




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*Report – Webinar*

## **“Shifting Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Regional Stability”**

**July 2, 2020**



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### Pictures of the Event



The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad's (ISSI) Arms Control and Disarmament Centre (ACDC) hosted a webinar on “**Shifting Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Regional Stability**” on July 2, 2020. Dr. Ghulam Mujaddid, Dean Faculty of DASSS, Air University, spoke on “No First Use: Continuity or Change in Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Air Vice Marshal Faaiz Amir (Retd), former Vice Chancellor, Air University, made remarks on “Pre-emption and Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Pakistan,” while Dr Rabia Akhtar, Director CSSPR, made remarks on “India Nuclear Weapons Modernisation: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” and Air Marshal (Retd) M. Ashfaq Arain, Director CASS, talked about “Shift in Indian Nuclear Doctrine and Deterrence Stability: Option for Pakistan.” The keynote address was made by Professor Han Hua, Director, Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Peking University, China.

### **Welcome Remarks by Malik Qasim Mustafa, Director, ACDC, ISSI**

Malik Qasim Mustafa, Director ACDC, in his welcome remarks said that the use of nuclear weapons will bring catastrophic consequences, therefore, keeping in mind this inherent danger associated with the use of nuclear weapons, states have adopted different weapons use policies, including the defensive use or the No First Use (NFU) policy - China is the first country who adopted the NFU policy in 1964 and it is still following it. However, in the South Asian context, in 1999, India adopted the NFU policy, but its vagueness and ambiguity continue. Since then, the Indian officials and nuclear experts have been debating to review India's Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) doctrine and criticising the effectiveness of its NFU policy with an attitude that “Why India should bind itself to a No First Use policy,” (Manohar Parriker) and “What happens in future depends on the circumstances,” (Rajnath Singh).

Mr. Mustafa noted that recent developments indicate that India is abandoning its so-called NFU with a more aggressive policy of first use or pre-emptive counterforce strike and developing a new and advanced nuclear weapons programme, as well as, modern delivery capabilities (Triad). According to the latest SIPRI estimates, with a growing arsenal of 150 nuclear weapons, India is expanding the size of its nuclear weapons stockpiles and infrastructure for producing nuclear warhead. Such a transformation in the Indian nuclear doctrine and force posture will bring severe implications for regional peace and deterrence stability. He said that this will introduce further

instability by generating an open-ended nuclear arms race. It will increase nuclear forces alert and readiness status, which will enhance the chances of accidental or unauthorised use and any miscalculations will provide no time and chance to avoid a nuclear exchange within the region.

He said that the seminar was aimed at exploring that what is the likely shift regarding the NFU policy in the Indian nuclear doctrine, and what would be its nature and impact on the Indian force posture? What are the implications for regional nuclear deterrence stability? What kind of threat (first use or counterforce pre-emption or any other) does it pose to Pakistan's security? And what are the possible options for Pakistan to restore regional deterrence stability?

### **Briefing by Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Research Fellow at ACDC-ISSI**

Ms. Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Research Fellow ACDC-ISSI said that the Indian nuclear doctrine has been going through a transformation. There has been debate in academic circles over abandoning the NFU policy. Statements from policymaking circles also support the notion that India is abandoning its NFU. As recently as August 16, 2019, the Indian Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh, made a statement on India's NFU policy saying that it has been adhered to so far but, "What happens in the future depends on the circumstances."

She highlighted that the Indian commitment to NFU was always shaky. Pakistan has never taken it seriously. However, the issue goes beyond NFU. The Indian doctrine is not only moving towards abandoning NFU but there are indications that it is moving towards a policy of nuclear pre-emption against Pakistan. Evidence also suggests that India seems to be developing a nuclear arsenal that goes beyond its policies of credible deterrence and NFU.

Ms. Jalil pointed out that pronouncements from the former Indian defence officials and corresponding pursuit of enhanced nuclear capabilities reveal a strategy of pre-emptive counterforce strike against Pakistan in a crisis. India has been investing in new precision weaponry, as well as, space-based and ground-based surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities that would support any move towards first use and pre-emption.

