

PAK INDIA DIALOGUE - QUEST OF PEACE

April 20 – 21, 2006

INAUGURAL SESSION

REMARKS

Haroon Ahmed

I would like to welcome you very warmly to the conference today, titled “Pakistan–India Dialogue: A Quest for Peace”. This is the second conference in the series organized by the Allama Iqbal Fellow at the Cambridge University, Dr Dushka Saiyid, in collaboration with Wolfson College, and sponsored by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI). I would like to start by introducing our first speaker today. The opening remarks will be made by Mr Inam ul Haque, Chairman, Board of Governors, ISSI, formerly Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and also Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He is a diplomatic officer of long-standing and has served in many prestigious positions as Pakistan’s Representative, including service at the UN. I would like to start by inviting Mr Inam ul Haque to make the opening remarks.

INAUGURAL SESSION

OPENING REMARKS

Mr Inam ul Haque

Thank you. Professor Haroon, Dr Gordon Johnson, President, Wolfson College, Dr Maleeha Lodhi, High Commissioner of Pakistan in the UK, distinguished panellists, ladies and gentlemen. This is a prestigious and historical place of learning and holding a degree from Cambridge signifies a very special aura of knowledge, scholarship, and particularly confidence. We are pleased that this is the second in the series of seminars being organized by the ISSI and the Allama Iqbal Fellow at Wolfson College. I would like to thank Dr Johnson, President of Wolfson College, for his support in this project. We are hopeful that these seminars will become a regular feature and the subjects discussed here will encourage general discussion and debate on the issues of interest to the international community and particularly to South Asians.

The holding of these seminars is, in no small measure, due to the dynamism of three distinguished ladies from Pakistan, each of whom has made a great contribution. Dr Maleeha Lodhi, our High Commissioner in London, is a person of great talent, who has distinguished herself in many capacities: as a teacher, as the editor of the largest English daily in Pakistan, and as a diplomat. Before serving as our High Commissioner in London, she has served as our ambassador in Washington twice. With a rare combination of elegance, flare, and confidence, and, since I have had the privilege of working with her as Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, I can tell you that she has very few peers in the diplomatic sphere, as well as in the intensity of her commitment to our country. Dr Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, is the moving spirit behind this event. She has the distinction of chairing the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad at a very young age. She writes extensively on international security and strategic issues and she is well-known and admired for her straight talking and no-holds barred, no criticism taken, and full speed ahead approach. She has many admirers in Pakistan, but I am not sure whether the long list of her admirers includes any of those who have been at the receiving end of her acerbic wit. And then there is Dr Dushka Saiyid, who completes this trio. Those who know her admire her for her continuous efficiency and gentle ways. We also have with us Mushahid Hussain Sayed, Senator and

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also the Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League, the ruling party. His other claim to fame is of course that he is lucky to be married to Dr Dushka Saiyid. Let me also say that we also have with us Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais, the head of the Social Sciences Department at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.

We regret the absence of some of those whom we wished would have been able to join us but could not do so. First of all, Mr Yasin Malik: we were hoping that he would be here but he has recently undergone surgery and we pray for his speedy recovery. The veteran Kashmiri leader, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, could not make it because he was perhaps not given his passport, which is usually the case with him. But there are others with us, most importantly Mir Waiz himself. We are very happy and grateful to Mir Waiz Omar Farooq that he has taken the trouble of travelling all the way to be with us at this seminar. We have here Mr. M.J. Akbar, a well-known journalist, and Mr Dilip Padgaonker, who is well known as the editor of the *Times of India*; these days he is doing a number of other things and I am sure that we will be hearing from all of these personalities. We are also lucky to have with us Professor Alistair Lamb and Sir Nicholas Barrington, both of them extremely well-known scholars; I am glad that Victoria Schofield has also been able to join us today, because all three of them have done a lot of work on India and Pakistan, and particularly on Kashmir. Dr Rahul Roy Chaudhary of the International Institute of Strategic Studies is also here.

To turn now to the subject of the seminar, “India–Pakistan Dialogue: Quest for Peace”, I would not like to make any remarks on the substance of the issue, particularly since Dr Lodhi will be making the keynote address at this opening session and I do not want her to be cross with me and also because I myself will be holding forth at the opening session and I do not want to steal my own thunder either. I would like to note, however, that, with the completion of two years of the dialogue and the completion of two completed rounds at the Foreign Secretary level, it is appropriate that we take stock of the situation and bring our respective opinions to the table to assess where we stand and where we go from here. And this is what we plan to do over the next two days in the hallowed atmosphere of this great Institution. I am confident that all of us will benefit greatly from this exercise.

Haroon Ahmed: Thank you, Mr Inam ul Haque. Our next speaker today is Dr Gordon Johnson, who needs no introduction: this is, after all, his

college. He is President of Wolfson College, and also serves as Deputy Vice Chancellor in this University; among many other positions he holds, the one I know him best as is the Chairman of the Syndicate of the Cambridge University Press. His professional career is as a historian, where he is an authority on Indian history and the editor of the enormously authoritative series of books, *The History of India*, published by CUP, which has now run into its twenty-third volume. He is our host today and it gives me a very great pleasure to ask Dr Gordon Johnson to make a few remarks of welcome.

INAUGURAL SESSION

WELCOME REMARKS

Gordon Johnson

I will be very brief. I give you a very warm welcome to Cambridge on this rather cool April day. I hope there will be time for you to look around Cambridge. This is of course a very old university, but universities have to keep reinventing themselves in order to keep up-to-date and I am happy to say that you have come to what is probably the most forward-looking and enterprising of Cambridge's colleges and one of the youngest colleges here.

In fact we have had a very close connection in this college with Pakistan over the years, and it is a great privilege for us to have Dr Dushka Saiyid as the Iqbal Fellow. This is an enormously important topic that you are going to discuss during the next day and a half, and I just want to say two things about that. The first is this: I am in the middle of reading a very interesting memoir about Professor John Franklin, who is now in his ninety-first year; he is an enormously distinguished historian of modern United States history. He is an expert and authority on the history of the Blacks in the United States. And what is so impressive about this historian is that he has, throughout his life, done great things for civil rights and for running down and tackling the prejudice and barriers in contemporary United States. For his entire life, he has been devoted to public service in improving the relations between White and Black America. And the thing that we should admire very much is that he is a passionately good historian and the way he has handled it and the calm way he has studied it and the way he has seen it in the broadest possible context has actually informed all his public service activity. As a result, he has been enormously influential and has made a great contribution to solve things of a really serious sort.

We really do need to understand the historical context, and the contemporary passion that drives political and cultural issues. Without the fundamental understandings, we will be in a much weaker position in making policies and organizing ourselves to provide solutions to the problems properly, so that they do not just continue to be a running thought for the generations. The second thing that I want to say is that it is the nature of intellectual activity that it is collaborated. And what I like

about this particular project is that the High Commissioner, the Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, and Dushka Saiyid have come together and made this conference possible. And this is not just a meeting or a conference; it is an exclusive exchange of ideas and the continuing collaboration that I think is very important.

Haroon Ahmed: Thank you very much Dr Gordon Johnson. Our next speaker, who will make the keynote address, is Dr Maleeha Lodhi, our highly regarded High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom. Our first speaker talked a good deal about stealing everybody's thunder, but I should still say and repeat some of the things he has already said. Dr Lodhi graduated from the London School of Economics. She studied economics and political theory I believe, but she also taught at the London School of Economics before moving on to what has already been mentioned as a meteoric career in journalism, where she made an enormous impact in a very short space of time. After that, she went into the diplomatic service and particularly to the United States, where she made a great impression. We are very fortunate that she is now High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, where she is also making an enormous impact not only among the diplomats of other nations, but also in the community of people of Pakistani origin who live in this country. We are very grateful to her and now I would like to call upon her to make the keynote address.

INAUGURAL SESSION

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Dr Maleeha Lodhi

Thank you. It is a great honour and privilege to be here, Dr Johnson, and thank you for those words, Professor Haroon and Mr Inam ul Haque. Of course, I see so many of my colleagues and friends, and I am humbled really by the presence of my two former bosses. One, Mushahid Hussain, who was instrumental in introducing me to journalism and, of course, the second, Mr Inam ul Haque, who was Foreign Secretary. I was working for him and I learned so much about the world of diplomacy and foreign policy from him. My two colleagues from the LSE, Dr Mazari and Dr Saiyid, of course, we have had a long association and I have learned a lot from them. I feel it is a great privilege that I have been asked to deliver the opening keynote address.

I want to start by first saying that it is the first time that I have shared the platform with the man I have admired for so many years and that is Mir Waiz. I have admired him hugely for his courage, his vision, and his wisdom, as he leads the Kashmiri people in their freedom struggle. So it is a double honour for me that I should be here sharing a platform with him. With that, let me say that the Institute of Strategic Studies as well as the Allama Iqbal Fellow must be commended for organizing this conference on a topic that, as Dr Johnson has so rightly said, is of vital importance for Pakistan, for our region, and for the international community.

So let me begin by saying that the present political environment in South Asia is marked by an ambience of hope and anticipation. Our region, in fact, has witnessed intense diplomatic engagement between Pakistan and India; perhaps the most intense since the military stand-off of 2001-2002. From the depths of confrontation and crisis, Pakistan and India have been able to take a series of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to restore a modicum of stability to their relations. The security environment has improved remarkably some two and a half years after the diplomatic re-engagement, but many questions remain. Before turning to the challenges, it is only right that we should, as Mr Inam said, take stock of where we are. I think the past two years can be characterized as a period of strategic transition in the region. The environment in which the

two countries are conducting their bilateral relations has been significantly transformed.

Let me put to you the proposition that the new environment in our region is marked by five features. And let me quickly flag what these five features are. First, there is a strong popular sentiment in favour of peace and normal relations in both Pakistan and India. New stake-holders and, perhaps, more numerous stake-holders have emerged in both the countries. Leaders of the two countries have repeatedly referred to this transformation of the public mood in many of their public speeches. Second, there is the realization in both the countries that there is no military solution to the Kashmir dispute or to the other problems that exist between the two. The 2002 military stand-off, the exercise of coercive diplomacy and the limits of that diplomacy confirmed this proposition. Third, there is recognition, at both the popular and official levels, that neither country can achieve its full economic potential or achieve prosperity for its people while engaged in confrontation. Indeed, they see more regions, be it East Asia or China, passing them by in all social and economic indices of progress. The fourth new feature of the environment is the recognition that the two countries need to carefully manage their relations in a nuclearized environment. Both countries recognized that they are and will remain nuclear weapon states. And they have moved to the conclusion that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. The fifth element of this new environment is the impact of globalization, which has been unleashing new dynamics and shaping perceptions in both Delhi and Islamabad. For South Asia, the challenges of peace, stability, growth, and prosperity are no longer internal, as they used to be, but today they are much more external. So, far from being local, it seems all politics today is now global.

In terms of war and peace, conflict and co-operation in South Asia have direct or indirect implications that go far beyond the region. Whatever issue we look at, whether it is economic growth, out-sourcing of jobs, proliferation of WMD, all of these have global implications. It is no accident therefore that the bilateral endeavours for peace between India and Pakistan have been actively encouraged by the international community, including the United States, Europe, China, and other major powers. The international community, more than ever in the past, has engaged not merely in crisis management but in supporting a sustained peace process in South Asia. And, in a notable departure from the past, the United States in the post-Cold War era, because we lack a term to describe the current environment, has good relations with both Delhi and Islamabad.

Against this backdrop, I think it would be instructive to enumerate the positives that have emerged in the past two years or so. Let me flag six positives. First, of course, is the 6 January 2004 joint statement, called the Islamabad communiqué, which states that both sides are committed to resuming a composite dialogue, including on Kashmir. The second positive is that the cease-fire on the Line of Control has continued to hold since December 2003. Third is the unprecedented people-to-people contact. In certain areas, this contact has not only been sustained, but also intensified. Cricket, or sporting ties, is a case in point. I understand that, on average, eight to ten thousand visas have been issued each month from both sides. Of course, the number varies from month to month, but that is the average since the dialogue process began. And this marks a record: if you see the base-line which was below zero, you will see how far we have come in the terms of people-to-people contacts.

The fourth positive I would say is the two rounds of the composite dialogue process that have been completed without delays, without interruption, without postponements. The third round, as I am sure you all know, has started in January 2006, and given the stop-start pattern of talks in the past, this itself is significant. Fifth, a number of Confidence-Building Measures have been agreed to and implemented. These include (and I am not going to give you an exhaustive list, I will only speak about some of these just to give you a sense of flavour): the bus service—in fact several bus services— from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad; from Amritsar to Lahore; from Nankana Sahib to Amritsar—and there is an agreement now to start one between Poonch and Rawalakot. The resumption of a train service recently between Monabao and Kokhrapar, in addition to the one between Lahore and Amritsar, is another important CBM. Among the CBMs, there is also an upgradation of the hotlines between the two countries, and the formalization of the agreement on prior notification of missile-testing by each country. We have also seen that, among the CBMs being implemented, there is the revival of the Joint Commission after a lapse of sixteen years. There is also an agreement not to develop any new posts and defence works along the Line of Control to build confidence. And of course, most dramatically, we have seen the facilitation of intra-Kashmir visits, including landmark visits before and after the earthquake, the tragedy that struck Azad Kashmir and parts of Pakistan's North-Western Frontier Province, and visits of leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, including Mir Waiz who is sitting here, to Azad Kashmir and to Pakistan. These are historic milestones which are shaped to build confidence.

The sixth positive is the willingness in both the capitals to discuss economic co-operation, as signified by continuing talks on the multinational gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India. In this context, I think it is important to mention that trade between the two countries has also picked up in the last couple of years, even if it remains somewhat modest in relation to its actual potential. Previously averaging about \$230 million a year, this year, meaning the last year 2004-2005, the year for which we have the figures, it crossed over \$800 million; this is expected to cross one billion dollars in the current year. Of course, informal trade, which is a polite way of describing smuggling, accounts for upwards of two billion dollars a year. So I think that the important thing is, as bilateral trade ties begin to get into swing, we will be able to stop smuggling, which is such an erosion of revenues to both countries.

Now I have enumerated these steps and described these developments because they do convey a clear sense that there is an improvement in the security climate, but they also raise the question whether this improvement can be consolidated and can be further enlarged. Also, I think that the question is raised, and I am sure that with such distinguished delegates you will be able to address it in the next session, whether this improvement is seen as strategic or tactical by one or the other side, or by both sides. I do not wish to answer this question, as I think it is a question that we will address in the conference along with the questions: Can the process regress? Has the peace process become irreversible? Are we seeing a new level of maturity in the management of relations between Pakistan and India? I think it is important to recognize that, while there has been considerable movement on confidence-building measures, there is as yet very little, if anything, on conflict or dispute resolution.

President Pervez Musharraf has recently reiterated, not for the first time, that in the absence of conflict resolution, the CBMs risk losing their effectiveness. In other words, the dialogue process can run out of steam without forward movement on substance and an inability to resolve the disputes between the two countries. There is much speculation about a possible agreement on Siachen or Sir Creek, part of which is fuelled by a certain gentleman sitting here, who is the editor of the *Asian Age*, because they wrote a story in their paper yesterday I believe, which talked about the Indian Prime Minister possibly visiting Pakistan in the summer of this year or earlier than summer, carrying with him a deal, a possible deal on Siachen. Now it is not of course for me to add to this speculation, but I can say that such an agreement would constitute an important substantive achievement for the composite dialogue, and will also enhance mutual

confidence, provided this is accompanied by progress on other aspects of the Kashmir dispute.

I would, in fact, submit to this august audience that the future of the dialogue and the stability of South Asia depends on whether the two countries, can (a) address and overcome their divergences, specially on Kashmir, but also on the nuclear-military balance; and (b) build on the areas of convergence which are clearly there, whether they are trade, regional economic co-operation, or North-South issues on which both the countries take identical positions in multilateral fora. But these are the two key questions that I think we need to look at and I think that I should mention here, or only flag that in this regard, the US-India agreement on civil nuclear co-operation, that certainly has important strategic implications for our region, does raise serious questions about future regional security and may cast a shadow on the composite dialogue process. But I will return to this later; let me turn to the all important issue of Kashmir.

Obviously, the composite dialogue now has entered its most delicate, even defining phase, because unless the talks begin to address the Kashmir dispute, the relations will remain susceptible to future relapse into tensions and perhaps even confrontation. The declared official positions of the two countries on Kashmir are well known, I do not need to repeat them here; but Pakistan's leaders have repeatedly stated that the two countries will need to go beyond these official positions if a peaceful negotiated settlement is to be evolved. President Musharraf has mentioned, for example, ideas on demilitarization of the region, establishment of some kind of self rule by Kashmiris on both sides, and of joint supervision or oversight of the common elements of Kashmir affairs by Pakistan and India. There are perhaps alternatives that could be discussed. These ideas are yet to be explored, with a marked reluctance discernible so far on the part of India to do so. As you know, we have both the front and the back channels operating in the dialogue process and we have yet to hear from Delhi on its response to these ideas because, so far, the impression in Islamabad is that Delhi's responses to these concepts and notions have either appeared negative or obfuscatory.

Let us look for a minute at the concept of demilitarization which, as I said, is yet to be elaborated through either front or through back channels. All earlier peace plans for Jammu and Kashmir had envisaged some kind of total or partial demilitarization. And, as Pakistan has proposed that the demilitarization could start with withdrawal of Indian troops from designated Kashmiri towns, and this could be broadened in scope and depth gradually to cover all of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the

Line of Control. Demilitarization could be accompanied by the gradual enlargement of the powers and authority of the regional Kashmiri governments at different levels. Kashmiri participation in the dialogue will be necessary, in order to evolve the concept of self rule. Discussions with them are essential so that the modalities can be crafted for their inclusion in the peace process on Kashmir. The issue of violence, that is obviously repeatedly raised by India within Kashmir, needs to be frontally addressed, but we think and believe that the demilitarization of the major Kashmiri towns and a halt to human rights violations against the Kashmiri people can persuade them to disavow armed resistance and opt for peaceful and political means to secure their rights and aspirations. Simultaneously, further steps can be taken to increase intra-Kashmiri exchanges across the Line of Control and to bring the Kashmiris into discussions for a durable and just solution to the dispute. So the bottom line here is that, if the substantive issues are not addressed, the dialogue—and that is the lesson of our history—will likely go round and round in circles, leading to frustration and possibly even a breakdown. This we have seen happen in the past and obviously we must learn lessons from the past, especially lessons that will enable us to avert a breakdown in the talks at some future point.

Let me now turn to the nuclear–strategic relationship, because it is again a vital area where both countries have divergent approaches, if I could put it that way. But let me say that until recently, South Asia was considered the most likely nuclear flashpoint in the world. The composite dialogue that includes the security relationship as a major agenda item and the CBMs that have been agreed, some of which I have just read out to you, have contributed to reducing global concerns. Yet the strategic relations between Pakistan and India remained undefined and potentially unstable. Pakistan has proposed a *Strategic Restraint Regime* to define and stabilize this strategic relationship, in both the nuclear and the conventional fields, based on the concept of minimum credible deterrence. In the bilateral dialogue, India and Pakistan have jointly declared that their nuclear weapons are the factor for strategic stability in the region. To ensure this, it is essential that they accept self-restraint in the development and deployment of their nuclear and strategic capabilities. And in this context obviously, Pakistan remains very concerned about India's draft nuclear doctrine which was enunciated after the nuclear test in 1998 and has never subsequently been disavowed, even with the change of government in India. This nuclear doctrine envisages the development of a triad of some 300-400 nuclear weapons deployed on land, sea, and air. Such ambitious capabilities are being steadily acquired. Moreover, Pakistan sees India as contemplating acquiring ballistic missile defence or

BMD systems, which would further complicate, and certainly erode, the stability of minimum deterrence as it exists today.

The Indo–US nuclear deal also has serious implications for regional stability. Under this agreement, a large number of facilities and reactors, including breeder reactors, would be maintained by India outside safeguards, which will only encourage India, in our opinion, to continue and even accelerate its weapons programme without any constraint or inhibition. In other words, India would be free to build its nuclear arsenal. This threatens to erode the minimum nuclear deterrence and strategic stability as conceived and proposed by Pakistan. The danger is that this could also trigger a new arms race in our region, an arms race that we certainly do not wish to join; but, at the same time, Pakistan will respond to its defence requirements when it feels necessary. In our view, a package approach for India and Pakistan, rather than a discriminatory one, needs to be pursued. We have to avert a nuclear arms race, promote restraint, and preserve strategic stability, while also ensuring that the legitimate needs of both countries for civilian nuclear power generation are met.

History, we believe, provides ample testimony to the destabilizing repercussions of a discriminatory approach. I do not need to recall history. The nuclear history of the subcontinent is very well known. Yet, certainly an approach that applies double standards to the nuclear question, will have, we believe, the same destabilizing impact that it had in the past. But in this case, we believe that history has been a poor teacher. We believe that a stable nuclear strategic relationship is necessary for sustainable stability and normal relations between India and Pakistan. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the current CBMs that have been talked about or negotiated between the two countries and address more fundamental questions and concepts and take more fundamental steps to translate and operationalize the concept of minimum deterrence. Otherwise, it just becomes an empty word with a very expensive interpretation, at least by one country in our view. Pakistan's proposals for more far-reaching mutual nuclear and strategic restraint remain to be substantially discussed in the dialogue. They are on the table in the dialogue, but we have yet to receive a substantial response from India. They include ideas like maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status, non-deployment of nuclear capable missiles, non-induction of anti-ballistic missile systems into our region, and formalization of the unilateral moratorium that the two countries have on nuclear weapon testing.

We turn now to the conventional balance, because a balance in the conventional scenario is also an essential component of stability between our two countries. We have seen that the Indian defence budget increased

almost hundred per cent in the past five years, whereas Pakistan's is virtually frozen. We have also tracked that India's planned arms purchases globally amount to over a hundred billion dollars over a period of time. The provision or the supply or the desired acquisition of several advance missile system such as the Israeli Phalcon, AEW Aircraft, the Green-Pine Radar, the Russian nuclear submarines, the Patriot III anti-ballistic missiles, all of these big ticket items, strategic weapons, threaten to erode the conventional balance. And this build-up raises serious questions in Islamabad about India's ultimate strategic objectives and ambitions within South Asia and beyond. The vast bulk of India's land, sea, and air forces are not deployed against China but against Pakistan. And these can be quickly mobilized as we saw in 2002, for action against Pakistan. So any military build-up naturally raises legitimate concerns in Islamabad because it impacts adversely on Pakistan's security.

We believe that a conventional arms imbalance will increase the danger to peace and stability and needs to be addressed. Again, in this area, we floated a number of proposals in the composite dialogues and these proposals have one aim: to somehow put together a package of restraints, so that we have a balance in the conventional area. And we rule out through such restraint any danger of a surprise attack by one or the other country. For example, we have proposed restrictions on the induction of heavy weapons within certain border zones. We have also proposed limits on the size and deployments in military exercises being undertaken by either of the countries. We believe that if these ideas are explored and addressed, ultimately they could pave the way for an agreement on the non-use of force between the two countries or a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently offered Pakistan—and this is something of course that we have been hearing for many, many years—a “treaty of friendship”. We would like to propose to India ‘a non-aggression pact’, a treaty in which both countries commit to the non-use of force and that is something that has been on the table and we will renew this offer to India.

Let me now turn on to the regional dynamics and make a few points and move on to the (b) part of my equation: that is, how India and Pakistan can perhaps build areas of convergence. But before I get there, let me just flag one other concern and that is that the normalization underway now between the two countries can be adversely affected by Pakistan's perception of Indian efforts to act against Pakistan's interest in the other parts of the region, as, for example, co-operating with anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan and joining and sometimes even orchestrating the campaign to blame Pakistan for the so-called resurgence of the Taliban.

Such actions, if we are unable to address them in time, can also set back the quest for regional peace. So I think that both in the front and the back channels these are issues which will have to be addressed as we continue our quest to find viable, sustainable peace. Now let me turn to trade and North-South issues because they do provide issue areas on which to bear convergence between Pakistan and India.

As you know, progress has already been made towards trade liberalization under SAARC's SAFTA arrangements, although, as I said before, the potential for trade has yet to be realized. It has been explained that while the important first steps have been taken, this potential can only be fully exploited when there is substantive progress in resolving political disputes. This is not because Pakistan is conditioning any movement in trade on the resolution of political disputes, but again this is the dictum of common sense. We have to see progress in the other tracks of the composite dialogue before we can realistically envisage any further opening up of trade. I think it is also important to bear in mind the other factor, which is that for trade ties to be substantially advanced, India and Pakistan will need to overcome asymmetry in their trade and economic regimes to create a level playing field. Pakistan's trade regime is one of the most liberal in the region with low tariffs, few non-tariff barriers, and virtually no subsidies. This is so probably thanks to the IMF and the World Bank, because we implemented very stringent programmes; but whatever the driving force, we ended up having one of the most liberal trade regimes in the region. India still has work to do because India still maintains some of the world's highest tariff levels, for example, on agriculture and on a number of so-called sensitive products. So its trade regime incorporates several non-tariff barriers as well. In this regard, the agreement earlier this month in Islamabad during trade talks that took place to identify and remove non-tariff barriers, we believe, represents a step in the right direction. And why are these trade regimes being harmonized? Trade and economic agreements that are in the mutual interest in the near term can be attended to. The pipeline projects from Iran and Turkmenistan are prime examples of agreements that we obviously need to work on because they have great potential to create a win-win situation for all the countries of the region, despite the opposition of extra-regional powers.

On many North-South issues, Pakistan and India already co-operate actively specially in multilateral forums like the United Nations, the Group of Seventy-seven, NAM, and these go to promote the interests of the developing countries and to demand equity in international economic relations and in global security arrangements. With progress towards the resolution of their political differences, we believe such co-operation can

be significantly enhanced in these multilateral forums in the future. So, in other words, we can build upon what already exists, but build upon in terms of expansion. Looking ahead and asking the question of how the dialogue can be sustained in what is a dynamic but uncertain global environment, to my mind at least six elements would be critical to sustaining this process.

The first is the preservation of agreements and CBMs instituted so far. I think it is important to preserve what we already have agreed to. The second, promoting the resolutions of disputes, so that the peace process can move beyond the CBMs into its conflict resolution mode or into its conflict resolution stage. And the third element which can help to sustain the dialogue process is a problem-solving approach, if this is adopted by both countries. Fourth, self-evident but important to mention, is the principle of reciprocity guiding and defining the talks. Fifth—and this has been critical in the past so I mention it on the basis of our experience of the past two years—political contact at sufficiently high levels to manage issues and to keep the process moving to ensure that it does not get bogged down. In other words, you have to have strategic intervention at the leadership level so that the process keeps moving and we do not lose momentum. The sixth element—and we can discuss it later, because I think it needs some elaboration—is evolving a convergent vision, the two countries evolving a compatible and convergent vision for the future of peace and co-operation for the entire region.

Let me conclude by saying—and I borrow from a famous philosopher, if I can paraphrase him—that peace surely is not an absence of war; it has to be more than the absence of war. It is a state of mind, a disposition for confidence, for trust, and for justice. In this sense of the word, the journey towards peace may only just have begun.

