

*Proceedings of the Roundtable Seminar*

**THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATO**

*The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI)  
in collaboration with  
Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF)*

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## Introductory Session

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### **Opening Remarks**

***Mr Inam ul Haque, Chairman, ISSI***

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this seminar on “The changing role of NATO”, organized jointly by the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. Dr Andreas Rieck is a well-known figure in the academic and diplomatic communities in Islamabad and is greatly admired for his dynamism. I would like to thank him and the Foundation for their collaboration in making this seminar possible. I would also like to welcome the NATO team comprising Ambassador Robert Simmons, Ambassador Maurits Jochems, Ms Mirella K. Luksik, and Air Vice Marshal.

As far as I am aware, this is the first seminar on NATO being held in Pakistan, but I am confident that in the future there will be more frequent interaction between Pakistan and NATO. This seminar will be conducted in two sections today: the first session will be held immediately after the introductory meeting and will examine the evolution and role of NATO in the post-cold war period. The second session will address NATO’s role in disaster management. The last session will deal with NATO’s contribution to bringing stability to Afghanistan. In this seminar, one NATO representative and one Pakistani speaker will address each session, to be followed by open discussion.

With the end of the cold war, NATO underwent a transformation. Its membership has increased to 26 members; it has 20 partnership agreements and another 7 dialogue partners in the Mediterranean; it has facilities that have been diversified in standard and its doctrines have been revised. I am confident that the presentations that will be made today and the discussions that will be held will be both informative and educative for all of us. I will conclude by thanking all our guests and it gives me great pleasure to invite Dr Andreas Rieck to take the floor.

### **Remarks**

***Dr Andreas Rieck, Resident Representative, HSF***

Thank you Mr Chairman, former Foreign Minister for State, Inam ul Haque. I would like to compliment you as the most polished and competent

speaker here. I was very happy about the seminar held last year, in collaboration with the Institute of Strategic Studies. Dr Shireen Mazari, the Director General of the ISS, is our good friend and a very dynamic personality. We also have here with us Ambassador Maurits Jochems and Ambassador Robert Simmons from the Netherlands and the USA respectively. Air Vice Marshal will also participate in the discussion. We have Mrs ~~inaudible~~ who came up with the idea of this dialogue last November, and Ms Mirella K. Luksik from NATO in Afghanistan.

The NATO presence in Afghanistan has come to the doorstep of Pakistan in an unexpected way. I think, in the long term, NATO's role in Afghanistan over the next ten years will not diminish; I think, rather, that it will increase. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is in fact a symbolic force. Since early 2002, it has consistently grown more powerful and effective and it has become largest-ever NATO operation. It is also a long-term operation. This has raised some unease in the region. Among other countries, people in Pakistan are asking what this Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization is. Originally, NATO was formed for the defence of Europe. Where are the limits of its areas of operations? I think these questions will be discussed in depth and transparently in the following sessions. I remember already in early 1990s, after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, many people in Pakistan asked why NATO still existed. Why was it not dissolved after it had achieved its purpose? It is sometimes overlooked that this dismemberment of the Soviet Union was a huge gain for the security of Europe. First, it had to consolidate. In this consolidation, a major role was played by NATO in the 1990s, bringing all the former colonies or satellite states of Russia into the fold of Europe. So Europe is now much more secure than it used to be during the cold war.

On the other hand, divisions within NATO emerged in 2001, after the 9/11 attacks on the USA, when NATO decided it was an attack on all NATO member states. Those who actually were ready to react in a forceful way were only the USA and Britain, which, to some extent, participated in the Afghanistan operation. In later years, some other NATO countries sent their combat troops to join in the operation. As it turned out, NATO countries were divided between those who were still trying to fight a war and others who wanted to be involved in peace-keeping operations only. Once peace is established, once security is established, then these countries are ready to send troops anywhere. Now, we are faced with this question of whether NATO countries will be ready to send troops to the dangerous southern provinces of Afghanistan. Britain and Canada are sure

candidates; the Netherlands was doubtful, but it has also taken a decision. This is a sort of litmus test to check if NATO's functions are still alive.

