



**INSTITUTE OF
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

web: www.issi.org.pk
phone: +92-920-4423, 24
fax: +92-920-4658

Report- Roundtable

Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process

March 25, 2016



Compiled by: Malik Qasim Mustafa

Edited by: Najam Rafique

Pictures of the Event







“Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process”

The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI) organised a Roundtable Discussion on March 25, 2016 on “*Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process*”. The Chief Guest at the occasion was Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khalid Kidwai, NI, HI, HI(M), Advisor Development, National Command Authority (NCA) and former Director General, Strategic Plan Division (SPD). Other distinguished speakers at the occasion included; Dr. Ansar Parvez, former Chairman PAEC; Mr. Zafar Ali, Director General, SECDIV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Brig. Zahir Kazmi, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), SPD; Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Executive Director, Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS); Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President & Executive Director, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI); Dr. Adil Sultan, Director, PDS, SPD; Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR), University of Lahore; and Dr. Rizwana Abbasi, Assistant Professor, NDU.

Inaugural Statement - Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khalid Kidwai

I deem it a special privilege to have been invited by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad to deliver the Inaugural Statement to this very important Seminar on ‘*Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit Process*’.

At the outset, I would like to commend the intellectually superior role that the ISSI has played over the years in the development of Pakistan’s strategic thought by focusing on subjects of national and international concerns. As DG SPD for over 15 years, I followed the discourses at this forum with particular interest because these contributed directly and indirectly at self-education at the SPD itself. I am particularly aware that after the appointment of Ambassador Masood Khan as the Director General, the ISSI has moved strongly in actively leading the Islamabad family of strategic think tanks in areas of strategic analysis with renewed vigour, clarity and energy. His appointment brings to Islamabad an extremely rich mix of diplomatic, intellectual and hands-on experience of international diplomacy that he has so successfully conducted in the service of Pakistan in important Capitals. I always considered him and a few other key Pakistani diplomats as our warriors on the first line of defence while safeguarding the interests of Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme. Knowing him personally and professionally for about the same time as I was DG SPD, I have the highest respect for his abilities and intellect and have no doubt that under his stewardship, ISSI will continue to retain its first rate status as Pakistan’s leading think tank.

The selection of the subject of ‘Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit Process’ is a good example of keeping with the times on important developments as the fourth and last Summit is being held in Washington next week. This Seminar, in many ways, is therefore designed to showcase Pakistan’s strong credentials on nuclear security and its commitments to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. Coming as it does as the brainchild of Ambassador Masood Khan, I have no doubt that the Seminar will be enriched by his personal stewardship having being Pakistan’s Sherpa for the previous three Summits with extensive knowledge of the inner workings of the preparatory meetings. I know personally that he and his team of professionals have worked most astutely to balance Pakistan’s interests with the sometimes conflicting interests of the international community.

When a state becomes a nuclear power, its first priority is to ensure and demonstrate that its nuclear capability is credible and effective. Simultaneously, the national command and control system has to ensure that its nuclear assets, facilities and personnel are safe and secure. After becoming a nuclear power, national security becomes closely intertwined with nuclear security and hence a nuclear weapons state's most pressing priority. As is well-recognised by now, during the development of our nuclear capability and after demonstrating it, Pakistan has attached the highest importance to nuclear security.

When President Barack Obama took the initiative, in 2009, to launch a Nuclear Security Summit process, we were fully prepared because Pakistan had already taken a series of strong measures to strengthen its nuclear security in a comprehensive manner. As I mentioned earlier, we equate nuclear security with our national security. Therefore, there could be no compromise on the security dimension of our nuclear programme.

Over the years, the Strategic Plans Division that I had the privilege of heading for over 15 years, conceived and developed a rigorous nuclear security regime. After Pakistan successfully tested nuclear weapons following India's tests in May 1998, our first task was of course to operationalise nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles at priority, raise tri services Strategic Forces as the end users while ensuring one hundred per cent security. This was done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and therefore, while we consider our operational deterrence capability to be Full Spectrum, I will also say that Pakistan's nuclear security is Full Spectrum as well.

Another important and simultaneous task was to establish a National Command Authority (NCA) which matured in 2000. Today, the NCA, supported by the SPD as its secretariat, and the Tri Services Strategic Forces Commands, exercises full control over policy, procurement, employment and nuclear security. The SPD, through its Security and Intelligence Divisions, has incorporated the most stringent physical and technological solutions, runs a strict Personnel Reliability Programme, and has developed security and intelligence capabilities to deal with all issues impinging on national security, including proliferation, insider and outsider threats, accidents, precluding any possibility of WMD terrorism.