She said that India has developed several short and medium-range missiles that would be perfect for a counterforce strike – including short-range Prahaar, Brahmos and supersonic cruise missile Nirbhay. It also has a range of nuclear-capable missiles that are part of its naval nuclear strike

capabilities. These include K-15 and K-4 missiles, Dhanush, Sagarika and Brahmos cruise missile, which can be deployed on warships and 2 nuclear-powered submarines that are operational. It gives India a second-strike capability. The US has also approved the sale of 24 anti-submarine MH-60 Helicopters that would ramp up its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. It is set to acquire 5 battalions of S-400 missile defence systems from Russia between 2021-3, which will integrate with its indigenous systems AAD and PAD. India also has nearly 2 dozen dedicated military satellites that help in communication, surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance that would aid in its counterforce strategy.

India's nuclear capabilities have expanded both horizontally and vertically and become more accurate and with smaller and potentially manoeuvrable warheads. The combination of more weapons, a greater number of accurate delivery vehicles at a higher state of readiness and responsiveness, precise warheads, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and a layered ballistic missile defence system gives the option of a pre-emptive first-strike to the Indian civilian and military leaders. The logic behind it is that India can launch a counterforce attack and absorb any surviving missiles through its ballistic missile defence shield.

Another problematic issue is India's propensity to blame Pakistan over its internal security mismanagement vis a vis non-state actors. Modi's government has tried to divert attention from its internal failures by warmongering and blaming Pakistan for any incidents within India. There is a debate in the Indian academic circles for finding ways to punish Pakistan for the alleged links to non-state actors. India tried to frame post-Pulwama strikes in Pakistan along those lines. Now there is talk about linking nuclear response to actions by NSA. This is very dangerous thinking on India's part and brings more instability to South Asia. Prime minister Imran Khan has also recently warned of the dangers of India attempting false flag operations.

India's adoption of nuclear counterforce could generate not just an arms race, but dangerous "first-strike instability" where neither side could afford to go second. Both sides would be faced with use it or lose it dilemma.

Pakistan, thus, needs to adjust its posture to cater for both an abandoning of NFU by India and possible pre-emptive tendencies. Pakistan has the option to use mobility, dispersion, and camouflage to increase the survivability of its nuclear force. It has diversified its delivery

systems which support a mix of short and medium-range missiles, developed MIRV technology, as well as, cruise missiles. It has already developed significant sea-based nuclear assets that would ensure a second-strike capability including Submarine Launched Cruise Missile, Babur 3. This second-strike capability ensures that not all of Pakistan's nuclear assets are destroyed in a nuclear first strike.

Finally, she stressed that Pakistan needs to build maximum international pressure on India that highlights its aggressive posture and its dangerous nuclear policies.

### **Remarks by Dr. Ghulam Mujaddid, Dean Faculty of DASSS, Air University**

Dr. Ghulam Mujaddid, Dean Faculty of DASSS, Air University, spoke on “No First Use: Continuity or Change in Indian Nuclear Doctrine.” He outlined some of the Indian arguments for the continuation of NFU. In an April 2014 interview, Modi clearly stated, “No first use was a great initiative of Atal Bihari Vajpayee - there is no compromise on that. We are very clear. [It] is a reflection of our cultural inheritance.” Also, in Japan in August 2014, Prime Minister Modi said, “there is a tradition of national consensus and continuity on such issues. I can tell you that currently, we are not taking any initiative for a review of our nuclear doctrine.” Also, in its 2019 election manifesto, BJP had completely skipped any mention of a determination to shift India’s nuclear posture - unlike its 2014 manifesto.

Dr. Mujaddid outlining pro-change arguments for the Indian nuclear doctrine mentioned by the retired Indian officials like Shiv Shankar Menon, former Foreign Secretary and NSA, and General B.S. Nagal, former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command, who have questioned the morality and sanctity of NFU. Menon highlights that “there is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS. Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.” Menon further stated, “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons.” Menon and some other Indian officials hold that pre-emptive use upon warning of imminent Pakistani launch is consistent with its existing NFU policy. He also quoted General BS Nagal who in 2019, gave the most explicit argument for pre-emptive counterforce: “Strategic

deterrence can follow a policy of first use when there is an unstable and unpredictable adversary, thereby eliminating the dilemma of responding to battlefield weapons or having to qualify circumstances of use with no first use.... The basic requirement is to have an assured capability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect, identify, track, and destroy the nuclear assets of the adversary. This capability must be real-time, day and night, all-weather and multi-mode to make it fool proof...[which] allows the employment of nuclear weapons at the right time and place.”