INAUGURAL SESSION

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIR

Thank you very much, High Commissioner. The High Commissioner has set the scene by raising many of the issues—all the issues perhaps—ranging from Kashmir, nuclear issues, trade, and people views, and has surely set the scene for what could be a wide-ranging and very useful discussion at this conference. Now I was given some opportunity to make

a few concluding remarks, but since the High Commissioner has touched on so many, I have to say little and have less opportunity to display my ignorance on the subject. But one thing I would like to say and it is a remark that the High Commissioner made about the stake-holders being different. The stake-holders today are not the stake-holders of yesterday: I give just you two examples: I work in education, I meet young people all the time here. The young people I meet are the diaspora, the third generation of young Pakistanis and Indians born in this country, brought up in this country by the rules of behaviour and education and life in this country. To them, the issues that have been raised no longer matter, they just do not. It is a great yawn, basically of being technocrats moving along, doing wonderful things in their own lives. So they moved on, and they are the stake-holders of tomorrow. I am not quite sure about whether this is the situation in India and Pakistan, but that is the situation here.

Now the Indian situation is very interesting for me also because I work in my professional capacity as professor of microelectronics and I am often in the United States and meet a great many people who work as Indian professionals, hugely successful in the diasporas; many have come from the Indian Institute of Technologies, highly educated, working in the United States, particularly in the Silicon Valley in California. To them also, of the many issues that have been raised, they want most of all a rapid resolution so they can bring prosperity to India, by transferring their huge success in the United States, where they have set up companies which are very successful, businesses that are very profitable, over to Bangalore, and take advantage of India's great educational capacity and the low cost of its technocrats.

So I think that the High Commissioner has touched upon a very important issue: that the stake-holders are different and I hope that some of them in conferences will actually look at it from that point of view. The only other point that I would like to make, since I have been given this opportunity, is to make a plea for tolerance. No resolution of any dispute can take place unless there is some degree of tolerance. Now this dispute between India and Pakistan has gone on for far too long, it has gone on for five or six decades. Things have changed enormously in this period of time, I give you one story that I like to use to illustrate by own experience here. I have done Masters from Cambridge University, which is very ancient. In 1919, the Statutes of this College clearly stated, "No Indian shall be admitted to Corpus Christi College"; eighty years later, they take a Pakistani and make him Master of the College. So, in eighty years, life has changed, society has changed, everything around here has changed. Surely things will change the way Pakistan has worked. So things have

changed in the outside world, globalization was talked about, and I hope that with these few remarks about the things having changed in the outside world, I hope things will change in India and Pakistan as well.

SESSION ONE: *PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS*

PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS AN INDIAN VIEW

M. J. Akbar

The subject that we are addressing in the conference is in fact the key subject, the substantive subject: the prevailing status of the peace process. I have a suspicion of words and cynicism is a very useful methodology, so the question that comes to my mind to begin with is: Is there a peace process? Is it a peace process or is it a negotiating process? Is it a status quo process or is it a horizon process? Because if it is a status quo process, then it is merely a situation in which two states have to address each other, particularly if they are neighbours, and find ways and means of doing so. Another very important question that we need to address is: Do the objectives of the two sides, India and Pakistan, have anything even marginally in common? Because if you do not have anything marginally in common, then you will get nowhere, except around to the same spot. More questions regarding what kind of conversations, when we all know that the conversations are going on? High Commissioner Dr Lodhi has very lucidly given half a dozen reasons as to why the process should continue. But the question that I have is: Is it a monologue between the two countries—in the sense that are the two sides talking to each other, or are the two sides talking *at* each other? If there is a dialogue, then does the dialogue have a purpose? And, finally, is a trilogue ever possible? And I know that a trilogue is assumed to mean Mir Waiz, if not Mr Gilani. But for me, the trilogue, the three sides of the triangle are different. Two governments may constitute two of the sides, but the third side and the broader side is really the side of the people, and the people across provincial divides as much as across national divides.

Now the people: I was very happy to hear the High Commissioner of Pakistan here making this point in her own way, that if there is substance in it and there is advance, this is because it is for the first time there is people participation in this process. And in this context I would actually like to refer it to—there is no text without context—what has happened in my view: the partition in 1947 was a political, technical, and national reality. But the real partition, as far as I am concerned, really took place in 1965, because it was after the 1965 war that the people of the two countries

were divided by a huge wall, the wall of impenetrable visas, that wall of being unable to go to each other. Before that, like so many Indian Muslims, my mother who had relatives in Lahore or Karachi, each summer holiday, each winter holiday, were simply put on a train to Amritsar. We would go to Wagah after two days and stay with relatives on the other side and we probably spent more time with our Pakistani relatives than we spent time at home with our Indian relatives. But that partition came in 1965 and it took twenty years for that partition to begin to crumble.

One more question, and again I think I could put it in the category of the most vital questions: Why do we want peace? Why do India and Pakistan want peace? Very many nations have a vested interest in war—it is not unknown, they have vested interests in hostility, establishments very often actually prefer hostility to peace. Now the worst possible answer to this question is sentiment. If the reason why we want peace is merely sentiments, we will get nowhere, we have gone nowhere, in my view, and we will continue to go nowhere. Peace has to have a practical and a rational component to it in order to become policy, because all policies are motivated through self-interests much more than the other's interest. In fact, I believe that we must have neither peace nor war for sentimental reasons. But you know war is easy to sell, it is considered hard psychologically; peace is considered soft, and therefore soft things are not practical and hard things are durable and practical. There was a practical reason for the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947; it was an attempt by Pakistan to change the geography of the time. One of the real problems of the Kashmir issue, as far as I am concerned, is that all the time taken on Kashmir, is war-directed—"Ceasefire line, United Nations"—all of these are the consequences of conflict and I hope to return to this point later but we have to be very clear about whether the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan began in October 1947 or on 15 August 1947. And this difference of six weeks will lead us to some very interesting perspectives. I do not have the intellectual capacity to reach the number six, so I will stick to three.

What are the practical reasons for peace between India and Pakistan? One, historically it can be argued that peace might have brought more rewards than war. What do I mean by that? Briefly, for example, if war had not broken out in October 1947, Kashmir was in a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan. There would have to have had negotiations for the future status of Kashmir; there is no question of not having negotiations for the future status of Kashmir and on any other part, whether Junagardh or whatever, because, according to the Government of India Act which created partition, there was no third option. This may not

sound very comfortable to even my friend Mir Waiz, but according to the Act, you have to opt for one of the two and there would have to be a resolution in dialogue and in talks in which certainly Lord Mountbatten would have involved the British government as the third party to this process. Instead, we went into conflict and I do not know the facts of the conflict; but after sixty years of the conflict, not even sixty inches of land has changed hands. And I dare say that even in sixty more years of conflict, it would be the same. Here I would like to stress the point that if anyone had any illusions about what the nature of land and peace was, then those illusions were removed in 1965, because in 1965, land actually changed hands. But after Tashkent, both the governments of India and Pakistan, as national sovereign states, actually returned lands occupied by each other. That was de facto recognition of the ceasefire line as the practical working border, irrespective of the claims on either side.

So, the practical reasons: First, war has not achieved its purpose for Pakistan or for India. Hot war, cold war, surrogate war, terrorism war, no form of war has achieved anything. If it has not achieved anything, then it is our bounden duty—again a point made by the High Commissioner—to look into the fact that, if war is not going to be a solution, we have to look towards the options for peace. The second practical reason: Again, the greatest thing to happen between India and Pakistan in 1998 was nuclear weaponization. That set mutually stark destruction very firmly in place and I hope that we never ever actually denuclearize. Because if you take out the nuclear component, the subcontinent will be back to 1971 and will be back to 1965 and I have actually strongly advocated that it is in the vested interest of India to protect Pakistan's nuclear weapons and it is in the vested interest of Pakistan to protect India's nuclear weapons. I might, if I get the time, address the Indo-US deal; it is not quite possible at the moment, but if I get a chance to address it, I hope to explain it to you. The only country that will benefit from it will be Pakistan.

The most important practical reason—number three—is the continuation in a sense of number two. I know definitely, I can say it on the behalf of my country, that India's horizons, particularly those of its younger generation, are definitely on a different path. India is now for the first time thinking of itself as having conquered the consequences of colonization and has firmed itself through its economy. It is rising both through its economy and through its military power. Its military power is not—and I am very strongly of this view—Pakistan-specific any more. It is representative of India's idea of itself and India is rising above South Asia. The most important aspect of India in its own self-assessment is that anywhere between thirty to forty to fifty thousand scientists today are working at very high salaries on genetic research. What is their task? Their task is to get

two patents, three patents may be, out of this pool, and if you can achieve that, that is the India that Indians want to find themselves in. And this brings us to the important question that is relevant to the conference: it is not that India will not find itself ready in a situation of conflict, but the peace it will reach. Its own dreams are going to be badly hampered as long as there is a conflict with Pakistan. Therefore, reason number three is that it is in India's self-interest, India's selfish interest, to find peace with Pakistan and I hope that I can say the same thing for Pakistan, although it is for the Pakistanis to say.

Here I suggest that, if by any miracle, we two find peace, then on the nuclear issue we have very, very creative options, and these options will open up suddenly because they are lying on the ground, waiting for somebody to pick them up. In fact, I see a time, if we get our act together, when India and Pakistan will work towards a common nuclear doctrine because it is in both their interests to do so. What I mean by the common nuclear doctrine, is that when you have set aside fifty per cent of your nuclear weapons and kept them totally aimed at each other, what will you do with the other fifty per cent? I do not propose that India and Pakistan go and conquer anyone else, least of all themselves. But is it legitimate or not for a nation to use its nuclear weapons or its military power in order to protect its economic interests? What could be a better economic interest for a country that you have got an eight per cent or seven per cent growth rate, we have also got seven per cent growth. What could be a greater interest than economics? Is economic growth possible without energy? So can India and Pakistan use their military power and their nuclear doctrine to protect the gas pipeline? The moment they think of that, the whole meaning of energy security in that region will change its meaning. And we will have repercussions from Morocco right up to Burma and perhaps beyond. These are the ideas that will come into play. I suggest that you take another look at the map: a nuclear crescent has been created—Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are shaped like a crescent; within this nuclear crescent lie seventy to eighty per cent of the world's energy resources. So why should someone sitting five thousand miles away come and protect it? We are the guardians of those resources because we are all nuclear. So these ideas will come into play. And when they come into play, I am sure that the next generation will pick them up with more excitement than we can.

Now, very quickly, I do not believe in addressing an India–Pakistan conference without discussing Kashmir, because I do not believe that I can get the easy option of using the status quo as a solution. My government may or may not believe it, I do not know, I can't speak on their behalf. But,

as a thinking Indian, I believe that we need to address it. Now again, using the methodology of words, what is the solution? We think again of solutions as hard acts, but the meaning of solution essentially is of a liquid. The chemical meaning of a solution is liquid. And the moment you start thinking of solution as a liquid, you begin to see that there are options that are beginning to open up. What are we discussing? Are we discussing Kashmir or are we discussing Kashmiris? We have to address these questions. If you are discussing Kashmir, then you can be frozen where you are, at least within our lifetime. But if you are discussing Kashmiris, if you are discussing Mir Waiz, if you are discussing my mother, fine, then there are options that begin to open up. We can start doing something, and I am very encouraged by some of the recent messages or hints coming from President Musharraf, in which he is talking of looking at other options. I actually suggest a theory of two circles, India and Pakistan are caught in a vicious circle, and there is a very old Sufi solution to this problem. And that is to draw a larger circle around your vicious circle and within the new space you have created between yourselves, at least you will not be elbowing each other all the time like failed sumo wrestlers. And within this larger circle will come new ideas.

You have to think that if the problem started on 15 August 1947, then where do we go from there? I had the privilege to stand in front of the camera with Mir Waiz and suggesting an option. I said we may be looking for this liquid solution within three words: Honourable: honourable is a code word for Kashmir because whatever we find must be honourable to what they have suffered. Acceptable: acceptable is a code word for Delhi, because if Delhi does not accept it, you would go nowhere, nothing will happen; so it has to be acceptable for Delhi. Sustainable: sustainable is a code word for Islamabad, because if Islamabad does not support whatever solution is found, it will not be sustainable. We had solutions with Sheikh Sahib, a great man, Sheikh Abdullah; I wish he was better known all over South Asia. But Sheikh Sahib's solution was not sustainable because it eventually broken down.

Now who will open the space for the second circle? I do not believe that governments alone will open the space for a second circle because governments are imprisoned by their past positions. You cannot expect the High Commissioner of Pakistan to stand up and actually provide any form of an idea because she simply cannot do it. She has to live within the code and within the past. You cannot expect the Prime Minister of India to provide a solution, as he is bound by a parliamentary resolution: he cannot do it. So, who is going to do it? Here is the space for the third part of that triangle, which is that it has to come from civil society. If you will not, you

cannot find the future in the present. But you will find the future in the open space and it will come from civil society. The stakeholders for peace actually are the present generation and the next generation, and I was very happy to hear that the next generation is talking a different language. Unless we move away from the language of the past and find a new dictionary for the future we will remain imprisoned and this will be a very sad situation.

SESSION ONE: PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS THE PAKISTANI VIEW

Inam ul Haque

Actually, I find myself in a quandary: first Maleeha and then M. J. Akbar. Is there anything left to say? So if the verdict is that there is not much left to say, we may move on directly to discussion. The subject was really the status of the dialogue and in the next session, we are going to discuss the future of the dialogue. Maleeha gave us the Pakistani perspective, and M. J. Akbar raised a number of philosophical questions. We will address some of those and we will not address some. In fact, he left the most important questions unaddressed. His own question was: Is there a peace process? He did not respond to that. Is there a peace process going on between India and Pakistan or we are talking at each other? What I will do is to try to place these philosophical questions into what has actually happened in practical terms on the ground between India and Pakistan, particularly since 6 January 2004.

The first: Is there a peace process? What is a peace process? A peace process is when the two countries that have been practically at each others throats begin to talk to each other. We are all aware of the crisis in 2002, when thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops were facing each other and war was considered imminent by some. The international community was educated and fortunately for both countries and people, war was avoided. After 6 January 2004, what has happened on the ground is that the leaders of the two countries are talking to each other. And there has been a multiplicity of confidence-building measures. So what is a building block in a peace process? Reduction of suspicions of each others intentions, reduction of the possibility of going to war; if the leaders of India and Pakistan declared at the highest level that this process is now irreversible and there are responsible people talking on behalf of their governments and their people, we have to take their word for that. So my answer to that question would be, yes, there is a peace process. We may be talking at each other at a number of occasions, but we are also talking to each other, because otherwise these confidence-building measures would not have come about.

One can discuss whether these confidence-building measures have had any real impact on the ground or not. And in some ways—for example, this confidence-building measure in Kashmir, the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and five other points that have opened up after the earthquake in Pakistan—have not really converted themselves into anything concrete that we can talk about. Mir Waiz will tell you, as others have told us, that perhaps because of bureaucratic red tape and other reasons, the bus service has not been as successful as it was expected to be. There have been major disappointments on both sides of Kashmir that people have not been able to avail of the limited opportunity of these bus services. But the fact is that these services have started; hopefully, we will be able to remove the red tape also, and the people will be able to move across the Line of Control more freely. It has already happened, it will continue to happen, and I think that it will be very difficult for either country now to say that they want to go back, that they do not want any bus service or train service or anything like that.

Do the objectives of the two countries have anything marginally in common? I think that Mr M. J. Akbar responded to that question himself: that it is in the interest of both countries to live in peace with each other. India may have its own reasons, Pakistan may have different reasons. We may in fact think of different routes also, to what is the best way of moving towards that objective of peace. But I think as long as we retain that objective of peace between the two countries, then, even if our interests are divergent, even if the paths we travel are different, we will reach the same ultimate objective and that is what I believe we should be working for.

Another question that Mr Akbar asked was whether a trilogue would ever be possible? Trilogue, tripartite negotiations between India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people: I would say that until such time as we involve the people of Kashmir as equal partners in this exercise, there is going to be no honourable, sustainable, lasting, acceptable solution. Any solution has to be acceptable not to Delhi, but to the Kashmiri people. Any solution to be sustainable has to be accepted by the Kashmiri people and any solution to be honourable has to be seen by the Kashmiri people as such. They are at the centre of this equation. India and Pakistan have been fighting perhaps for territory, perhaps fighting for certain ideas that they believe in. But it is the Kashmiri people who have been trampled underfoot, who have suffered, who have lost hundreds of thousand of people, young people, in this struggle between India and Pakistan. And to what end? Who has benefited by this struggle? So whenever we talk in terms of Kashmir, let us be very clear about it. If the Kashmiri people are not happy with a certain

solution, that solution is not going to stick. The central voice must remain that of the Kashmiri people.

Another question that you asked was: Why do we want peace? That is a very interesting question. Sometimes we, and perhaps all the smaller countries in bilateral negotiations, do get the impression, that perhaps the establishment on both sides does not really want peace. But again what I would like to emphasize is that if there is a basket of issues that have to be discussed, there should be no effort to label a particular issue to one country's advantage. In Pakistan, we sometimes do get the feeling that perhaps India is trying to act charitably. If that impression can be eliminated, I think that the peace process can move forward much more quickly. It is true that India's horizons are changing, but so are Pakistan's horizons. Nobody remains static. India may have the ambition to become a world power, but certainly Pakistan has the desire and the will to live as an equal, independent, sovereign state in South Asia. Notwithstanding India's position in the world, notwithstanding India's position in the region, we recognize that India is a much larger country, but that does not mean that we also necessarily recognize that what India asks for, India has to get. Negotiation is a process of give and take and it is only when both countries recognize that it is through the process of giving and taking that we will achieve a real peace and harmony.

Now India and Pakistan are not living in isolation; they are living in a world in which the international community does have a say and does exercise influence on their decision-making. Energy is one such issue. We have spoken here this morning and even now about the energy pipelines, particularly the Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline. And one factor is that the sole superpower in the world, the United States, is not in favour of this pipeline. To my mind, the jury is still out as to whether India and Pakistan will have the will, the determination to go through with this project. And some of the signals I must say are negative. Mr Manmohan Singh goes to the United States immediately after his meeting with President Bush; he emerges and says there are major problems in the execution of the project of Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline. Mr Shaukat Aziz goes to Washington; he emerges from a meeting with Bush and he also casts some sort of doubt on this project. I think that we should begin to make our decisions ourselves. If we believe that this pipeline is in the interest of all three countries, and particularly those of Pakistan and India, because of the increase in energy requirements of the two countries, and also because of its contribution to the normalization of relations between the two countries, we are quite capable of telling the United States to lay off. But we have not done that so far to my mind. The Iranians may not be playing a very positive part in that

because of the price they are asking; I understand that in this April's meeting, the Indians tactically walked out of the meeting after hearing the price that the Iranians were asking. But I think that negotiations should continue on this pipeline. Another pipeline, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline, which can also go to India, should also be continued, not only for the economic benefits but also for the strategic benefits.

One word on the nuclear issue: Mr Akbar is right and both countries will recognize the fact that nuclear weapons have brought about regional stability and that the two countries should be very clear about their respective nuclear doctrines. Unfortunately, again, there has been no serious discussion between two countries on this very vital issue. Whenever we have wanted to discuss this issue with India, China has always been brought into the equation. This morning, Dr Lodhi pointed out that Indian forces were facing Pakistan and not China. I can give you a list of what the Indian army's formation is doing, what the Indian navy's formation is doing, and where the Indian air forces bases are located. But I will not do that. All of you are aware that eighty per cent of Indian forces are facing Pakistan and not China. But every time we want to discuss the nuclear doctrine of the two countries, on the nuclear issue, India says that its horizon is much bigger than ours. You say that our nuclear programme is India-specific; we say that India's nuclear programme is not Pakistan-specific and therefore there is no room for discussion. Let me say very clearly here that Pakistan's nuclear programme is not India-specific. Pakistan's programme was equally security-driven and status-driven as that of India. If India were seeking a special status through its nuclear programme, so was Pakistan. Once we clarify that are we ready to discuss the nuclear issue, to my mind, the Indian establishment is not ready to discuss it, because they think that it might confer some kind of equality between the two countries, which they do not want.

Many political analysts, particularly in Pakistan, have also sought to portray the agreement between the United States and India on civilian nuclear technology as also partly motivated by not the so-called de-hyphenation of US–India and US–Pakistan relations, but the de-hyphenation of the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. India hopes to be placed in a higher category than Pakistan through this nuclear deal which the United States is obliged to finalize. Yes, now India has had to pay a price for the nuclear programme, but that is a different debate and I partly agree with Mr Akbar that Pakistan should not be seeking an agreement identical to the one signed between India and the United States. Nonetheless, Pakistan's requirements for civilian energy, maybe on a smaller scale, are very much there and we need that energy.

SESSION ONE: *PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS*

THE KASHMIR FACTOR IN INDIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Alastair Lamb

I am not qualified to speak on India at all because in fact in the last six years I have not actually talked to Indians who are here, which is not a dialogue. There was a period when I travelled extensively in India. And remarks about the partition in 1965 are very well taken because, twice in 1955 and once in 1962, my wife and I crossed the West Pakistan–Indian border by car as tourists. We drove from England and drove back to England, and all we did was cross borders. It was not the easiest thing to do, and it was certainly by no means nastier than going from Turkey to Syria, presenting all sorts of dramatic things in 1955. There were also some very peculiar happenings in crossing Afghanistan in finding where the frontier was. In 1966, I was invited to Rawalpindi by the government, and I was taken by some guide to Lahore and then shown the battlefields of the then recent war, which is now a long time ago. We went to the border which I had previously crossed three times at Wagah. And there was a firmly closed gate, nobody was crossing it. We saw the changing of the guards, closing of the gates, and people marching around. My host took me forward to the edge of the gate on the Pakistan side of the border to see what was happening. There was a sort of senior-ranking officer on the other side who saw me and waved at me on the other side; he called me to come and have a cup of tea with him. So I crossed the border, while my host could not. So without a visa, without a passport, I went and had tea with the Indian officers. We had a very pleasant hour or so and my host was wondering whether he would ever see me again.

I went across: to me, this represented a fundamental change. There were buses running in dozens and people rushing around with suitcases and people offering to carry your suitcases from one side to the other, all sorts of normal things. So something very fundamental changed, and to my mind these are the changes we have been talking about, the Confidence-Building Measures, and so I really know nothing much except getting back to where we were before 1965: So we have not really solved the Kashmir problem anyway at all.

I just want to say one thing about the Kashmir problem which will occupy me for the next five to ten minutes, and then I will shut up. If you

analyse it from a totally dispassionate point of view, there are actually a number of specific elements that are quite different from each other. I will name three of them here. One, there is a problem of human rights, which I do not intend to discuss this as it is a humanitarian issue and could be discussed regardless of the other two. The other two are territorial issues. But the human rights aspect, the humanitarian aspect, the political liberty aspect is not the essential one. The essential one is who owns what and this is how the whole issue started. It was an India-Pakistan question which reached the United Nations and it was a dispute over the territorial rights over a certain piece of territory, rather ill-defined in some cases. And this actually involved two quite separate tracts of territory. One was the old Valley of Kashmir and adjacent regions, and the other was what is now known in the language of dispute as the Northern Areas, and these are actually quite different. They are quite different because they have quite different histories.

I will talk about as the Kashmir Liberation Movement, but we know that what we are talking about is a war that can be analysed, studied; it has its causes, it can be disputed. The war again in the Northern Areas is totally unconnected, so unconnected that it actually took place without anybody in Pakistan being aware that it took place at all. And they were very embarrassed when it did, because it was in fact involved in the mutiny of the British Army when it refused to accept the rule of the Maharaja of Kashmir and decided that the fate of this area was going to be rather different. But even this was confusing the issue, because some of the areas involved, such as Hunza, Nagar, etc., were not part of Kashmir at all. They were independent states, not independent states but princely states in their own rights, which operated under the rule of the paramountcy and in fact they acceded to Pakistan. The only trouble was that it was the Pakistanis who never got around to accepting the accession and, if they did, they did it in such a bland manner that one did not know.

The Northern Areas are very interesting from the point of view of international relations' students, because it involves something which I recently rediscovered in fact in Dr Shireen Mazari's book on Kargil. For one thing, I think that it is a very brilliant analysis of a very complex and puzzling episode of South Asian history and, secondly, because there are some things that I really do not understand about it. We have a ceasefire line which represents the division and it has been extraordinarily stable, given, as you have said, the number of conflicts that have gone on over this line, each one about where it was. In the spring of 1948 or thereabouts, it was settled by an agreement effectively on 29 July 1949, in what is called the Karachi Agreement. After that, it has been messed about

and unsettled here and there a little bit, but it is roughly where it always was. If we read the text of the Karachi Agreement, which I must admit that I have not done for thirty years until this morning, it is a very puzzling document because it describes this line following map references of maps which are very hard to find. None of the Karachi Agreement references actually contain the sheet numbers, but I presume that it is right because they were using one of the maps—actually the NJ series—because all around the world, without the sheet numbers, the whole thing could be an anomaly. But the fact is that we assume it is in South Asia somewhere, in that sort of the altitude. And it has these six references: it did not start at the place they call Shyok Glacier or something. Where it sort of says it is difficult to find, we cannot go beyond that area, but sooner or later somebody will come around and look up where this place is. Perhaps Dr Mazari can enlighten me on it: we get a reference to NJ9842. Now as soon as you get the sheet number, and there you go for references, and if you look at this series cartographically, NJ9842 occupies a space roughly between 25 square miles, then between here to somewhere beyond Mount Austen is the end of the ceasefire line. So it is not really a very precise point to which you can pin the complete geopolitical structure.

Now I wonder why it is that we are left with this: is it really that everybody ran out of breath and could not climb up the glaciers and put a spike in it to define it? Or is it that both sides did not actually and one side did actually want to specify where the ceasefire line ends? Because where I see an end to the ceasefire line, we get a quite different sort of a frontier. Now there are a number of problems about this point beyond NJ9842. One is that it is theoretically impossible, given the state of Indian foreign policy at this moment, for each to agree to a Northern terminus of this line other than the one Dr Mazari shows in her book, which is the Karakorum Pass, which is not mentioned anywhere in the Karachi Agreement. And, as far as I know, it is a line of no legal significance whatsoever. But there is one point in that book that is agreed to by the Chinese and British throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century and therefore is an undisputed point on the border between China and wherever the line is on the other side of it. So you are going to end the line somewhere, it is about the only place you can anchor it, the one firm point. You can do so, but it is not what they actually did. If you push the line absolutely due north up to the glacier, you get the point where the Indians maintain that in 1963, the Pakistani army surrendered two thousand and twenty square miles of Indian territory. This is a very interesting argument because India never occupied that territory. In fact, nobody ever occupied that territory because the frontier during the British period was undefined

The great K. P. S. Menon, who was the pioneer of Indian geopolitics, wrote a beautiful diary which is very rare now. But it has a reproduction of a map of the Northern Areas, undefined right across it and no doubt it was undefined. But suddenly it involves, in Indian geopolitics, the surrender of some two thousand square miles to the Chinese. Now if you were to put a terminus to this border, you either have to accept the Chinese–Pakistan agreement of 1963 or you have to push it forward, in which case you will be marking expert-specific trails on what is now Chinese occupied territory and I do not think that India can do either of those very easily. Probably recognizing the 1963 border would be easier than making claims on Chinese territory. But the fact is that India was unable to organize its border with any part of the Chinese frontier, despite great efforts to do so; thus, it is unlikely that we do so.

So we are left really with the theoretical position that this line from NJ9842 to the Chinese border is undefined systematic territory. Now what does that mean? I think it means nothing, in one way probably it means nothing at all, because I do not think that most people understand the significance of the geography of it. But it does mean something and it did mean something in 1947. It really meant that whoever controlled the territory beyond this point controlled the border region between China and India which was then under threat from the Soviets. So the British–Indian foreign office, headed by Sir Olaf Caroe firmly believed this in the 1930s and early 1940s and I suspect the geopolitical legacy of this was carried over to independent India, who was not very concerned with Russian communism in this period.