Pakistan's nuclear security regime deals with the full spectrum of any nuclear threat - insider, outsider or cyber threat. Reinforcing the very sizable numbers of security troops, a highly professional Special Response Force works round the clock to secure our assets and facilities. An integrated intelligence system has been instituted to provide depth in defense.

Nuclear security is not just about protecting nuclear assets and forces. It is a complete cycle of threat assessment, vigilance and response mechanisms. That is why we created a comprehensive nuclear regulatory regime that encompasses not just physical protection of materials and facilities, but also fissile material control and accounting, transportation security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies.

Overtime, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), an autonomous oversight body, has developed a sustainable nuclear safety regulatory system with established response and

recovery capabilities for radiological sources. It has earned the confidence and respect of the IAEA because of its close coordination with the world body.

Early on, Pakistan also created a comprehensive export control regime. The legislative, regulatory, administrative and enforcement measures we have taken are at par with the multilateral export control regimes. We have revised the National Export Control Lists, on the basis of the European Union's integrated system, and harmonised them with the controls maintained by the NSG, Australia Group and MTCR. Our National Detection Architecture also includes use of detection devices at several entry and exit points as well as other random check points to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

As I mentioned, nuclear security is a full spectrum and full cycle business. In 2012, we established our Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security which imparts security training based on international best practices and standards. At the Seoul Summit, we felt confident of our professional and infrastructure capabilities and therefore the Prime Minister of Pakistan made the offer of utilising the Centre of Excellence as a regional and indeed an international training centre. After some hesitation, the IAEA accepted the offer and today four years down the road in cooperation with the IAEA, this Centre of Excellence is functioning as a regional training hub on all nuclear security aspects. High level visitors to the Centre have admired the high standards of training developed by the Centre. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, during his visit to the Centre in March 2014, said: "It is very impressive that you organise the training in a very systemic and operational manner." The United States leaders, during their meetings with Pakistani counterparts, have repeatedly appreciated Pakistan's proactive engagement with the international community, including through its hosting of IAEA training activities at its Center of Excellence. In fact, it was quite satisfying the other day to hear the US Under Secretary Rose Goettemueller deeply appreciating the Centre of Excellence during a Congressional hearing in glowing terms.

In the past several years, we have invested heavily in nuclear safety at the plant, corporate and regulatory levels. Following the Fukushima accident, we conducted a detailed assessment of the safety parameters, emergency preparedness and response, and operators' training protocols and procedures. All authorisations since then require from the licensees to implement lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident.

In collaboration with the IAEA, we are implementing our Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) to manage radioactive sources, secure orphan sources, detect radiation, and prepare for emergencies.

We have also established a Nuclear Emergency Management System to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. Covering the entire range of activities, the mechanism has state-of-the-art equipment, mobile labs, technical guidance and countrywide connectivity. Several training courses and exercises for the first responders, emergency response personnel and front line officers have been conducted for emergency preparedness.

Legally speaking, nuclear security is a national responsibility, and Pakistan has been fulfilling it primarily in pursuance of its own national interest. At the same time, Pakistan has been

proactively engaging in the international forums to promote norms and good practices for fostering nuclear security.

Pakistan has submitted four reports to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee that lists the measures we have taken for nuclear and radiological security as well as on controls over all forms of transfer of sensitive materials and technologies. We are now working on the fifth report.

As a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Nuclear Safety Convention, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Pakistan has been contributing to the nuclear security framework. Our consistent observance of the IAEA Code of Conduct and participation in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), have been highly useful. Pakistan has also now decided to ratify the CPPNM.

In recent years, we have also been working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas, including the development of the Initiative's guidelines on a nuclear detection architecture, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation.

Pakistan has held the positions of leadership in IAEA Board of Governors for 2010-11, Biological Weapons Convention, Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament and non-proliferations forums.

I would say that, with the possible exception of NPT, no conversation on nuclear security would be complete without Pakistan's participation.

I would also underline that Pakistan fully qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes. Pakistan's nuclear trade is one hundred percent legitimate and therefore all impediments in its way should be removed. Pakistan will most certainly never accept discriminatory treatment on this account.