Dr. Mujaddid highlighted that the combination of more weapons, a greater number of accurate delivery vehicles at a higher state of readiness/responsiveness including operational nuclear submarines, precise warheads, MIRVs, and a layered ballistic missile defence system allows the Indian civilian-military leaders to contemplate first-strike strategies or launch-on-warning strategies - that use nuclear missiles to target adversary’s nuclear arsenal, and then rely on BMD defences to intercept any assets that survive the disarming strike attempt.

He also talked about India’s increasing military space capabilities. He said that the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), operational name NavIC- an autonomous regional satellite navigation system, provides accurate real-time positioning and timing services; designed to cover India and a region extending 1,500-6000 km around it; currently consists of a constellation of seven satellites, with two satellites on the ground as stand-by.

He highlighted that India is increasingly capable of destroying what it can find in Pakistan. For an effective comprehensive counterforce, India is fast attaining the capability to find, fix, and destroy-or intercept Pakistan’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

He also noted that the Indian deterrence capabilities got a boost from the US-India civil nuclear agreement of September 28, 2008; Indo-France Civil Nuclear Deal of September 30, 2008; NSG waiver to India on September 6, 2008, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries; the Indian membership of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangements (WA), and Australia Group (AG). Thus, the Indian deterrence capabilities are greatly enhanced by the Indo-US, Indo-Israel, Indo-Russian and Indo-France Strategic Partnerships. These partnerships have provided India with NPP, space, cyberspace, satellite, BMD, missile technology, drones, and space sensors technologies.

He argued that the Indian NFU has enough flexibility for pre-emptive counterforce options. NFU is likely to continue and India is not likely to revoke or textually change it. However, more important are changes that enhance the Indian deterrence capabilities that must be watched.

Talking about possible options for Pakistan, he said that Pakistan must improve strategic intelligence capabilities; enhance early warning and missile detection capabilities; enhance platform-weapon readiness level of nuclear forces; attain the operational ready capability of nuclear missiles carrying submarines; improve decoying, displacement, concealment and mobility routines of nuclear assets; build assured second-strike capability under all possible scenarios, and declare official nuclear doctrine that ensures Pakistan's dignified survival against all threats.

### **Remarks by AVM Faaiz Amir (Retd), former Vice Chancellor, Air University**

AVM Faaiz Amir (Retd), former Vice Chancellor, Air University, gave his remarks on "Pre-emption and Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Pakistan." He touched upon three main points during his presentation - regional stability dynamics, India's floating nuclear doctrine, and implications for Pakistan. Talking about regional stability dynamics he said this region is one of the most dangerous where three nuclear powers share borders and flashpoints. One of them, India has hot borders with the other two. It also has water disputes with its neighbours. No discussion on Indo-Pak nuclear doctrines and postures would be complete without taking China into account. China does not recognise India as nuclear power and neither it considers it a threat. It does not deem it appropriate to respond to India – conventionally or in the nuclear realm. Deterrence stability is predicated on NFU on both sides. Changes in the Indian nuclear doctrine disturbs the deterrence. India's efforts to compete with China make any chances of arms control between India and Pakistan difficult. This dilemma brings volatility in Indo-Pak relations.

Indian has floating military doctrine in the sense that it is evolving and becoming increasingly aggressive. The Modi doctrine seeks a multipolar Asia and strives to make India one of the leading powers. It projects India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. Under Modi, India has been very adventurous with its neighbours. Modi's South Asia policy is to dominate its smaller neighbours. Its military doctrines are increasingly in sync with the political thought. The joint warfare doctrine of 2017 espouses both the Cold Start doctrine and surgical

strikes. The Indian Military land warfare doctrine of 2018, the first official document that recognises joint threat from Pakistan and China. This has dominated military strategy in India. Land warfare doctrine of 2018 aims at escalation dominance and seeks deterrence by punishment.

