Director General ISSI Ambassador Masood Khan said Pakistan had demonstrated utmost restraint in its nuclear programme, which was India specific.
He reminded that Pakistan had been discriminated with all sorts of sanctions during development of its nuclear programme.

“The discrimination must come to an end and double standards should not be applied.”

He said Pakistan should continue to pursue dialogue for civil nuclear deal with the United States, adding Pakistan was a legitimate and normal nuclear power and had legitimate needs for nuclear energy.

Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Khalid Banuri said dispute resolution, dialogue and equal security would enhance peace in South Asia.

Pakistan was not the first to acquire nuclear weapons and it desired regional peace, security and stability, he added.

“Our nuclear capability is meant to maintain regional security and avoid war by maintaining credible and minimum nuclear deterrence.”

For India, nuclear weapons were for prestige while for Pakistan the purpose was to stop external aggression, Banuri said adding only necessary national resources were devoted for nuclear programme.

Banuri said India was increasingly getting belligerent and its relations with neighbours had deteriorated.

Dr Rizwana Abbasi, Dr Zafar Khan, Malik Qasim Mustafa, Ghazala Yameen Jalil, Tahir Mahmood Azad and Dr Naeem Salik presented their papers on nuclear issues.

Discrimination with Pakistan on nuclear issues impacting regional security: Foreign Secretary

February 13, 2016  BY APP

Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry on Friday said that discriminatory approach towards Pakistan on nuclear issues had impacted strategic stability in South Asia.

Speaking at the launch of “Three Reports under ISSI’s Nuclear Paper Series” organised by Institute of Strategic Studies he said that Pakistan was a responsible nuclear state and a peace loving nation which had been compelled to acquire nuclear weapons after nuclear explosions were conducted by India.

He said that Pakistan had offered many proposals including a non-aggression pact to India, but it did not respond favourably to these overtures.

“As a nuclear state, Pakistan has always endeavoured to fulfill its international obligations,” he said.

He said that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was working under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

“We have invested heavily on nuclear safety, export control regimes and robust command and control structure,” he added.

He said that during the last strategic talks, the United States acknowledged in unambiguous terms the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

He said that Pakistan should be given membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), adding that Pakistan had legitimate uses for fissile material.

Pakistan had been consistently and constructively engaging the international community members of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and IAEA, Chaudhry said, adding that a criteria based approach for membership of NSG would serve the purpose of strategic stability.

He said that Pakistan had not indulged in nuclear arms race and had only acquired minimum credible deterrence.

Pakistan believed that the scarce resources should be used for socio economic development, alleviation of poverty and economic growth, he added.

ISSI Director General Ambassador Masood Khan said Pakistan had demonstrated utmost restraint in its nuclear programme, which was India specific.
He reminded that Pakistan had been discriminated against with all sorts of sanctions during development of its nuclear programme.

“The discrimination must come to an end and double standards should not be applied,” he said.

He said that Pakistan should continue to pursue dialogue for civil nuclear deal with the United States, adding Pakistan was a legitimate and normal nuclear power and had legitimate needs for nuclear energy.

Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Khalid Banuri said that dispute resolution, dialogue and equal security would enhance peace in South Asia.

Pakistan was not the first to acquire nuclear weapons and it desired regional peace, security and stability, he added.

“Our nuclear capability is meant to maintain regional security and avoid war by maintaining credible and minimum nuclear deterrence,” he said.

For India, nuclear weapons were for prestige but for Pakistan the purpose was to stop external aggression, Banuri said, adding that only necessary national resources had been devoted for the nuclear programme.

Banuri said India was increasingly getting belligerent and its relations with neighbours had deteriorated.

Dr Rizwana Abbasi, Dr Zafar Khan, Malik Qasim Mustafa, Ghazala Yameen Jalil, Tahir Mahmood Azad and Dr Naeem Salik presented their papers on nuclear related issues.

Regional peace: ‘Indo-US nuclear deal to have negative effect’

Published: February 14, 2016

ISLAMABAD:
Peace and stability in South Asia had been negatively impacted by the Indo-US nuclear deal, as well as the discriminatory waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).

Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said this at a seminar for the launch of a new publication titled the Nuclear Paper Series, organised by The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) here on Friday.

He said that the recent reports by international experts corroborate that the NSG waiver had allowed India to increase its fissile material stocks with grave implications for strategic stability in the region.