Pakistan has a proven record spanning 42 years of safe and secure operation of civilian nuclear power plants, which are all placed under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan needs alternate, clean and sustainable civil nuclear energy for its burgeoning industry and to meet growing consumer demand. Our National Energy Security Plan includes a Nuclear Energy Vision - 2050, duly approved in 2011 by the NCA, to redress the existing energy deficits and to respond to the future requirements of our economy. In that context, we envisage generation of nuclear energy of 8,800 MWe by 2030 and 42,000 MWe by 2050. It is realistic, doable and under implementation with the near readiness of Chashma 3 and Chashma 4 Plants (each of 340 MWs) and the ongoing construction of KANUPP 2 and KANUPP 3 near Karachi (each of 1100 Mws). Nuclear energy is therefore an essential part of our national energy mix and the Vision 2050 is generally on track.

It is high time that a discriminatory approach towards Pakistan is discarded and Pakistan is fully integrated in the international nuclear mainstream. This can be best done by removing restrictions imposed on Pakistan. In this regard, Pakistan looks forward to an equitable access to international civil nuclear cooperation. All reasons put forward by the international community for not doing the right thing by Pakistan have become outdated and have run their cycle of illogic

by now. Pakistan has worked with the international community to erect barriers against nuclear terrorism as a preventative measure and strengthen nuclear security. In this regard, Pakistan's credentials are no less than any of the nuclear weapon states.

With its long and varied experience, Pakistan's inclusion will enable it contribute to power generation, non-power application of nuclear technology, nuclear security and nuclear safety, in collaboration with the IAEA. I would add that with an advanced nuclear fuel cycle capability, Pakistan is in a position to provide nuclear fuel cycle services under IAEA safeguards, and to participate in any non-discriminatory nuclear fuel cycle assurance mechanism.

Pakistan has also played a key role in elaborating the priorities of the Nuclear Security Summits and negotiating their outcome documents. Our contribution during the preparatory processes has been acknowledged as positive and constructive. The United States, the initiator of the NSS process, time and again has commended Pakistan's "constructive engagement".

We remain committed to pursuing nuclear security cooperation, through voluntary national actions in accordance with our international obligations.

That being said, I would like to clear the deliberately created fog of rumours about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. While I would not go into the skewed studies that would have the world believe that Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear programme, because the methodology used to draw such conclusions is seriously flawed and biased, suffice it to say that Pakistan would maintain the credibility and effectiveness of its strategic deterrent, which now includes a variety of short range low yield weapons. This Pakistani capability of full spectrum deterrence has helped in the retention of a strategic equilibrium in South Asia, and has seriously neutralized the use of the military as an instrument of policy by our adversary, ruling out war as an option – Cold Start or no Cold Start. It stands to reason therefore that the credibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons has contributed to peace and stability in the region. I like to call them weapons of peace.

Pakistan would not cap or curb its nuclear weapons programme or accept any restrictions. All attempts in this regard as recently made clear by the NCA are bound to end up nowhere. As the National Command Authority said, Pakistan would continue to respond to the threats to its national security without indulging in an arms race. We will continue to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with our policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is not about Pakistan but about international nuclear security culture and norms involving more than fifty four states. Pakistan as in the previous Summits is participating because it believes in the objectives of the NSS process and will abide by its obligations as a responsible nuclear weapons state.

In the end I would once again like to compliment Ambassador Masood Khan and the ISSI for organizing this Seminar on this important subject and timing it well with the NSS in Washington. I wish all the participants well and I am sure that your participation will enrich the proceedings of the Seminar.

Question/Answer/Comment Session

During the Q/A session, Gen. Kidwai responded to a number of questions related to Pakistan nuclear programme. Following are some important questions and their response by Gen. Kidwai:

Q: Can Pakistan become transparent to the world community by opening up the facets of its nuclear weapons programme. The US has stated that they have a contingency plan to take control of Pakistani nuclear weapons in case if they are taken by terrorists. In case if there are other enemies than India, and if the satellite Global Positioning systems are turned off, then how our missiles would reach to that enemy or India in case of war.

A: No country maintains transparency in its nuclear weapons programme. Only the civilian nuclear programmes which are under the safeguards of the IAEA are transparent. No country has done this. Even within the system like the SPD, not all the information is available to everyone. In such strategic organisations, only that information is available which is needed, not all the necessary information is available.