The Indian NFU is interpreted by Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian National Security Advisor, who asserts that NFU only applies to non-nuclear states. Thus, NFU is not operational against nuclear states like Pakistan. The logic of NFU, thus, does not prevent pre-emption. The evolving Indian military capabilities to find and kill the Pakistani assets create incentives for the Indian leaders to think about counterforce options against Pakistan.

Remote sensing, conventional strike capabilities, anti-submarine warfare, cyber warfare technologies will continue to improve and evolve and erode deterrence. Increasing accuracy of weapons has turned counter value assets into counterforce assets.

AVM Faaiz Amir said that Pakistan needs to develop countermeasures against the range of capabilities India is building including investing in space capabilities. At the same time, Pakistan is economically constrained and will not be able to develop a full range of countermeasures. Pakistan will have to prepare for a disarming strike from India, this creates incentives for first use from Pakistan.

He said that counterforce strike will create massive civilian casualties. Pakistan will have to retain robust retaliatory forces as a hedge against the adversary's technological advancements. India's continuing doctrinal changes and technological changes will trigger an arms race. He recommended that policymakers and academics in both countries should abandon the idea that nuclear wars are winnable.

### **Remarks by Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Director CSSPR, UOL**

Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Director CSSPR, while speaking on "India Nuclear Weapons Modernisation: Implications for Deterrence Stability," said that the region destabilised due to three nuclear states bordering each other. She posed a number of questions in her presentation. One is, what is the Indian defence modernisation geared towards – Pakistan or China, or both? India has spent more than \$100 billion on modernising its warfighting capabilities. Rafael aircraft purchased from

France is alone worth \$7.8 billion. India will use these against Pakistan for deterrence signalling, which is meant for China. She used the term 'surrogate deterrence' this indirect signalling and deterrence. India has moved from Sunderji Doctrine to Cold Start in the last two decades. Its land warfare doctrine of 2018 is aimed at conventional incursion inside Pakistan. It also talks about Pakistan-China collusion. So, India has a plan in theory but in practice how will things play out? Golan tells us it has a long way to go.

Dr. Akhtar's second point was about the changing nature of warfare which is going through a doctrinal shift towards non-contact and standoff capabilities, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, which can have a decisive and degrading effect on the war. The Indian land warfare doctrine makes a mention of these technologies. One again, these look good on paper but there is a big question whether it will be able to stand against the might of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Her third point was about modernisation and deterrence stability. She said that it is important for India and Pakistan to study the three PLA warfare concepts. The concept of public opinion in warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. First is to shape public opinion domestically and internationally. Psychological warfare seeks to shape how foreign powers see and approach China. Together these three types of warfare form a considerable part of China's deterrence policy.

In terms of overall deterrence strategy, one must look at two dyads separately. Within India-China dyad dynamics are different because China does not believe in India as a nuclear weapons state. There is general strategic anxiety within this dyad but nuclear weapons do not figure as - Pakistan dyad. So, there is a need to look at the two dyads separately. India dilemma cannot have credible minimal deterrence against both adversaries. What is adequate deterrence against Pakistan is not adequate against China. India is, thus, faced with a dilemma where it needs to have one policy vis-à-vis China and another against Pakistan. This adds to the overall instability in the region. The Indian capabilities are inadequate against China as its recent clash with China has amply exposed. She said that India has built an international narrative where its move from NFU to first use would not elicit any negative response.

**Remarks by Air Marshal (Retd) M. Ashfaque Arain, Director CASS**

Air Marshal (Retd) M. Ashfaque Arain, Director CASS, talking on “Shift in Indian Nuclear Doctrine and Deterrence Stability: Option for Pakistan” said that debate on the Indian nuclear doctrine started soon after the Pokhran II tests when one of the scientists revealed that the tests had fizzled out with a yield “much lower than what was claimed. While many in India had been advocating for revocation of NFU, revisiting the nuclear doctrine has also been discussed by the current and former defence ministers, as well as, the former NSA. The February 27, 2019 setback has given fresh impetus to this debate.

He highlighted that the Indian nuclear doctrine is based on NFU and credible minimum deterrence. However, the ground reality is different, as India continues to build its nuclear arsenal, develop missile programme, and enhance its missile defence, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. India’s current missile modernisation has exceeded what is necessary for a minimum credible deterrence, and resources put in to develop and acquire capabilities exceed, what is required for a strictly retaliatory nuclear arsenal. Its therefore clear that there is a vast gap between the Indian nuclear doctrine and the reality on the ground.