The secretary said Pakistan was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of a grave threat that could have been ignored, but only at great peril to the country’s national security and sovereignty.

Chaudhry said Pakistan was a peace loving nation, and that the country’s nuclear safety and security measures were in line with the best international standards and practices. He also said Pakistan’s strong credentials as a nuclear state qualify her for being mainstreamed in the global nuclear order.

“In order to meet our exponentially increasing energy needs, and to support sustained economic growth and industrial development in the years to come, civil nuclear power generation is an imperative necessity for Pakistan,” he said.

The secretary said that in order to ensure South Asia’s long term peace, stability and prosperity, it was essential for the international community to adopt an approach to this region that is even-handed and criteria-based, rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations or political expediency.
“Pakistan’s conduct as a nuclear weapon state will continue to be defined by restraint and responsibility,” he said added that country sought to ensure its national security, credible minimum deterrence remained its guiding principle.

“Pakistan had always made a consistent effort to ensure that sensitive technologies, material and equipment remain in the stringent control
ACDA Director-General Khalid Banuri

Earlier, ISSI Director-General Ambassador Masood Khan in his welcome remarks said that Pakistan and India, both non-NPT nuclear weapon states, should enter into the NSG simultaneously on the basis of a single criterion.

He said double standards should not be applied. “Pakistan should be given space to pursue its legitimate nuclear trade and participate in the work of export control regimes,” Khan said added that Pakistan should pursue a dialogue for a civil nuclear deal with the US, but not at the expense of the legitimate growth and refinement of its nuclear programme.

“There should be no pricey pre-conditions for Pakistan to get what India was given pro bono,” Khan said.

Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Director-General Khalid Banuri in his keynote speech said that unlike India Pakistan did not consider its nuclear weapons one of prestige, but a weapon of security. “Pakistan had always made a consistent effort to ensure that sensitive technologies, material and equipment remain in the stringent control in the international spirit of non-proliferation,” Banuri said. Three reports were presented at the occasion. These included ‘Pakistan in the global Nuclear Order’, ‘Pakistan and India: Nuclear Non- Proliferation Credentials’ and ‘Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects’.

The speakers applauded Pakistan’s efforts to improve its legal order, fight terrorism, create a rigorous export-control regime and construct a nuclear security regime.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 14th, 2016.

Pakistan defends right to keep nuclear programme
By IjazKakakhel

February 13, 2016

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry on Friday said Pakistan reserves the right to keep its nuclear programme running for its defence and balance the number game.

The foreign secretary expressed these views while addressing a seminar for the launch of a new publication titled the Nuclear Paper Series. The event was arranged by Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). Chaudhry said Pakistan was forced to develop a nuclear arsenal, and the propaganda against it is baseless. The country would not give up its right to keep nuclear capability for its defence, he said, adding that it had forwarded recommendations to keep the region free of nuclear responsibilities for as many as 24 years, however India forced the country to become a nuclear state by carrying out successful nuclear tests.

Pakistan’s atomic programme was totally safe and in accordance with rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he added. The foreign secretary said Pakistan should also be a part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) like other countries. He said that to meet the country’s increasing energy needs and to support a sustained economic growth and industrial development in the years to come, civil nuclear power generation was imperative for the country. He noted that strategic stability in South Asia has been negatively impacted by the Indo-US nuclear deal and the discriminatory waiver granted to India by the NSG.

The recent reports by NTI, ISIS and other assessments by international experts corroborate that the NSG waiver has allowed India to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks with grave implications for strategic stability in the region. The foreign secretary said that in order to ensure South Asia’s long-term peace, stability and prosperity, it was essential for the international community to adopt an approach to this region that was even-handed and criteria-based rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations or political expediency.

Pakistan’s conduct as a nuclear weapon state would continue to be defined by restraint and responsibility, Chaudhry said, adding that as the country was seeking to ensure its national security, credible minimum deterrence remains its guiding principle. Other speakers in the seminar were Khalid Banuri, Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), the authors of the Nuclear Paper Series; Dr RizwanaAbbasi, Assistant Professor, NDU; Dr Zafar Khan, Assistant Professor, NDU; Dr NaeemSalik, Distinguished Fellow, ISSI; Qasim Mustafa, Senior Research Fellow, ISSI; Ghazala Yasmin, Research Fellow, ISSI and Tahir Mahmood Azad Research Fellow, ISSI.
Earlier, former ambassador Masood Khan, director general of ISSI, said that Pakistan and India, both non-NPT nuclear weapon states, should enter into the NSG simultaneously on the basis of a single criterion. Double standards should not be applied, he said, adding that Pakistan should be given space to pursue its legitimate nuclear trade and participate in the work of export control regimes.

