Pakistan-India Relations: An Analytical Perspective of Peace Efforts

Muhammad Sajjad Malik*

Abstract

Pakistan and India share a critical relationship. In addition to several limited border clashes they have fought three major wars since 1947. However, they have also a history of joint efforts for resolving differences through peaceful means. In fact, after every major conflict, they sat down for talks. The peace efforts can be categorised into three types: the UN-driven, the bilateral peace parleys and third-party mediations. The study concludes that third-party mediation has been more successful and result-oriented as compared to the bilateral efforts or the UN-sponsored initiatives. This article relies on multiple sources to traverse the history of Pak-India conflicts and peace efforts. The findings of this paper support the main argument that third party mediations have been more successful in resolving issues between the two countries.

Keywords: Pakistan, India, UN, Third-Party Mediation, Wars, Kashmir.

Introduction

The relations between Pakistan and India started on a bitter note because of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The immediate cause of tension was the bloodshed of millions of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, moving across the new borders to settle either in India or Pakistan. The communal violence, at the time of independence, set the stage for a permanent future rivalry between Pakistan and India.¹

As J N Dixit noted, Pakistan and India are stagnated in a mode of confrontation since inception as free countries despite many

---

*The author is PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from National Defence University, Islamabad. He is a researcher, academic, teacher and freelance writer.

There have been wars, limited conflicts, border skirmishes, intrusions, warlike situations and confrontations but wars have not stopped the two countries from making joint efforts to resolve their differences through different means. Yet, it is a matter of debate why such efforts met with limited or no success.

This paper traces the history of Pak-India bilateral relations and focuses on the moments of acute tension and joint efforts for making peace. It hypothesises that third-party mediation is the most successful model of conflict resolution between Pakistan and India. It helped the two sides to sign the historic water accord of 1960, which had a far-reaching impact on the agriculture of the two countries. The bilateral efforts produced only limited results while the UN-sponsored initiatives were not much of a success either. For instance, its resolutions on Kashmir have still not been implemented.

There are two parts of the paper. The first part delves into the political history of relations, including wars and tensions, while the second focuses on the joint peace efforts to resolve the differences. Both primary and secondary documentary sources have been used in this research.

**Overview of Past Confrontations: A Zero-sum Game**

The political history of Pakistan and India is a study into rivalry and unmitigated confrontation — a kind of zero-sum game. Till date, the relations have not fully recovered from the first conflict over the Himalayan region of Kashmir.

*First War on Kashmir*

Soon after partition, Pakistan and India clashed over Kashmir. It was a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu king called the Maharaja Hari Singh. Ignoring the sentiments of the majority of people and guidelines for the accession of states decided on October 26, 1947, the Maharaja

---

announced to join India. It resulted in an uprising. The local Kashmiris were joined by the Pakistani tribesmen who launched an armed struggle to liberate Kashmir from India. India sent its regular army to control the situation. As the unrest increased, Pakistan’s government came under pressure to intervene and finally sent its troops in May 1948.\(^5\) It resulted in the first war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.

The war-like situation was averted after the UN intervened. However, Kashmir was left divided between the two parts, under the administration of Pakistan and India. The two countries accused of initiating the war and demanded to have control over the entire territory of Kashmir. Meanwhile, the UN passed a resolution to decide the final status of Kashmir through a plebiscite and both countries agreed to it. However, India refused to hold the plebiscite after Pakistan and the US signed a defence deal in May 1956.\(^6\)

In a letter dated March 5, 1954, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing the Pakistani Prime Minister, stated that the US decision to give aid to Pakistan has changed the “whole context of the Kashmir Issue.”\(^7\) He repeated the same argument in another letter on August 23, 1954.\(^8\) Afterwards, India not only refused to hold a referendum but took steps that ultimately resulted in Kashmir becoming a state of India.

**Second War on Kashmir**

The second war over Kashmir was fought in September 1965. Compared with the first war, it had a slightly different context. India was defeated by China in 1962. Pakistan, after receiving western military hardware, had improved its defence and also gained the upper hand over India in the Rann of Kutch\(^9\) clash in 1965. Meanwhile, the unrest in Kashmir was increasing due to various factors. India’s founding leader, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death in 1964, had left a power vacuum in the political arena of the country. These

\(^6\) Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Kent: Dawson Westview, 1980), 221.
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Rann of Kutch is low lying marshy areas between Pakistan’s Sindh province and India’s Gujarat state.
factors prompted the Pakistani policymakers to play a final round in Kashmir.