Now, coming to Pakistan: When the government of Pakistan called for help after the devastating earthquake last year, NATO's response was positive. But many people in Pakistan asked what the NATO was doing in their country, especially in Kashmir. Even the Chinese and Indians were worried about this. These questions will also be answered in the sessions. The main objective is to clear ambiguity.

## **Remarks**

### ***Leader of the NATO Team***

Mr Chairman, Dr Mazari, Mr Rieck, the hosts, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. I am honoured to have served as the senior civil representative of NATO relief operations in Pakistan after the earthquake (8 October 2005) and you know relief operations ended on 1 February of this year (2006). When I first came to Pakistan, in mid-October last year, my mission was to discuss with the authorities of this country how else NATO could be of assistance to Pakistan, in addition to airlifting of the goods from Europe. That was the task we undertook two days after the earthquake, as you would probably remember, upon the request of the Pakistan government. Since then I have visited Pakistan regularly in order to meet my Pakistani counterparts; I also worked with NATO colleagues and NATO member countries' ambassadors to make sure that our efforts corresponded in the most effective way to the needs of this country. The timing of the conference, by the way, is interesting against the background of the relief operation because today, the Federal Relief Commission will merge with the Earthquake Rescue and Reconstruction Authority, and the last representative of the NATO operation will stay behind on a bilateral basis. Our German colleagues, with their helicopters, will end their activities. I also understand that the American friends (who did not participate in the NATO-led operation) have also stopped their earthquake-related activities.

The earthquake was, as we well recall, a very tragic event. We in NATO are very sorry for the loss and grief it has cost. We also cannot but comment on the resilience of the people in the affected areas, which we have the privilege of having visited in those difficult days. The effort conducted by the Pakistani authorities, the Pakistani army, and the civil society to help the survivors to recover and to move on with their lives are truly heroic. I have enjoyed the opportunity to work with the authorities of this country. Here I should mention, in particular, Mr Tariq Usman Haidar,

Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the ambassadors of the NATO countries in Islamabad. These five months that have passed since the earthquake have also confirmed my belief and values that NATO can have a good working relationship with other international organizations, first and foremost with the UN, which led us in the relief operation. The earthquake has also given us the opportunity to learn more about Pakistan. We in NATO, frankly speaking, did not know much about Pakistan. In fact, we had no relationship. We learnt more and more about Pakistan, its people, and its media. We noticed that people in Pakistan are interested in NATO. Dr Rieck in his introductory remarks raised some pertinent questions. Interest goes beyond NATO's contribution to the relief operation in the earthquake-hit areas. So we are honoured and happy to be here today and participate in discussion on the changing role of NATO.

NATO has indeed evolved considerably since the end of the cold war, but this issue will be introduced by Ambassador Simmons in a few minutes, so I will refrain from a more substantive discussion of it. Now, I will myself as chairman, take the opportunity to say some words about NATO's contribution to the earthquake relief operations and the role of NATO in the stabilization of Afghanistan.

I want to thank our Pakistani host from ISSI and Hanns Seidel Foundation for organizing this seminar. We are pleased at the hospitality and co-operation we have enjoyed in your country during the relief operation. We are looking forward to the opportunity that we have today to exchange points of view with Pakistani participants in the seminar about different aspects of NATO in the twenty-first century. Thank you very much.

## Session One

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### NATO in the Post-Cold War Era

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**Chair**

***Mr Inam ul Haque***

Without further ado, I think we should move into the first session of seminar which is “NATO in the post-cold war era”. We have two very distinguished speakers: first of all, I would invite Ambassador Robert Simmons to take the floor, and he will be followed by Dr Shireen Mazari. Ambassador Simmons you have the floor.