In any country, its armed forces are entitled to have certain contingency plans. Pakistan has also developed its contingency plans and the strength of the Pakistan's nuclear programme in terms of numbers, quality, and its personnel has now gone beyond Kahuta Syndrome. Pakistan is an established nuclear power with a large number of operationalised nuclear weapons. Like other states have their contingency plans, Pakistan has its own.

I am not aware of enemies other than India; therefore, there is no contingency or retaliation plans for enemies other than India. Pakistan enjoys good relations with regional and extra regional nuclear powers. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme is India-specific.

Our missile system is not based on satellite GPS system. They have their own independent guidance systems

Q: Since the inception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, it has been subject to restrictions in past and its credentials are been doubted ever since. Now after the development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or battlefield nuclear weapons, international community has raised their concerns on the chances of military miscalculation by deploying TNWs. Indian and the US have raised their concern on the development of TNWs that Pakistan is on the fringes of nuclear use. How is Pakistan going to deal with this issue at the international level?

Q: Would you like to respond to threat response mechanism in cyber domain, and how well that cyber response mechanism is developed to address conventional and non-conventional threats, and is Pakistan developing a cyber command in this regard?

Q: How long Pakistan, as a nuclear weapons state, will feel insecure in the face of growing Indian might?

A: The history of Pakistan's nuclear programme is faced with denials and restrictions. Pakistan was punished in 1974 due to the sins of India when it conducted its first nuclear test. In the aftermath of the Indian test, the international community placed restrictions on Pakistan and it is something we have learned to live with. We are living in an unfair world and one have to look after their security and interests, and that is basically what Pakistan has done to safeguard its security. Despite denials, restrictions and sanctions, today, Pakistan's nuclear programme is thriving and healthy and is capable enough for Full Spectrum deterrence. This clearly shows that in the past 40 years, Pakistan has not been affected by these denials, restrictions and sanctions. The credit goes to all those engineers and scientists and strategic organisations that helped Pakistan develop its own infrastructure and deterrence capability. In fact, denials made Pakistan self-reliant and gave Pakistan the autonomy to develop its own nuclear weapons capability.

TNW development has become a hot issue. In this unfair world, Pakistan has to live and has to safeguard its own interests. If one looks at the cause and effect of TNW, which is in-built in Pakistani response system, they would only look at effect and ignore the cause of developing the TNW specifically with reference to India and then development of its military doctrine. The cause why Pakistan does a certain thing is a consequence of development of the Cold Start doctrine by India, which has brought the level of war fighting to the tactical level. This doctrine was developed with a philosophy to quickly mobilise and hit Pakistan. The Cold Start doctrine compelled Pakistan to plug that gap at a tactical level by developing TNW. That was the cause which was ignored by the international community. Pakistan is not apologetic about the development of TNWs, they are here to stay and they provide the third element that is called full spectrum or complete spectrum of deterrence. This means the deterrence at three levels which Pakistan holds represents strong deterrence to war and aggression. TNWs have helped to maintain peace by preventing the use of military means as an instrument of policy by India.

Concerns over cyber threats are very valid. Cyber-related threats have done a lot of damage to the Iranian nuclear programme. The decision makers in Pakistan are aware of cyber threats at conventional and nuclear levels. Technological solutions are being found and commands have been put in place to determine the nature of threats and response to them.

Pakistan is not insecure as a nuclear weapons state. These weapons have added to Pakistan's security. Pakistan is very much a secured nuclear weapons state.

Q: What can we do to manage the crisis between Pakistan and India without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons? What is needed to be done in terms of structures and systems with reference to full spectrum deterrence? The Minimum Credible Deterrence subsumes Full Spectrum Deterrence because Pakistan's nuclear doctrine allows doing what is necessary.

Q: Governments have their plans with reference to the continuation of Nuclear Security Summit process which they are going to debate in Washington. What are your views in this regard?

Q: Pakistan will not accept any discrimination on the question of the admission into the NSG. But what if India was admitted into the NSG and Pakistan not. Then what steps we intend to take or what option will Pakistan have?