Code-named as Operation Gibraltar, a plan was prepared to provide aid to initiate a rebellion against India in Kashmir. It was based on the assessment that the situation in Kashmir was ripe for change and India will not be able to launch any major offensive against Pakistan.\(^\text{10}\) The plan did not achieve success and, soon, the two countries were engaged in a major conflict after the Indian forces crossed the international border on September 6, 1965. For Pakistan, the situation was saved by its brave troops and timely intervention of the international community to arrange a ceasefire.

1971 War

The immediate trigger of the 1971 war was the elections of 1970. The Awami League Party won majority votes after sweeping the polls in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Since power was not transferred to the Awami League by March 1971, as was initially announced, its supporters resorted to violence and created a rebellion like situation in the country. The central government retaliated by launching a military crackdown to quell the disturbance. The situation steadily slipped out of control until India intervened, resulting in the third Pak-India war.

Pakistan suffered a defeat and lost its eastern wing permanently. As if it was not enough, more than 90,000 soldiers were made Prisoners of War (PoW) by India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power as his Pakistan’s People Party had won a majority in 1970 elections in the then West Pakistan.\(^\text{11}\) In 1972, Bhutto signed the Simla Accord with India and the two sides promised to normalise ties. However, India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974, putting the region on a path to develop nuclear weapon capability. Apart from this, the rest of the 1970s was calm for the Pak-India relations.


A Decade of False Alarms

The 1980s were full of action for Pakistan and India. Pakistan recovered faster than expected from the defeat of 1971. Its relations with India were first defined by the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, for which India blamed Pakistan.\(^\text{12}\) Second, Kashmir was back on the scene after India surprisingly outmanoeuvred Pakistan to occupy the Siachen glacier in 1984. Pakistan also sent troops to stop any further ingress by India and the two sides are still locked in the futile conflict.

In 1984, Pakistan was also threatened that India was planning an attack on its nuclear site in Kahuta near Islamabad. There were reports that India might implement its nefarious designs with the help of either Israel or Kabul government, which was controlled by the former Soviet Union. However, the Americans came to rescue and informed Islamabad that the report about the involvement of Israel was not true. India was also told that Pakistan will interpret such an attack as an act of aggression.\(^\text{13}\)

A few years later, a new danger emanated when India organised a massive exercise in 1986-87. The manoeuvres were called Brasstacks, which triggered a tension that lasted for at least three months. Pakistan could not ignore the threat and moved its troops close to the border. However, the escalation came to an end after the two sides agreed in February 1987 to call back the troops.\(^\text{14}\) The US officials played a major role in de-escalating the tension.

Kashmir on Fire

Kashmir was already a bone of contention due to the Indian action in Siachen but it was not until 1989 that it flares up into a crisis. The simmering unrest reaching the boiling point due to fraud in the election held in 1987. After India failed to address the popular concerns, the mass protests over rigging transformed it into the insurgency. The use of force by India further alienated the people in Kashmir.

\(^\text{13}\) Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy, 193.
\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., 193 and 185.
The deteriorating situation in Kashmir overlapped with the former Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan, where those fighting against the Soviets were left jobless. These battle-hardened fighters were left unattended and no effort was made to bring them back to normal life. They were available for fighting and it is alleged by the Indian policymakers and experts that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies diverted some of those fighters to Kashmir.15

As India was unable to control Kashmir, it blamed Pakistan. In this regard, tension prevailed between both the countries, “trading accusations and threats, India and Pakistan spent February, March and April of 1990 seemingly preparing for war.”16 Sensing the threat to regional peace, the US decided to normalise the situation once again. The then Assistant to the National Security, Robert Gates, visited both the states in May 1990 and his efforts helped restore peace.

Kashmir Issue dominated Pak-India relations in the 1990s. Pakistan blamed India for the violation of human rights and India hit back by accusing jihadi groups entering Kashmir and creating trouble. The 1990s ended with the Kargil War in 1999. However, before Kargil, the two sides had tested nukes in 1998 to overtly show their nuclear powers and eventually added a dangerous dynamic to the already difficult relationship.

Kargil War

The Kargil conflict lasted from May to July 1999.17 Though it was confined to a small geographical location, it got a great deal of attention at the global level as it could have easily spread and even result in a nuclear exchange. As usual, the US played a key role in de-escalation after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington and met President Bill Clinton.

The crisis came to an end but not the tensions that it unleashed. The Kargil War engulfed the diplomatic gains of the late 1990s, including the goodwill created after the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,

---

17 Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 25.
visited Lahore from February 20-21, 1999. It is believed that the Kargil adventure damaged the Kashmir cause as the international attention was diverted from the Indian violations of human rights to cross-border interference by Pakistan.