**NATO’s Evolution in the Post-Cold War Era**

***Ambassador Robert Simmons***

Thank you very much Mr Chairman, Dr Mazari, colleagues, and Dr Rieck. First of all, let me say how happy I am to be back in Pakistan. I was here in Pakistan in the US embassy in the early 1990s. I can recognize among the guests many friends. I am particularly happy to get back to Pakistan. Let me say that I have been three times at NATO, in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and now again at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Each of these, I think, gave me a good outline to represent the change in the alliance that is the theme of my presentation here today.

When I was there in the early 1980s, we were in the hard part of the cold war. The division was very neat. We had taken what we called two-track decisions to deploy missiles in the West in response to Soviet deployment. In fact, I think many of us would not have believed that change would come so quickly. But I argue that it was the firmness of our commitment to have collective defence at that time that brought about remarkable and rapid change within the Europe. In fact, these changes have led Europe to unify and that is the measure of success of the change.

When I returned in the early 1990s, through that term of my assignment, we saw the fall of the Berlin wall and the reopening of the East and West to each other and the beginning of rapid change in Europe. NATO, which many could have defined as the paramount organization during the cold war, adjusted remarkably well. In fact, I would argue that it was a more successful organization to deal with changes. We did so first and people have referred to it, by opening the partnership of alliance. We

were determined to avoid what we called the “time of security vacuum”, but it was equally important to avoid the possible re-nationalization of military forces. It was important to open our hands and to begin a partnership with countries that had been enemies during the cold war under the Warsaw pact.

So, first of all, we founded the Northern Atlantic Co-ordination Council, which was in fact a grouping of countries that were members of the Warsaw pact and of the alliance. In fact, Albania, which was a member of the Warsaw Pact was eager to join that group. This showed how popular and how interesting the alliance was that many countries wanted to join and to become a part of larger Europe. It was the first forum of larger Europe. Out of that has stemmed a series of partnerships with these countries that have led ten of them to join the alliance, making them stronger and equally representative of co-operation in united Europe. We associated with that and it has been a matter of great pride in my work with the alliance.

This was not the only purpose of that partnership, as we went from the Northern Atlantic Co-ordination council through partnership for peace, to a Euro-Atlantic partnership council. We had three basic purposes: One, to prepare certain countries to choose to join the Alliance was an important step; second, to create the possibility that all countries work together to deal with the crisis; third, to develop defence institutions, especially in those countries that were our new partners, because their defence structures like those of many countries in the alliance, were designed for the cold war period. These were no longer relevant and it was important first to reduce and then restructure these institutions, so that they could meet the challenges of the new age. I would argue that this process has been remarkably successful. As I said, firstly, because ten countries did join the alliance, meeting the alliance’s standards, not only in terms of their own qualifications but also the processes and steps that they had taken in terms of defence reforms. Secondly, there are countries that are still seeking to join the alliance because they do want the security. Third, we have groups of partners who want to co-operate with us and avail the benefits that we can help them with in a variety of areas. Let me say, it is not limited to defence. One of the aspects of the alliance that we have been involved in for some time is the civil aspect. In fact, going back to the cold war planning time, we had a civil emergency planning section. Also, the alliance has been an important forum for political dialogue. Allies did not always agree, but in the alliance, they could meet and discuss and try to find a common sense of security, and they mostly did.

Now the alliance is doing so with a wider range of partners. First, there are partners within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: now, 20 countries have joined the alliance. We have a particular focus on the countries of the Caucasus region and Central Asia. In addition to my duty as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary General, I am the Secretary General's special representative for dealing with these countries. In 1995, we opened a dialogue with countries in the southern Mediterranean. So the alliance also has an action program for co-operation and dialogue for discussions with seven countries of the Mediterranean, from Israel to Mauritania, including Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. This dialogue does have forms of co-operation that, to begin with, were bilateral, but now include all of the countries. Secondly, it is increasingly becoming a forum for dialogue because already the defence ministers of this group have met with the defence ministers of the alliance. The foreign ministers have met and we will have a major session in Morocco at the end of next week.