India has increased fissile material stocks: Foreign Secretary

February 13, 2016
NSG waiver

 Discriminatory approach towards Pakistan on nuclear issues impacted strategic stability in region; India never responded favourably to Pak proposal for non-aggression pact

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry Friday said the Nuclear Supplier Group’s (NSG) waiver had allowed India to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks. He was speaking at the launch of three reports under ISSI’s Nuclear Paper Series organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies here. He said discriminatory approach towards Pakistan on nuclear issues had impacted strategic stability in South Asia.

Source:  www.thenews.com.pk/print/98032-India-has-increased-fissile-material-stocks-Foreign-secretary
Balance of Nuclear Power

February 15, 2016

The rest of the world has too often called Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy as a dangerous one. However, Pakistan has continued to contest membership for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) with an assertion that their nuclear weapons remain safe. With the Western countries, especially the US, completely ignoring the country’s compulsions to ensure credible deterrence against a rapidly growing Indian conventional and nuclear arsenal, it will be a wonder if our efforts result in something concrete.

Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry at a seminar at the the Institute of Strategic Studies made it clear that we will not accept such discrimination anymore and will seek criteria-based treatment. Moreover, he was adamant over the fact that Pakistan only goes for credible minimum deterrence, having every right as a state for self-defence. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will lead a delegation to the World Nuclear Summit being hosted by the United States, next month in Washington. The effort being made serves a diplomatic purpose of clearing our name, but will amount to nothing more. It seems that Pakistan’s demand for NSG membership also gained significance following the energy crunch it is facing and wants to use nuclear energy to meet future needs - a logical mandate.

NSG is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials. Pakistan is certainly not getting fair deal from the US, and on its behest, by its nuclear camp followers. In exchange for letting Pakistan in into the NSG, it is trying barter by asking Pakistan to accede to certain international regimes like CTBT that even USA itself has not ratified, and India vehemently opposes it.

The United States expressed concern on Friday over the security of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons. Given that Islamists not only attacked civilians but targeted military installations and bases as well, some might say that the Taliban and al Qaeda have their eyes on Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. The claim is preposterous and is just a way for the US to keep the Indian panic in check, while they sell us F-16s. Chaudhry has said that the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s “discriminatory waiver” to India and the Indo-US nuclear deal had allowed New Delhi to increase its fissile material and disturb the strategic stability in South Asia. The US must look to Pakistan as a balancing chip if nothing else.

Pakistan to contest for NSG membership

*AizazCh says Islamabad won’t accept nuclear discrimination anymore*

February 13, 2016
Maqbool Malik

Islamabad - Pakistan will contest for membership right of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the World Nuclear Summit slated for next month in Washington in the interest of strategic stability in South Asia.

Well-placed diplomatic sources told The Nation on Friday that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will lead a delegation to the World Nuclear Summit being hosted by the United States.

Foreign Office is busy finalising the speech the prime minister will deliver at the summit seeking waiver for Pakistan’s membership to the NSG and will interact with important leaders of the suppliers group on the margin of the summit.

Islamabad feels encouraged to contest its right this time around after the United States gave a clean chit to Pakistan’s nuclear programme last year as safe and secured one, meeting the standards and practices of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) including the non-proliferation regime.

Islamabad has been making efforts to seek a similar waiver granted to India after the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal in 2005 which Pakistan says has upset the strategic stability in South Asia.

Pakistan’s demand for NSG membership also gained significance following the energy crunch it is facing and wants to use nuclear energy to meet future needs.

“We will not accept such discrimination anymore and will seek criteria-based treatment to Pakistan,” Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said while addressing a seminar yesterday on launch of Nuclear Paper Series, a new publication of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI).

Mr Chaudhry said Pakistan is a peace loving and responsible nuclear state which fully deserves NSG membership, adding that it was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of grave threat to its national security.

He said the country's nuclear facilities are placed under IAEA safeguards and Pakistan fully adheres to the standards set by the international agency. He made it clear that Pakistan does not want arms race in the region at all, and its nuclear programme is defence-oriented based on the concept of minimum deterrence.
The foreign secretary said membership of the group is essential for Pakistan to achieve the energy production goal of Vision-2050.