**Indian Parliament Attack**

On December 13, 2001, the Indian parliamentarians were discussing a corruption report about the purchases made during the Kargil War\(^\text{18}\) when the attack was launched. Though it was foiled and all five attackers were killed but it unleashed a never-ending wave of anger. In an address to the nation, Prime Minister Vajpayee called it a warning to the entire country and said, “We accept the challenge.”\(^\text{19}\) India blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed for the incident while a famous Indian politician, L K Advani accused Pakistan by saying that the “mentors” of those groups had tried to kill the entire political leadership of India and pressed for retaliation from the Indian side.\(^\text{20}\) The parliament attack furthered damaged the bilateral relations; in fact, it did to the gains of the Agra Summit what Kargil War had done to the historic Lahore visit of Vajpayee.

**2002 Military Standoff**

The nuclear weapons introduced the element of deterrence in the Pakistan-India defence equation. Yet, the Kargil War negated the concept by substituting it with the idea of a limited war under the nuclear umbrella. While addressing a seminar in 2000, the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, said that war had not become obsolete due to nuclear weapons.\(^\text{21}\)

The 2002 military standoff was an effort to put the new concept of limited war in practice. The Indians were trying to dabble with the dangerous idea of winning a nuclear war with Pakistan during the 2002

---

\(^{18}\) Chari, Cheema and Cohen, *Four Crises*, 118 and 149.


The conflict started soon after the parliament attack when India launched operation Parakram. It was the largest military build-up after the Second World War as about one million troops were mobilised by the two adversaries.

The Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, said that India made a unanimous decision to cross the Line of Control (LOC) and the international border. He said that a speech made by Pervez Musharraf on January 12, calmed the temper because he lambasted terrorism used in the name of Kashmir. Mishra also said that it could have been an all-out war. However, the then External Affairs Minister of India, Jaswant Singh, did not subscribe to what Mishra said and stated that “I know there wasn’t even a risk of a full-fledged war or crossing the boundary or the Line of Control.”

The statements by different leaders and the ground positions of the troops showed that the things could easily get out of the control. Musharraf’s January 12 speech, promising to stop infiltrations and crackdown against the militants, did help. Thus, a deadly conflict was avoided due to timely action. Still, the incident had its cost. India lost 1,874 troops during mobilisation and standoff from December 19, 2001, to October 16, 2002, while Pakistan suffered around 34 deaths. At that time, it was estimated by some quarters that the monetary cost for India was near to US$4 billion and the same for Pakistan was $1.4 billion.

Mumbai Terror Attack

The Mumbai attack was another major violent event that had a long-term negative impact on Pak-India relations. Around 10 militants were involved in the attack launched on November 26, 2008. They allegedly used a fishing
boat to reach Mumbai and then got taxis to reach their marked points to initiate the mayhem in which 166 people died.\textsuperscript{27}

All the attackers were killed except one, Ajmal Amir Kasab, who was captured alive. India said that Kasab’s link was established with Lashkar-e-Taiba and, therefore, New Delhi suspended the Composite Dialogue. It also took other provocative steps against Pakistan but avoided a direct conflict. The bilateral relations have not recovered from the Mumbai incident till date.

\textit{Surgical Strike Saga}

The 2014 elections and the victory of Narendra Modi, a die-hard supporter of Hindutva and an alleged facilitator of Gujrat Muslim riots, changed the nature of Pak-India relations. His term in office coincided with some of the toughest clashes on the LoC and Working Boundary. After the Uri Incident of September 18, 2016, in which the militants stormed an Indian military facility and killed about 19 soldiers. On September 29, India claimed that its army carried out “surgical strikes” across the LoC to destroy what it called “militant infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{28} Pakistan rejected the claim as totally unfounded.\textsuperscript{29} However, the incident triggered heavy artillery fire exchanges between the two sides.

The cross-border clashes were already going on since early 2015. The “surgical strike” further intensified the occasional firing incidents. There are reports that dozens of soldiers and civilians have been killed on both sides of the LoC in these exchanges.\textsuperscript{30} It further eclipsed the chances of peace between the two sides.