The second broad area that we began at the Istanbul session was to open up to the Gulf countries. This has led to us opening up to countries of a broader area to help us. We want to develop areas of co-operation and this has been successful as already Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman have begun co-operation with the alliance.

The second part of the transformation of the alliance is that we have begun changing the alliance's mission. Collective security and willingness to respond if any member is attacked do remain the core purpose of the alliance. The fact that after 9/11, we invoked that part of the charter for the first time shows that it is an important part of security. But this is true and recognized that since we do not face an enemy in a single country, we no longer have a clear enemy as we had in the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union. The alliance must be aware and deal with other threats to security and stability. In Europe, initially these threats to security and stability came from the collapse of those states which had not benefited from the co-operation programme I have already mentioned. In fact, former Yugoslavia, what was happening there? Tragically, minority groups, often of Muslim origin, were being harshly dealt with and suffered from ethnic cleansing. The Alliance realized that we had to deal with these challenges. We could not allow such activity to take place in Europe. So alliance after some discussion decided to deploy a force first in Bosnia, later in Kosovo and finally to Macedonia, so that in to achieve the reliability with the presence of alliance. When we were first going to deploy in Bosnia, it was not clear that it would be easy mission. Some predicted citing cold war guerrilla activities in Yugoslavia that it would be difficult mission and large number of casualties could be possible. After a long debate, the alliance



took a decision because it was important to deploy forces to bring peace. I would argue that we attempted to create new kind of deterrence to deal with the continuing threat of states breaking down and threatening our security: human rights were being challenged and there was conflict which we could not control.

We were successful in Bosnia: we helped in creating a new state, which began defence reforms to strengthen its unity. We were able to turn it over to the European Union. We remained engaged in Kosovo with K4. As we continue to face negotiations over the status of that province the only thing they do agree on is that K4 should continue and maintain stability throughout that period. During difficult times in Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia, we were able, with the co-operation of the governments, to bring stability when it likely that these countries were heading towards war.

We then saw that the challenges to security and stability have other dimensions. Terrorism, many felt, was a national phenomenon or far away; that way of thinking was destroyed by attacks in the US, and later in Turkey and Spain. As an alliance, we felt bound by our oath to prevent the spread of WMD and other challenges. In response to attacks on the US and other threats of terrorism, at first individual alliance countries and then the alliance as a whole felt that we could make contributions, using the lessons we had learned in peacekeeping in the developing countries of the Balkans, to assist other countries that had been termed by some as “failed states”. NATO decided to deploy its largest mission – ISAF – to Afghanistan to bring stability. However, there is an important difference in design in dealing with and co-operating with local forces from province to province. We are also assisting in training the armed forces of Iraq. When called by the UN and the African Union to assist the African Union to deploy its forces in Darfur, we responded and did that. Finally, consistent with the mission, we deployed our forces to assist you in rebuilding your country and in meeting immediate needs after the earthquake you suffered. So the alliance’s mission, consisting of its basic principles of preserving peace and security, has become geographically and functionally widespread and it has been successful. During the cold war, we never deployed out forces, never went to war. Since that time, we have had to. For the purpose of greater security, we successfully deployed first in Europe and then in other regions.

The third aspect is that we have to transform our armed forces. We had armed forces that were static, based on determined borders, and basically geared to a common plan. I said that I was in NATO in the early

1980s; one of the things that struck me at that time when we had lively political dialogues, was that we did things that were static in nature. We had exercises, we used to draw off the shelves these volumes of exercise materials and read the numbers of those and say, "Our plan 15, 45 and 95 and so on", and no one knew what was in them because they had been in those books for years and we knew that was the classical response. The actions I have described called upon us to be much more flexible and have more flexible armed forces to carry them out. It is no surprise that it has not been easy for the alliance. In fact, making these changes and not taking reductions has been a problem. But we have developed a NATO Reaction Force and other capabilities that, hopefully, give us the ability to deal with the kinds of new missions we have undertaken and we might be called upon to undertake in future.