Earlier, ISSI Director General Masood Khan in his welcome remarks said that Pakistan and India, both non-NPT nuclear weapons states, should enter into the NSG simultaneously on the basis of a single criterion.

“Double standards should not be applied”, Ambassador Masood said, adding that Pakistan should be given space to pursue its legitimate nuclear trade and participate in the work of export control regimes.

He said that Pakistan should pursue a dialogue for a civil nuclear deal with the US, but not at the expense of the legitimate growth and refinement of its nuclear programme. “There should be no pricey preconditions for Pakistan to get what India was given pro bono”, he added.

Key speaker of the seminar Khalid Banuri, the director general of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), said that unlike India, Pakistan does not consider its nuclear weapons one of prestige, but a weapon of security. He said Pakistan has always made a consistent effort to ensure that sensitive technologies, material and equipment remain in the stringent control in the international spirit of non-proliferation.

Three reports – Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order, Pakistan and India: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Credentials, and Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects – were presented on the occasion.

In his concluding remarks, Chairman of the Institute, Ambassador Khalid Mahmood said that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power. He said Pakistan does not have any aggressive designs and its main objective is self-defence and economic progress and it is high time to mainstream Pakistan into the international nuclear order.

**Published in The Nation newspaper on 13-Feb-2016**

**Source:**  http://nation.com.pk/national/13-Feb-2016/pakistan-to-contest-for-nsg-membership
Indo-US nuclear deal threat to strategic stability in SA: Aizaz

February 13, 2016
ALI HUSSAIN

Calling for the grant of NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) membership to Pakistan in accordance with a non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry on Friday said that the Indo-US nuclear deal as well as discriminatory waiver granted to India had negatively impacted strategic stability in South Asia.

He was speaking at the launch of nuclear paper series by Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). Dr Rizwana Abbasi, Assistant Professor, NDU; Dr Zafar Khan, Assistant Professor, NDU; Dr Naeem Salik, distinguished fellow, ISSI; Qasim Mustafa, senior research fellow, ISSI; Ghazala Yasmin, research fellow, ISSI and Tahir Mahmood Azad, research fellow, ISSI, presented their papers on the occasion.

"In order to ensure long-term peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia, it is essential for the world community to adopt an approach that is even-handed and criteria-based rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations or political expediency," the Foreign Secretary said, adding that the apprehensions expressed by Pakistan and shared by objective analysts were turning out to be fully justified by subsequent developments.

He pointed out that the recent reports by NTI, ISIS and other assessments by international experts, corroborated that the NSG waiver had allowed India to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks with grave implication for strategic stability in the region.

Referring to energy requirements of the country, he said that in order to meet its exponentially increasing energy needs and to support sustained economic growth and industrial development in the years to come, civil nuclear power generation was an imperative necessity for Pakistan. "Our energy requirements are expected to grow by a factor of 7 over the next two decades. Hence, our national goal is to expand our nuclear energy capacity to 50,000 MW as envisaged by the Vision 2050," he said.

In order to meet this objective, he said Pakistan needed to be granted NSG membership in accordance with a non-discriminatory, uniform and criteria-based approach. Pakistan's membership would also be of immense benefit to NSG's credibility and effectiveness as a non-proliferation regime, he added.
"Our nuclear safety and security measures are in line with the best international standards and practices," he said, adding that over the past 15 years or so, Pakistan had taken a series of measures which included, establishment of a robust command and control system, an effective export control regime, and steps to improve nuclear security at all levels.
He said that Pakistan was also actively and constructively engaged with the international community including the IAEA, Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). "Our strong credentials as a nuclear state qualify us for being mainstreamed in the global nuclear order. The global non-proliferation regime also stands to gain from our membership," he asserted.

The Foreign Secretary said that "we are a peace-loving nation that is compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of a grave threat that we could have ignored only at great peril to our national security and sovereignty." Pakistan's reluctant entry into the nuclear club was well documented, he said, adding that after 1974 when the first nuclear test was conducted in our neighbourhood, Pakistan made several proposals for keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons and missiles.

These included simultaneous application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities and bilateral arrangement for their reciprocal inspections; simultaneous accession to the NPT; regional CTBT; Zero Missile Regime in South Asia; and signing of a Non-Aggression Pact, he added.