Joint Efforts for Peace

The history of Pak-India ties has followed two tracks: one is that of recurrent tensions and conflicts and the other is of periodic efforts for a peace dialogue. The two countries showed the maturity to sit together and try to resolve the disputes peacefully, either through their own initiatives or by the third party efforts. Broadly, their peace efforts can be divided into three categories:

i. UN interventions
ii. Bilateral track
iii. Third party mediations

UN Interventions

The first time when the UN was called to intervene was during the first Kashmir war. The conflict started in 1948 and came to an end due to a UN-sponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. The UN Security Council (UNSC) also passed a resolution on January 9, 1949, to decide the future of Kashmir through a plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan accepted the resolution, which provided a detailed mechanism to settle the Kashmir dispute but the issue could not be resolved due to the intransigence of India.

The UN also played a key role in ending the 1965 war, also known as the second Kashmir war. The conflict was halted after the UN passed a resolution on September 22, 1965, calling for a ceasefire. The two sides, later on, signed the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966 to restore peace. It was sponsored by the former Soviet Union. Despite its successes to arrange a ceasefire in 1949 and 1965, the UN could not adopt a resolution to stop the hostilities of 1971, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. The world body obviously failed to stop the Indian aggression in the former East Pakistan. Despite its failure, the UN is still the most effective forum to highlight the tensions between Pakistan and India and provide support for the implementation of its resolution on Kashmir.

Bilateral Track

Pakistan and India frequently indulged in bilateral efforts to address their issues. Such efforts have been successful at times but failed to resolve major issues like Kashmir. The 1950 Nehru-Liaquat Pact was the first successful
example of the bilateral track to address thorny problems. It helped address the issue of religious minorities because, under the agreement, the two sides decided to protect the right of minorities after partition.

Through bilateral channel, a major effort to settle the Kashmir Issue was made in 1953. The opportunity came when Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra met his counterpart Nehru in August in New Delhi. The two leaders discussed Kashmir and also decided to solve it through peaceful negotiations. However, no further progress was registered as India suspended the process after Pakistan got military assistance from the US in 1954.31 In another successful attempt, Prime Minister Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart, Feroze Khan Noon, agreed in 1958 to settle the eastern border between India and the former East Pakistan.

The first real comprehensive bilateral push to address the Kashmir imbroglio was made from December 1962 to May 1963: The foreign ministers, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh, held a marathon of six rounds of talks focusing on the central issues of Kashmir.32 Yet, the process was not as successful as the two sides could not agree on a formula to resolve Kashmir.33

The next bilateral success came after the 1971 War. Pakistan was defeated and its new leader Bhutto entered into a dialogue with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The efforts bore fruit and the two settled for the Simla Accord on July 3, 1972. Its success lied in formalising the bilateral track as the two countries pledged to resolve all difference, including Kashmir, through bilateral means.34 It not only helped to secure the release of 90,000 PoW of 1971 war but also provided a framework for the resolution of all the issues bilaterally.

Concerted bilateral efforts were also made to address the conflict over Siachen. According to the former Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar, the two countries had agreed to end the conflict when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Pakistan in July 1989. He met Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and

32 Sattar, *Foreign Policy*, 272.
both leaders endorsed a draft of the agreement. However, it was never implemented.\textsuperscript{35}

A substantive example of bilateral efforts was a successful arrangement reached in December 1985, when the two sides agreed informally not to attack their nuclear sites.\textsuperscript{36} It also provides a mechanism to exchange the list of civil nuclear installations annually. Signed in 2008, a similar agreement called the Consular Access Agreement reached about the exchange of list of prisoners twice a year on the first day of January and July\textsuperscript{37} and a mechanism to provide consular access to held prisoners. These agreements have stood the test of time and are being still followed.

The 1990s remained fruitful was good for bilateral engagements as the two countries returned to intensive diplomacy. It started with the 1991 agreement about prior notification on military movements and exercise. The agreement also provides how to prevent violations of airspace its use for over-flights. The two sides also agreed on a joint declaration in 1992 to ban the use of chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{38}

Further bilateral diplomatic engagements were spurred by the deteriorating situation in Kashmir. Apart from other interactions, a top-level meeting was held between the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, and the Indian Prime Minister, IK Gujral, in the Maldives in 1997, on the eve of the South Asian Association for Regional Corporation (SAARC) Summit.\textsuperscript{39} Later, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999 and signed the Lahore Declaration with Nawaz Sharif, whereby the two countries once again committed to addressing the difference through bilateral talks.