Let me raise by way of challenge two issues to close. The first is the importance of the alliance as a place where the North American parts of the alliance and their European partners, now 29 – including Western and Eastern European states – come together to define these common security goals and that is not an easy task. It was not easy during the cold war and it is not easy now. And there was certainly a period, particularly during invasion of Iraq, when that dialogue broke down and it was difficult to conduct it. Since the summit we conducted in 2005, the dialogue with NATO has reopened. We have begun to discuss challenges we face together and I think that is an important step forward. Those challenges include terrorism, but also things like energy security and other aspects. These are things that any alliance and group of countries should discuss together.

The second aspect is the broad nature of our partnership I outlined the classical ones that were founded at the beginning of this period, but let me highlight three that exist now. First, our continuing dialogue with Russia, the successor state to our former enemy, the USSR, which has become a privileged partner of the alliance. We have both an active co-operation programme, covering 15 committees, and political dialogue, which at times may be difficult because we have disagreements. It shows that the goal of Russia and of the alliance is to maintain a set of relations and co-operation to help us move forward.

Another aspect is our healthy co-operation with a range of international organizations – a co-operation I would also label as a partnership. It means that on the ground in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and in Africa, we have to work with organizations and we have to have a set of relations to deal with that co-operation over a wider area. It has largely

been successful. I think it is a measure of that success that the UN and the UN Secretary General often look towards NATO to provide assistance in areas far afield. We have similar relations with the EU, the OSCE, and others.

Finally, we have both by specific co-operation—such as when we responded with you and other groups to the earthquake—a set of countries we call “contact countries”; these are countries that are not part of any partnerships that I have described. However, when we want to develop a range of relationships to help them with some of the tools we have used with our partners, the tools which can help with defence, institution-building, dealing with civil emergencies, and other activities, we can call on our contact countries. These partners include countries like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, and countries in Latin America. My hope is that we can also develop similar relations with Pakistan for the mutual benefit of both NATO and this country. We can try to see what tool we have to help you meet your challenges in a collaborative way, in a way that will confirm the beginning we made in dealing with relief.

So again, I am very happy to be here. I would hope that my background in Pakistan and work with the alliance can lead to development of that relationship that we look forward to.

### **Pakistan’s Perceptions of the End of the Cold War and NATO’s Role** ***Dr Shireen Mazari***

Honourable ladies and gentlemen, I am going to talk within a slightly different framework—this is basically a perception of the end of the cold war. Then I am going to discuss how I see NATO’s role from the Pakistani perspective. Let’s begin with the new operational milieu, which began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which can be seen as the end of bipolarity. People talk about the end of the cold war; I think this is a mixed moment because the cold war ended much before the end of bipolarity. When you say “the period of the end of the cold war”, what is meant is that this is the era of peace and so on. As we saw, the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not provide an era of peace. Now, we have wars in Afghanistan, in Iraq; we have instability around our region as well; so I think it makes more sense if we talk about the end of bipolarity rather than the end of cold war. The end of bipolarity, of course, destroyed any semblance of balance in the international community. The US emerged as the unipolar superpower and it determined the global strategic structure to facilitate its policy goals. In such a scenario, there was very little room for hostility to the designs of the US.

The tools for implementing policies also altered much before 9/11. For instance, deterrence, which reflected the maintenance of the status quo, has gradually been put in the background with the advent of the notion of missile defence. The notion of collective security fast degenerated into a collective defence system in the pursuit primarily of the US strategic agenda. This was, for example, reflected very clearly in the UN sanctions which were used in the case of Iraq and against the Taliban in Afghanistan. I am talking about the pre-9/11 period. What I am trying to say is that 9/11 extenuated the trends that were coming into place with the end of bipolarity. Of course, we also saw a new trend after 9/11 of collective action coming into being. That was the notion of a “coalition of the willing”. This, of course, was a direct challenge to the UN collective security system. The idea is that, if the UN Security Council does not sanction a collective military action, powerful states can then form a coalition of the willing and effectively defy the UN system—if not defy, certainly circumvent the UN Charter and the UN collective security system.