A: There has been a reasonably long learning curve, spanning of 15 years, in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan have thrown around terms like crisis management, strategic stability, and peace and security, but with a little understanding of their implications. Both states faced crisis after crisis e.g. Kargil crisis after the 1998 nuclear test; attack on Indian parliament; operation Parakram; Mumbai attacks; pressures on the line of control and Pathankot attack. Within a very short span of 15 year, the learning curve was good in a sense that these entire crisis led to a certain conclusion on both sides. The leading conclusion which I draw, that notwithstanding the attempts of finding space of fighting a limited war on the other side, and notwithstanding the responses in the conventional and nuclear field by Pakistan, there was a very little space to use the military as an instrument of policy by India. As a result, the decision lay with the leadership and diplomacy, and ultimately sanity prevailed at the end of each crisis. At the end of the day, each side restrained. Diplomacy and political leadership played an important role and every time they came up with win-win solution, composite dialogue, comprehensive dialogue and other related measure. Statesmanship plays an important role in this regard. Even today, political leadership in India and Pakistan belong to same parties which initiated composite and comprehensive dialogue. There is no other way forward except the comprehensive dialogue process. India has utilised military and nuclear threats, but it did not work. Conflict resolution through a comprehensive dialogue is the only way forward. The gravity of these past crisis resulted in military mobilisation, but at the end, sanity prevailed. There is no escape from starting and dialogue and attentive conflict resolution.

Point is well taken about the full spectrum deterrence because Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) incorporates lot of things. The term full spectrum deterrence was introduced after the successful test of 'Nasr' short-range missile test because of completion of three levels i.e. strategic, operational and tactical. The Indian military and political leadership was uncomfortable after the 1998 nuclear tests, and especially after the 2000 crisis that with all their military might they were unable to bring the pressure of their force structure on Pakistan. India tried to find space to fight a conventional war by calling Pakistan's nuclear bluff, and to degrade Pakistan's armed force and nuclear capability, Indian came up with the Cold Start doctrine. Under this doctrine, bringing Pakistan to a negotiation table by finding space at the tactical level was a naive thinking by India. It was a proactive and impractical doctrine because it has its own weaknesses to be exploited by Pakistan. When Pakistan came up with 'Nasr' to plug that tactical gap in the nuclear weapons, it was meant to send strong messages that all gaps are covered under Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence capability. An in-built message was also sent to the international community because it was totally mentoring the nuclear development in South Asia that Pakistan has now full spectrum deterrence and should not be messed with. The full spectrum deterrence is not an independent doctrine, it remains within the confines of CMD.

The NSS process has run its course. The initiator and other states part of this summit are not looking at the continuation of this process. Nuclear states will continue their commitments at national level.

There was clarity during the times of all previous governments on Pakistan's nuclear programme and positions. On the objectives, developments, force goals, infrastructure development, quality and quantity of Pakistan nuclear weapons programme, there was a complete clarity and consensus among all the leadership at all the times.

Possibility exists that the US, like the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, may allow India to become a member of the NSG. Pakistan will continue to make all political and diplomatic efforts for its entry into the NSG. On practical terms, denial of entry into NSG will not affect our civil nuclear programme. Pakistan's civil nuclear energy programme is linked to reactors provided by China under the IAEA safeguards. Pak-China cooperation will continue irrespective of the NSG membership. There was very little Pakistan could do when the Indo-US nuclear deal was signed and NSG exemption was given. All of Pakistan's diplomatic efforts were unable to prevent that from happening. I hope that this should not happen, because NSG membership requires a consensus by its members and we have friends in the NSG who will prevent this from happening. Indian NSG membership can hurt Pakistan on political grounds, but it will hurt Pakistan's civil nuclear programme. Pakistan's nuclear energy Vision 2050 is based on Chinese nuclear reactors.

Q: Like Pakistan's Nuclear Energy Vision-2050, can we have a nuclear security vision for Pakistan?

Q: In contrast to other nuclear weapons states, Pakistan is much more open about its nuclear programme. Is it because of the pressure or is it because of providing more clarity to the international community? Full spectrum deterrence gives an impression that Pakistan can handle its nuclear weapons in space and everywhere in the areas that are left. Is it a false impression that full spectrum encompasses everything? The use of tactical weapons in response to the Indian Cold Start doctrine is true, but among international audience there is always an argument that if Pakistan deploys its TNWs in forward locations would they remain safe? Although Pakistan keep telling them that its TNWs would remain safe as Pakistan has taken or would take certain measure. How we can really forestall these arguments? Are India and Pakistan are going to maintain a specific number of their nuclear arsenals?

Q: Why it is important for Pakistan that it keeps countering concerns of the foreign press? Pakistan diplomats in other countries really do not have the information to get a space in the international press. How one can counter the concerns raised against Pakistan in foreign press as they impact Pakistan's negotiation process at international forums. What are the other means to counter foreign press?