If it is not this issue, then it is the Indian issue of trying to keep that border and to keep the limits open and it is quite interesting that, despite everything else, a war has been continuing there since the early 1970s. Again, Dr Mazari's book is very interesting: it shows that the Siachen Glacier conflict did not start in 1984 but in 1972 or 1973, immediately after the Simla Agreement. And there has been a pressure by the Indian side for some reason unknown, around this border. Now I suspect that the reason changes with time and at that time it was to show Mr Bhutto that he had surrendered and he need not do anything naughty, I suspect there was an element of threatening. In 1980s, it was probably a slight response to the fact that the Pakistan under the Zia epoch was getting slightly more friendly with the Americans and the Afghan war may be another reason: I do not know. But I wonder now with the pipeline issue for example, if you can build a pipeline across Balochistan and under the Persian Gulf, you can probably build one in Afghanistan; you can build past NJ9842, which would probably be the shortest route to Kazakhstan. When I raised this

point recently to somebody, they said you cannot build pipeline like that. But if you can build a highway across the Karakoram, you can certainly build a pipeline. Pipelines are terribly easy to build as they do not present any great technical problem. I asked one of my friends in the oil industry: Could you build India a pipeline across the Karakoram Mountains and he said it would be no problem. It will cost twenty billion dollars, but it can be done. Now if there is any problem with the control of the pipeline across Pakistan between Iran and India, it might well be that some person has thought that there might be less problems in not building the thing. The problem involves all sorts of political issues, and opens up a new area of negotiations, which do not commit anybody to anything particularly.

SESSION ONE: PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

STATUS OF KASHMIR IN THE PAKISTAN–INDIA DIALOGUE

Mir Waiz Omar Farooq

When we talk in terms of an India–Pakistan dialogue and the quest for peace, I think much has been said and much has been written about the core issue of Kashmir which is essential to peace in the region. The real question, which is still unanswered, is: can peace be created in a vacuum? We feel that until and unless there is a genuine movement forward *vis-à-vis* India and Pakistan primarily, I think that peace is still a distant dream in the region. We feel that living in Kashmir and going through the difficult stages which we have seen in the last fifty-seven years, the people of Kashmir have no doubt been the worst sufferers in this whole conflict. For us now the real question is what the way forward is. We feel that the people of the region, especially the people of Kashmir, are putting this question to the leadership of India and Pakistan, of whether there is any hope that we can reach an agreement and really work in terms of lasting peace in the region. I think that when we talk in the terms of peace, we really have to accept the fact that India and Pakistan in the past have signed many agreements and held many negotiations. The question is whether these accords were between India and Pakistan, or India and the leadership of Kashmir, because the focus of the dialogue was always on a bilateral level.

The Hurriyet Conference believes that until and unless there is a triangular dialogue or a tripartite dialogue, things will not shape up. And we feel that in order to work for a lasting solution for Kashmir issue, it is imperative that there has to be a genuine dialogue at every level. The Hurriyet was formed in 1993, when we introduced in our constitution a new concept. But the Hurriyet's pragmatic view and vision I would say today gives us an opportunity to work for a solution, what we term an alternative negotiated settlement of Kashmir, while we continue to emphasize the fact that the UN resolutions provide the basis for the genuine struggle of the people of Kashmir. But we believe that if a solution is to be found outside the ambit of the UN, we have the ways and means through which we can reach a solution which is acceptable, honourable, durable, realistic, pragmatic, tangible: whatever word you want to use. But the real issue is that it has to be between all the three parties.

The crucial question is how you will get the three parties engaged. We know that even the history of bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan is very complicated. Things have not really worked out up to expectations, as we thought they would. So how do you get a third party on board? In 2004, the Hurriyet came up with yet another alternative mechanism, which we said was a triangular dialogue, instead of a tripartite dialogue. What we meant by a triangular dialogue was that let the dialogue between Delhi and Islamabad continue, and let there be a separate dialogue between Kashmir and Delhi, and Kashmir and Islamabad. Fortunately, we see that things have started moving, I would say that the peace process and the resolution process— whatever name you want to give it—although there were hiccups, although there are problems, but to some extent, things have started moving in the sense that in 2004, the Hurriyet Conference actually had a dialogue with New Delhi, the borders were open after the earthquake in Bojh. Later, as you know, the corporate sector, the media, sports, Bollywood: everybody came out in support of the affected areas, but nobody spoke about Kashmir, nobody came forward. Because there is no link between the new Indian youth or the Indian public opinion, maybe in terms of just emotion or maybe in terms of the so-called nationalistic approaches. But apart from that, there is no bond or binding which we have seen in terms of the situation on the ground. If you ask me if India decided at the time of the earthquake that they were going with the decision of letting people come and go freely across the ceasefire line, without any documents required, no passport or visa required, I did not see any public outrage in India. People were not even bothered about what had happened.

I think you know, in sharp contradiction to public opinion, the problem is not the Indian public, the problem is the Indian polity, the political institutions, the political parties, and I think this is the best time to move on. I mean the fact that the BJP initiated the dialogue process, they supported it, and they started it. Today, the Congress is in power, the left is supporting them on Kashmir, the BJP is supporting them on Kashmir, and even the regional parties in India are very supportive on Kashmir. But hardly anybody is moving; they are not doing anything. Since September, when it was decided that we will meet again in October to discuss some ideas which the Hurriyet had mentioned to the Prime Minister, saying that we want to have a second round and we want to present some ideas on how to move forward, there has hardly been any response from New Delhi. On the contrary, we see that one fine day we receive a letter and invitation from the Prime Minister to come to a roundtable discussion on Kashmir. We do not know the agenda, we do not know what happened to the Hurriyet–Delhi dialogue and one fine day, you have sixty people or seventy

people from the state and give it the name of a roundtable discussion on Kashmir. I mean, what can we talk about in a crowd? In a crowd there can only be noise, there cannot be talks in a crowd.

We also have to accept the fact that primarily the talks have to be between India and those groups who oppose the Indian point of view. It makes no sense if the Congress in Delhi talks to the Congress in Srinagar, or the National Conference or the PTP. True, we are not opposed to the fact that they should also be involved; it is good. We actually support the fact that the Indian mainstream parties, the National Conference, the PTP have also changed their approach. Now they are also talking in terms of a settlement, in terms of peace, in terms of moving forward. But then I think you have to acknowledge the fact that there is a very strong sentiment, though we have never said so, that the Hurriyet is the only representative body of Kashmir. There is no doubt about the fact that Hurriyet represents the broad spectrum of opinion of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Now those are the people who have suffered a lot and have given everything as far as Kashmir is concerned. The Hurriyet is willing to come to the negotiating table, Hurriyet is willing to move forward as we initiated the dialogue, we took the risk, and we plead strongly for it.

My uncle was recently killed; our school—a hundred and ten year old institution in Kashmir, the first educational institution in Kashmir, the Islamia High School—was burnt to ashes. Our library of three thousand books and around seven hundred manuscripts was burnt, but we did not back off, we said this is the way forward, we want to continue our dialogue with Delhi and Islamabad. But unfortunately there are so many things that can be done which are not being done by Delhi and I do not think that they need to even seek the approval of opposition in doing so.

And what can be done? We have given a list of things that India needs to do. For example, we have asked for the cessation of military and paramilitary actions and ultimately an end to militancy actions in Kashmir. This has to be initiated by India. The Indian army chief is on record saying that the number of infiltrators or freedom fighters is not more than fifteen hundred to two thousand. And to combat that, we have more than five hundred thousand of troops in the region. So I think that the initiative has to be taken by the government of India; if they do that, the Hurriyet is ready to exercise whatever influence, whatever resources we have to try to bring the freedom fighters on board as well.

The second issue which we see as important is bringing down the presence of military and paramilitary forces in the town and villages. The third important step is dismantling of bunkers: we used to have sand

bunkers in Kashmir; now we have concrete bunkers, and concretization of bunkers has taken place. Now they have been given proper shape, they are decorated with Kashmiri Khatemband wood-crafting and they are being presented as tourist spots, though there is an army guy sitting in the bunker with a gun in his hand. Another important issue which we raised was the release of political prisoners. Still, more than three hundred and fifty political prisoners and around seven hundred detainees are being held by the Indian police in different jails and interrogation centres. Another issue was the custodial killings and the issue of abductions, and this is something which we have always said needs to be addressed. Another thing is the annulling of various special oppressive laws, like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which is not in session now. But we still have the Disturbed Areas Act, we have the Special Police Powers Act, we have the Public Safety Act. All these Acts give tremendous powers to the Indian forces and they can behave the way they want.

Another thing that has begun to happen is that, on the one hand, we talk about the peace process and dialogue, and on the other hand, the government of India is trying to strengthen its military presence, even today. You might have heard just last week there was a report in the newspaper that the Indian air force stands to acquire the seven thousand canals of land in southern Indian-occupied Kashmir, for garrison and cantonment purposes. I believe that you will understand that if this continues and on the other hand you expect only the Kashmiris to give in or support the dialogue process on the leadership of Kashmir. A great deal is being said about the representation and the Hurriyet; yet, irrespective of all that is said, the leadership of Hurriyet is trying its level best to make things work, but in my opinion, until and unless the government of India also responds to the situation, we cannot have any movement forward. And I think it is very clear that there needs to be some seriousness in the dialogue. I mean why are the foreign secretaries, the foreign ministers, the governments of India and Pakistan not meeting continuously? Why do we have just two or three meeting a year? Why can we not have ten meetings a year? Why can we not have serious meetings and dialogues? I mean, yes, Siachen is there and we will be happy to see if tomorrow there is an agreement on Siachen and there is peace there and the troops are withdrawn. But I would say that it makes no sense that you have given priority to a barren piece of land, rather than to the people who are dying every day. I think that the focus and the priority have to be on the human issue of Kashmir, the humanitarian angle of Kashmir. When I think in terms of the future, there is so much of potential. I was in Poonch and Rajorhi and Kashmir has so much potential, so much potential that Kashmir can offer to both India and Pakistan. And I think that the Hurriyet Conference

and the majority of the leadership in Kashmir are ready to work on the lines of co-operation.

Whether it is demilitarization, self-governance, self-rule, or the United States of Kashmir, many ideas are there. We have our own roadmap, we have said time and again that we are ready to come up with solutions, come up with suggestions. But then you are aware it is all talk, until and unless there is genuine movement from India. If India has some suggestions, if they have some proposals, let them also put them on the table.

Now, of course, you talk about a new south Asia, the SAFTA agreement is in place, China is probably going to be the member of SAARC. So why can a solution not be found on those lines. If you can have a free trade agreement between India and all the other players in the region, why not involve Kashmiris too? Historically also, the fact that we have such close relations with Central Asia and other parts of the region and you will be amazed to know that the flight from New Delhi to Srinagar is probably one hour and twenty minutes and a flight from Srinagar to Tashkent would only be forty-five minutes.

I think that we are ready for the possibilities in term of economic incentives, in term of political issues, but the real thing is that the government of India should come forward. The Hurriyet's position is very clear: we are ready to discuss everything with the government of India and with the government of Pakistan. The only issue is that we are not in favour of a division of Jammu and Kashmir. This is the basic position that the Hurriyet Conference has taken. On other issues, there is a lot of room, a lot of space to work in. And we are hopeful that maybe soon, if we are going to have our next round of dialogue with the Indian Prime Minister, the Hurriyet will be presenting some of its ideas to the governments of both India and Pakistan, and hopefully something can be worked out.

Ultimately the basic issue is that, with Kashmiri participation, everything is possible. If you exclude the Kashmiris, if you exclude the leadership of the Kashmiris, you cannot have anything. Bilateralism has miserably failed *vis-à-vis* Kashmir. So it is high time that the leadership on both sides of the ceasefire line is involved in the dialogue process and there is some genuine movement on the ground, the people see some change, the common Kashmiri sees some relief. That is only possible when there is a sustained dialogue between the three parties. These were some suggestions and requests.

SESSION ONE: PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

STATUS OF KASHMIR IN THE PAKISTAN–INDIA DIALOGUE

Victoria Schofield

I would like to thank very much indeed the organizers of this conference, the three ladies, for inviting me. I am sorry that I am not Yasin Malik. When Dushka Saiyid asked me to speak, she listed the other speakers and I must admit, I accepted immediately, because speaking on Kashmir is always very close to my heart. However, I did decline to speak on the prevailing status of the peace process because we gone over that ground several times earlier and I am very glad that we have gone with the prevailing status of the peace process. And I suggested that perhaps it would be a good idea to speak on the complex issue of Kashmir. However, I did not reckon that Mir Waiz Omer Farooq would be speaking on the complexities of the Kashmir issue. In fact, obviously I knew that he was speaking, but I realized that he would put more eloquently than I could the complexities of the Kashmir issue. But my desire to speak on this really arose from my own research and own studies because the question often comes up why the issue is so difficult to resolve and why is it so complex? On the other hand, I have also spoken to a number of Kashmiris who feel disappointed and let down by the lack of support they feel they have had for the Kashmir issue, and to them the issue seems quite simple. So I try and say that it is a little complicated and so Mir Waiz has touched on it because he has admitted that the APHC does not speak for the whole of the Kashmiri people. And there the difficulties arise because you have an issue which has its varying viewpoints. Obviously, we do not need to go back into the history of Kashmir, although we were fortune to hear Professor Lamb's little sortie into some border dispute which is really fascinating and his knowledge is second to none on the history of the Kashmir dispute. But clearly a state which was a princely state, even by its name—the state of Jammu and Kashmir; it could also be called the state of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. It is not a homogenous unit, and so when we are trying to identify what are the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, one gets conflicting viewpoints. Equally, when you talk about the Kashmir issue, I think it is something which is up for redefinition.

I am glad that we have had some definitions today, because when I started working on the Kashmir dispute, I was clearly informed that it is not

a dispute because a dispute is between two countries. That issue has now been transformed from what it was originally back in 1947. It was, as Alastair Lamb has said, much more of a territorial dispute, it was to be who took control of the princely state of Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir. Was it all to go to India or was it all to go to Pakistan? And this is where it remained for decades, essentially, and as we know right up to the beginning of the insurgency, the demand was for the resolution of the issue, resolution of the dispute, according to the UN resolution, which, as we have clearly heard, it did not stipulate the third option; it only stipulated that Kashmir should either go to India or Pakistan. In the 1990s and in the twenty-first century, that definition has now very clearly changed and I think that we do have to admit that it is thanks to President Musharraf, who, when he started to talk about the Kashmir dispute, equally began on the UN Resolutions.

My first interview with him was in February 2000, and I have on record that his resolution of the issue was according to the UN Resolutions, and we have seen some very dramatic transformations in Pakistan's position, even coinciding with what Mir Waiz has now said, that Pakistan originally did consider its territorial objectives and now it is really reconsidering the interest of the Kashmiri people. This is a dramatic change in terms of what the Kashmir issue now is. And in a way we, as journalists, as writers, need to document this, so that when we are talking to students or others who are eager to learn about the Kashmir issue they are fully up to speed on what the Kashmir issue now is. And you will all agree with me that it has transformed itself in the past five years from what it originally was and where it had remained log-jammed.

So that is one issue of complexity which I feel is being clarified, and as I say when I offered to speak on this issue, it was prior to knowing what everybody else was going to say. I think it is now, amongst an educated audience, realized that the Kashmir issue is no longer what it was. Equally important—and I think it is in the terms of what the way forward is going to be and will it be contributing to the peace process as a whole—will be this definition of objectives from amongst the Kashmiri people. Mir Waiz mentioned the roundtable conference, and it always sounds very attractive, having a roundtable conference. But if the roundtable conference is a crowd where everyone is speaking at cross-purposes, then that is not going to achieve the objectives of fine-tuning what those eventual objectives are. So perhaps the way forward is to have a series of discussions so that these objectives can be identified, because in terms of third parties facilitating whether it is at government level or at the academic level, they too have to realize what the eventual objective is. That does not

mean stating an endgame which is immutable and cannot be transformed, but it does mean having an idea of what the fight is now about.

I do feel from my own travels in Kashmir that the tragedy of Kashmir is that thousands of young boys have died before almost before they have lived, without exactly realizing what they have been fighting for. I take an example of a young journalist I was talking to, and I asked him what he was fighting for. And he said, "Azadi". So I asked him how he defined his "Azadi", what he meant by "Azadi". He said: "Well, independence." So I said that was going to be a little difficult to achieve. So, did he mean the independence of the whole state or merely a part of the state? And he said the independence of the Valley would be fine, he did not care about the rest of the state. So I was a little provocative, as journalists have to be, and I said it was very cold in the Valley in the winter, what he was going to do in the winter, when the pass is closed. And he said he would go to his house in Jammu. So, it is indicative of the mindset that the definition of what the objective is has not really been fully defined.

Again, while not presuming to make any suggestions to Kashmiris, because I am not a Kashmiri, I would suggest on the basis of the wide range of interviews I have done and the number of people I have spoken to from all regions that what Kashmiris do want is to lead their lives in peace and dignity. Within that is included self-governance, the rule of law, human rights, that they should feel that they can speak and move as we feel we can speak and move in Britain or other parts of the world. If we are looking for a way forward, this has to be the eventual objective. It is something that we take for granted and what Kashmiris have been deprived of, because they have had a situation of a state of siege. I am one of the fortunate people who has been to Kashmir on a number of occasions. This summer, I took my family, and the reason I did so was firstly, I wanted to obviously go to Kashmir myself, but I wanted to pass on to the next generation of British children what Kashmir was like. Again, if one has been able to go to Kashmir, we take that for granted, but a lot of people out there do not know what the Kashmir issue is all about, because they have not been there. And it was I think very educational for my children to witness these bunkers we are talking about, to see the barbed wire, and to see what living in a state of siege is really like, because otherwise you cannot imagine it. I think I must take responsibility for the beautification of the bunkers, because I did complain about it to the chief minister, saying that if they really want tourists to come back there, they had to get rid of the bunkers; otherwise it is very disarming for young tourists to see soldiers sitting there with their rifles. Unfortunately, he did not follow my advice and decided to turn, as Mir Waiz said, to tourist attraction: beautify them, which

was not my objective at all. I just wanted to share this little bit of information with you. But if we are really looking for a way forward, we have also to help ourselves in terms of clarity of objective and it is now almost too long since the insurgency began to talk about ideas without defining them.

There are different groupings in Kashmir: the APHC is one group, but as we know it has its differences; the Congress Party; the PDP; Umar Abdullah's National Conference just within the Kashmir Valley alone. Then there are the Kashmir Pundits, whose voice needs to be heard, in Jammu; you have the Hindus of Jammu; you also have the Muslims of Jammu, who also have a voice; you have Ladakhis; and the Buddhists. All of these have to be taken into consideration. If somehow we could search for the lowest common denominator, as Mir Waiz has said, they do not want the status quo; then we can undertake to resolve the issue on the basis of standing still, which seems a little disheartening. But if somehow that lowest common denominator can be found from within the voices of the Kashmiris, then, like the voices of the Palestinians, people outside, researchers, analyst, academics, and journalists will feel that they can understand better what the voice of Kashmir is. Because if the voice of Kashmir is slightly muddled and confused, it is much easier to say this is too complicated an issue, we cannot deal with it.

I have to share this with you: when I first started writing on Kashmir in the early 1990s, I was telling Rahul on the train that I wanted to write a book of excellence that would put forward all the viewpoints. But I was warned by a number of publishers, who asked why I wanted to write on the Kashmir issue, it was so complex, so tedious, and it could not be resolved. They advised me not to bother and waste my time. But I am very glad I did spend time, it was not a waste of time to do so because as we see, it has become a critically important issue, because although those people who have grievances are the Kashmiris of the Valley; what happens to them does affect the other people in the state, because there is a loyalty to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. And so I also take your point, that you do not want the division of the state because it is as if you break up Kashmir, you break up Pakistan, because states are by nature rich in cultural diversity. These are a few of my thoughts, because I know we have a discussion group. And I did not necessarily mean to quote you, Mir Waiz, but your point that Kashmiris have much to contribute to both India and Pakistan reminds me of what you said to me when we first met in 1996, that Kashmiris do not want to be a hotbed of hatred, they want to be a bridge of friendship between India and Pakistan.

SESSION ONE: *PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS*

OPEN DISCUSSION

Q: My name is Zahoor Saeed, I am a doctor in Cambridge and I have come from Srinagar. My question is for Mr M. J. Akbar. The government of India has involved APHC and Pakistan in the discussions now for a couple of years. But we see that it all stops when India says any solution to the Kashmir problem is to be within the constitution of India. My question is when, if ever, will India think out of the box?

A: Any government of India is a feature of India's parliament, and India's parliament has a resolution on Kashmir. The Indian Supreme Court has ruled that the territories that were part of India on 15 August 1947 will in fact not be negotiated, apart from some exceptions. There is a history which is now recorded in government doctrine, the point which I actually addressed. The past positions actually bind governments down, as much the government of Pakistan as the government of India. And if we want to open a space, that space can really be opened up by civil society, because the only thing that can change the government's view, particularly in a democracy like ours, is the changing nature of public opinion. As long as public opinion does not change, there can be very little hope of anything else changing. So I do not dare to presume in fact this specific cantor of the horizon. I think that you got the sense during the panel's discussion of how complicated it is, and I think nobody here gave a malicious intent to this statement. Yet there is a variety of sincere differences on the table: any reconciliation with hawks comes much later; first comes the reconciliation of doves.

The important point is that if we do not inflict injuries on Kashmiris in the process of finding a solution to the Kashmir issue, than we have taken a significant step forward. I do not believe frankly—you want a very honest answer—that it would be possible for any government to negotiate away any territory. I do not really believe that Pakistan is in a position to do that either, irrespective of what anyone says. But I do actually believe that within the seemingly rigid position, there is a lot of space for opportunities. Now this is absolutely without

reference to the present context. We have an even bigger dispute with China; the first war we fought was with China. The dispute on Tibet was the terminology that evolved in 1954, by which we recognized the Autonomous State of Tibet within China. And eventually, we reached a resolution with China which was very important because China also realized that its own economic development would not be impossible and could be affected by a conflict with India. The solution that was found—and I was in China very often in the years 1987-1988—was that there would be peace and tranquillity on the border, irrespective of positions taken by both the countries. All I am trying to say is that if there is a will, a way forward can be found. Let us hope that the governments and the institutions find a way forward, because institutions in this conflict are actually as important as countries. Political parties and think tanks are very important; they both have the will and can find options.

Mushahid Hussain: I just want to add to what Mr Akbar mentioned that reconciliation among doves is easier than reconciliation among hawks. I think this is not necessarily borne out by history. If you go take two examples, the opening to China by the hawkish right wing Republicans led by Nixon and the BJP, which is not actually dovish, reaching out to Pakistan. So I think that the vision is very important, whether it is a hawk or a dove. And sometimes hawks have shown the will and the vision to move forward and take decisions.

Q: My name is Sajjad Yousaf, I am from Srinagar in Kashmir and I am working as a doctor here. My question is to both Mir Waiz Sahib as well as the Chair. At present, it seems as though Mir Waiz Sahib is caught between India and Pakistan as the leader of the Hurriyet Conference. My question is: how will he keep this relationship, when he has to take tough decisions *vis-à-vis* Kashmir, keeping in view how both India and Pakistan have dealt with their leaders in the past.

A: Well, I think that on the Pakistan side, there has been a change, and I am one of those who have been advocating that kind change on the Kashmir policy: that we should not be playing favourites *vis-à-vis* the Kashmiri resistance, whether it is military resistance or political, and the symbol of the resistance today is none other than Mir Waiz Omar Farooq Sahib. I always cite the example because we talked of mistakes which Ms Victoria Schofield alluded to, and I think it's important that when you move forward, you have to accept your mistakes. We made mistakes; Pakistan made mistakes in the

Afghan jihad. We had a seven-party alliance and then we started playing favourites with them. We first supported Hikmatyar; then it was Rabbani; then the Taliban. Eventually, we ended up with nobody there. And actually I think we did the same in Kashmir also. But now it is very open-ended and I think that frankly the question you have raised, we find a kind of unfortunate reciprocity which should have been there for Pakistan's dramatic change as Victoria mentioned, because when we talk of horizons, changes in attitude, the mindset has to be changed first.

Akbar spoke about horizons having changed for the Indians and they now talk about it as no longer being South Asia. I beg to differ. Let's take two examples: in 1999, when we both went nuclear and we started a dialogue with each other and we had no kind of conflict and Kargil had not happened. If you see the book by Strobe Talbot, *Engaging India*, and the discussion by Jaswant Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister had with the Americans privately, he was told a couple of times to stop his obsession with Pakistan. It was a strange kind of obsession: they were talking about Pakistan, 1947 and that sort of things. And we felt that it should not have been there. Secondly, I am happy that the Indians have finally joined the American fan club, because whenever we were part of the American camp or getting American aid, the Indian side raised lot of hullabaloo about it. Even if we get no more than a nut and bolt, it was a big issue, with India saying it would destabilize the region and it was always a factor of friction in Pakistan–India relations, the American factor. But I am now glad that suddenly the Indians have discovered a new romance with America or with George W. Bush or Condoleezza Rice to be precise. And for us, we take it in our stride because we gone through the process and we know what it is all about, and we can handle it.

So I think that on Kashmir policy, you have got to hand it to President Musharraf, he has done something which is quite unique and unprecedented, and I think due credit has not been given to him because of the mindset on the Indian side. They have always said that the military, the Khaki, is an impediment in the normalization of relations, the army does not want it. Here is the head of the army, the head of the Pakistani establishment, the President, who is also in uniform, thinking out of the box. What has he done? He has injected the Kashmiris as a factor. And what Akbar has put is a very important question. Is Kashmir important or Kashmiris? Musharraf has answered this question: Kashmiris are important. And any

solution acceptable to the Kashmiri people is acceptable to Pakistan. And I remember a statement of Mir Waiz which was published in *India Today*, after meeting President Musharraf at the Islamic Conference in Doha in October 2000. He had said, and I quote, "President Musharraf is the first Pakistani leader I have met who has shown so much flexibility on Kashmir."

Secondly, he has made the people the stakeholders in the process, something that has never happened before. And thirdly, he has done genuine out-of-the-box thinking. The phrase "out of the box" was first used by Manmohan Singh, but the thinking has been done by our side first. And I give you an example also from personal experience. I was with President Musharraf when we were negotiating with Indian Prime Minister in September 2005, and it was a four or five hour long meeting. Mr Manmohan Singh was there, a very good man, a very sincere man, a very decent man. But I think that the problem is with his minders: we had Mr Natwar Singh on one side, Mr. K. R. Noman on the other side, and they were even refusing to hold a press conference there. President Musharraf wanted to have one. The Indian press was ready and, finally, I intervened. I said that I was a journalist; I knew that people had been waiting for three hours, you cannot just tell them to go back with a press release, you have to appear before them. So I think we have made mistakes in the past, but we have changed our attitude and we have given you the go ahead and decide, it's the Kashmiri people who should decide. And the proof lies in the eating: we are not just making statements, the actions are there, we have reached out. Mir Waiz knows that, other people know that, and we have an honest difference of opinion with Syed Ali Gilani Sahib, who came out saying that perhaps this was not the right way forward. But we have been trying to reach out sincerely, and now as the Mir Waiz has said, the ball is in the Indian court. They have to respond and there has to be reciprocity, and I think that the earthquake was frankly a very big missed opportunity. So many people died in the earthquake, a humanitarian disaster of such a huge scale. Sonia Gandhi's children come to Karachi for a cricket match or other events. But we thought you know, may be Sonia Gandhi or President Abdul Kalam, or Manmohan Singh, would fly a special plane and say they were bringing relief goods. And that would have been such a good gesture. They should have flown on a chopper with Musharraf and gone to Muzaffarabad, but that did not happen because there are crafty old men in the Indian establishment who are very conservative, who still look at Pakistan through Cold War blinkers. I

am very sorry this is a hard reality and the basic issue is, as I was telling somebody in the morning, that the main issue is even beyond Kashmir. The bigger issue is the *bania* mentality and its baggage. India needs to show a bigger heart: that is the important thing. You have to reach out, and it's a big country with the mentality of a small country, that mindset has to change. A big country should have a big heart, a big vision, should reach out, and I think we saw a glimmer of that when Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, the Nixonian vision. You have to take grand initiatives, make grand gestures. If you leave it to the bureaucracy, then you will not get anywhere. Then you will be fighting over commas and colons and nitpicking over little things, and that I think is a missing dimension in my vision.