\textsuperscript{35} Sattar, \textit{Pakistan Foreign Policy}, 190.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 193.
\textsuperscript{39} Sajad Paddar, “The Composite Dialogue Process between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency,” Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, working paper no 65, February 2012, 2.
The Track II diplomacy also became prominent in the 1990s. Several tracks were initiated this diplomatic modality. A leading such track called Neemrana Process started in 1991, still exists. However, all the good work done during the decades was wiped away due to the tension brewed in the wake of nuclear tests by the two sides in 1998 and second due to the Kargil War of 1999.

The next major bilateral effort was the Agra Summit held between Pervez Musharraf and Vajpayee. The process for the high-level meeting on July 15-16, 2001 started with an article written by Vajpayee at the start of 2001, in which he talked about addressing the Kashmir problem. Agra Summit was confined to detailed one-on-one interaction between the two leaders with one note-taker on each side. Unfortunately, their huddle met with failure. Though once they were close to issuing a joint declaration but India backed out at the last minute.

Fortunately, the failure of the summit did not last long and the two sides worked out another initiative in a couple of years when the composite dialogue was launched in 2004. It was based on the broad contours of understanding reached during Gujral-Sharif meeting of Maldives in 1997. The occasion to start the new bilateral peace move came when Vajpayee visited Islamabad for the annual SAARC Summit in 2004.

It was indeed a comprehensive process as all the issues of concern for the two countries were divided into eight groups and assigned to different experts to discuss them over an extended period of time to come up with solutions. After more than five years of extensive efforts, the process was suspended due to the Mumbai attack in July 2008. The Composite Dialogue generated great hope but, as was feared, a single deadly incident killed it. In the hindsight, the then President Asif Ali Zardari participated in a conference in India through video link just three days before the Mumbai attack and said that Pakistan would not be the first to use nukes against

---

41 Ibid.
42 Sattar, Foreign Policy, 236-238.
44 Chari, Cheema and Cohen, Four Crises, 212.
India.45 This spirit was a product of the dialogue but all the goodwill evaporated after the attack.

The Mumbai incident not only reversed the composite process but also cast a long shadow at any fresh peace initiative. The process of reengagement was slow and unfruitful. The first signs of thaw appeared in the meeting of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and his counterpart Manmohan Singh in Sharm al-Sheikh. It resulted in a joint statement in which for the first time Balochistan was mentioned. There was hope for peace talks but Manmohan Singh came under intense criticism over conceding to Pakistan’s point of view on Balochistan interference. Therefore, he had to backtrack. There was hope for a revival of the talks when Singh and Gilani met in April 2010 on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Bhutan but no progress was made.

Another bilateral opportunity emerged when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to New Delhi to witness the oath-taking ceremony of Narendra Modi in 2014. However, this move failed to make headway as the general elections in Kashmir were around the horizon and the Modi government wanted to exploit the Pakistan factor. The visit of the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, to Islamabad to attend the Istanbul Process meeting in December 2015, again created a ray of hope when the two sides agreed to resurrect the peace talks. Later, Modi’s dash to Lahore on December 25, 2015, further boosted peace efforts. Nonetheless, it all came to a grinding halt due to Pathankot attack in January 2016, when India once again blamed Pakistan for it and called off all talks.

Later, the arrest of the Indian spy, Kubhushan Jadhav, who was nabbed from Balochistan and convicted by a military court for espionage and subversive activities. The Uri attack and the so-called “surgical strikes” further dimmed the chances of revival of peace talks. The two sides are still poles apart and unable to find common grounds.

Third Party Mediations

The third party mediation has been quite successful in resolving Pak-India problems. The first such effort was the signing of the Indus Water Treaty

45 Vinod Sharma and Zia Haq, “There is a Bit of India in Every Pakistani: Zardari,” http://www.hindustantimes.com/Nwes-Feed/India/There-is-a-bit-of-India-in-every-Pakistan-Zardari/Article_1-353488.aspx
(IWT) in 1960. The World Bank played a lead role in arranging the parleys and the final deal. It is considered as a historic water accord that has survived through the tumultuous decades of Pak-India tensions and wars. Even, today the two sides assert that each of them followed the accord and accuse the other of violating it. Recently, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner visited India and inspected water projects in the Chenab basin.46

The agreement to peacefully settle the Rann of Kutch dispute is another example of successful third-party mediation. It is a marshy area located between Sindh province and India’s Gujarat state. This is the area where the armies of Pakistan and India clashed over it in April 1965. However, the good sense prevailed and the two agreed to resolve it through a tribunal appointed through the mediatory efforts of the UK. “Britain has earlier taken a stand on the question of Kashmir and had mediated in 1965 the Run of Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan.”47

Another example was the Tashkent Agreement signed in January 1966. The former Soviet Union was the mediator and the agreement terminated the 1965 war between Pakistan and India. The two adversaries agreed to restore peace by returning the areas captured in the war and going back to pre-war positions.