Unfortunately, he said none of these proposals met a favourable response. Neither did the wider international community intervened to assuage our security concerns, he added. "This left us with no option but to develop nuclear deterrence in the pursuit of undiminished and equal security which is a right enshrined in the final document of the UN General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament," he added.

In the wake of South Asia's overt nuclearization, Chaudhry said Pakistan had demonstrated its commitment to peace and stability in the region by putting forward the comprehensive strategic stability proposal, which was premised on three interlocking and mutually reinforcing elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance.

"This proposal remains on the table. If pursued with sincerity, this proposal can lay the foundation of lasting peace and stability in the region," he added. As a nuclear state, he pointed out that Pakistan had always endeavoured to fulfil its international obligations. Despite not being a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he said Pakistan had placed all civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards with an impeccable and faithful compliance record. Pakistan had a four-decade long experience of safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants, he added.

"Pakistan's conduct as a nuclear weapon state will continue to be defined by restraint and responsibility. As we seek to ensure our national security, credible minimum deterrence remains our guiding principle," he added. He said Pakistan would also continue to pursue constructive engagement with the international community including the non-proliferation regimes as a confident and responsible nuclear state.

“Pakistan believes that the scarce resources of our region should be devoted to the socio-economic development of our people,” he said, adding 'we need a willing and constructive partner to tackle myriads of daunting challenges that beset our region
including disease, poverty, illiteracy, climate change and environmental degradation." He further said that a peaceful neighbourhood was the sine qua non to build prosperous societies.

Source:  http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/16062/
India Can Increase Fissile Material Stocks Through NSG Waiver: Aizaz

Pak fully adheres to standards set by IAEA

Mian Arshad

Saturday, February 13, 2016 - Islamabad—Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad Chaudhry, Friday, said that strategic stability in South Asia had been negatively impacted by the Indo-US nuclear deal and the discriminatory waiver granted to India by Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) “However, in the wake of South Asia’s overt nuclearization, we have demonstrated our commitment to peace and stability in the region by putting forward the comprehensive strategic stability proposal, which is premised on three interlocking and mutually reinforcing elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance” he said while speaking at a seminar for the launch of a new publication titled the Nuclear Paper Series here.

This proposal remains on the table. If pursued with sincerity, this proposal can lay the foundation of lasting peace and stability in the region” Chaudhry added. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry stated that Pakistan is a peace-loving nation that was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of a grave threat that could have been ignored, but only at great peril to the country’s national security and sovereignty. He stated that Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security measures are in line with the best international standards and practices and its strong credentials as a nuclear state qualify it for being mainstreamed in the global nuclear order. The global nonproliferation regime also stands to gain from Pakistan’s membership. In order to meet its exponentially increasing energy needs and to support sustained economic growth and industrial development in the years to come, civil nuclear power generation is an imperative necessity for Pakistan. The recent reports by NTI, ISIS and other assessments by international experts corroborate that the NSG waiver has allowed India to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks with grave implication for strategic stability in the region.

The Foreign Secretary stated that in order to ensure South Asia’s long term peace, stability and prosperity, it is essential for the international community to adopt an approach to this region that is even-handed and criteria-based rather than driven by strategic and commercial considerations or political expediency.

Source: http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=289036
Pakistan fully adheres to standards set by IAEA: Aizaz

Friday, 12 February 2016

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary, Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry says discrimination in South Asia regarding membership of Nuclear Supplier Group will not be accepted.

Addressing at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on Friday, he said strategic stability in South Asia had been negatively impacted by Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005.

He said peace loving Pakistan was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of grave threat to its national security.

The Foreign Secretary said Pakistan fully deserves membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group.

Membership of the group is essential for Pakistan to achieve the energy production goal of Vision-2050.

The foreign secretary said the country’s nuclear facilities are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He said Pakistan fully adheres to the standards set by the international agency.

Addressing on the occasion, DG ISS Masood Khan regretted that India did not reciprocated Pakistan’s several proposals for peace and stability in the region.

He said India is trying to impede development of Pakistan in energy sector.

Pakistan has right to boost its nuclear program: Aizaz

February 13, 2016

Islamabad (Online): Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry has said that Pakistan reserves the right to keep its nuclear programme running for its defence and balance the number game. Addressing at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on Friday, he said strategic stability in South Asia had been negatively impacted by Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005.

Chaudhry said discrimination in South Asia regarding membership of Nuclear Supplier Group will not be accepted. He said peace loving Pakistan was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of grave threat to its national security. The Foreign Secretary said Pakistan fully deserves membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group. Membership of the group is essential for Pakistan to achieve the energy production goal of Vision-2050.