A: I would have answered the question. I told you that there are differences so far as perceptions are concerned, *vis-à-vis* the leadership in Kashmir, but we believe that we have a very strong political case. And when we talk in the terms of a resolution to the problem, the Kashmiris will have to lead because the people in Kashmir want the leadership to deliver. I think new ideas, new propositions, new suggestions have to be judged, we have to talk about them on merit. And there have been differences with some of our friends who reject outright some of the ideas. We feel that we have to acknowledge the fact that when we talk about the people of Kashmir, their rights, their concerns, we have to be accommodating to India's and Pakistan's concerns too. And I think that if you disagree with the basic concept of talking because we have a dispute with India, and if we say that talking to India is going to harm our movement, then I think that is not the right attitude. That is the difference that we have with some of our friends. But I am sure if things move on, everybody will support the process, everybody will help in moving forward. There are some concerns and some people have very genuine concerns about what has happened in the past, but what has happened in the past should not deter you from trying: we must try; maybe we will fail, but we will at least have tried and we should not fail without trying at all.

Q: It is really very easy when you are discussing the subject to slip into the memory and rigidity of the past. It happens almost unconsciously. It is very easy for me to say who started that war, four wars have taken place: what has been the price paid? We talked of human rights and human rights always have two dimensions. The number of civilians killed in India through what is acknowledged to be terrorist attacks and so on. These killings have

been inflicted upon Hindus and have exerted great pressure on the Indian body politic that has emerged out of it. While I have been the first to advocate the fact that President Musharraf really has taken a very dynamic approach, but there are strong people with strong forces who cannot forget Kargil. It's not easy to forget Kargil and you cannot discount them and you cannot remove them from the table. They will sit there and will have their place. And they may be putting impediments in the way of the peace process and so on. But once again, I would really like that, if we are going to lead, we may have come to this conference with whatever frame of mind. But we should not leave this conference without understanding one thing about my country, which is that it is really ticking on different cylinders now. I have not seen this over so many years of journalism and watching and you have to define the 1960s and 1970s. I have been reporting certainly from the 1970s. This century is seeing a completely new dimension of thinking that has taken place, and when Mushahid said that the government has not changed, he has a point. But in India, when India changes, the last people who know about that change is the government of India; they are always the last to be informed which is why they lose the elections. But it is within the dynamics of the new thinking that is going on that you might possibly begin to see solutions.

Mushahid Hussain: Excellent and I hope that the new thinking incorporates Kashmir as well.

Sir Nicholas Barrington: There is no one here for the British foreign office, they are often the American government. I do not speak for the British foreign office. I have spent nine years of my life in Pakistan and I know the country a bit and I am very interested in the subject. But I do not know that I disagree with the British government on quite a lot of things at the moment. Mr Akbar said that the land, the territory has not changed since 1965, but of course it did change when the Indians took a part of Siachen without warning the Pakistanis. In fact the Pakistanis in Gilgit had no idea that the Indians were there until much later. And there was a slight shift and there is that whole question of the uncertainty about where the line goes, as Alastair Lamb talked about. And in those days, I remember it was sometimes adventurous army commanders on either side planning to attack one another and there was therefore the danger of things potentially bursting up. Let us hope that does not happen now.

I absolutely agree with the feeling of the people in general that the average, ordinary people do not want war, despite the propaganda. I was in Egypt when Saadat went to visit Jerusalem and the whole of the public propaganda in the Egypt was that the Israel must be violently dealt with. Saadat went to Jerusalem and he came back; I was there when he went to the streets and he was cheered in the streets of Cairo. And again talking about not giving up territory, the Israelis did actually give back large areas of Sinai to Egypt. So these things can happen and basically if the governments do have the courage to make agreements, I believe that the public will support them. And I absolutely accept Mr Akbar's view that India is a great country, it is not going to be the mood except through public opinion, I do not believe that it will never be a mood in the sense that no piece of territory will ever disappear. But if the public opinion wants that, it will. And I think that the important thing that he said was that it was in India's interest not that to have peace with Pakistan, but to resolve its disputes with Pakistan. My view about that, keeping in mind that of course I know Pakistan better than India, that India is a great country: it is by far the biggest and the most important country in South Asia. But it is not the natural leader yet because it has disputes with its neighbours. If it can sort out its arrangements with Pakistan, it will then become the natural leader of South Asia, and it will greatly increase its scope and power in the world, including, for example, a better chance of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council which on grounds of proportions is justified. I mean there are some countries who say that they do not want any changes anyway. But if the situation were to change where India has an agreement with Pakistan, and Pakistan supported India's case, it is my personal opinion, not the British government's point of view, that there would be great strength in India's point of view and prevailing prestige in the world.

Another point I would like to make, taking the example of Northern Ireland: we had a problem with Northern Ireland. Whatever we did, we could not solve it without getting the Southern Irish government involved. And I am glad to say that, although the dispute is not resolved, the Indian government has now accepted that the Pakistan government has its own *locus standi* in Kashmir and it is a great progress as we have accepted in Northern Ireland. We also accepted frankly that we could not resolve the problem without the help of the Americans as outside people. And though the Indians have resisted that, that may be necessary at some stage, but I mean that there is a progress and I hope it will be resolved.

My own feeling always was that the future of Kashmir was not one great state or it was for a short period of time; and then the other parts, like Hunza and Nagar, which I know, I do not believe that they have any particular relationship with Srinagar, and I frankly do not think Ladakh does either. It is the way which is the hard way, how I have understood it, and perhaps Jammu and the people of the Valley can be satisfied, the question arises of whether these other areas should have another arrangement soon. Because in Pakistan they feel disenfranchised at the moment, they are in a very unfortunate situation: they are not represented in the Pakistani Parliament, so something needs to be done, whether the first process could be to try to separate that. But I would like to ask Mir Waiz that when he said that Kashmir must be united not divided, do you mean to say that you would never accept a position whereby Hunza and Nagar and some others would be separated from Srinagar? Because if you do, then I think there is no hope because I don't think that will ever be acceptable to either India or Pakistan.

Mir Waiz: I was recently in Karachi for the World Social Forum and, for the first time, I had an opportunity to meet some leaders and people of Gilgit and Baltistan, and their situation and their position is not different from the position of the people of Ladakh. Unfortunately, the structure of the state is such today that we have three region *vis-à-vis* Indian control. We have Jammu, Ladakh, and the Valley, but none of the regions see eye to eye. There is problem between Ladakh and Srinagar, there is a problem between Jammu and the Valley. So there is always an uneasy relationship between the regions. Ladakh wants a majority of the region as far as Leh is concerned; they want a unitary status *vis-à-vis* Ladakh. Kargil is another example: predominantly, they want to be with the Valley. So we feel that if an issue has to be worked out in which we have to have a structure which has to be reframed, I think that the present structure of the state is not doing justice to the aspirations of all the people of the regions. So I think that the structure that evolves may be called a federal structure where you have five regions and five constituent original assemblies, and then an overall parliament in which India and Pakistan also have some sort of involvement. It can be the answer to the questions which people are asking in these areas, because predominantly in Jammu, in Ladakh, in the Northern Areas, there are quite different perceptions, we have to agree with that.

Q: My name is Hamad and I am from the Norridge Business School. I have in fact two short comments to make. The first is that for some people it seems that the quest for peace has really come out of economic necessity for Pakistan, and economic and leadership necessity for India, and not peace for the sake of peace, as a concept in itself. And perhaps, as Dr Lodhi was suggesting earlier, that is a state of a mind, it is a kind of concept that is higher than economic and political necessity for that matter. The second comment that I have is that I have gathered from the discussion that the panel has so far taken a very narrow perspective of the word “peace” here in the region. You tend to go back to peace as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. Some people might disagree with that; they would probably say that the territorial dispute is only a manifestation of a larger and a deeper problem that India and Pakistan face, where Pakistan has had its position that there are two different identities, India and Pakistan, and India continuously refuses to accept that these identities exist. In fact, India says that there is only one identity in the region and unless you get to those deeper and fundamental issues, all efforts towards peace will be momentary or perhaps transitory.

Mushahid Hussain: I think that your first comment was a general one. Nobody is saying that there is a pragmatism attached to this peace process. I think that first and foremost, from the Pakistani perspective, it is very clear that we have to put the people first, see the issue of human beings, humanity, human right violations, as Mir Waiz was also saying. And we are not treating it, at least in our present policy, as a territorial dispute nor as a peace of real estate. So I think that could have been one view, but it would be wrong to view it in the present context in that light, it is not our policy at least.

Akbar: You raised the point of identity which of course is something I think that we have addressed and now left behind both our suspicions that any identity was going to swamp the other. But the important thing about the two identities that emerged out of the suzerain that created two nations is that Indian identity, the identity of the Indian state is multi-polar, Pakistan’s identity is unipolar. I am not getting into a judgmental debate, what is right and what is wrong to each. But I am an Indian Muslim and if my Islam and my identity are not only an equal, and perhaps more than equal part of the Indian identity, then I would challenge Indianism. By being a Muslim in India, I am not diminished, I am not in any sense treated as an unequal. And therefore the India that I represent, the India that I live

in, has to flourish on the basis of equality for all citizens, irrespective of name, creed, language, colour. Yes, this does lend a sort of piquant paradox to the Kashmir problem, we all know that. What is very interesting is how this is creating multiple paradoxes within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. We do not know what the state of Jammu and Kashmir is; sometimes we feel it is just shifting goalposts. It is not just Hunza; when we talk about the unity of Jammu, and the Hindu majority, even the Muslims of Jammu who have a very different culture and life and entity. Leave aside Ladakh, for instance. So yes, India is a great complexity of reality, united by very important modern traits of equality, liberalism, and democracy.

Mushahid Hussain: Just a modest identity business, it's very interesting. When I came from Islamabad yesterday, I went for an early morning walk and I went to the store near the petrol pump and I got a copy of Mr M. J. Akbar's newspaper, *Asian Age*, which is being sold here by the way, and the man said I was the first person to buy this newspaper. No, he did not know I was Pakistani. There is a very interesting story here which I think this paper has captured. "Clerics write to Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir": there are two letters written by top Indian Muslim leaders; one is from the shrine of Ajmer Sharif, Syed Sarwar Chishti; and the other is the leader of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, which is the oldest seminary of South Asia, the oldest madressah, and both are for the first time linking the issue of their support to Congress to what they call a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. And they said that the problem of Kashmir must be resolved, and the article says the letters have, for the first time, linked the Indian Muslims with the people of Jammu and Kashmir. So I think that there are complex issues which need to be resolved, and for the first time the Indian Muslims have also become a factor for seeking a resolution of Kashmir which is compatible with the aspirations of the Kashmir people.

Q: Listening to the voices from Kashmir, what about Pakistani territory. You have focused on Indian-occupied Kashmir? What about Kashmiris living abroad, including those in Pakistan?

Akbar: I wish I could defend the Indian establishment. The Indian state is now powerful enough to defend its territorial claims, if that is an issue. It may seek to keep them aside *vis-à-vis* China. The resolution with China too will come on the basis of China accepting India's strength, rather than India's weakness. We had— I do not know whether you are aware of this—a very major development in

Chinese terms. So I don't see, so far as the situation *vis-à-vis* Kashmir is concerned, that there will be absolutely any ability to compromise on territorial claims. But yes, technical claims, I suppose under a parliamentary resolution, we still claim Muzaffarabad.

Mir Waiz: Regarding the leadership, I would cite the Valley. I mean that there is a general agreement that we had opportunities many times this year for the first time and last year also, that we went to Muzaffarabad, we went to the other parts of Azad Kashmir. And there is a general agreement among the leadership in Kashmir and in Azad Kashmir that there has to be involvement of Kashmiris on both sides of the ceasefire line and in that context there have been occasions also. We had the Pugwash conference and another conference in Islamabad after that. In Karachi, we had the World Social Forum where the people from all the regions of Jammu and Kashmir were invited for the very first time, not only the separatist organizations, but also the mainstream pro-India organizations. So, even in that context, there is a growing recognition among all the key players in Jammu and Kashmir to whatever school of political thought they belong, that the involvement of Kashmiris is paramount and there has to be some movement forward beyond the status quo.

Victoria Schofield: I just want to give an illustrative point, which I think is interesting, on the subject of flags and boundaries, stemming from my trip to Kashmir this summer. I went to a tourist shop and asked for a map of Kashmir, and the tourist map produced by the Indian government gives no indication whatsoever where the Line of Control lies. As I was in a really provocative mood, I suggested that it was not terribly helpful for a family of English people touring around and who might end up without knowing which height to cross, back into Pakistan. Of course, that wasn't true, because it is so heavily fortified along the border that you can't go anywhere.

Mushahid Hussain: Sorry to say that Bangladesh was also a Caesarian operation carried out by Mrs. Gandhi, and after the suzerain birth of Bangladesh in 1972 through 1989, Pakistan did not talk about Kashmir. It was not on our radar screen. India had the chance of a lifetime to do some healing, to put things to right, to have honest elections, because a part of India which has not had decent and honest elections is Indian-occupied Kashmir. And Mufti Saeed admitted it in 1989 that elections in occupied Kashmir have been rigged from 1952 till 1989. So, for seventeen years they forgot

about it, and later, the 1987 elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India were rigged. Syed Salahudin took part in those elections as leader of Hizbul Mujahedeen, and other important leaders said that there was no way out, we have to have recourse to arms. So there was resistance to the oppression in a movement which was indigenous, popular, spontaneous, and widespread. So of course we supported it and morally we did the right thing.

So in that context, you see that the problems do not go away historically, you can't crush them aside. And even if you take another example, two other examples: the Afghan Jihad, 1979 to 1989, it was a joint jihad, with MI-6, CIA, and the ISI together in the jihad, supporting Mr Bin Laden, supporting Ayman Al Zawaheri against the evil empire. But once that joint jihad was won and the Red Army had to go back, the mujahideen were humiliated and left in the lurch. Afghanistan was off the radar screen, but the problem didn't go away. And two years later, American troops, NATO troops are in Afghanistan. The last big battle of the twentieth century has now become the first big battle of the twenty-first century. In 1991 President Bush sent his big army into Iraq, and said that they had sorted Saddam out, everything had been knocked out, and we would all live happily ever after. It didn't happen that way and, twelve years later, there was another intervention. If the Indian leadership has a vision or a sense of history, I would say that it should grasp the olive branch presented by President Musharraf because it is an opportune moment. The people want it, the Kashmiris are ready, we are ready. There is no constituency in Pakistan that seeks confrontation with India, whether it be the armed forces or the political forces, whether it is the religious right or the liberal left. So this is an historic opportunity I would say, and if they don't grasp it, the problem will not go away, something else will happen. The Israelis refused to negotiate with Arafat and now they have Hamas to deal with. The Americans refused to accept Khatami's dialogue of civilizations; now they have to condemn Mahmoud Ahmed Ahmadinejad. So let's be very clear.

Q: I am Yaqoob Khan and first I just want to make a historical footnote. It was mentioned about Hunza and Nagar, that they were never legally a part of Kashmir as declared by the British government of India in 1941. The odd thing is Pakistan turning back, even though it was a settled legal issue six years before partition even happened. So that's one thing that the Kashmiris should also clarify. The one thing that adds more complexity to what we have been discussing is

the other factors that relate to the Kashmir issue. For Pakistan, from the late 1940s till at least 1960, it was a question of water, as all the waters to Pakistan come through Indian-controlled Kashmir. There is also the Indus Water Treaty, and recently we have been arguing about the dams and everything there.

The question from the Indian side, the whole question of secularism, that the people think that it is mere rhetoric to an extent. But the recent re-emergence of the Congress in power and this whole secular thing; but then Kashmir is a sort of a token secular standpoint. It should also be pointed out that there are seventeen other insurgencies going on in India. So as Mr Inam ul Haque and Mr Mushahid Hussain have both been, in varying degrees, involved in the government dialogue, would you please comment on how much realization there is on both sides that there are these other factors. India says no territorial readjustment; Pakistan says no status quo. And the last point I want to raise is that one part of Kashmir, the original Kashmir region, is administered by China, the Xin Jiang region. India doesn't talk about it very much and in some way it has been resolved. How far has Pakistan learned from that and how far has India learned from that, and how far can that be employed?

Inam ul Haque: I can assure that both the countries are aware of the complexities of the situation. Let's put it this way: the dispute is territorial, it is religious, it is ethnic. It relates to water resources, it relates to geographical limits. Nobody has so far defined the geographical limits of Jammu and Kashmir, and it relates most importantly to the right of self-determination of the people. There all these factors connected to this problem, and we are not unmindful of these different aspects. It has internal problems, it has external pressures. You referred to China: in the 1963 bilateral treaty between Pakistan and China defining the borders, it still says in one of the articles that the border would be re-examined after the final status of Kashmir is determined. In this way, China also has a role to play. India, for example, claims—and perhaps some Kashmiris do too—that Xin Jiang is part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, although that has not been historically established. There is only one expedition which the Maharaja sent into Aksai Chin, which returned without defining any territory. But some Kashmiris believe that that expedition establishes their claim to that territory. So as I said, the geographical limits of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir have not been finalized, even the Kashmiris are not quite clear.

The fact of the matter is that Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Astore, whatever, there are records the British resident wrote to the Maharaja saying that the territories of Jammu and Kashmir are limited to the bilateral agreement contained in the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846. In fact, in that letter they said that they encouraged the Maharaja to occupy other territories. But we never conceded that these are your territories, or you have any legal title to these territories: your legal title is limited to 1846. What I am trying to say is that we are aware of the multifarious and complex problems in the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. That is one reason why perhaps it has not been settled so far. Mir Waiz referred, for example, to the conference that was held in Islamabad which I also attended. From the Kashmir side, there were members of PDP, two ministers, the National Conference's Umar Abdullah, of course APHC, the people from Jammu, representatives from Jammu, representatives from Ladakh, and others. But I can tell you that they were speaking with different voices. So, perhaps it is essential that the Kashmiris of various regions should, among themselves, first of all find a common platform, a minimum common platform, where they can negotiate on a common position with both India and Pakistan. It will take time, it needs patience, but most of all it needs goodwill from all sides, it needs sincerity from all sides. I think we are done with hypocrisy, we should sit down across the table and talk frankly about the issues with the intention of resolving them. It will take time, but it can be resolved.

Q: I am Afzal from Srinagar. So far, we have discussed geopolitical issues and, as Mr Akbar said, the new horizons of India, Silicon Valley, Bangalore, and all that. But so far, no one has talked about ideology, the ideology of Jammu and Kashmir. As Mr Farooq said, it is a complex issue because we have Hindus in Jammu, Muslims in Kashmir, we have Buddhists in Ladakh, and so on. I have not seen in Srinagar, though I was born there. Hindus support this revolution in Kashmir. It's a problem of the Valley of Kashmir because the Muslims want Kashmir to be part of Pakistan, and Pakistan was born in 1947. It was an extension of the two-nation theory. I fail to understand why people don't address that, or is it that they hide their heads in sand? And also, I would like to ask Mr Akbar why he said that the Indian constitution cannot be changed, when we know how it was changed by Indira Gandhi and how many amendments she made, how she changed most of the constitution. And also, that India cannot have two flags, when we know that the name India itself

is a folly. Who can define what India is? It was a land conquered by the Mughals and by British. Now you are afraid that another Mughal would come to India. Why are you so afraid or obsessive with this flag thing? I would like Mr Akbar's take on this.

Inam ul Haque: The first part of your question that you refer to is ideology. In fact, this has been, since the early part of the dispute, one issue which was considered, because if you recall, the first representative, Sir Owen Dixon came to Jammu and Kashmir, and in his report came to the conclusion that Kashmir was a collection of disparate people; that perhaps a plebiscite can only be organized on that basis. The plebiscite was organized when Pakistan became independent, which means that it would have had to be probably a district-wise plebiscite to decide which parts wanted to go to India and which parts wanted to go to Pakistan. You are right that there is a large majority particularly of Hindus in Jammu, who would under no circumstances want to accede to Pakistan. Maybe they are not a part of the liberation struggle of APHC, but to say there is not one Hindu who does not support the liberation struggle of APHC is also not correct. There are some who believe in the cause of Kashmir and who support the cause of APHC. But the fact of the matter is that Jammu and Kashmir became a state in 1896, when Kashmir was sold to the Dogra Maharaja, and before that they were not together. Some territories were conquered by the Maharaja, some before 1846, like Ladakh, and some after 1846. So it is a territory that is composed of different people, that is why I said that there are ethnic differences, there are religious differences, there are geographical differences, and to resolve all these differences is a Herculean task. Nobody is unmindful of these differences. Different ethnic groupings live within certain countries. India has many ethnic groupings, Pakistan has a number of ethnic groupings, Kashmir has a number of ethnic groupings. That doesn't necessarily means that they have to be broken up: they can live together. But if they cannot live together, then there can be some kind of a radical solution which can also be sorted out, where all groups are given a chance to decide that which side they want to go to. Do they want to live together, do they want to go to India, or do they want to live with Pakistan?

Mir Waiz: I just want to add, in terms of support to the struggle from non-Muslim camps: we were recently in Rajori and Poonch last month, we were in Jammu and, for the first time in Jammu, we had a public rally after 1947. And it was interesting to note that we had

people from the Sikh community, Kashmiri pundits from the Hindu community who had come to listen and talk. That is why I said that there is a growing realization. Initially, the response was whether this conflict was going to affect our lives. In the early 1990s, mostly the non-Muslim section was disassociating themselves from the movement, but today, after so much has happened, there is a growing realization that this conflict has touched upon the lives of all the people who have lived in the region or are living in the region. So you can't disagree with the fact that a political settlement is the only way through which the problem has to be settled. And secondly, in that context, to be honest enough to acknowledge the fact that there were mistakes made even by the majority leadership, that they were not able to take the minorities with them. Initially, there were certain things which happened and which should not have happened. We have always maintained that the Kashmir struggle is a political struggle which needs a political solution. And we cannot deny the fact that predominantly there is a Muslim domination in the region. But when we talk about the aspirations of the majority, we have to address the concerns of the minorities too and that is something which, till the recent past, has not been the case *vis-à-vis* most leadership in Kashmir. But now we have been trying our level best to at least try to create some sort of a consensus within the Kashmir pundits or the Hindu community regarding why they are better off living with Kashmiri Muslims rather than Ladakh going under India, or the people of Hunza or Gilgit people accepting Pakistani rule.

M. J. Akbar: I just want to clarify one point on the Indian Constitution: there are two aspects of the Indian Constitution. One is the fundamental principles, the fundamental principles cannot be amended; for example, secularism cannot be amended. But the rest of the Constitution, like any Constitution in the world, can be amended.

SESSION ONE: PREVAILING STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIR

Mushahid Hussain Sayed

I just want to add that we had an excellent discussion, with a largely Kashmiri panel. It was a great discussion, but I would like to make two or three points. One basic line that everyone agrees with is that the status quo in Kashmir cannot hold, whether it is Akbar or Mir Waiz, that is the bottom-line. There has to be forward movement and I would say that talking of history, we have seen that what has happened in the Middle East after the 1967 war—a no-war, no-peace situation—that resulted in the October 1973 war. And another lesson of history is, of course, very clear from the Middle East, that military might, the use of force, however superior in term of numbers, cannot resolve issues. Israel has tried out two *intifadas* and the result was a converted Sharon. The US has 130,000 troops in Iraq and the war there is an unmitigated disaster, because the war was essentially immoral, unjust, and illegal. So I think that the basic lesson should be understood even in New Delhi.

Just two points about the US–India nuclear deal. I think Maleeha handled it very well. I wonder if, had this deal been part of a peace dividend on Kashmir, or a moratorium on nuclear weapons development, it would have been easy to sell it to the region and to the world. In the absence both a peace dividend on Kashmir or a moratorium, it appears to us as a move to counter China and a move to—as Maleeha Lodhi put it rightly—will spark a new arms race and even spark a new Cold War in Asia. It is only a proposal, it is not a deal; the proposal will not be finalized until the fat lady sings, and the fat lady is the US Congress. And I agree with Akbar that nuclearization was the best thing that has happened to South Asia. And in fact, in the talks in 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif thanked Prime Minister Vajpayee for going nuclear first, which allowed us to become a nuclear power as well. And I think that is very important, because it has given the people of Pakistan national self-confidence. Now we feel that we can look the Indians in the eye and we do not have to blink, because the size of the country no longer equates strength, given the nuclear factor. In my opinion, it has been very, very important, and please rest assured, nobody is going to denuclearize and we are going to move forward after this excellent discussion.

SESSION TWO: FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS
CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

INDO-US RELATIONS: THE IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA

Mr Dileep Padgaonkar

On the eve of the Bush visit to South Asia in March this year, A. C. Nielsen conducted a poll to garner Indian views on the American president and on his administration's policies towards the region. The findings, published in *Outlook* magazine, would appear to an outside observer to be full of inconsistencies, paradoxes, and contradictions. But for those who track the trends and processes at work underneath the surface of day-to-day events, they lacked neither coherence nor consistency.

Let me run through them. Sixty-six per cent said that Bush was a friend of India. Less than twenty per cent disagreed. Such a high rating for Bush would be hard to come by anywhere in the world, including in the US itself. But fifty-nine per cent said that, by coming closer to the US, India had compromised on its foreign policy. At the same time, fifty-four per cent said India needed the US and fifty-five per cent asserted that India can trust the US in times of need. Yet, seventy-two per cent of the respondents believed that the US was a bully. Fifty per cent held that the US was closer to Pakistan than to India. Forty-nine per cent claimed that the US had not done enough to help India fight terrorism. The paradoxes continue. Fifty-one per cent said that India was right to support the US on Iran. But as many as sixty-four per cent also argued that India should ignore US objections to the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

Such a mix of approval and scepticism about Bush and his administration's policies appear less daunting when you place it in the context of the changes convulsing India since the end of the cold war. An appreciation of these changes would go some way in grasping India's concerns and ambitions in the international arena. For, in its pursuit of the national interest abroad, no government, especially in an open society, can afford to be out of step with public sentiment.

As a result of economic reforms and the functioning of democratic mechanisms over the past two decades, the locus of influence, authority,

and power has shifted from politics to economics; from the state to the market; from government to civil society; from New Delhi to state capitals; and beyond state capitals, to district headquarters; from the upper castes to the land-owning peasant castes; and beyond them, to the scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes, and minorities; from elites dominated by the elderly to those dominated by the young; and, finally, from a male-centred India to an India where women play an increasingly important part in governance in most fields of endeavour. The country has also embraced science, technology and modern management methods as never before.