The third-party intervention was helpful in avoiding at least three potential conflicts and reduces several tensions in the 1980s. There was a crisis in 1984 due to fears in Pakistan that India was planning to destroy its nuclear facilities. Another conflict situation was triggered due to a massive military exercise by India in 1986-87, while another dangerous situation was created due to Kashmir violence in 1989-90. Chari, Cheema and Cohen argue that the US intervened on all three occasions to restore peace by bringing the situation under control.48

48 Chari, Cheema and Cohen, Four Crises, 218.
The next occasion for international mediation was provided by the Kargil crisis in 1999. Again, the US took lead to end the conflict and a full war was averted. The US President, Bill Clinton, intervened directly after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met him on July 4, 1999. After receiving Sharif, Clinton talked with Vajpayee over the telephone and arranged the truce.

The US also played an important role in defusing tension in 2002, when both countries mobilised armies after the attack on the Indian parliament. The reason for the US concern was that Pakistan would withdraw troops from the volatile north-western border, where its army was engaged against terrorists, to redeploy them on the eastern border to face India. It might have diluted attention of the international community in Afghanistan. The threat of nuclear conflagration was another reason for the US to intervene.\(^{49}\)

Another form of the third party facilitation has been taking place on the platform of SAARC, which was created in 1985 to promote regional cooperation.\(^{50}\) Though SAARC is considered as a toothless tiger but its summits have been providing a useful platform for several side-line meetings between the leaders and officials of Pakistan and India. The important Composite Dialogue process was launched after a similar meeting in Islamabad in 2004. The 19th SAARC Summit planned in Pakistan 2016, was cancelled due to the Indian-promoted boycott but lately, Pakistan was making efforts to reschedule it and also invited Modi.\(^{51}\)

Thus, it has been established through evidence that the third party mediation has been more useful in addressing differences between Pakistan and India. The bilateral efforts have produced only limited results despite several such efforts, while the UN-sponsored initiatives have also been not very successful and its resolutions on Kashmir have still not been implemented.


\(^{50}\) Jaffrelot, *History of Pakistan Origins*, 130.

Conclusion

Pak-India relations have been through many ups and downs since 1947. There have been wars and conflicts but the two countries showed the tendency to come to the negotiations after every holdup. But unfortunately, the two sides have failed to transform the desire for peaceful coexistence into lasting peace and cooperation. In this regard, the main argument of the paper was built around the hypothesis that third-party mediation is the most successful mode of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. The above debate proves that third-party mediation has been the most successful model of peace-making between the two countries. Starting from the historic IWT to Rann of Kuch and the management of conflicts like the Kargil War and military standoff of 2002, the third party interventions have been more fruitful for peace.

The role of the UN stands apart from the traditional third party mediations. The UN has been instrumental in ending the first Kashmir war in 1949 and the second war in 1965 but it has failed to deliver peace in Kashmir. Hence, its role so far has been limited as far as the resolution of the most serious issue between Pakistan and India is concerned. The main reason, though, is Indian refusal to let the UN have a decisive say on Kashmir but the world body cannot be absolved of failure as it seldom took up a moral and legal view of the situation to play a pro-active role on Kashmir. However, the UNSC resolutions are still useful and can go a long way to address the Kashmir issue.

There are some good examples of successful bilateral peace initiatives but they also have failed to address the contentious issues. The Composite Dialogue process was the most comprehensive peace effort ever made so far but it was not successful and failed to resolve any of the major issues discussed. It shows that the bilateral channel can help to pave the ground or help resolve minor issues but it has been ineffective in addressing the major problems.

The main reason for the failure of bilateral efforts is the absence of any institutional framework to address tensions and conflicts. The second reason is the deep mistrust between the two countries. Failure of the UN and bilateral channel provide space for the exercise of other options. Since third-party mediation has a track record of success, it should be used to address
serious problems vis-à-vis Pak-India relations. In fact, in the prevailing atmosphere, we are left with third-party mediation as the only option, which not only has a history of success but also the potential to resolve Pak-India disputes, peacefully.

Therefore, the international community should realise its role of a mediator and refocus its attention on South Asia, which is a potential nuclear flashpoint. India should also revisit stance and recognise the importance of third-party mediations. It should also let the UN use its good offices in helping to resolve the Kashmir dispute, which is vital for regional peace and good ties between Pakistan and India.