Q: Has Pakistan invited India to come to Pakistan Centre for Excellence for training, and if India wants to participate would Pakistan welcome it?

Q: Why is Pakistan in a hurry to go to NSS when Pakistan is getting nothing? The Marshall Island has gone to the International Court of Justice against Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and everyone know that who is behind the all this. With reference to the Indo-US

nuclear deal, why Pakistan was unable to block that deal even Pakistan was Charing the IAEA Board of Governors at that time?

Q: What are the conditions for mainstreaming Pakistan?

A: Nuclear Energy Vision-2050 is a deliberate plan that Pakistan has developed. In 2005, Pakistan made an ambitious energy plan of 162,000 MWe by 2030. Out of this 8,800 MWe was targeted to be achieved through nuclear energy. On the civil nuclear side Chashma 3 and 4 and KANUP are being built, Pakistani nuclear energy planners felt very confidently that the target of 8,800 MWe can be achieved earlier even by 2025. Pakistan realised that we should develop a more ambitious plan and developed Vision-2050 plan and calculated that with the help of China Pakistan can reach 42,000 MWe by 2050. That was a very solid calculation and got approved by the government.

Nuclear security is an open-ended vision as it is based on development of new infrastructure and facilities. Nuclear security will grow when the number of facilities will grow. Therefore it is difficult to devise a vision. As the facilities will come up so the nuclear security will come up. Pakistan is doing a five year and ten year plan but beyond that one cannot predict that what kind of infrastructure will come-up and what kind of security a state requires.

The statements which Pakistan gives are very controlled statements, and they mainly come out from the foreign office in close coordination with the SPD. Statements come out as a response to certain developments which have taken place. Statements in foreign press are weighed first that either this requires a response or not. Pakistani response is given where there is a misperception or it needs to be countered. On other occasions statements like test of missiles are normally meant to inform the public.

Full spectrum deterrence has been defined in terms of strategic, operational and tactical levels. There are operational issues regarding deployment of TNWs. Pakistan has already planned their numbers, their storage and planned their official deployment. Pakistan makes sure that its deployment should be so balanced on ground that they should be available when time arises and should not be sucked into a battle.

There is a game plan and structure which is visualised and dually approved by the NCA and that is underdevelopment. The moment Pakistan visualises that it has achieved its required number it will stop because going beyond that desired number is an exercise in futility.

Generally speaking, foreign press is negative against Pakistan. On Nuclear issues it is completely negative. But Pakistan makes its efforts to set the record straight. The focal point is Foreign Office which closely coordinates with SPD on technical matters, and timing is of course very important and response does go out. However, there is a limitation that how much should be published in local press as it makes less impact internationally. A story carried out in leading international press carries more weight than in local ones. Pakistan faces limitations in terms of the reach of its media to western audiences. Pakistani diplomats who are concerned about the latest development are always in the loop and are in close coordination with SPD and other related organisations. Media groups in Pakistan should

extend their reach. Concerned international quarters also monitors nuclear related developments of Pakistan.

The idea behind the creation of Centre of Excellence was to create it as training centre and when it was done the second thing was to create it as a regional hub and to offer to the international community. After some hesitation, international experts came around they saw it, and now four years down the road the IAEA have started running its courses. When the question of Indian participation arises, Foreign Office would be the deciding authority. But participating countries comes through the IAEA.

Pakistan is not in a hurry to go to the NSG instead the international community should be in hurry to mainstream Pakistan. If the international community leaves Pakistan on the brink it would be disadvantageous for it. What Pakistan needs is recognition from the NSG and a similar criteria should be laid down for others to enter into the Group. Pakistan is not in hurry and if India is rushed into this then Pakistan will make all its efforts to prevent that from happening. However, it will not impact Pakistan's civil nuclear energy programme as it has developed its Vision-2050 on calculations of support from its friend.

On the issue of Marshall Island, it is an ongoing process and Pakistan has gone in the ICJ to defend its case. India, UK and Pakistan are roped up together but Pakistan has taken its position and it is fighting that particular position.

Pakistan had tried to block the Indo-US nuclear deal. There was a chance but Pakistan missed it.