The sum and substance of these changes is that Indians, despite their variegated political inclinations, have now come to accept that what will make a difference to their lives, and in the bargain enhance the prestige of their country, is a confluence of education, empowerment, and entrepreneurship. All this is a radical break from the past. Throughout their recorded history, Indians have nurtured a deep and abiding distrust of the *bania* and of his caste-ordained profession. Since independence, this distrust was manifest in India's economic and foreign policies. Socialism, state control over the "commanding heights of the economy", the primacy of the public sector, the licence-permit raj were the buzz terms as far as the economy was concerned. In foreign policy, it was non-alignment. It enabled three generations of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and large swathes of the political establishment to give vent to their anti-capitalist and, by extension, anti-American sentiments.

The end of the Cold War more or less coincided with the acceleration of the economic reforms process. A major impetus for India to adjust to the post-Cold War world was the success of Indians in the IT sector. Consistently high GDP growth rates pushed New Delhi to jettison ideological posturing and seek to build bridges with countries which would allow it to strengthen its economy and safeguard its security interests. On both counts, India looked beyond South Asia to the world at large.

Against this background, it is no surprise that public opinion began to favour close ties with the US. That is the country which could offer high-end technology, investments, trade opportunities, and the wherewithal for India to modernize its military apparatus. The Bush administration's response to these expectations was more than fulsome. From offering more visas to Indians to work in the US, to openly and warmly agreeing to help India take its place in the company of the world's front-ranking nations, it left no one in doubt that it was junking policies that had created suspicion and mistrust for more than five decades. What aided the process was the growing clout of the Indian diaspora in the US in IT, the liberal

professions, in academia, in the media, in local and, increasingly, in national politics and bureaucracy. And in India itself, the burgeoning middle-class, whose consumerist and nationalist aspirations found reflection in the mainstream and print media, contributed its bit to the process as well.

Obviously, these perceptions were not shared across the board with the same intensity. Leftist parties made known their reservations about speedy economic reforms and about New Delhi's friendly disposition towards America. Sections of the Congress party, which had not entirely got over their Cold War reflexes, were equally reticent. Indian Muslims, who had not the least been perturbed after the splintering of Pakistan in 1971 or throughout the insurgency in Kashmir, grew restless, even resentful, of America after its actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and especially in Iran.

I said a moment ago that the troubles in Kashmir did not perturb Indian Muslims. This is not quite accurate. A front page story in today's edition of *The Asian Age* says that several Muslim clerics have written separate letters to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urging him to intervene directly for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue even while asserting that "J & K is an integral part of India".

The nazim of the Ajmer Dargah, Syed Sarwar Chishti, said, however, that support for Sonia Gandhi in the Rai Bareli bye-election to be held on 8 May, would come only if the Congress government resolved the "immediate problems of the people of Kashmir". Furthermore, he took the opportunity to make the government aware "of our resentment towards its policies regarding US President George W. Bush and its friendly approach towards him". He also berated the government for its tendency to blame "all and sundry" for acts of militancy, without proof. And for good measure, he added that before Congress asked Muslims for their support in elections, it "should deliver peace to the Valley of Kashmir rather than pay lip-service to Indian Muslims". Letters along similar lines were sent to the Prime Minister by Maulana Mohammed Haroon of the Kul-Hind Tanzeem Alimma-e-masjid and by Maulana Abdul K. Madrasi of the Dar-ul-uloom, Deoband. The latter stated that the "people of Kashmir are leading their lives in great helplessness, trauma and mental stress and are in political turmoil".

This was not the first time that groups or political and quasi-political outfits asserted their religious or ethnic solidarity with their counterparts abroad. Some in Tamil Nadu supported the LTTE's demand for Eelam

(independence), which was at complete variance with New Delhi's policy. Then again, Hindu rightwing organizations, like the VHP and the RSS, backed King Gyanendra to the hilt, even though the BJP-led government was far more circumspect on the subject. Still, the Muslim protests, centred on India's vote on Iran, were novel: they introduced an element of ummah-affinity in a foreign policy issue. The new Muslim assertiveness on Kashmir is bound to polarize opinion along communal lines—to the benefit of the BJP and other right-wing Hindu outfits.

Regardless of these dissenting voices, however, an overwhelming majority of opinion in India continues to root for America and for Bush. None of this has come to pass overnight. India's nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 sent the Clinton administration seething with shock and rage: shock because US intelligence agencies had failed to detect the preparations for the tests; and rage because of the feeling that New Delhi, both before and after the advent of the Vajpayee government, had wilfully duped the Americans into believing that there would be no tests until the US had undertaken a comprehensive review of its nuclear policy towards India.

Mandatory sanctions against India followed. The Americans goaded other nations, notably Japan, to withhold economic assistance. Moreover, they managed to get the UNSC to unanimously adopt resolution 1172 on 11 June 1998, which called on India to swiftly adhere to the international non-proliferation regime. Worse still, from New Delhi's point of view, the resolution wanted the "root cause" of India–Pakistan tensions to be addressed forthwith. India found that particular reference ominous for it signalled the dreaded "internationalization" of the Kashmir dispute.

All the same, within weeks of the tests, the Clinton administration initiated a dialogue with New Delhi to find common ground between the non-proliferation goals of the former and the security concerns of the latter. The Strobe Talbot–Jaswant Singh talks, spread over many months, focussed on five assurances the Americans sought from the Indians: sign the CTBT; join the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; tighten controls over Indian exports of sensitive technologies and commodities; adopt a non-threatening nuclear weapons posture; and reduce India–Pakistan tensions through a sustained dialogue.

Even as the dialogue was underway, Clinton visited India in March 2000 and received a rapturous welcome, including in Parliament. His speech laid the basis for a rapprochement between the two countries,

though given the differences on the nuclear issue, their relations remained at a low ebb.

In the first term of the Bush administration, the dialogue was pursued at a higher level: that of National Security Advisers. The Condoleezza Rice–Brajesh Mishra meetings resulted in agreement in broad terms on civilian space and civilian nuclear co-operation and high technology trade. But the process suffered a setback after the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, when the administration's priority was to defuse heightened tensions between India and Pakistan.

Developments over the year that followed put the Indo–US dialogue back on track: talks between Bush and Vajpayee in New York in September 2002; a decision taken two months later to set up a High Technology Co-operation Group; several meetings at the highest echelons throughout 2004, leading to what came to be known as India–US Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).

The change of government in New Delhi and the re-election of President Bush for a second term in office in 2004 ushered in a radical shift in Indo–US relations. Rice, now designated Secretary of State, emphasized time and again that the US needed to focus its attention on India on a priority basis. Her visit to New Delhi in March 2005 marked, as C. Raja Mohan noted, a “historic departure from six decades of American policy towards India”. Nuclear co-operation was now construed in terms of energy security and environmental concerns. The administration explicitly made known its goal: to help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century, with all that this would imply, even in military terms.

Alongside the co-operation, the administration laid out its objectives in South Asia: to ensure that Pakistan becomes economically strong and fully democratic, since this alone would first contain and then roll back the tide of anti-Americanism and Islamic extremism. Much the same panacea was sought for Afghanistan. Overall, the Americans reckoned, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan should come together to stamp out terrorism and extremism, reach out to Central Asia on the one hand, and, on the other, to South-east Asia. By and by, this arrangement would serve to make sure that the power balance in Asia did not tilt heavily in favour of China. However, what neither America nor the South Asian neighbours want is a conflict relationship with China. The emphasis is on co-operation when this is possible and on amiable competition when this becomes necessary.

Against this background, the Bush–Manmohan Singh joint statement issued at the White House on 18 July 2005 assumes all its importance. A nuclear deal had been reached. Some hurdles remained, notably on the issue of separating civilian and non-civilian nuclear reactors. But these were cleared when Bush visited India in March. The deal has yet to be endorsed by the US Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its implementation will have to be worked out by India and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The non-proliferation ayatollahs are still influential in the US Congress and Pakistan's efforts to lobby Senators and Congressmen against the deal are in the public domain. In India itself, the BJP, some retired nuclear scientists, and sections of the strategic affairs community are critical of the deal on the grounds that it will effectively cap India's nuclear weapons programme.

The failure of the US Congress to clear the deal will of course come as a great disappointment to New Delhi. But the excessive focus on it has served to detract attention from the long-term significance of the strategic partnership between India and America. Let it be stated at the outset that such a partnership would not be tantamount to an alliance. The two countries differ on a host of issues. Iran is one example. Another is, in Indian eyes, the Bush administration's unwillingness to get to the bottom of A. Q. Khan's clandestine proliferation activities and to push General Musharraf harder on Pakistan's low intensity warfare in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. Remember, too, that the administration is still non-committal on India's membership of the UN Security Council. Added to this are American pressures on New Delhi to open up its retail and insurance sectors and to overhaul labour laws.

The point that is sought to be made here is that such differences would in no way hinder India from doing what it has to do to safeguard and promote its security interests. This has happened time and again in the past, when Indo–US relations had touched rock-bottom. In July 1971, William Bundy, then Assistant Secretary of State, told the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee that he saw no way for India to soon play a major role in East Asia or to counterbalance China. It was too weak to amount to much in power terms.

Barely five months later, the Pakistani army surrendered to Indian troops in Dhaka. Three years later, India conducted the Pokhran tests which invited American sanctions. The Rohini Satellite Vehicle test took place in 1980. In 1987, the Americans argued that India would not militarily

intervene in Sri Lanka. Less than three months after they had argued thus, the IPKF had landed on the island.

The determination to act independently was also in evidence in India's relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite their close ties, New Delhi distanced itself from Moscow on a host of issues, including the Pokhran tests. In the situation prevailing at present India can be trusted to resist with greater force and alacrity efforts to push it around. As it has shown time and again in the past, it will not hesitate to take unilateral action, regardless of the consequences, should such action be required. And the action can go so far as to seek regime change. This was done in Nepal—when New Delhi restored the Shah dynasty after ousting the Rana regime—and later in Bangladesh.

The success of the Bush visit has doubtless boosted India's morale. But its impact on India's relations with its neighbours is still an open question. Consider China. India cannot but take such steps as are required to neutralize Chinese influence in Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and increasingly in South-east Asia. At the same time, New Delhi will explore every avenue of co-operation with Beijing. A settlement of the boundary question is on the cards. Trade flows are increasing at a swift pace. More and more joint ventures are in the offing. At a seminar held in New Delhi in mid-April, the Chinese ambassador let it be known that Beijing would welcome India becoming a permanent member of the UNSC, provided it broke ranks with Japan on the issue of reforming the world body. Let me add in passing that it is only after Indo-US ties began to strengthen that China started to seriously focus on India.

The Bush visit finally de-hyphenated America's relations with India and Pakistan. This doubtless increased Washington's margin of manoeuvre in South Asia. Its facilitating role in reducing India-Pakistan differences has gained in legitimacy in Indian eyes, not least because it remains discreet. It certainly weighs on the ongoing dialogue between the two countries at different levels. Progress on issues like Siachen, Sir Creek, the Baglihar dam, more trade, greater people-to-people contacts, and heightened cultural contacts is a distinct possibility in the weeks and months ahead.

The sticking point obviously remains Kashmir. Both countries are moving tentatively towards seriously considering a formulation that entails a huge quantum of autonomy for Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), facilitating a freer movement of goods and people across the LoC to make it "irrelevant", and putting in place mechanisms for India-

administered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir to work together to promote tourism, safeguard the environment, harness water resources, and so forth.

It is on the question of sequencing that the two sides have yet to concur. India continues to argue that CBMs and the resolution of less contentious issues will facilitate the search for a durable solution of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan wants it the other way around. Meanwhile, Kashmiri separatists have begun to engage in a dialogue with New Delhi. They have been allowed to visit Pakistan and leaders from Pakistan-administered Kashmir have been allowed to visit Delhi and Srinagar.

Suspicion and lack of trust do prevail in both countries. A section of opinion in India is convinced that Pakistan cannot ever agree to a solution of Kashmir or, for that matter, to a close and mutually beneficial relationship with India. The reasoning is that the military establishment in Pakistan can hold the country together only on the basis of relentless hostility towards secular India. Without the anti-India glue, Pakistan's very identity, and in due course, its integrity could be threatened. Sections of opinion in Pakistan too continue to hold that India is not reconciled to the creation of Pakistan and that it will resort to every nasty trick to make life difficult for it.

As against these views, another school of thought contends that domestic compulsions and the force of public opinion in both countries will compel Islamabad and New Delhi to settle contentious issues, including Kashmir. Both have to contend with militancy, insurgency, religious extremism, and terrorism in their respective territories, though the situation in Pakistan, as seen from New Delhi, is far more precarious. The two governments are also called upon to focus on issues of governance, economic growth, and development of social sectors. As for public opinion on both sides, the yearning for peace and co-operation is unmistakable.

It is therefore significant that a series of terrorist attacks in India during the past few months have not derailed the composite dialogue. Moreover, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's proposal of a friendship treaty has been found worthy of consideration in certain influential sections of the Pakistani media, even though the official response to it has been lacklustre, to say the least. By engaging India and Pakistan separately to goad them to pursue their composite dialogue with greater urgency, the Bush administration is in fact making sure that its own goals in the region are met.

The Bush visit has also served to finesse India's role in relations to other countries in the region. India and the US are on the same wavelength as regards Nepal. American misgivings about the Maoists and their consequent molycoddling of King Gyanendra are a thing of the past. The US also endorses India's efforts to reconcile the warring parties in strife-torn Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, much to America's relief, relations between India and Bangladesh, which had strained to breaking point, have begun to look up after Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's recent visit to New Delhi. Moreover, the US has endorsed the growing co-operation between India and Afghanistan, in the full knowledge that this causes some discomfiture in Islamabad.

From a long-term perspective, there is room for cautious optimism for the region as a whole. The economies of the three largest countries—India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—are doing reasonably well. This provides as sound a basis as you can hope for to promote healthy ties between them. They are better placed than ever before to realize the goals of the “SAARC Vision beyond the Year 2020”, which a group of eminent persons from the seven SAARC countries had formulated in 1997. The document calls for the establishment of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by 2008; a Customs Union by 2015; and a South Asian Economic Union by 2020. The US now wants an observer status in SAARC. No member seems to object.

For the first time since 1947, America finds itself on the right side of every nation in South Asia. The opportunity for South Asians to make common cause has never been more promising. Should they summon the will and the imagination to work together they can, with the support of America, and of the international community at large, focus on the well-being of their peoples. And, no less significantly, they can strive to sculpt a larger strategic vision which would include Central Asia and South-east Asia, not to speak of the Indian Ocean region. Will their governments shed their historical baggage to seize the opportunity? Will they be in a position to checkmate extremism, militancy, and terrorism? Or will they seek to harness these forces for their narrow ends? Will the absence of democratic governance in some SAARC countries defeat the goals that America and South Asia share in common? As newspaper editorialists are wont to say: time alone will tell. However, even in the absence of a coming together of the South Asian countries, India, thanks to its strategic partnership with America, can be trusted to deploy its power to implement the larger vision on its own—and on its own terms.

All in all, the Bush visit firmly places India in the category of the power centres in the emerging international order alongside the US, the EU, Russia, China, and Japan. India will be engaged with each one of them and the engagement will translate into economic and strategic partnerships, if this has not already happened. This is bad news for India's neighbours, if they continue to see the country through the prism of past assumptions, rooted notably in communal prejudice. But this can be good news for them if, in line with the evolving international scenario, they regard co-operation with India to be in their long-term national interests. In effect, such co-operation calls for a borderless South Asia, which might have appeared to be a utopian fantasy not too long ago, but which today is a possibility which no real politician can afford to scoff at.

The ideologies of the "two nations" theory, the Akhand Bharatwallahs, the "India-as-a-hegemon" pundits, the post-9/11 jihadis and Islamophobes : they can all continue to pursue their fantasies at their own risk and peril. However, in the process, they risk damaging the only things that matter in south Asia: peace, development, sound governance, and the blossoming of the region's astonishingly rich and shared cultural and spiritual traditions. A Bush visit was not needed to make this obvious. But what it did was to stamp the ongoing dialogue in the region with a cachet of goodwill from the world's foremost power. Pardon my impertinence: South Asia can, if its leaders so will, do without a cachet which smacks, even remotely, of subservience, let alone servitude. Our peoples have lived through that long enough. The time has surely come for us to say: yes to bonding, no to bondage; and this, with each other, with America, with the world at large.

**SESSION TWO: FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS
 CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION**

PAKISTAN–US RELATIONS: IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA

Rasul Bukhsh Rais

I will only make a few comments, primarily on the issues that have created certain controversies between the US and Pakistan during the past two or three years. Before I begin with those issues, I would like to say that it is not for the first time that Pakistan and the US have entered into a relationship: it is for the third time, the other two times having been in the climate of international rivalry and Cold War. The two partnerships have left a lot of material for Pakistan to learn about international diplomacy and how to conduct its relationship with the US. Amongst the important lessons in the US–Pakistan relationship has been the question of trust. Because the second time, and also the third time, when the US and Pakistan began to move closer, there was a lot of debate in Pakistan and in certain circles, both between policymakers as well as independent think tanks, about whether we can trust the US to stay with us. There are similar questions about trusting Pakistan in the US establishment.

The second important legacy of US–Pakistan partnerships that continues to shape and influence the process of the third partnership is this whole question of ad hocism and discontinuity in US policy. We also need to understand the international environment in which the third partnership has been forged between the two countries. Before the tragic events of 9/11, Pakistan was facing three different layers of sanctions. The first US sanctions came as a result of the refusal of the US President in 1990 to certify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear capability; the second came as a result of the 1998 nuclear tests; and the third came as a result of the military takeover in 1999. The other important thing that we have to keep in mind in order to understand the environment is that the 9/11 events entirely changed the structure of international relations and particularly the US outlook towards Muslim societies. And Pakistan and Afghanistan being in that category, it had a lot to do with the environment that was created as a result of those events. Pakistan in that climate had difficult choices and overall, if you characterize that environment, it was very compulsive, with very limited options. Pakistan made virtue out of

necessity, i.e., how to use the opportunity to advance national interest in a very difficult situation where we had only two choices: either to be with the US or to stand neutral. However, neutrality was not thought to be credible by the US. The third element that shapes this partnership is the evolving partnership between India and the US and how India has been visualized as a great power in the twenty-first century.

There are four issues that continue to be very controversial in US–Pakistan relations. I would like to start with Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, which primarily brought the US and Pakistan together. General Abizaid, Commander of Centcom, is on record as having acknowledged that no other country has supported US as much as Pakistan has in Afghanistan. And if you look at the range of support that Pakistan has extended, it is very diverse and extensive, from sharing intelligence to providing base facilities, and more importantly, stationing about 80,000 troops on the Pak–Afghan border. Pakistani troops have gone into some new areas for the first time. Even the British could not venture in to those areas during the colonial period.

Thirdly, as a result of this war, regular Pakistan troops as well as paramilitary troops have suffered a greater number of casualties compared to the total number of casualties that the US and coalition forces have suffered in Afghanistan. With all the support that Pakistan has extended to the US, there is continuing distrust about Pakistan. Occasionally, and at times very frequently, the US has told Pakistan to do more and that there is need for greater assistance in Afghanistan. Raising the question of distrust, not realizing that the legacy of Afghan conflict has been very menacing for Pakistan and that legacy has to do with US strategic objectives during the Cold War. Mushahid Hussain mentioned that it was a collective enterprise, Saudis, European countries, NATO allies, Pakistan: everybody was involved in that.

I will mention how Afghan mujahideen were perceived by the US administration. There is a famous quote by President Reagan when he invited Afghan mujahideen and introduced them to his guests in the White House lawns, the men with their turbans and German army jackets as men who were morally following the founding fathers of the American republic. This shows how the entire structure of international relations changes and Pakistan was supposed to deal with the entire length of the war, the mess-up of the conflict that Pakistan had to confront within Afghanistan, because there was a lot of talk about the Taliban becoming the bad guys. But during the Taliban regime as well, Pakistan was only one of the players in Afghanistan; there were other players too. Iran was there, the Russians

were there, the Indians through the Russians, and the major actors in Afghanistan: President Hamid Karzai, the king, and the king-maker, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador at that time.

There are heaps of records to look through that show whether the US administration was indirectly, through Pakistan and through other means, engaged with the Taliban at that time and to what extent they were roguish, to what extent they were anti-Western, and to what extent they were being brought into the scheme of energy pipelines at that time.

From the Pakistani point of view, where convergence takes place between the US and Pakistan interests and with coalition partners, the convergence in particular is in the integrity, stability, and peace in Afghanistan, because instability in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan, and similarly, instability in Pakistan will disturb Afghanistan. If you look at history, ethnicity, geography, and national security and go back into history, you will notice that these two countries have become somewhat inter-dependent as many factors bind them together. Therefore, we have an abiding interest in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. But what should be the approach, what kind of policy instruments have been applied to make Afghanistan secure, stable, and peaceful?

There are differences in the perspectives in Washington and Islamabad and a number of institutions and mechanisms have been created to bridge this perceptual gap between the two countries. The objectives probably remain the same, but then what instruments can be used and how we can go about that? There seems to be a lot of difference, particularly on the question of Pakistan's movement in Waziristan and the casualties Pakistani troops have suffered. The situation has created a lot of difficulties for the current regime in Pakistan, because we are doing too much, beyond our political capacity and beyond our national interest, to support the US. It creates many difficulties at a time when the US starts distrusting Pakistan and tells it to do lot more.

During the recent visit of President Bush, his comments and the press briefing were very telling and must have sent a very strong message and also created many difficulties for the regime. President Bush said that part of his mission on the occasion was to determine whether or not President Musharraf continued to be as committed as he has been, to bringing these terrorists to justice. It has been a very difficult relationship about Afghanistan and how to deal with that issue. Pakistan's support to the US has not been very popular: if you look at the public opinion surveys, you will find a lot of resentment among the people in Pakistan, the feeling

that we are doing a thankless job, and we have Muslims killing Muslims. There are different perceptions at different levels. At the street level, at the policy level, at the think tanks and intellectuals' level, there is altogether a different calculus because of a better and enlightened understanding of the international situation. The international environment in which states have to operate is different, but at the public level, there is a lot of anti-Americanism as a result of our support to the US in Afghanistan.

The second important and divisive issue between the US and Pakistan is how, in a new world climate, the legitimate liberation movements have been tagged along with the terrorist organizations. In Chechnya, the war was mostly defensive, the European Union had imposed so many sanctions against Russia and they were not talking on certain issues. The Chechnyan war has now become a terrorist war against the Russian state. Similarly, what has happened as a result of 9/11 is that the support Pakistan used to get on the liberation Kashmir, the Indians got an opportunity in this international climate and, through the US media, think tanks, intellectuals, and everybody who matters, started saying that it was a war on terrorism and that, in a war on terrorism, no distinction should be made against whom these armed struggles are being waged: whether it is in Afghanistan, Chechnya, or occupied Kashmir, it is the same thing. This has put a lot of pressure on Pakistan, when it comes to Kashmir, and also in dealing with the Indians. Pakistani expectation has been that the US would play a much larger role beyond that of a facilitator of negotiations, beyond a manager of conflict between India and Pakistan, diffusing tensions at a critical point of time and helping to resolve conflict between the two countries. Unfortunately, it has leaned more heavily on Pakistan to discontinue its support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters.

The third important issue is the question of nuclear proliferation. I think Pakistan made a conscious choice in the 1970s, something that other speakers have argued, that in such an asymmetrical relationship, if you look at geopolitics, size, conventional military capabilities, and also the history of conflict between the two countries, nuclear capability was the only answer in order to create some kind of parity and Pakistan did learn a lot about what a relationship was, based on Mutual Assured Destruction. The Soviet Union–US analogy helped and Pakistan did not accept any influence or pressure when it came to the nuclear issue. This issue was widely linked to Pakistan's long-term national security interests. It accepted great costs but, in recent years, unfortunately because of the role that our “national hero” has played, Pakistan has been hugely under American and global pressure. At this point, when a civilian–nuclear deal has been concluded and negotiated between the US and India, Pakistan also tries to

seek similar concessions and deals. But the case of Pakistan in the backdrop of this scandal has become extremely weak and Pakistan seems to be vulnerable on this issue. Although Pakistan is not going to surrender or de-nuclearize or anything of this kind, but access to nuclear technology through legitimate means will become a problem for it in the coming years.

The last question is a complex one. In the US, there is a view about Pakistan and this view has been emerging slowly for the last ten years, that Pakistan is a troubled state. There is something wrong internally in Pakistan, and in order to be a friend, a trustworthy strategic partner, it needs to reform. But if you look at the reformist perspective articulated by many scholars and think tanks, it is like a TV programme called “Extreme Makeover”, in which people get a makeover; the demands made on Pakistan are like a complete makeover too. The demand for closing down madressahs, democracy, ethnic issues, women issues, laws, society, governance, civil society, there is a long list. There is a lack of understanding, particularly amongst these political scientists, that you cannot bring about fundamental social change in a society, it has to be slow and cannot be mechanical. I think that sociologists or anthropologists would have a better understanding of such a society that has faced the legacy of the Afghan conflict, because there is hardly any realistic understanding of what went wrong in Pakistani society, particularly in the border areas where we are fighting the war against terrorism. So this extreme makeover seems to be quite unrealistic: instead, there has to be a slow process of change. This slow process of change will require a lot of international support and assistance, particularly in the social sector development.

When it comes to education, I see one programme of the US with the Higher Education Commission, the largest Fulbright programme in Pakistan; but then, who is really going to benefit? Is it going to benefit Pakistani universities, the 200 students going from Pakistan to American universities? It is basically meant to create a constituency of support for the future. If they are interested, I think the best thing would be to focus on Pakistani universities, where the common person goes. Education is one; health, infrastructure, and so many other things where they can help Pakistan to grow out of that image that has become fixed.

I would like to end by saying that the question of trust, the question of who gets what out of this relationship, and the question of what is really the bar for the US point of view of Pakistan, and what is the bar from Pakistani point of view—these are the real question. The expectations, mutual benefits, and the question of trust are the continuing problems in

US–Pakistan relations. In such a climate, ordinary people in Pakistan see that the US is against Muslim societies. As Pakistan has an image problem, so the US too has also an image problem in Muslim societies.

C: I am glad that you mentioned Afghanistan because it is a very important area. I just want to correct something that senator the said, that the US supported Bin Laden. I was part of the whole process. Actually, Bin Laden was a nobody, he was a minor actor. There were mujahideen groups of course; Bin Laden was in Sudan at that time, when we were involved. It is also worth saying that governments do change and of course the Pakistan government did support the Taliban. They partly helped in creating it, through Naseerullah Babar, not through the ISI: surprisingly, because the ISI supported Hikmatyar. Pakistan saw the situation and sometimes it is the strength of a government to be able to take a U-turn. Pakistan took a U-turn on Afghanistan and did realize that it was the wrong policy. With due respect, I do think that it is not just a question of helping America in getting rid of extremists, it was in Pakistan's own interests. My Afghan friends hated being dominated by the British in the old days, and later by the Russians and the US; they did not want to be dominated by the Arabs either. They did not want Bin Laden to dominate them.

SESSION TWO: FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS
CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

PAKISTAN'S EXPANDING FOREIGN POLICY MILIEU

Shireen Mazari

The post-9/11 era expanded Pakistan's foreign policy milieu, primarily within the context of issues and concerns. A marked feature has been the interlinkages between all these issues to an extent that was either not there previously or was qualitatively different. Another feature is that those issues which impinged on the domestic environment have tended to aggravate the internal security milieu. The most important issue in this context has been the new linkages in the Pak-India bilateral relationship and the India factor now prevailing in Pakistan's relationship with the US, Iran, and Afghanistan. Enmeshed in all this is the US war on terror, the issue of NATO in Asia, the US strategic relationship with India, and the prevailing standoff with Iran.