He said that the BJP led government, keeping up with her 2014 electoral promise and statements by some of its leaders, is likely to revisit the nuclear doctrine. This exercise could result in three possible outcomes; the option of first use, flexible response and maintaining status quo.

He pointed out that the first use option will have very wide acceptability in India, especially with the Hindutva hardliners. Internationally, this may, however, raise concerns and could create some difficulties in the Indian endeavours for the NSG membership. This would also not go down well with China. Additionally, with conventional force balance heavily tilted in the Indian favour, opting for first use puts the capabilities of her armed forces under question.

Implementation of this policy, he said, will necessitate stringent operational preparedness and place nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert, with forward deployment. Since the first-use posture is vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack, in addition to a credible ISR system, dispersal of warheads would also be a necessity, requiring large inventories for survivability and swift mobilisation. All these actions are likely to create an atmosphere of vertical proliferation. This entire scenario

would not be conducive to sustaining crisis stability in South Asia. Looking at the prerequisites for such a posture, as well as, likely implications, this option seems least likely.

Secondly, India could opt for “flexible response” options, aiming to allow policymakers to take decisions according to the crisis situation. These may include pre-emptive strike, counter-force and counter-value targeting, and assured destruction through massive retaliation. This option would also require a variety of weapons, modernisation of delivery systems, good ISR capability and higher alert states. International reaction is likely to be somewhat similar to the first-use option.

This, he said, brings us to the last option of maintaining the status quo. Keeping in mind the backlash on the revocation of Article 370 and 35A, border disputes with all its neighbours and tension with China, India is not likely to make an aggressive doctrine at this time. Therefore, during the review, the Indian decision-makers may debate alternative doctrinal options do nothing thereafter, except for some minor changes. The debate would, in itself, portray Modi as a strong leader. Internationally, it will be used to build an image of a responsible nuclear state, avoid open competition with China and get support for the NSG membership. However, India will continue to add more weapons to her inventory, modernise her delivery systems and upgrade her intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and go for a robust air defence system. This, in turn, will help adopt any option during a crisis situation.

Keeping in view Indian hypocrisy, he highlighted that Pakistan cannot take the Indian statements on face value. Our response options, instead of the announced Indian nuclear doctrine, should be based on the assessment of ground realities, which include nuclear weapon development, modernisation of delivery systems, ABM and BMD systems, and ISR capability etc. Since Pakistan never trusted the Indian NFU, revocation of NFU by India should not have serious consequences. As Pakistan has always worked towards maintaining strategic stability in the region, it should take all possible measures to counter the Indian designs without entering an arms race or open competition. Pakistan must continue the work to consolidate full spectrum deterrence, improve upon its MIRV and cruise missile capability, plan for good dispersal to cater for counterforce strike, develop a robust command and control system for quick decision making and build a credible second-strike capability that could deter India from any misadventure. This

will also necessitate Pakistan to place its nuclear weapons on higher alert status to avoid ‘use it or lose it’ dilemma, pushing the region towards instability.

### **Keynote Remarks by Prof. Han Hua, Director CACD, PKU, China**

Professor Han Hua, Director, Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Peking University, China in her keynote remarks said that the Indian nuclear doctrine is moving towards first use. From counter value to counterforce doctrine. She said that there is doubt on both the shift to counterforce and on its capability to achieve counterforce strikes.

She said that this capability is not assured against the Pakistani hard targets. The thinking is that perhaps India can destroy a majority of targets with a first strike and deal with remaining counterstrike through missile defence system. However, she expressed great doubt that India could achieve the assured first strike at present. India does not have the kind of systems to launch the first strike against Pakistan but not China. Even against Pakistan, it is not assured destruction.

She said that the conventional deterrence in South Asia is very important presently. She expressed concern that while the last conventional conflict between India and Pakistan did not escalate but the next conventional conflict could very well turn into a nuclear exchange. She pointed out that there are three factors that are important in nuclear South Asia – national interest, a capability which India does not have at the moment vis-à-vis escalation dominance, and political resolve to use nuclear weapons.