The only condition Pakistan is seeking is criteria based approach on the basis of which a nuclear power should be selected for its entry into the NSG. If Pakistan and India fulfil those criteria and other countries fulfil those criteria they should be added to the NSG.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) report on Pakistan was not accurately done and it was biased. The report having stated that Pakistan has done a lot, the NTI turned it around by pointing out other negative concerns outside the domain of nuclear security. Similar has been done by Kennedy Harvard School in its latest report against Pakistan. They have counted India positive points ignored negative ones and despite Pakistan's highest point of nuclear security counted negative points of Pakistan's political environment.

Q: According to a New York Times report, Pakistan nuclear weapons programme is the fastest growing programme. How Pakistan should counter this?

A: This is not a new story, as it has been going around for many years. The accuracy of this report is hugely doubtful and biased. It has completely ignored developments in India. Pakistan should put this in perspective and negate these kinds of biased observations. This is politically motivated, because developments taking place in Pakistan are of very modest level and are very much in line with its MCD. There is always a reaction to action which takes place in India. Pakistan is not going in to an arms race, but it would ensure its minimum safeguards. Pakistan has not a fastest growing nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan Foreign

Office and its diplomats are continuously countering negative propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The power of the international media is so pervasive that once a banner headline goes out it is picked and circulated the world wide and becomes that if it is carved on stone. Pakistan has to live with this unfair world but it is making its efforts as best as it can, diplomatically, politically and now empirically.

Remarks by Ambassador Masood Khan

Ambassador Masood Khan, Director General ISSI, appreciating Gen. Kidwai's strong presentation stated that he has highlighted the NSS preparatory process; steps taken by Pakistan at the NSS process; and Pakistan nuclear policy and programme in a very authoritative manner. Ambassador Masood said that Gen. Kidwai's remarks have increased confidence in Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state, and he has firmly depicted Pakistan as a strong and responsible nuclear weapons state. Ambassador Khan added that Gen. Kidwai's has been a competent steward, custodian and leader of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and history must record the singular contribution made by him.

Remarks by Dr. Ansar Pervaiz

Dr. Ansar Pervaiz briefly spoke about the NSS process, how it was initiated and what it has achieved so far. He said that Pakistan actively participated in the NSS process and assured the international community about that safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets.

Remarks by Mr. Zafar Ali

Mr. Zafar Ali talked about Pakistan's role in strengthening its border control and strategic export controls. He emphasised that it is Pakistan's national responsibility to maintain the safety and security of its nuclear assets.

Remarks by Brig. Zahir Kazmi

Brig. Zahir Kazmi, critically evaluating the NSS process highlighted that the process has tried to establish a parallel nuclear regulatory framework which is not a responsible entity and it is a legacy of the Obama administration which is based on political motives alone.

Remarks by Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi

Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi in his remarks said that Pakistan actively participated in the NSS process and showcased its positive contribution in the field of nuclear safety and security to the international community. He emphasised that the NSS process will provide a platform to engage in positive discussion related to nuclear safety and security. However, a post-2016 roadmap in terms of safety and security of nuclear assets should be in the minds of global leadership.

Remarks by Dr. Naeem Salik

Dr. Naeem Salik said that there is need to change our outlook as the international trends are visible regarding safety and security of nuclear materials. In this regard, the IAEA need to carry forward its role to ensure safety and security of nuclear materials. Pakistan should continue to promote safety and security of its nuclear assets.

Remarks by Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema

Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema in his remarks countered the international propaganda regarding Pakistan's fastest growing nuclear weapons programme. He said the assumption that Pakistan has the capacity to produce more nuclear weapons is a negative and false judgment against Pakistan. The international community has overlooked India's production of five nuclear weapons a year.

Remarks by Dr. Adil Sultan

Dr. Adil Sultan talked about Pakistan's role in the NSS process and highlighted that to ensure nuclear safety and security Pakistan has made tremendous achievements, whereas India is still lagging behind in terms of its commitments made under the NSS process.

Remarks by Dr. Rabia Akhtar

Dr. Rabia Akhtar in her remarks raised several questions regarding propaganda by India and the international community; long-term vision of nuclear safety and security in Pakistan; and the effectiveness of Pakistani nuclear diplomacy on the international front.

Remarks by Dr. Rizwana Abassi

Dr. Rizwana Abassi in her remarks pointed out that nuclear security is a national responsibility and Pakistan has made considerable progress in this realm. Pakistan is moving in the right direction and can enhance its international collaboration to enhance education, training, countering terrorism and upgrading nuclear safety and security measures.

Vote of Thanks

At the end, Ambassador Masood Khan, Director General, ISSI thanked all the participants for their valuable contribution.