Taking Afghanistan first: post-9/11 Afghanistan has presented a whole range of issues for Pakistan to deal with, where the external dimensions of foreign policy impinge directly on its internal or domestic dynamics. With the fall of the Taliban, Pakistan effectively has been facing a hostile Afghan government. Apart from the fact that the Karzai government has no writ outside of Kabul, the growing Kabul-Delhi nexus is a source of real threat to Pakistan, especially along its sensitive western border where it is believed that India is already involved in LIC operations. The fact that India has sent 300 Special Forces, on the pretext of providing security for its businessmen in Kandahar, has raised suspicions of Indian intent. Pakistan still has more than 3 million Afghan refugees and the instability in Afghanistan is preventing their return, thereby adding to the pressure on Pakistan's environment and finances.

Also, there has been an impact on the domestic environment—especially in areas in close proximity to FATA (Federally-administered Tribal Areas). All in all, for Pakistan, the war on terror has a critical domestic dimension, as acts of terrorism, especially against religious groups and congregations are increasing, after seeing a major decline pre-9/11.

Another new dimension to Pakistan's foreign policy milieu is the presence of NATO in Afghanistan. The NATO presence in Afghanistan raises a host of questions, including whether this presence is going to be a permanent one. If the answer is "yes", then it will raise security concerns for countries like Pakistan, Iran, and China because their national interests may not always coincide with US or NATO interests.

Even more troublesome at a basic conceptual level is the idea that NATO is being transformed from a collective defence organization to a collective security organization to serve the interests of future "coalitions of the willing". There is no legitimacy for any collective security organization other than the UN with its universal membership. Will NATO now push itself as a collective security organization, promoting the values of the Atlantic-European community? Internationally, there is no legitimacy for such an organization, because Article 51 of the UN Charter provides a very clear and limited framework for collective defence organizations. Is NATO going to be an alternative to the UN system of collective security, peacekeeping, and so on—just as the notion of "coalitions of the willing" is a direct alternative to the UN and its Security Council?

Given the new role the US envisages for India in the region, as a regional policeman with an active role in Afghanistan, this notion of "coalitions of the willing" as an alternative idea to UNSC-authorized action is fraught with problems, especially for states like Pakistan, which are committed to the UN system of multilateralism. In fact, at a time when the Pakistan-India peace, or dialogue process has been moving ahead, US policies in the region—especially the so-called de-hyphenation between Pakistan and India—have aggravated rather than aided this process. The main result has been to give India encouragement for its hard line on bilateral, conflictual issues.

On Kashmir, the post-9/11 scenario led to some operational shifts for Pakistan, especially in terms of the ongoing freedom struggle within occupied Kashmir. The January 2004 joint Musharraf-Vajpayee statement reflected this shift. In this statement, Pakistan's President reassured Vajpayee that he would not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.

Since then, although the dialogue process has been moving forward without being held hostage to the Kashmir issue, there is a growing view in Pakistan that India has failed to move forward on Kashmir, despite a number of proactive interim measures suggested by the Pakistani leadership. The main proposals in this connection have been:

Demilitarization; self-governance; regional ascertainment of the wishes of the Kashmiri people; and joint control. India has not responded to any of these. Instead, it has chosen to go around these by offering a peace and friendship treaty, with Kashmir being left out of its ambit!

The earthquake drew attention to the human dimension of the Kashmir issue but, by now, that has again been pushed into the background with the LoC crossing points seeing little human traffic. But the process of greater exchanges amongst the political elites on both sides of the LoC continues to increase and there is an effort being made by some to think beyond the status quo. However, the Indian Establishment has still to make a major psychological shift that will allow it to think beyond its traditional position on Kashmir.

It is not just the Kashmir issue that has seen no forward movement on the part of India. All the other outstanding political disputes continue, including Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Water issues—the Baglihar Dam issue having already gone to international arbitration as provided for in the Indus Waters Treaty. So, clearly, there is a growing perception in Pakistan that India is seeking to put these conflictual issues either aside or to impose solutions—as on Siachen.

Again, even as the overt nuclearization of South Asia allowed for the establishment of a stable deterrence between Pakistan and India, this is now being threatened by the Indo–US strategic relationship, creating a whole new dimension within Pakistan’s external security considerations. The most threatening aspect for Pakistan is the Indo–US nuclear deal.

Three main issues which arise out of this deal:

- First, it undermines the international non-proliferation regime. By asking India to separate its nuclear facilities from its civilian ones, the US is de facto accepting India’s nuclear weapons’ status, since it is allowing it unfettered development of its weapons programme. In fact, by providing nuclear fuel for civilian reactors, it will allow India to utilize all its unsafeguarded indigenous fissile material for weapons production. Thus, the NPT stands undermined because the US is contravening its obligations under this Treaty, especially Article I and Article III:2 of the Treaty.

Article I states:

- *Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.*

Article III: 2 states:

- *Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.*

Just as the US killed the CTBT, it has now challenged the validity of the NPT.

A pertinent question also now arises that if the US is itself contravening the NPT, how can it penalize Iran for any alleged violations of this Treaty—given that both the US and Iran are Parties to the Treaty?

Of course, the US is trying to get India accepted as a nuclear weapon power within the context of the NPT through “the backdoor”—hence the provision that under the deal, India would “assume the same responsibilities and practices” as the five original nuclear-weapon states—but there is no legal provision for this, unless states like Pakistan are also brought in and the mechanism would have to be a formal Protocol which cannot only make an exception for one state. At present, this aspect of the deal contravenes Article IX of the NPT which only recognizes five nuclear weapon states—those that tested before 1967.

Apart from the NPT, the deal also undermines the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, which forbids the transfer of nuclear technology to non-NPT, nuclear weapon states. But of course the NSG is a suppliers’ cartel and the rules can be altered even if it means undermining the credibility of the Group as a whole—which is what will happen.

- **Second**, the Indo-US deal contravenes American national laws—especially the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which bars nuclear trade with states like India and Pakistan. But unlike the NPT, this is a national law, which can be amended by the Bush Administration if it can convince Congress. And the Amendments can be India-specific.
- **Third**, and perhaps most critical from Pakistan’s perspective, the Indo–US nuclear deal totally undermines the strategic stability that presently prevails in South Asia between Pakistan and India. In fact, we need to see the deal within the overall military cooperation between the US and India which directly impinges upon Pakistan’s security parameters.

In the post-bipolar world, Indo–US collaboration began in 1992 and began moving apace with the Clinton visit to India with the putting out of the Vision document.

Since then, the Bush Administration has expanded the framework of this strategic partnership. On 17 April 2002, in the first major US–Indian weapon deal in more than 10 years, India agreed to buy 8 Raytheon Company long-range weapons locating radars. On 22 May 2003, the US approved the sale of Israel's Phalcon airborne early warning system worth \$ 1.2 billion to India.

It is in this strategic context that we need to examine the 2005 strategic agreements that evolved as a result of the Manmohan Singh visit to the US in the summer of 2005—the Ten-Year Defence Pact and the Nuclear Agreement. Taking some of the central factors of the Indo–US defence agreement one by one, the fallout for Pakistan can be assessed more clearly.

The most important, both in the short term and long term, is the Indo–US agreement to co-operate on missile defence (MD). This is not surprising, given that India was the first state that welcomed the US decision to launch into a missile defence programme. Since then, India has set itself on the course for acquisition of a similar capability— beginning with acquiring Russian aerial platforms, the Phalcon radar system from Israel, and a plan for the acquisition of the Arrow missile system. Acquisition of missile defence capability by India directly destabilizes the nuclear deterrence in South Asia, as well as undermining Pakistan’s doctrine of minimum deterrence and nuclear restraint. To sustain a credible deterrence, Pakistan will have to begin multiplying its missiles and

warheads very soon. While there is no need for a direct arms race, the “minimum” will be moved to a much higher level unless Pakistan is able to also acquire missile defence capability— which does not seem likely for quite some time. In this context, the successful testing by Pakistan of its first cruise missile, Babur (Hatf VII), on 11 August 2005, with an initial range of 500 kilometres, could be seen as Pakistan’s first response to the Indo–US MD co-operation.

The instability is further heightened by another of the components of the Indo–US defence agreement—that of activating the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in this region with India becoming a partner. The PSI is part of the US notion of “coalitions of the willing” which seek to undermine prevailing international law—in this case the law of the sea—by attributing to members of the coalition the right to stop traffic on the high seas and in international airspace on a mere hint of suspicion of transportation of WMD material or components. One does not require too much wisdom to see how this pretext can be used to harass other states and their nationals—especially given that there is no provision of compensation for wrongful interventions.

Beyond the MD and PSI aspects, there is the element of joint weapons production between the US and India which implies transfers of state-of-the-art technology to India and includes joint military research and development projects. Also, on 6 December 2005, India (supported by the US) joined the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER), a multi-billion dollar international project that seeks to make use of fusion energy for electricity generation a reality. The main facility will be built in France but all the ITER partners will take part in its construction, research, and development. This will, of course, allow India to use the technology knowledge in their modern weapon systems. This again will put pressure on Pakistan in terms of its nuclear and conventional weapon systems. The US has also committed to India on transformative systems in areas such as command and control and early warning. These will then become force multipliers for India and again put pressure on Pakistan’s weapon systems.

It is in this context that the Indo–US nuclear deal is particularly threatening for Pakistan. Apart from allowing India a multiplier effect in its weapons production by liberating its unsafeguarded fissile material totally for military facilities, it separates the nuclear status of India from that of Pakistan. This could be a first step for renewing pressure against Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the future—at any time—now that the linkage has ended.

Finally, the US rationale for the deal is truly absurd. The main one is the often heard statement that India has a record of responsible behaviour on nonproliferation matters. US Undersecretary of State, Nicholas Burns, has made this claim and more recently, his boss, Condoleezza Rice also felt compelled to state this in a column. But does this gel with reality? No. And this is coming out more and more, as new information comes to light. Most recently (10 March), Albright and Basu of the Institute for Science and International Security wrote that the ISIS had “uncovered a well-developed, active, and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries’ export control efforts.” Also, according to them, India leaked out sensitive nuclear technology in order to procure material for its nuclear programme.

But even before these revelations, India’s proliferation record was highly suspect. It had a strategic relationship with Iraq, which included nuclear co-operation, going back to the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, as highlighted in a document of the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). It was in 1974 that Saddam flew into India specifically to sign a nuclear co-operation agreement with the Indira Gandhi government. This agreement included exchange of scientists and training and technology transfers. Iraqi scientists were working in India's fuel reprocessing laboratories when India separated the plutonium for its first nuclear explosive device.

Later, those same Iraqi scientists were in charge of the nuclear fuel reprocessing unit supplied to Iraq by the Italian company, CNEN. This was followed by an Indian scientist spending a year at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission's computer centre, training Iraqis in the use of nuclear computer codes.

An Indian company, NEC Engineers Private Ltd., is believed to have helped Iraq to acquire equipment and materials “capable of being used for the production of chemicals for mass destruction”, according to a CNN report of 26 January 2003. The company also sent technical personnel to Iraq, including to the Fallujah II chemical plant. Between 1998 and 2001, NEC Engineers Private Ltd. shipped 10 consignments of highly sensitive equipment, including titanium vessels and centrifugal pumps to Iraq.

India also had a nuclear co-operation agreement with Iran, signed in February 1975. It began helping in the completion of the Bushehr plant between 1980 and 1983, including the sending of nuclear scientists and engineers to Iran in November 1982. In 1991, despite US opposition, India negotiated the sale of a 10 megawatt nuclear reactor to Iran and Dr Prasad

worked in Bushehr after he retired in July 2000 as head of the Nuclear Corporation of India. That is why, in February 2004, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, visited New Delhi for talks with the Indian Prime Minister

Nor is this all in terms of WMD proliferation: In 1992, India supplied thiodyglycol and other chemicals to Iran and, in 1993, 30 tonnes of trimethyl-phosphite were supplied to Iran by United Phosphorous of India. It is also known that an Indian company exported chemicals to Iraq for Saddam's missile programme and a director of that company, Hans Raj Shiv, was under arrest in New Delhi.

As for a strong commitment to protection of fissile material, there is a record of nuclear thefts and missing fissile material in India, including an Institute of Strategic Studies, based primarily on Indian sources.¹ More recently, Albright and Basu published an ISIS paper on India's proliferation record and poor export controls (5 April 2006).

Of course, in the long run, the new external realities within the region offer Pakistan some new opportunities as well—including further bolstering its relationship with China and pushing for stronger strategic links in the Gulf region. With energy security a major global and regional issue, Pakistan straddles crucial regions linking the Gulf and Central Asia to China and India. In fact, Pakistan now sees itself as a critical actor in the energy pipelines that are being planned across Western, Central, and South Asia—and beyond. Pakistan and India as well as China are seeking energy security from external sources, because of their deficiency in traditional energy resources. Apart from nuclear energy, oil and gas from Western and Central Asia are options being explored.

The most viable project in this context—as well as being a political CBM for the subcontinent—was the Iran to India through Pakistan gas pipeline. Pakistan produces around 70 mmcm of natural gas a day but the demand is for 96 mmcm. Imported fuel oil makes up most of the energy shortfall. Unfortunately, the US has intervened to practically kill the Iran gas pipeline project—despite the Pakistan government's insistence that it could still go through. The other two proposals are not feasible: that is, the Qatar pipeline and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline (TAP). The Qatar one is not on the cards currently, while the TAP project can only be thought of seriously once there is some stability in

¹ S. Mazari & M. Sultan, *Nuclear Safety and Terrorism: A Case Study of India*. **Islamabad Papers**, No. 19 (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, November 2001).

Afghanistan. Even more critical, gas reserves are only an estimation, so there is no reliability regarding reserves in Turkmenistan so far.

Just as for India, for Pakistan also energy and water are going to be major issues of concern in the near future—especially as both economies are developing fast. The opening up of Balochistan is also problematic for Pakistan because it comes into conflict with the present US policy of isolating Iran within the region.

The importance of China for Pakistan has also become even more evident in the light of the new developments in the region. China is now involved more extensively in the economic field in Pakistan, including in Balochistan. The strategic relationship between the two states is also becoming more intense. The Sino–Indian relationship does not evoke the same concerns in Pakistan as the Indo–US relationship does.

There is also the issue of Iran—a critical neighbour of Pakistan. Here again, apart from the traditional factors impacting Pakistan–Iran relations, the US policy of seeking regime change in Iran as well as the Iranian nuclear programme have added new factors to the Pakistan–Iran dynamics. The Iran policy of the US may become a source of instability within Pakistan’s domestic polity, which has strong cultural and religious links to Iran. Any military action against Iran would be unacceptable to Pakistan and its civil society and would make it difficult for the Pakistan government to continue its extensive co-operation with the US. At the same time, Pakistan is firmly committed to the principle that states must live up to their international treaty obligations.

Finally, even geographically now Pakistan finds itself having to deal with a wider notion of South Asia itself. The formal parameters of South Asia expanded with the inclusion of Afghanistan as a member of SAARC—a reflection of the strategic realities post-9/11 and post the introduction of medium-range missiles into the region. With China and Japan getting observer status, there is every possibility of SAARC’s parameters increasing further outwards towards East and West Asia in the future. Most recently, on 12 April, the SAARC Foreign Secretaries’ Standing Committee, in principle, also granted observer status to the US and South Korea. The Council of Ministers will probably approve this in July 2006.

This opens a whole series of issues relating to the future functioning of SAARC, including its purpose and agendas. Meanwhile, despite all the political issues that still persist among the member countries, SAARC has slowly and incrementally been operationalizing its economic and social

agendas—especially since 2004, when the Social Charter was signed at the Islamabad Summit in January 2004. It was on this occasion that the Additional Protocol to the Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was also adopted, especially to plug in the gaps that had existed, including on the financing of terrorism.

2006 saw the start of the implementation of the SAARC Social Charter and the ratification of SAFTA by the seven original SAARC members. Afghanistan has observer status *vis-à-vis* SAFTA. But, at the end of the day, the bilateral Pakistan–India relationship will continue to dominate SAARC, including in the context of SAFTA, where the MFN issue remains between these two states.

Unfortunately, for the present, partially as a result of external factors, Pakistan and India continue to have divergent perspectives regarding the conflicts existing between them. While India seeks conflict management, Pakistan seeks conflict resolution. This difference is reflected in the approach taken on these issues within the bilateral dialogue and peace process. And perhaps there is also a greater divide between the two states' approach, which may be focused more on negotiating postures, and the two civil societies which see themselves in a peace process. Also, this process now is directly impacted upon by US policies in the region, adding additional factors for Pakistan in its external security policy dynamics.

SESSION TWO: FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS
CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

OPEN DISCUSSION

Victoria Schofield: I would like to address my question to Dr Mazari: can we look into the crystal ball, for finding a way forward to have peace between India and Pakistan, if we can indeed resolve the Kashmir issue and other outstanding disputes? Do you ever see your concerns about Indian nuclear potential put to better use in terms of joint military exercises and looking towards a federation, which was envisaged from the outset that India and Pakistan might work together? Have we not had the hostility over Kashmir, it is quite possible that India and Pakistan would never have felt the need to build such an arsenal to such an extent. So do you think we would ever see in a short period of time, would this be possible and could this not be something that could be put on backburner to work towards?

Dr Mazari: I have a different perspective on that. I don't think we envisage ourselves as a federating unit with India. I think we will always try to balance rather than bandwagon with India, even if the Kashmir issue is resolved. Because we see ourselves with our own priorities in the region and India sees itself as the major player. If you look at the record of India and its neighbourhood, it wants all the states to do as it wishes to. And the policies should be in consonance. Look at what happened to Nepal when it bought a few anti-aircraft guns from China. India stopped transit trade. So I think we see ourselves as a regional power and therefore, as a balancer, we could have very good relations with India, we could have joined a dialogue on mutual reduction of conventional forces. In fact, I have been advocating that Pakistan and India should have a dialogue on the Paris Treaty model, which was on conventional force reduction in Europe; that we should have mutual conventional force reductions between the two countries and so on. But I certainly don't see us as federating with India.

C: The world is now developing; Europeans have solved their problems in many ways. South Asia is a major gap in the world, where the countries don't really get on to that. They don't have enough co-

operation economically. If you did manage to solve these issues with India, could you not envisage a close relationship?

Dr Mazari: We would have a closer relationship, but as I said earlier, we would still like to balance rather than bandwagon with India. But of course already the economic openings are there. The problem with South Asia is that all the countries have borders only with India and problems only with India. So India is such a predominant power in the region that unless there is a balance, you would find a very aggressive India. And then with the US–India relationship, we would have some problems in the future because we don't see ourselves as hostile to Iran, while we see the US increasingly becoming threatening to Muslim polities. And if India and the US have a strategic partnership, I think there would be other issues that would divide us. However, I think at the end of the day, economic co-operation can certainly not be ruled out, but you have to resolve the political issues first.

Mushahid Hussain: With this India and US nuclear co-operation deal, as Shireen also mentioned, do you see nuclear instability? I mean the India– Pakistan relationship is not going to change overnight and with this Indo–US nuclear treaty, what kind of impact do you see on the region?

Dileep Padgaonkar: Well, I disagree with Shireen and I don't think we should under-estimate in terms of the current imbalance. The effect of a person who Dr Rais called a “national hero”—and I am sure he was talking about A. Q, rather than Imran—I am afraid that is an element there. But I think perhaps countries do change their positions. Although some people said that the Indian Constitution would never be changed, Indians after all are clever people. One of the reasons that they changed to capitalism, realizing its benefits, was that because of collapse of USSR, the Indians were extremely affected in changing their position in the new situation. What I am worried about now is one of the reasons why the India and the US are getting together is partly because of a general fear of Islam. I am a diplomat who has served in four different Muslim countries, and I think in America and the West, people have an exaggerated fear of Islam. They consider all terrorism as Islamic terrorism, started by Muslim people. Somehow, we get the feeling that all Muslims and all Islamic countries are into this and when we see the situation in Iran, this is a very dangerous situation. I am extremely pessimistic about

that. I think that maybe one of the reasons why America has made this special alliance with India.

My own view is that because America is extremely unpopular now, in Britain even, there is tremendous anti-American feeling and people like me who have always been great friends of America, are very critical of Americans on Iraq and other things. But on the other hand, it is a superpower, it can solve its problems militarily. We know if the resistance in Iraq want to stop the Americans, they cannot do anything about the rockets. Nonetheless, it is a superpower and we can't solve world problems without American help. So we need America. I don't think the Kashmir problem could actually be solved without some passive or discreet or behind the scenes support by Americans. So America getting involved in South Asia is not a bad thing.

Mushahid Hussain: I am not saying that at all. But every policy has a response. We see that the American policy in Afghanistan was not necessarily evil, but it had a blowback effect, and Pakistan was the principle victim of the policy. Pakistan had to bear the effects of that policy. Similarly, American cooperation with India will have certain affects on South Asia. This is what my concern is. What will be the long-term impact? Pakistan followed India's nuclear policy. Pakistan would never have been a nuclear country, if India had not gone nuclear. But now, if the US extends nuclear co-operation with India, what will be the impact ten years down the line?

A: Well the situation changes. I understand why Pakistan became nuclear. After all, Pakistan was faced with the overwhelming superiority of Indian conventional forces, just as we in Europe were faced with overwhelming superiority of Eastern European and Soviet conventional forces. Whether America's deals with India will alter that balance, I am not sure. I am not an expert on it. But I am not pessimistic enough to think that Kashmir can never be solved, for example. I believe that things do change and the most important factor is public opinion.

C: One point that you might want to consider, that the serious, concerted, and official opposition to the Indo-US deal is coming from the Hindu-Pak Association. The BJP now has officially taken up a position; Jaswant Singh has delivered a nine-page letter to the Government of India, Vajpayee has formally opposed it. BJP has taken the position that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not an Indian

passion. There are a lot of issues in the deal which Pakistan is missing, because maybe their feeling is that because India has done so, it should be challenged. It may be the same with India if Pakistan comes to any such deal with America. But if you analyse the implications of this deal, in my view, there are very serious implications for both countries and if we don't sit down and examine this, what is going to happen is most of India's nuclear facilities will be under strict regimes with regulated supplies of uranium and levels of weaponization.

C: The effort New Delhi is making is to focus excessively on the deal part, whereas things have happened before the deal was formally announced and what India is offering was not properly taken into account. There is the scientist's version; the apprehensive version, and particularly the version of the head of the Atomic Energy Commission, I think when he turned around, this was the time when the real break came. I sincerely believe the deal is good for India. Very often, something that begins to irk is the fact that this business of seeking parity with India at all costs, even though the consequences may not be as expected. I think there is a problem. If that is put aside, effective measures can be taken to see where co-operation is possible. We have similar problems with Bangladesh and these are being sorted out. But somewhere down the line, if you think about South Asia and SAARC, there was the 97 eminent persons group, which has given a vision of SAARC 2020: five steps were mentioned and progress is made there and an atmosphere is created where you don't have these obsessive fears on both sides, which somehow come to the fore each time. At the moment, the public opinion may be hostile to the US but how many governments of the Muslim countries are hostile to the US?

C: I think India is such a big country. It is six times the size of Pakistan. In some ways it is the obligation of the bigger country to make a gesture, because the bigger country need not worry about self-confidence, about its strength and power. I agree with your point as it is a very real issue. I would certainly be extremely unhappy at the idea of NATO in any way threatening the role of the UN. If my government wants to do that, I would oppose that too. This idea of permanent bases, I think there is very strong interest in the West to get permanent bases in Afghanistan or Iraq. It would really give credence to the people who say what people really want is resources and that they not trying to help us.

Maleeha Lodhi: I just want to respond to a point that was just made. Actually, there are two points. The first is on the Indo–US nuclear agreement. The position my country has taken is to call for parity. It is a position taken on principles. So it's the principle of parity that is driving Pakistan's position. And we took this position also because the logic of history and the history of proliferation, non-proliferation in fact, shows that when nuclear alliances are created, when discriminatory approaches are followed and when double standards are applied, you set back the process both of non-proliferation and of creating a more secure world. That is essentially the point Pakistan is making now, which is if you are going to have double standards on this issue, then there will be serious consequences.

Secondly, we also take this position on the basis of security concerns. So the question is not to pursue a situation where we are saying that if you are doing it for India, do it for us. What we are saying is that we had proposed a strategic restraint regime to help avert an open-ended nuclear arms race in the region, because we think South Asia, Pakistan and India ought to know from the experience of the Cold War and superpower competition during the Cold War, where they created an over-kill capacity, which they didn't need. We ought to learn from that and need not go into that open-ended arms race. I would like to use a different paradigm rather than paradigm of trust, because I think we should be careful not to transpose the expectations that come to inter-person relations to inter-state relations. The maxim that has always guided us, certainly in the post- Cold War period, is that there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies in international politics. Only interests are permanent and therefore, interests are the paradigm through which we have conducted our relationship with the US and will continue to do so. There will be times when these interests diverge and we will not hesitate to say so. For example, we have made it very clear that in the case of use of military forces against Iran, we will completely and utterly oppose it. There is no question that Pakistan can ever be a party to an attack on a Muslim country. We oppose the war in Iraq, my country sat in the UNSC as a non-permanent member and did not agree to the second resolution the US was looking for. So we do not hesitate where we disagree with the US. But we believe we can still have good relations with other countries, be it the US or the UK, where we have disagreements but we also have convergences.

I would like say something about the war on terror: I would use the term “campaign against terror”, because war implies that only military means must be used, whereas we all know that the military is only one dimension in this fight against terror. We have constantly urged the US and other members of the coalition that this war cannot be won by military force alone; we must address the root causes of terrorism or extremism. So there too we brought up our view, while being a member of that coalition. You don’t have to agree on everything. Just to look up to the US and think that if Pakistan somehow does not live up to that agenda, somehow the relationship is falling apart: I don’t think relationships at the state level are about that. I think they are about key interests both countries have. We have pursued our interests with the US. Some we managed to promote, some we did not manage to promote—that is international politics. Today, in a unipolar world, and we hope that it is a unipolar moment, because no situation in the international arena is going to be static, most countries seek to have good relations with the US. But there are vast asymmetries of power involved because the relationship between a superpower and other countries will necessarily be defined in a certain way. But I thought a clarification is necessary because somehow it is assumed that in this asymmetrical relationship, only one country is pursuing its interest. Pakistan also pursues its interests, we have our own issues, and we will agree on some issues and will disagree on others. However, it doesn’t means that the relationship is going to fall apart if we have disagreements.

- C:** Can I pick up something that was said earlier? I think I would like to bring it back, it is about new actors on the stage. This is not the central drive, but it is certainly becoming a new drive, compared to 36 months ago or that timeframe. In new actors, three are key here: the private sector has already been mentioned, not just within the region but also outside the region and I think it is not only the US or the European corporations, but also the Japanese and others also need to be looked at. Civil society is also becoming important as is the diaspora. These elements are playing an important role within South Asia. But is SAARC playing a useful role? I think time is ironically riding SAARC in three ways. One is because the first five members were given institutional focus, both during Pakistan’s chair of SAARC and also after the successful Dhaka conference. The second reason is the strategic expansion of SAARC. The third reason is it signals very limited progress on SAFTA, it signals that this South Asian region is moving towards trading relationships.