Whether or not India is conventionally deterred, there are three things that are important. First Indian leaders’ understanding of effective conventional deterrence, secondly their assessment of Pakistan’s warfighting capabilities, thirdly their assessment of the result of Pakistan to defend the critical national interest. Whether India is conventionally deterred, depends on their assessment of the cost of a conventional attack.

Professor Hua said that ultimately the balance of capabilities, balance of resolve, and balance of interest are the deciding factors in conflict and for making deterrence effective.

## Question and Answer Session

**Q:** What is the role of the US strategic partnership in enhancing the Indian warfighting capabilities?

**A:** India's partnerships with the US and Israel has indeed increased the Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities. Increase in the Indian nuclear capabilities has also been caused by Indo-France nuclear deal and nuclear trade with many other countries.

**Q:** What should be Pakistan's response to prospective changes in the Indian nuclear doctrine?

**A:** Pakistan should not take the Indian doctrinal pronouncements on face value. India is building a narrative where it smoothly transitioning from NFU to first use. Also, India should not be allowed nuclear doctrinal ambiguity. Pakistan needs to expose the doctrinal ambiguity.

**Q:** If India wants to move away from its NFU, what is the net gain to it?

**A:** India wants to legitimise two front conflicts based on Pakistan-China collusion. It also wants to legitimise first use based on the Pak-China collusion argument. The strategic objective may partially be to unnerve both Pakistan and China and could be a strategic objective.

Pakistan essentially has to prepare against the Indian capabilities. The Indian preparations are for first use. Thus, Pakistan response has to be against the Indian first use capabilities. Pakistan needs to develop an assured second-strike capability.

**Q:** Does Pakistan need to match India weapon for a weapon?

**A:** Matching India weapon for the weapon has never been Pakistan's aim. India is one of the largest arms importers and Pakistan cannot match that. What Pakistan needs is assured deterrence in the conventional and nuclear realm. Pakistan should also explore space domain where it lags considerably behind India.

Moreover, Pakistan needs to aim for credible minimum deterrence. However, credible minimum deterrence is not fixed but dynamic because the Indian capabilities keep changing so deterrence requirements also change.

**Q:** What are the chances of a dialogue between India and Pakistan and confidence-building measures (CBM)?

**A:** CBMs would certainly be welcome whether conventional or nuclear. But given the hostile environment and mistrust between the two countries, there is no chance of dialogue or CBMs at present

Last time India and Pakistan held any kind of talks was December 2012. India is changing from democratic secular to extremist Hindutva base. Also, the US tilt towards India has emboldened India. Thus, President Modi is not cognizant of the importance of dialogue at present.

**Q:** If nuclear weapons are not for use, perhaps Pakistan should invest more in peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

**A:** Nuclear weapons are weapons of non-use. Their importance is essentially political. Civil nuclear uses are increasing. Pakistan is already applying nuclear technologies in the field of medicine, agriculture energy. However, Pakistan needs to expand the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

### **Concluding Remarks by Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Chairman BoG ISSI**

Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Chairman BoG ISSI, said that the imminent changes in the Indian nuclear doctrine and force posture has made South Asia a much more dangerous place. This has a number of implications for Pakistan's security and its nuclear strategy. It would accelerate an arms race in the region and will necessitate adjustment by Pakistan to its force postures and doctrine. It would essentially lower the nuclear threshold with increased chances of war between India and Pakistan and greater instability in an already volatile region like South Asia.

India will continue to harp on declaratory NFU but will pursue modernisation of nuclear and conventional capabilities. At some stage, it will move seamlessly to first use policy. The international environment is characterised by crumbling arms control, arms races, with no hope of improvements. At the same time, great powers are following policies that encourage India to

follow aggressive policies. On the other hand, the false premise is propagated that Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. It gives cover to India. It is India that has vast nuclear material and power plants outside of IAEA safeguards.

Today, the world is a much more dangerous place. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' doomsday clock is closer to midnight than it has ever been. It is 100 seconds to midnight. This means that the world must pause and consider the consequences of its relentless pursuit of offensive arms and doctrines before the world descends into chaos, anarchy and destruction.