The foreign secretary said the country’s nuclear facilities are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He said Pakistan fully adheres to the standards set by the international agency. Addressing on the occasion, DG ISS Masood Khan regretted that India did not reciprocated Pakistan’s several proposals for peace and stability in the region.

He said India is trying to impede development of Pakistan in energy sector. On the other hand, Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif will attend Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be held on March 31. Chaudhry, in the last week travelled to United States. He attended a conference aimed at preparing for the summit and discussing the process. The summit will be attended by heads of as many as 35 to 45 countries. Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Jalil Abbas Jilani was also present at the preparatory conference.

Meetings of several world leaders are scheduled with the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif is also likely to meet President Barack Obama on the sidelines of summit.

Source: http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/373959//
SA Strategic Stability Negatively Impacted By Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: Aizaz

February 12th, 2016
National

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry cautioned about the discrimination in South Asia regarding membership of Nuclear Supplier Group and termed the practice unacceptable.

He was addressing at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on Friday.

“Strategic stability in South Asia has been negatively impacted by Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005,” foreign secretary maintained.

He said peace loving Pakistan was compelled to acquire nuclear deterrence in the face of grave threat to its national security. “Pakistan reserves the right to keep its nuclear programme running for its defence and balance the number game.”

The Foreign Secretary said Pakistan fully deserves membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group.

Membership of the group is essential for Pakistan to achieve the energy production goal of Vision-2050.

The foreign secretary said the country’s nuclear facilities are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He said Pakistan fully adheres to the standards set by the international agency.

India forced Pakistan to become nuclear state, says Islamabad

Deccan Chronicle
Ahafqat Ali
Published Feb 12, 2016, 6:38 pm IST

Pakistan’s atomic programme was safe and in accordance with rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Foreign Secretary said.

Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry (Photo: Twitter)

Islamabad: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry Friday said India forced Pakistan to become a nuclear state by carrying out tests.

He said that Pakistan forwarded recommendations to keep the region free of nuclear responsibilities for as many as 24 years however, India spoiled the efforts.

He said Pakistan reserved the right to keep its nuclear programme running for its defence and balance the number game.

Addressing a gathering at Institute of Strategic Studies here, Chaudhry said Pakistan was forced to generate nuclear arsenal and propaganda against it is baseless.

“The country would not give up its right to keep nuclear capability for its defence,” he added.

Pakistan’s atomic programme was totally safe and in accordance with rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he said.

Chaudhry said Pakistan should also be a part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) like other countries.

The Foreign Secretary said that talks between Afghan government and Taliban were likely to happen by the end of the month. He said Pakistan desires Afghan reconciliation process to move forward.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will attend Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be held on March 31.

Chaudhry, in the last week travelled to United States. He attended a conference aimed at preparing for the summit and discussing the process.

The summit will be attended by heads of as many as 35 to 45 countries. Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Jalil Abbas Jilani was also present at the preparatory conference.
Meetings of several world leaders are scheduled with the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif is also likely to meet President Barack Obama on the sidelines of summit.

Have right to continue building nuclear arsenal to maintain balance in region: Aizaz Chaudhry

Latest Update: February 12, 2016

ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry has said that Pakistan reserves the right to keep its nuclear programme running for its defence and balance the number game.

The Foreign Secretary addressed a gathering at Institute of Strategic Studies today.

Chaudhry said that Pakistan was forced to generate nuclear arsenal and propaganda against it is baseless. The country would not give up its right to keep nuclear capability for its defence, he added.

He said that Pakistan forwarded recommendations to keep the region free of nuclear responsibilities for as many as 24 years however, India forced the country to become a nuclear state by carrying out successful tests. Pakistan’s atomic programme is totally safe and in accordance with rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he added.

Chaudhry said that Pakistan should also be a part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) like other countries.

Earlier on Tuesday, the Foreign Secretary said that talks between Afghan government and Taliban were likely to happen by the end of the month.

While briefing Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in the federal capital, Chaudhry said that Pakistan desires Afghan reconciliation process to move forward.

On the other hand, Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif will attend Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be held on March 31.

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The summit will be attended by heads of as many as 35 to 45 countries. Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Jalil Abbas Jilani was also present at the preparatory conference.

Meetings of several world leaders are scheduled with the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif is also likely to meet President Barack Obama on the sidelines of summit.