C: I just had one point may be Dr Mazari could comment on that. There is so much emphasis on the Indo–US nuclear deal and the fact of what is happening in Iran and Afghanistan. A lot is being said about another regional player that is China. I think it is fair enough to say that Pakistan has mishandled its relationship with China or it has not developed a strategic relationship with China in the context of the new emerging world order.

Shireen Mazari: I don't think we have mishandled our relationship with China. I think in fact over the last few years we have seen Pakistan–China relationship widened. Previously, it was uni-dimensional to some extent; now you have economic co-operation. You also have far greater interaction at the Track 2 level between China and Pakistan, whether it is think tanks or business people or political leadership that goes to China. There is a lot more interaction between the two at multiple levels now. So I don't think we have mishandled it. I feel in many ways we were slow initially and took China for granted. We assumed that, because we have this longstanding relationship, we could always count on it. And then we suddenly woke up to the fact that interests are important and we have to keep ensuring that there is enough in the interests aspect to further this relationship. What is interesting is that, unlike the Indo–US relationship, which many in Pakistan see as having negative fallout for Pakistan, but the Indo–China relationship is not perceived in the same way. We don't see it as threatening. In fact, we see it as something that can stabilize the region further. Pakistan views the Indo–China relationship differently from the Indo–US relationship.

C: You think that China's economic strength can create problems for Pakistan or other countries. One thing I noticed when I was in Pakistan is that developing relations with Pakistan is important but there are very few people, even diplomats in Pakistan, who speak Chinese or learn Chinese. I don't know if that has changed now.

Mushahid Hussain: I would refer to your China thing. I have just returned from an eight-day pilgrimage to China: Beijing, Shanghai, and Urumqi; I was leading the party delegation. At the last meeting of President Musharraf in China, they agreed on three areas to focus on: Defence is of course a longstanding one; the others are energy and economy and trade. In the area of defence, for example, the air force and the navy, the entire modernization is now linked to China. So the relationship has broadened and Musharraf has also offered

them energy corridors because a lot of Chinese imports of oil come from the Middle East through the Gwadar port. I agree with Sir Nicolas that there are actually very few Chinese experts or speakers, so I have decided that we are going to establish a China think tank in Islamabad very soon.

Q: My question is to Mr Dileep Padgaonkar. You said that focus of your country has shifted from politics to economics, so should I say that it has shifted from bad to worse? In today's world, economics is referred to as freak-onomics. Dr Rais would be familiar with this: in America, development used to mean freedom from hunger, thirst, backwardness. This is what we don't see in South Asia, anywhere. We are talking about strategic mega-projects, like the pipeline. Do India and Pakistan have a history of mega-projects? What is going to happen to this one? One may talk about nuclear power plants and WMDs. Have you ever considered what their de-commissioning cost will be? Will you be facing same problem that Britain is facing now and you think this will be sustainable in anyway?

A: I was just trying to give you a summary of the kind of shifts that have been taking place during the past twenty years. I would just give you one instance: I have been doing a series of interviews with first-time members of Parliament, basically to find out (a) their educational background, (b) and what their pre-occupations were. The interesting thing I found out was that once you go to constituency level, the big political, ideological issues that are fought over during election times recede to the background and, instead, the focus is on drinking water, schools, repairing roads, and so on. This cuts across all party lines. This is what I meant by saying that there is an electoral process on one hand, but once people are elected, they know now—and this is a big change—if you don't deliver on your promises, that is the end of the road for you. I think that compels me to believe that this shift has already taken place and is going to take place ever more, because at the local level I have yet to see that. From state level to the district, where the same momentum is found, I would say it has begun but I am not very sure.

Dr Rais: I would like to answer this question of development and if people are going to benefit from modernization and development. Water and energy are two of the major issues in South Asia and also the world. If you don't develop mega projects in area of water reservoirs or energy pipelines from Central Asia, my take on this issue of pipelines is that connecting energy sources in South Asia

through pipelines would create a latent interdependency between the two states. It will create a better atmosphere for peace. So if you are talking about developments in other areas, without energy, India and Pakistan cannot move to the next stage of industrialization and development.

- C:** The role of SAARC can guide India and Pakistan to bridge their gaps. It is extremely important that the differences over Afghanistan be settled and cross-border issues should be shifted to focus on literature and music, where there is greater similarity and co-operation.
- C:** It is a very important point. I think the visa issue is also very important: if more people move, more magazines and artists are exchanged, that would help.

Dileep Padgaonkar: I think one of reasons that this issue was not mentioned is because it is probably one issue where there is no difference of opinion. If you take a look at what has been happening for the last three years, areas of co-operation are being explored, which didn't happen before. Our fashion designers are going up and down the two countries; we have got technicians from Pakistan. In this area, things are proceeding very smoothly.

Shireen Mazari: It is true that arts and literature are flourishing now, but till recently films were being used to further aggravate the hostility between India and Pakistan. This was an issue that has now come up in Indian society, how Bollywood uses films to bolster a negative image of Muslims and Pakistan. People have realized this now and have altered their stance now; but there has been this other side and this should be remembered.

Maleeha Lodhi: I think it is an important point. I think that what we miss and what has been recognized at the people-to-people level is the explosion of satellite television networks and the huge role they played in demonizing each other. I think that has been important.

SESSION TWO

FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIR

Nicholas Barrington

I think we have brought out most of my concluding points in the discussion, except one, and I was disappointed to hear Shireen saying that she felt that the government in Kabul was hostile. I have been supporting action in Afghanistan, although I oppose what is happening in Iraq, because Bin Laden was training terrorists. And they were not popular in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, what is happening in Afghanistan has been affected by what is happening in Iraq, which is very sad. But I am sad to think that the Pakistan and Afghanistan governments are demonstrating hostility towards each other; it is a pity and I hope that something can be changed and misunderstandings can be removed. I must say that I don't think it helps that the Indian government has consulates right over the border. I have no idea whether Indians are supporting extremist elements, but I think that is provocative and I think that Indians should realize that this does makes Pakistan feel uneasy and concerned.

I think we have had a useful discussion. Thank you all.

SESSION THREE
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE
AND INTERPRETATIONS

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE PAK–INDIA DIALOGUE:
AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Rahul Roy Chaudhry

When one looks at the future prospects of the peace process, I think there are two sentiments that really come up and sometimes these sentiments are contradictory. The first is the need to think “out of the box”, especially as we are looking at a serious issue, looking at the future of two countries with nuclear weapons. But there is another requirement, another sentiment, and that is the sentiment of examining these issues in a responsible and a realistic manner. So what we propose to do really in the next few minutes is to look at the practical side of this exercise and to see that what practical steps could take place in the next few weeks and months. And I deliberately used the words “peace process”, here rather than “peace dialogue”. I think this it is an important distinction but it is a sentiment again of the nature of the process of the engagement that we are seeing today. As High Commissioner Maleeha Lodhi noted in the keynote address, there is extensive engagement between the two countries, perhaps the most intensive since 2001-2002, and I think this intensive engagement really is far beyond a dialogue itself but actually it needs to be seen in the terms of a peace process. And I firmly side with those who believe that it is a peace process and not just a peace dialogue.

When you look at a peace process, I think there are two factors that are very important. The first is the element of time: a peace process requires time to gather momentum; it does not happen straight away. The India–Pakistan relationship for the past sixty years has been one of hostility and mistrust, things that cannot wash away in a short period of time. To build mutual trust requires time. We have already seen sixty years of tense relationships; clearly, it does not require another sixty years to build that trust. But, in my view, the time element is important when we try look at the peace process.

The process as we see today is really just over two years old. It started as one could say at the time of the Islamabad Communiqué in January 2004, during the SAARC summit in Pakistan. Since then, there has been intensive engagement, with the establishment of transportation and communication linkages between the two countries. There have been official and technical level contacts, Confidence-Building Measures, including on Kashmir, and people-to-people contact. But both countries are still to normalize their relationship. The relationship between India and Pakistan is still not a normal relationship. There was concern in India during the early part of this peace process about whether Pakistan would focus on building mechanisms, just building measures, rather than engage simply and focus on the Kashmir dispute. To Pakistan's credit, it has engaged wholeheartedly in CBMs and trust-building measures and that in itself is an important step in the right direction. The second aspect of the peace process is, I think, really that the process as it is, is a means towards an end, not an end in itself. The engagement that these two countries are carrying out really needs to be seen as aimed at moving towards a convergence of interests, moving towards specific deliverables, both during the peace process and the ultimate objective of the peace process.

There needs to be a clear link between CBMs and deliverables on the ground, from confidence-building measures to conflict resolution; that again is an important issue. The two countries need to see the process as a means towards an end rather than an end in itself. If the peace process is just for the sake of engagement, then clearly there will be problems with the process. The key question for the future really is a simple one and that is, is this peace process irreversible? Both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh, in April 2005, have gone on record saying that this process is irreversible. But as we know, this is not the case. Both countries have concerns over the future of the peace process. We heard yesterday the concerns from the Pakistani perspective on the importance of conflict or dispute resolution, concerns over nuclear and defence modernization in India, and concerns over developments in Afghanistan. Concerns in India on the future of the peace process relate to violence and acts of terror in Kashmir and the lack of progress on some of the key CBMs. But neither country would want to be in a position to unilaterally formally withdraw from this peace process, largely due to international concerns and also concerns within their domestic constituencies. The concern then really is that the peace process may not formally end, but it could slow down and that again is something that has its own dangerous implications. This is a fragile peace process and I think that what really needs to be taken into account.

I don't think that anyone in this room would like the peace process to slow down. And what I would like to do in the next few minutes really is to look at the six issues that could help to boost the peace process in the coming months and years. The first issue really is the question of building on existing CBMs and moving towards making them deliverable on the ground. As I have said, the momentum needs to be maintained for the peace process, it should not be lost. And if we look at a particular issue, such as the ceasefire on the Line of Control, that is a good way to look at how the momentum has taken place, built upon, and can be built upon. The ceasefire on the Line of Control is now nearly two and a half years old. This is a ceasefire that has held, notwithstanding the allegations of violations by both sides. I think that from the Indian side, there was considerable scepticism that the ceasefire would hold. Fortunately, that scepticism did not warrant doubt and focused on the realities. But what we have seen really is a ceasefire that has taken place on the Line of Control, but a ceasefire that needs to be strengthened.

In the last few months, there have been some critical developments on this. For example, last September the two Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan for the first time publicly welcomed the continuation of the ceasefire. A month earlier, at a bilateral dialogue between the two countries on conventional confidence-building measures, both countries agreed not to develop new posts and to try to buttress the ceasefire on the Line of Control, including the requirement to hold monthly flag meetings and local commander meetings, etc. But much more needs to be done on this, and if we look at one or two options on this, I think the first is conflict resolution in Siachen. I see this as part of the building up on the existing CBMs, the ability to provide a deliverable on the ground on this issue. We are not sure whether an agreement is going to be reached in the next few weeks or not, but whatever it is, it is important that both countries are in a position to trust and verify that agreement on the ground. There should also be more focus on moving heavy artillery from the Line of Control on both sides and also the requirement to build a mechanism for monitoring violations of the ceasefire and of the Line of Control, if they do take place. There still isn't a mechanism to monitor these developments. So what we are looking at on this confidence-building measure, for example, is really a requirement to build further on this issue.

The second issue that I propose is to institutionalize this peace process; what do I mean by this? I think we have really seen a critical development in terms of the Islamabad Communiqué, both from Delhi's side and Islamabad's side. From the Delhi side, this was really the first formal acknowledgement that Delhi made that Pakistan has a role in the

Kashmir dispute. And internally in India, this statement had considerable psychological importance and political importance as well. From Pakistan's perspective, clearly there was a commitment to end terrorism on its territory. I think we need to build on the Islamabad communiqué. It is not sufficient for statements to be issued after meetings between the leaders of two countries. But in the last two years, both countries have got a better feel of each other, a better understanding of each other. And I think there needs to be another communiqué which will actually concretize the developments that have taken place. The importance of this of course is to try to institutionalize, try to promote the peace process, try to re-fence the peace process as much as possible.

The third issue is in terms of increasing the key stakeholders in the peace process. We have seen considerable linkages in people-to-people contacts, and in the civil society contacts between the countries. These are linkages that did not exist in the past. People-to-people contacts are clearly important, but my own view on this is that sometimes they have a limited shelf-life, if there is no sustained government-to-government official interaction between the two countries. Also, another key element, which we haven't seen as much as we should, is the requirement for economic interaction, economic co-operation, this is critical for both countries. We heard yesterday about the bilateral trade relation, which is far less than the informal trade relations between the two countries. But there needs to be far greater economic interaction between the two. There needs to be business-to-business linkage, which we haven't seen: business communities on both sides taking forward and building in certain constituencies to ensure that the peace process continues. There was also some discussion yesterday on energy issues, especially on pipelines. The Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline is an important confidence-building measure, which would build inter-dependency between the two countries, India and Pakistan. This would bring in stakeholders for the peace process. But I think at the moment this option is unlikely, largely due to the geopolitical realities that are taking place and, instead, we need to focus much more on the economic and the trade linkages between our two countries.

The fourth issue is Kashmir, where there is the requirement to build on transportation and communications and people-to-people contact across the Line of Control. And the way to do this, again one option is to bring in economic content, trade content. In addition to the bus service, it is important to start a truck service, which is something that both countries have agreed to, to build in economic linkages across the Line of Control between and among the Kashmiri people. Inter-Kashmiri economic and trade linkages could create a momentum for the peace process in that

sense. But what we have really missed so far is an economic content to these contacts.

The fifth issue is one of encouraging both trilateral contacts as well as intra-Kashmiri dialogue. It has been, I think, an important development that the Indian Government started talks with the All Parties Hurriyet Conference. It's a pity that this hasn't continued, but it's something that needs to be encouraged. There needs to be more contact between the Indian government and organizations such as the All Parties Hurriyet Conference. In addition, I think, as we heard yesterday, there is not much homogeneity among Kashmiris on either side of the Line of Control. And I would look forward for a situation where both governments would actually increase or encourage contacts among the Kashmiris, for is what Victoria Schofield said yesterday could be an attempt to bring a least common denominator, the most common denominator in that sense. There have already been meetings such as the Pugwash meeting and, as we heard yesterday, there was a social forum meeting in Karachi. But there is a need for much more encouragement to actually try to get a better understanding of the issues and the need to encourage intra-Kashmir contacts.

The sixth and final suggestion really is in terms of looking at the flexibility of the Line of Control. Both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh have taken opposing views on the future of the Line of Control to a certain extent. President Musharraf has made it clear that the Line of Control is a problem and cannot be a solution. Prime Minister Singh has made it clear that there can be no second partition of the country. So what we are really looking at is an attempt to try to converge ways to further interest on this issue. Both leaders have looked towards making the Line of Control more flexible, to explore linkages across the Line of Control, whether it is in terms of people-to-people communication or trade. There is, I believe, a lot more work that needs to be done on this, a much greater understanding that needs to be evolved, especially in terms of the perspectives of both leaders and both countries. But this is something again that I feel could have certain value if we attempt to look at the Line of Control in a more flexible manner.

Finally, I would be happy to discuss these proposals, these suggestions that I have put forward.

SESSION THREE

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE

AND INTERPRETATIONS

Future Prospects of the Pak–India Dialogue:

A Pakistani Perspective

Dushka Saiyid

Unlike all the eminent speakers before me, I am a historian who does not usually speak on current issues, and consequently have a slightly different perspective on the future prospects of the Pakistan–India dialogue. I will approach the whole issue by examining the positive developments that have taken place so far. The Kashmir issue is central to the whole dialogue, and the positive development is that Kashmiris, rather than Kashmir, have acquired centre stage. As Mir Waiz said, triangular talks are taking place, and the Kashmiri leadership is talking to both India and Pakistan. President Musharraf has declared that the satisfaction of the Kashmiri people is of prime importance to Pakistan. Mir Waiz pointed out that the attitude of both the government and the people of Pakistan have changed since his first visit there. At tremendous political risk to himself, Musharraf has broken from Pakistan's long-held position on Kashmir. No other leader could have gone as far as he has done. And let me say that tomorrow and the day after, no Pakistani leader will be able to make the kind of offers Musharraf has made. I cannot stress that enough. Again, what is positive and on which there is consensus between Manmohan Singh and our President is that the LoC should become porous, and the barriers that have existed for decades between the two parts of Kashmir should come down. As for the bus diplomacy, although Mir Waiz was saying that not many people are able to travel because of bureaucratic hurdles, at least we are moving in the right direction. And the same applies to India and Pakistan, as our High Commissioner pointed out: eight to ten thousand visas are being issued every month. This is a big change!

Connected to all this is what M. J. Akbar also mentioned: the role and importance of civil society, the people-to-people contacts. I have seen it in Pakistan; although I haven't travelled to India, but I have met Indians after coming to Cambridge, and there is a visible change in the mood of how Pakistanis and Indians feel about each other. No one should underestimate the impact that this has had in the two countries. This change began with the cricket match of 2005, and it's quite amazing how important cricket is in inter-state relations. Thousands of Indians were given visas to come to Lahore, and, as you know, Lahoris are known for their hospitality and warmth, and they gave the Indians a fantastic reception. The Indians went back with such a different view of Pakistan, and that had a multiplier effect on the mood in the two countries. I would like to quote two other examples. The first is the visit to Pakistan of Advani, a man who in Pakistan and elsewhere is considered an ultimate hawk on Pakistan, and is held responsible for Ayodhya. This man comes to Pakistan, visits Karachi and Lahore, and like Paul on the road to Damascus, undergoes a transformation. He visits the mausoleum of the Quaid, and expresses his appreciation of him. Politically, he might live to regret that appreciation. But that just goes to show that people-to-people dialogue, people-to-people visits, and those eight to ten thousand visas are making a lot of difference. It's like the Berlin Wall coming down. Somebody said we have just gone back to the pre-1965 situation; well, the post-1965 situation was so bad that one has forgotten what it was like before that. Now, if Advani can undergo this transformation, so can others. People are discovering how they feel about each other, and what a great deal of mutual warmth and curiosity exists on both sides. I think that factor should not be underestimated, and what M. J. Akbar had to say about the civil society, I agree with it, that this will influence politics, parliaments, and everything.

I was reading about Jaswant Singh's visit to Balochistan. Jaswant is no dove either, but his statements when he was visiting Pakistan were very positive, very nice. Then of course, as Rahul Roy pointed out, there has been progress on Siachen and Sir Creek; and on the Baglihar issue, we are waiting for arbitration. I agree with him that these CBMs are *very* important, and are contributing to an improvement in the general feelings of the people in both the countries. The ceasefire for the last two and a half years on the LoC in Kashmir has made a great deal of difference to the lives of the poor in the villages near the LoC, who were suffering because of the constant barrage of artillery fire. There was also consensus amongst the speakers of yesterday and today, that when it comes to the actual resolution of the Kashmir dispute, there is no movement. As Mir Waiz very eloquently pointed out, the CBMs are fine, but the ground situation in

Kashmir has not changed, and the day-to-day lives of the Kashmiris is still affected by bunkers, oppression, killings, human rights abuses, and raids.

Going through *India Today*, in a February issue, there was a whole article on Hindu jihadis in Kashmir. It is not exactly a left wing newspaper any more, and the whole thrust of the article was that Hindus have become jihadis in Kashmir because of the conditions prevailing there. Manmohan Singh has recognized that there is a major problem about how Kashmiris are treated, and mild-mannered as he might be, I think it is pretty brave of him, because the Indian leadership does not usually accept it. Dr Singh, who was asked to explain his Kashmir policy at a press conference, said the government had to work harder in treating all Kashmiris humanely, as equal and empowered citizens. Now this is not a Pakistani citizen or Pakistani politician talking, and we heard Mir Waiz, who is considered a moderate leader, saying nothing has changed on the ground. So while I appreciate Rahul Roy saying that a peace process takes time, but as Musharraf pointed out, when we are talking about demilitarization, we are not talking about changes in the Indian Constitution, we are not talking about India giving up any territory, we are talking about improving governance in Kashmir.

Secondly, I have seen that the people who have come to speak here are wise and sensible in presenting India's point of view, but there have always been within India many strands of opinion. The danger with India is that, after signing the nuclear treaty with the USA, it should not get carried away by a sense of "triumphalism". Fukuyama says that after the collapse of the Soviet Russia was a sense of "trumphalism", which led USA into the Iraq adventure. This sense of "triumphalism" should not make India more intransigent about the issue of Kashmir. In Pakistan also, there are many strands of political opinion; there are those who support Musharraf, but on the street, on the ground, the mood is changing. It is becoming very anti-American and they feel that Musharraf is going too far in appeasing the Americans, making them happy; they also feel that Musharraf is going too far in appeasing the Indians. As a historian I can tell you, opportunity knocks once, but it seldom comes come a second time. Here is an ideal opportunity; here is a man who acts, who has taken a tremendous risk and has gone out on a limb. What happens tomorrow if there is any kind of political change in Pakistan? So seize the moment!

You saw what happened in Palestine, Arafat was a man under siege in his office, and nobody was willing to give an inch to him. As a consequence, he has been replaced by hardliners in the shape of Hamas. You had Khatami, a moderate and a reformist, but still no progress in

relations with the USA. He too has been replaced by a hardliner. Don't make the same mistake with Pakistan. The mood in Pakistan is changing also. My husband commented that I am obsessed with what is happening in Iraq; I think that when the history of the twenty-first century is written, Iraq will be seen as a watershed, for the world and for the Muslims. The concept of Ummah should not be underestimated, that Muslims all over the world feel they are one. In India, there are one hundred and fifty million Muslims, and three ulema of Ajmer and one other organization sent a message to Manmohan Singh, saying that he should do something about Kashmir. Their contention was that when they voted for him, it was on the condition that he would solve the Kashmir issue. This was unprecedented, the Indian Muslim religious leadership speaking on behalf of the Kashmiris. Notwithstanding what Blair has to say, the Iraq war has not just affected the British Muslims; it has affected Muslims all over the world and radicalized them. Remember, Kashmir is not Bangladesh: Bangladesh was thousands of miles away, Kashmir is contiguous to Pakistan. We have a part of Kashmir in Pakistan, and Kashmiris are working in our homes and in our offices. We have seen with the Kurds, and in so many other instances, you can never crush a people's spirit. Bush is trying it in Iraq, it hasn't worked; military might is never the solution; the bunkers in Kashmir will never be the solution.

If Pakistan were behind the insurgency, it would have happened 1948 onwards, but it started in 1989. Look at the indomitable spirit of the Kurds, how they have struggled for decades and now they have found a home at long last. Saddam gassed them; they were divided between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. You can only delay the process of giving self-government, but you cannot crush their hopes and aspirations. Victoria Schofield mentioned how the Kashmiri kids talk about *Azadi*, but are not clear what that means; but what *is* clear to these kids is that they do not want the status quo. Now you must give them a sense of *Azadi*, whether it comes from self-government or whatever, and the cleverest move that Pakistan has made is saying that Kashmiris are the priority for it: we are happy to talk to them and satisfy them. Nobody is going to accuse Muslim leaders who sent letters to Manmohan Singh of being a fourth column. They said they were loyal to India, that they were for secular India, they want the Kashmir issue to be solved.

SESSION THREE:

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE AND INTERPRETATIONS

OPEN DISCUSSION

Q: I have two rather different questions. One is primarily directed to the Muslims of India and bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Second, could there be a multilateral component, either in term of parties like the United States or Russia, or institutions in the case of SAARC?

Rahul Roy: From what we have heard earlier and Dushka's presentation, and M. J. Akbar's yesterday, I think that there is a sense clearly that the Muslims of India are becoming concerned over the lack of progress on Kashmir. I think that they do represent an important factor in institutionalizing the peace process. I think that it is a factor that hasn't been at the forefront of the developments in the past few years, and this is a welcome change. The question of course is: How will that fit in and how will that be factored into the peace process? I think that we are not still sure what the reaction from the Indian government has been to the letters written by the ulema and I am not sure how it will actually pan out. But it is an important development and something that needs to be taken consensus of. In terms of the bilateral versus the multilateral component, I have focused on the bilateral component clearly. The reason was also brought up yesterday during Mir Waiz's presentation of the requirement for meaningful progress in the bilateral relationship to actually impact on the ground in Kashmir. Of course, there was a concern that the bilateral dialogue could fail as it has failed in the past. But I think when it comes to looking at the United States, the UN, or Russia, I think there is a much greater comfort level in dealing with Washington on this. As you know, there was a major reaction against mediation, etc., after the Kargil conflict, and the border confrontation. I think Delhi has better flexibility in what it sees as facilitation by a country like the United States for example.

I think you have just seen the perspective from Washington today, as we heard earlier that Washington is embroiled in Iraq, in Afghanistan, there is also Iran. I don't think there is the political will in Washington to focus on facilitating developments in Kashmir or resolution of the Kashmir dispute in the absence of a move by both countries towards conflict resolution. So I think that if that doesn't take place, then it is unlikely that Washington would want to be involved to any great extent with the developments in Kashmir. In the UN again, it has little chance of moving ahead in a few years. There are of course UN peacekeepers on the ground and they are on the Line of Control and they have been there. There have been attempts to bolster the role of the UN peacekeepers, but I think that the developments in two and a half years, particularly in terms of ceasefire and the implementation of the ceasefire along the Line of Control, their role will continue to be limited.

M. J. Akbar: I warmly applaud Dushka's perspective and comments. A couple of points I would like to make in order to expand the perspective while we have been discussing the Kashmir in the perspective of 1947 and so on. Maybe it becomes more relevant sense to discuss it in the context of our own immediate experience of five to seven years. Because what you have said is relevant to what has actually happened in the past few years, almost as if suddenly things for better or worse begin to happen. One point about the letters by the way, these were not written by leaders who were traditionally hostile towards the government; nor by those who have taken contrary positions on, let us say, the Muslim question. These are people who have always been congressmen. The Dargah in Ajmer Sharif cannot survive without state patronage. So the Dargah chief dare not do anything, except agree with the government. The Jamaat-e-Ulema is not the Jamaat-e-Islami: it has always been a virtual member of the Congress.

In terms of civil society if I may be permitted to relate an anecdote: you talk of the Lahore cricket match; I was there and the story that has been written really is quite important in its own way. There was no side which has moved Indians more; I still feel emotional when I think about Pakistani and Lahoris celebrating Indian victory on the streets. You did not realize how much of an impact that had on me. I wrote a story the next day, the mood was great. I was sitting in the coffee shop of a Lahore hotel doing nothing more substantial than wasting time and waiting for somebody to come and suddenly a person recognized me and ran up to me, looking very worried. He said was from Delhi. I thought, "Jesus we

have our first incident: this chap has gone out, somebody has abused him and he said he just been to the market, he was very perturbed.” “Trust me,” he said, “I went to buy medicines and they didn’t take money, and I went to buy some clothes, they took only half the price.” And he kept saying was that I knew them, when I went back home—he knew I was in journalism—could I please tell the Pakistanis one thing that when they come to Delhi, they should not expect similar treatment. He was genuinely feeling that he could not, he said that he could not persuade the Delhi shopkeepers to give fifty per cent discount it doesn’t happen and they must not expect it. But this is a kind of reality. The BJP begins as a bizarre party called the *baniya* Party and these are *baniyas* who are reacting in this passion. And this is genuine *baniya* story.

The latest controversy at the moment is about the hijacking. What they remember is 13 December; it isn’t as if conflict is a remote fact or a 1947 fact or a 1948 fact. These were the leaders who were on the brink; I have never heard a tougher line taken on Pakistan than I heard from Advani, not Vajpayee. And I have done it as reporter, as someone sitting at the table. So for me this change, this epiphany, a road to Damascus has happened in a very, very short timeframe. The shorter the timeframe, the more you are liable to question it. That is it just emotionalism, therefore it won’t last the course. As I said yesterday, please let us not desire peace because if it is sentiment, it is flawed. There have to be more substantive, practical, self-interest reasons. I met Advani after he returned from his trip: the important thing was not the reaction, the reaction was utterly predictable. Don’t mix the Narinder Modhi reaction, the Gujarat reaction with the Indian reaction. That is a traditional constituency; if Vajpayee had done the same thing, the public would not have been reacted.

The political reactions deal with the expectations. Here is the hard line. The hard line and what he said about Jinnah was perfectly legitimate. He didn’t say anything which is against the Indian position or anything. But such has been the background in which he said it, even that was considerable. But the important thing for me is not that the BJP hounded him or removed him eventually, the important thing is that Advani hasn’t changed. He has actually given up his seat, but in private conversations he insists that he has said nothing wrong. Surinder Kalkarni, who was his assistant and so on so, wrote a very long piece justifying and defending it. The point that I am trying to make is that the debate is on in a democracy, and the debate is now

finding people across the Indian leaders. Jaswant, of course, there is no doubt is an RSS functionary. Even he had lunch the other day when he came to our launching. He said it was a too much of a moving experience; these people are now convinced that the history of conflict and confrontation has wasted their lives. They are seventy-five years old: when they look five years ahead, they don't see a solution of Kashmir. When they look five years ahead, they are looking at the crematorium or graveyard. So, at the end of their lives, if they may feel that there is a cross-connection required, I think it is extremely important. I don't want to take so much time, but I do want to take issue on one statement made by Mir Waiz that there is no change on the ground situation. I honestly and sincerely say that there is radical change in the ground situation. What we are saying about Advani and Jaswant Singh: if that is not change, what is change? If the fact that Mir Waiz is sitting at a conference called by Pakistan here without worrying about going back to be arrested, if that is not change, what is change? Two year ago, he could not enter Pakistan. There used to be a great debate: shall we send the Hurriyet to Pakistan? I was among the people—its no personal great trait of mine or anything—but politically I said: "What nonsense you are talking by denying them the right to go to Pakistan? In any case, they are in the High Commissioner's office in Delhi half the time. So what is the big deal about not letting them go? Rather than to go to Islamabad and suddenly say anything they haven't said in Srinagar, as they are talking to Pakistan Television every half an hour, so what is the big deal? In which world are you living in by denying them the right to travel? That is change.

The prime minister's statement is change, that is change, and therefore I plead with everyone to trust me when I speak on the behalf of my country that, yes, there is a change on every side and the good news is that, despite the memory of 13 December, and despite everything, it is a change genuinely for the better.

- Q:** This caravan of life goes past in a strange way, seize the moment while you can, and that's why I agree with Dushka and not with Mr Chaudhry, that for change you need time. Sometimes, when you have the right people in power, you really have to seize the opportunity and take the chance. That is one thing. The second thing is that you said the Americans have no interest. It is true that of course the Americans are deeply embroiled in other places, but they have a strong interest in the security of Pakistan because they realize that Pakistan is a front-line state in what they call a war on

terror. Whatever it is, I mean Pakistan is a key area. And in that sense, people in America who have an interest because they realize that making progress on India–Pakistan relations will help stabilize matters in Pakistan. The question I had related to all the goodwill of the people. Visas, I don't quite understand, all these visas that are issued, are bureaucrats impeding these that there are not enough people on the buses? Are bureaucrats impeding the handling of visas? You get visas for family visits, for tourism, for business, for health, for education, for pilgrimage, I don't know: how is it working?

Mushahid Hussain: Now these tourist visas have also started and the train which is called Thar Express from Sindh into Rajasthan is very popular. Unlike the bus from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar, it is very popular because many people from Karachi, from interior Sindh—and there are a lot of Hindus in Sindh also who have relatives across the border in Rajasthan—and they now have access and they can travel. Now visa offices have also been opened in Karachi and Mumbai respectively. Consulates are being opened up now.

Q: Are tourist visas being given by both countries?

A: Yes they are, they have agreed now. Tourist visas are being given for over a year now, because I know people who have travelled on tourist visas. It's given for religious tourism, if it is a pilgrimage, and also for normal tourism, if you want to visit Agra, etc.

C: I was just going to mention the fact that a lot has been said about trans-LoC communications and all that stuff. But there is another important question that we agreed to the fact that there should be more activity on both sides of the ceasefire line. There are also routes which are within the States of Jammu and Kashmir, which have not been opened. For example, I can tell you from Poonch to Srinagar, there is a road which is only thirty-five miles from Poonch to Uri, and the same is the case from Rajori to Jammu. So there are routes which primarily the government of India has to decide to open. For example, they have started to build a new Mughal Road which is a very good development. But then of course somebody wants to go Poonch and Poonch is an area which is in Jammu, but culturally it is very close to Kashmir. They speak the same language, the culture is the same, but to come to Srinagar, they have to come to Jammu, which takes six hours and it would be around two and a half hours if this road is open. So this is one thing which we feel that the government of India has to address.

Secondly, I would like to respond to Mr Akbar that there is no denying the fact that things have moved in the past two years. There is a process of dialogue, there is a process of communication, and we are talking. I would not say that there is no change in the political mindset in Delhi, but I am more concerned that we feel there have to be certain measures taken by the government on the ground, so that a common Kashmiri could feel the change. I feel that until and unless a common Kashmiri is convinced that all this dialogue, talk, and high talk is affecting his day-to-day affairs in some way, I don't think anyone will benefit from the whole process. No doubt about it, yes, there are statements, there is especially debate in the media and in civil society about what needs to be done and how important it is to address the problem of Kashmir. But on the ground, we are more concerned with the ground forces and the paramilitary forces who are basically in command on the ground, and the fact that the recent statement made a day before yesterday by Mr Azad, that the present government has no role in the resolution of Jammu and Kashmir. So what I am saying is that it is difficult that, on the one hand, we are saying that the government of India says there is democracy in Jammu and Kashmir, there is an elected government in Jammu and Kashmir; but, on the other, the elected government itself is in no position to take decisions. They have a route towards Delhi for any decision or guidance.

Q: As President Musharraf has conceded on CBMs very generously and India has now responded in equal measure, do you think India is taking this as a sign of weakness on Pakistan's part?

Dushka Saiyid: This is a very difficult question, it's something I keep asking myself. When I spoke about those who, within India, have a sense of "triumphalism", I think part of that would be that we are too big, we are in a different league, these guys doesn't matter; let them talk, let them keep offering. And because Musharraf has gone so far as he did in talking about demilitarization, he talked about self-government, joint supervision, etc., which has never been done in the past. It might in certain quarters be misread.

Q: I am a Muslim from India. I would like to bring the attention of the speakers who may not be aware of the facts for British Muslims. When British Muslims want to get a visa from the Indian government to visit India, and if they were either born in Pakistan or their parents were born in Pakistan, then they sometimes find it very difficult to get

visas and for no rhyme or reason, visas are rejected. So, I would like to bring this to the attention of the Indian government, if some of the speakers can take it back. It is extremely humiliating and embarrassing, and as an Indian, I find myself helpless not being able to help in this situation. One other point I would like to make for Dr Roy Chaudhry: of the six you have mentioned, I would like to add one more and that is that NGOs are also trying to arrange exchanges between the two countries. NGOs from both the countries are trying to increase the skills of each other. So if you would like to add some more, please do so.

A: I swore to add my little bit to the cricket match in Lahore, because I was there as well with my wife and three other friends, including two little children. And of course, what was moving there in the stadium was that this adolescent from Pakistan who asked us for our Indian flags as well as the tee-shirts which had come from India. They were of course cheering everybody and the moving thing was that it was not for the first time that it happened. After the India–Pakistan match in Chennai, when there was the victory lap, you had the entire stadium stand up and applaud the Pakistani players. So, these two events were that was very important. But if you look at the big picture, something else happened in Lahore which deserves mention. Ordinary Pakistanis, for the first time, got to meet young Indians. The kind of contacts that had been held so far was largely with people of a certain age, fifty-plus, sixty-plus, and so on. But I have to say that the contacts are, by and large, though not exclusively, between Punjabis on both sides. For the first time, a lot of Pakistanis got to meet people who came from Chennai, from Kerala, from Mumbai, from all over the place, and I think this was something very important that happened. I could see the reflection, but on the question of hospitality and the warmth and so on, believe me, everyone who came back, came back with nothing but goodwill and, as M. J. Akbar said, we are inadequate, that we in turn will never ever be in a position to pay back that kind of hospitality.

I would like to just, for a moment, talk about “triumphalism”. I think I would go along with what you say, but you must understand the background. For close to fifty years after independence, there was this great feeling among the Indian elites, you are constantly being told that your rate of growth, Hindu rate of growth, should not be taken seriously despite your size, and so on. All this has changed within less than ten years, and you can relate it to partly to the success of the Indian diaspora in the US, particularly in the IT sector.

It is also reflected in the consistently high GDP growth rate for the past seven or eight years. You know, I feel, that once your GDP growth rate crosses a certain benchmark— 8.9 per cent—I think that the mood in the country changes completely. And what is called “triumphalism” is very often the expression of a real bubbly sense of self-confidence that you find across the country. People no longer want government jobs, white collar jobs, they want to become entrepreneurs, I think that shift is reflective of this mood. Now “triumphalism” in the real sense comes in those who are confined largely to strategic affairs and foreign policy and so on. So I can see that happening, but if you go towards other areas, you find it is a very different sort of mood.

Again on the question of no change, has there been any real change? I give you one example which to me is indicative. First, we haven’t spoken at all of the fact that in the past one year there, have been a huge numbers of contacts between the people from the two Punjabs. And we haven’t yet really analysed what this means. But there is one indication which to me is suggestive of a certain kind of polarization within the intellectual community and the political community. So, I will say rather that the criticism of American policies ought to be done in a non-denominational sense, if it is to be effective.

Dushka Saiyid: When I was talking of “triumphalism”, I was talking in the context of Fukuyama which, in his opinion, is what’s happening in the USA and its policy *vis-à-vis* Iraq, and that “triumphalism” after the Soviet Union’s collapse led to misconceived notions of pre-emptive strikes and unilateralism and also generally aggression everywhere. We are very happy about the Indian success. And I think we have to learn a lot, especially about the education system, and how they are zooming ahead. But if “triumphalism” converts into a similar attitude *vis-à-vis* the Americans, that is what one is worried about, so I just want to clarify that.

The second point: the immediate response was that, of course, it is Pakistanis again up to no good. What was discovered was they were Muslim, but they were from Bengal. So we go back to my point that the hundred and fifty million Muslims, don’t push them too hard. It was the people coming from the eastern part of India, whether it was Bangladesh or Western Bengal or whatever. Thirdly, something I meant to mention but I forgot to: when Bush visited India, the

Muslims demonstrated against him, and so it was Muslims and the left wing parties who did. Again to reinforce my point, the Iraq war is a watershed.

Maleeha Lodhi: I just want to pick up a point that actually Rahul made, but I want to say how thought-provoking your analysis was, and of course, Dushka was outstanding. So we had two excellent presentations which stimulated a lot of discussion. I want really to pick up what Rahul said about deliverables on the ground, and I wanted to underscore the fact that the view in Islamabad is that Kashmir has three dimensions: the human dimension, the security dimension, and the sovereignty dimension or a sovereignty issue. We have adopted as realistic an approach as any country can in the talks, by basically saying: let's have a two-track approach. One track is of course the final settlement track which is the sovereignty or the heavy-duty issue, if you like, which are obviously vexed and you know the whole history so I don't need to recall that. But the second track ought to be able to deal with the immediate deliverables. And that's the point Mir Waiz has also been trying to make, and I will also reinforce it, that is, that the humanitarian dimension and the security dimension of the issue do present deliverables. The long list that Mir Waiz read out yesterday, for example, focused on the humanitarian front, which reaches all the way from the release of political detainees to various other points that he made. Now that is the cluster of humanitarian issues which we hope that this dialogue can begin to address. And if India wishes, it may wish to do this unilaterally, because sometimes it's easier for countries to take actions unilaterally rather than in a bilateral dialogue, which is fine with us; we understand that. But if there is movement of this kind, then it will begin to create an impact and create the perception amongst the Kashmiris because that remains the acid test. If the Kashmiris say they don't see any improvement in the ground situation and some of the changes that have occurred are external and not internal—external in the sense that they are stronger on PR effects. I mean I am quoting the people from Kashmir itself rather than reflecting my own point of view or my government's point of view. Then I think you know we will have to re-examine this.

So the idea being that if the dialogue process can address some of these deliverables on the humanitarian front, on the security front, of course the security front includes the presence of paramilitary forces and the military forces within Occupied Kashmir. And the idea that has been thrown into the dialogue process is begin to withdraw

some of these where you feel comfortable. It is as pragmatic as you can get. Begin to do that, so that you can create the confidence among the Kashmir people, so that the negotiating space can be created to tackle the final solution. So the two tracks have to move in tandem, they are linked ultimately; but in the first instance, we could sequence it in such way that we begin to address what is easier to address. Do it unilaterally, do it in whatever way you can. But I mean this is important, because this is what we would wish to see in the next stage of the dialogue process. And that's what we need, and I think that at times the people turn around, and I will pick up the point that Nicholas made about time and that's the point which you made too. You know, at times, we are accused of being impatient; at times, we are accused of wanting a settlement overnight, whereas in reality fifty-eight years on, we haven't been able to resolve all these issues. We understand that of course the final settlement will take time: that's why President Musharraf's ideas for an interim solution are also on the table.

So you have a whole range of options available now. And it's a question of which one, what is the mix that will work in terms of giving confidence to the Kashmiri people, creating the negotiating space to move forward, and moving simultaneously on the other tracks of the composite dialogue? We have never said that Kashmir only and Kashmir first, but we have said and we will continue to say that we can't have every other issue, but not the Kashmir approach. So we have got to find a way in which there is simultaneity in the movement rather than looking at ways in which we can sequence it. I think this is a very important point. One last thing that Dileep said, and I think I just wanted to again point to the fact that terrorists attack in India do not produce the same effects. I think we must recall the sagacity of leadership in both countries because both actually put in a joint statement, Prime Minister Manmohan and President Musharraf, I don't remember the exact sentence of the text, but it says something along the lines that they will not allow acts of violence, of terrorism, to derail the peace process. So I think that the one fundamental question which we still have to ask is, have the two countries moved to a new level of maturity in managing their differences? Because I think that is an important stage in the transition that we are making to dispute resolution. If this new maturity is evident now, for example, in the responses to some of these terrorist acts that take place, then I think we have grounds for optimism. But ultimately, the acid test will be Kashmiri perception of a change in their day to day lives.

C: Just a few points, first on the cricket front: I come from Lahore. I think that what we are seeing is a new kind of Pakistan, the post-nuclear Pakistan, which is more secure and confident *vis-à-vis* India. Because there has been that insecurity for a long time that India has not accepted us, India is out to get us at the first available opportunity, which is also true: look what happened in 1971. We always said that we didn't do to India what India did to us, in 1962, when India was in trouble. What does a good neighbour do? Do they douse the fire or inflame the situation? We didn't do that and we kept neutral. But in 1971, it was a situation of our own making, but India played a certain role. So after this nuclearization, I think there has been a sea-change in the mindset of the people, of the policy makers, of the establishment also, and you can see the real Pakistan, a new Pakistan which is secure, confident, a warm, welcoming, large-hearted Pakistan. And I remember it was not just Lahore, but Karachi and Peshawar, three different parts of Pakistan: southern Pakistan, northern Pakistan, central Pakistan, all three in the cricket matches *vis-à-vis* India had similar reactions. So it is across the board, it is not limited to the Punjab only.

Dileep asked a question about the real estate business and all that. It is very interesting and now there is a big new hospital being developed in Amritsar, and I was asking what the purpose was. They said that they will cater to clients from Pakistan. Paediatric surgery, for example, in India is very advanced, so many people are going there. I met a businessman from Amritsar who said that he has to go all the way to Delhi, if he has to go for business in Dubai. He wanted to drive out from Amritsar, park his car at Lahore airport, take the flight to Dubai, which is two hours from there, and come back via Lahore in two or three days. So there is that element which is can be sensed, and I think that it is making a difference. Also, I think that we are seeing the cultural and historical restoration of Lahore. Lahore had a certain pre-eminent position in pre-partition India as a cultural, educational, economic centre and that hub is being revived. And a lot of my friends have been to Indian Punjab and they feel that the Sikhs of Punjab—I don't want to sound sort of playing the ethnic card—but the Sikh community have matured after 1984. They were suppressed you know, suppressed by the Hindu majority after Mrs Gandhi's assassination and all that. So they are also seeing their own revival, that is through the Pakistan Punjab, and that is another element as they take pride in this situation. It is a very strange kind of a situation. Interestingly, we also have Nankana Sahib, which is

the Vatican of the Sikh community. A number of tourists from Britain, from Canada, from India are going there, and this bus service is catering to that.

Just a word on this Varanasi business: of course, it's very good that there has not been that kind of response as happened when the Gujarat massacre took place in 2002. Muslims were killed and there was no reaction in Pakistan. But I did notice, for the first time, a statement from a very high-level Indian policy maker, M. K. Narayan, the national security adviser. He said Pakistan was playing the communal card. This is to respond to what Dushka said about the Bengali Muslims being involved. Now this is a new element which is coming in, because I think the point Dilip raised yesterday is a very significant one, that South Asian Muslims have always had a pan-Islamist ethos historically. And you know, about five hundred million Muslims live in the South Asian subcontinent, in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. The first big movement of the twentieth century—and you as a historian would be interested in this—the Khilafat movement was triggered by what happened in Turkey. So this Ummah-driven thing is a very important element in, for example, Pakistan's foreign policy. We gave succour to Bosnian refugees just because they were Muslims. We had no national interest there. We broke the UN arms embargo to support the Bosnians to fight the Serb Christians. And then Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Iran, and Turkey followed suit. So this pan-Islamic solidarity which is now being witnessed for the first time according to the newspaper, I don't want to mention it because I mentioned *Asian Times* three times yesterday, so the paper which the gentlemen on the left edited, that paper has mentioned that letter. And for the first time, the Indian Muslim leadership which is basically pro-establishment, pro-government, compatible with the government's interest, they are talking of Kashmir: not in a radical sense, but a Kashmir settlement, Kashmiri people, because the Kashmiris are Muslims and that was not there before.

So there is a new kind of camaraderie being developed between the Indian Muslims and the Kashmir Muslims, not because of Pakistan, not because of any external factor, but because the situation has lingered on for so long. And I think that needs to be taken into account, and I think Dushka rightly mentioned Iraq because that has affected the mindset of a lot of Muslims. It is a turning point, a watershed event, and that event is now etched on the mind of millions and millions of Muslims who watch television and read the newspapers. They are seeing it more as a war against Muslims and

a war against Islam. And we have a resonance, not just in the Arab world or in the Middle East, but beyond, in South Asia as well.

Q: If action on Kashmir isn't taken now, it will be too late because the mood on the street is changing. Public opinion on the Pakistani side could become hostile. It seems that in a peace process, there is always a danger of sabotage. My question really is to Rahul, because the constraint that we are presented with on the Indian side is "triumphalism". There are constraints operating in public opinion on the Indian side. What was missing in some of the discussion was: What is the Indian ability to respond to this window of opportunity?

Rahul Roy: Indian "triumphalism" is something that I haven't mentioned and others mentioned it. But I think there is clearly a sense that there are opportunities and there are windows of opportunity in a sense. At the same time, there is reluctance to move ahead quickly on the issues. I mean if we look at particular issues, if we look at Siachen for example, I think the army is a strong constituent which may not want to go ahead with some of the political imperatives on the Indian side on Siachen. There is a sense that there are developments that need to take place, but to be honest, I think that the decision has been made in Delhi whether to move fully ahead on the peace process. There is concern in some people's minds over the leadership in Pakistan. I think there are some constraints in that sense, right or wrong, that is something that is there. There are other people who feel that the peace process can really only move ahead when there are democratic forces on both sides. These are some of the ideological constraints I think that have come into play and may continue to come into play on the Indian side.

Victoria Schofield: It is all part of the same argument that we have been debating. Just one quick observation, that clearly, by and large, there is this movement in India and Pakistan to improve their relationship. But there is sort of a second element of resolving Kashmir in a manner that is satisfactory for the Kashmiris. And I think that we do see that there has been a sea-change, that it's no longer as I mentioned yesterday, what's in Pakistan's national interest, but what Kashmiris would feel comfortable with. And I wanted to pick up Dushka's point, that you are quite right, the status quo is not quite working. The children may say they want *Azadi*, but the state isn't being effective any more. It never was effective because it is being challenged. But I would say that's why its so

much more important that we define, as Mir Waiz himself said, some homogenous objective because I think that while the objective has been *Azadi*, it's too easy to leave the stage a square place. I am probably not making sense, but what I am trying to say is that in this new phase, in this new window of opportunity, India and Pakistan must get along. The desire of the Kashmiris is to have their right of self-determination, but when you come to the nitty-gritty of exactly what that means, you can stonewall so easily, because there isn't a defined unifying lowest-common-denominator objective in terms of what exactly they want. Yesterday, I presumed Kashmiris to say they want to lead their lives in peace and dignity as a broad overall objective. Mir Waiz suggested that demilitarization, etc., all of these are durable ways of defining what the lowest common denominator is. So I just wanted to reinforce these thoughts that by not having this very thoroughly clear objective, it's been far too easy for the status quo to remain in place.

SESSION THREE

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE AND INTERPRETATIONS

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIR

Gordon Johnson

I think that time has come for us to begin to draw things to a conclusion. I am not really sure what useful things I can say to set this final scene. I think the thing we got from this discussion today and yesterday is that it is a very good moment actually for not just discussion, but real progress to be made in improving relations between India and Pakistan. And there are all sorts of reasons for that, not the least that we have a leadership in both countries that really has a will to improve things and I think the High Commissioner's rather sort of telling phrase that there is the sense that it is the duty of the people in high public office to manage responsibly: those who actually talked about how, in relation to nuclearization, of keeping this peace process moving. And I think there is a sense, particularly among the political elites, journalists, and academics, who have lots of opportunities to meet each other outside of South Asia and when you all meet in some place like this or the Middle East or Australia or the United States, you all say that we do actually have a lot of things in common. It does seem that at the moment there is a momentum behind turning things to everybody's advantage. Both countries are aware that this is a wicked world and there is a great deal of turbulence and stress and both countries have huge social and economic problems that are difficult to get away from; that both countries have to take some account of those stresses and of the actions which, in many cases, will not be very helpful. Various segments of their population will indulge in a given time. There will be a lot of horrible violence and lot of expression of interest, but it is possible to draft in elite discussion and elite collaboration to try to come to some sort of a sensible collaboration.

Now the positive thing at the moment is that we have seen that the common people are given visas to go to cricket matches in each other countries, which is very symbolic. But there are many others examples, and someone said yesterday that Indian and Pakistani students abroad get on incredibly well together. And there is going to be a sense that we might

have reached a turning point on that. There is now the young generation, people who ask why they can't go straight from Amritsar to Dubai. The people who want to make money, I mean the *baniya* types as it were, why can't they make money? There are a lot of ways in which this present people-to-people-contact that so many of you describe are operating in many different areas. It's got far enough to be very difficult to reverse; it would be very difficult for either of these governments now to decide we are going to go back on a more generous piece of provision. It's just not going to be practical in a sense because there will be a sufficient political reaction from within the society to say that it's not something that we can do. And I think it is a very important point actually on Kashmir.

All of that said, it is clear that one issue between these countries that has proved so intractable is Kashmir. What is the solution to the Kashmir problem? In the twenty-first century, with the new technologies, new ways of conducting business, things might be seen in different ways and there may not be a situation where India and Pakistan can put more emphasis on victories won. What really matters is that we should enable the people born in these territories, who want to live there, to have a satisfactory life there.

As with these person-to-person contacts that have been described, perhaps its time for the things that have previously held such significant symbolic issues, sovereignty in Kashmir, whatever that means, you invest in that. There are a lot of different things, depending upon the perspective. There is no reason that why we should not try to be more intelligent, sensible, and let the people in Kashmir live a peaceful life. I know various people have caught on to this perspective. The present leadership may have a problem in maintaining the momentum, but that is just a passing time of politics. There will be problems and difficulties, but on the whole, what is striking about the last two or three years in India and Pakistan's relations is that there are large improvements and there is desire to improve further. Previously, multilateral contact was proposed, of course, like the UN and they have been in Kashmir since 1947; we do have the US, who had serious interest in Pakistan, and some people have pointed to their increased interest in India. Or there are these wider regional organizations like SAARC. It has provided contacts between people, as has the Commonwealth. These were all helpful, but the key things were the two governments and the various allied interests have also been affected directly. They realize just how wasteful the conflict has been and it now stands in the way of economic development, enrichment, culture, and social exchange.

It's inconceivable to me, as a historian, that one-fifth of world population lives there. It is a rich part of the world in terms of economic resources. It has an incredible political and cultural history. Some of that history is tested in contact and conflict, but there are just as many examples that it is not a natural flow and there are exchanges that follow from less confrontational approaches. I am pleased that we are seeing at the moment the best opportunity for very significant, substantive improvement. But it has got a long way to go. We couldn't have this kind of conference, with this kind of subject and contribution five years ago. So I think it is a great tribute to the leadership in South Asia and so many people who support that leadership at diverse levels. I see this as a good opportunity and I see this as a practical success, small but significant. One will hope that there is a momentum here and it will continue and if the organizers of the conference here go back and say that there were many issues we agreed on and many on which we did not, but there are significant number of ways in which change is taking place, it will help to sustain this momentum.

SESSION THREE

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE AND INTERPRETATIONS

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Dushka Saiyid

Although I am among the organizers, I think it was a great conference and I am very grateful to the participants who have made efforts to come here, especially Mir Waiz Omar Farooq, and the Indian participants and Victoria; because of the short notice she was given. I would also thank Dr Gordon Johnson as the host at Wolfson College. Also thanks to Shireen and Maleeha, without whom it would have been impossible for the Allama Iqbal Fellow to even move. As has been mentioned earlier, it's the second conference, I was hoping it would be second in the series of three, and I hope that we will be able to have the third one. The first one was on "Pakistan After 9/11", because we all thought that a lot has changed in Pakistan. That was last year and this year it is "Indo-Pakistan Dialogue: Quest for Peace", and I hope next year we can have the last in the series. I must mention something: they say there is a woman behind every great man; although I am not a great woman, but there is a man of ideas behind me, and the secret is that the themes for all the conferences have been coming from him. Even this Pakistan-India Dialogue was his idea and previously too he suggested the theme. He is the intellectual powerhouse for me. There are a lot of people who have worked and I would like to thank them for their contribution. Let's hope we will have another conference like this.

SESSION THREE

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA DIALOGUE AND INTERPRETATIONS

VOTE OF THANKS

Shireen Mazari

Dushka has done a good thanking job, I do not have much to add. But I would like to thank Dr Maleeha for being extremely supportive as always and giving her inputs also. And of course Dushka, but I know we got all the inputs from Mushahid, not from Dushka. Of course, I want to thank Dr Gordon Johnson for the hospitality and support as always. It has been a very interesting and wonderful experience. I want to thank all the participants from India and Pakistan and also from Britain and especially Mir Waiz. I would thank all the people who have participated in the arrangements of the seminar. I would also thank the Chairman of ISSI, Mr Inam ul Haque, for handling things on the Islamabad side.