Let me identify some of the major trends that have come to the fore with the end of bipolarity, and which have become more pronounced in the wake of 9/11. First, of course, was that, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the map of the world, especially of Asia, was actually physically altered with the creation of a whole new set of states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These states, with heavy structural and economic dependencies on Russia, created a region of strategic vulnerability, especially since many of them had old historical cleavages within them and these come to the fore when they became independent. The war on terrorism brought external military forces into the region and added to the instability of the Central Asian region. For the states in the region, security concerns continue to predominate, especially since 9/11, and with the introduction of foreign coalition troops in at least three of the Central Asian states.

The second trend was that, along with the post-bipolar geo-political change, the dividing regional lines, at least in Asia, began to melt away. In other words, you could not really talk about South Asia as distinct from West Asia or from South East Asia. The reason for this was the introduction of medium range missiles in the arsenals of some of the states in the region and the nuclearization of South Asia. The distinctive strategic sub-regions were challenged again. Now, states like India especially refer to the post-9/11 strategic milieu as being South Asia, defining it as the region stretching from the Middle East to East Asia. Post-9/11, the parameters dividing these sub-regions were further weakened, because

Pakistan and, to some extent, India became part of the international coalition's war on terrorism. We now have the presence of external forces not only in the Central and West Asian regions, but also in the Indian Ocean. Effectively, Pakistan and states like Iran are sandwiched between the coalition forces, external forces, and military forces on land and on the seas. This presents a whole new range of security issues for countries like Pakistan. Besides, drawing the Central and West Asian regions more directly into the South Asian strategic milieu has resulted in the sounding out of various themes and proposals for oil and gas pipelines.

The third major trend which added to the regional changes was the shift in US strategic policy, with the end of bipolarity. For instance, the US is now talking about missile defence and about those regional allies which will be the part of the theatre of the missile defence system. In fact, even before 9/11, the US had begun to legitimize state intervention within the financial sphere of external actors, in terms of freezing financial assets and so on. Post 9/11, we saw the emergence of the doctrine of pre-emption, focusing on military, economic, and political pre-emption. Economic pre-emption, of course, means freezing of assets; political pre-emption takes the form of regime change; and military pre-emption is what we have seen in Iraq. What one is beginning to see is a new kind of alignment, based on the idea of core states, which will then ally with semi-core states, and so on. A major global theme that began to evolve before 9/11, which has, post 9/11, become mainstream, is the notion of the coalition of the willing, which, as mentioned before, is a direct challenge to the UN system.

The military reflection of the core-state alliances, in my view, is going to be based on BMD. Political tools will be sanctioned, as will anti-terrorism of a particular kind because all the international post-9/11 debates and discussions on terrorism, deliberately or otherwise, leave out the notion of state terrorism; the focus is primarily on international non-state terrorism. If we talk about the core states, we have seen various coalitions: the core states nest around the Anglo-Saxon framework, with a few regional powers like Israel, India, and Japan brought in. The final picture that evolves will depend upon further linkages between these states and other regional and global players. It is clear that the pronouncements made when the Soviet Union disintegrated, that this would be an era of peace, with the predominance of economic issues, with politics and military no longer primary issues has not proven to be the case. In fact, economic issues have also become highly politicized. Whether it is the WTO agenda or sanctions or the use of IMF or World Bank, politics is determining economic trends globally at the moment. If we are to talk of an era of peace, the only peace that one can talk about is an imposed peace as you

can see in the events unfolding in Iraq. It is in this framework that NATO acquired international legitimacy under the UN charter, chapter 7, article 51 relating directly to collective defence.

The context of NATO was regional, both in terms of membership and operational milieu. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, questions were beginning to be raised about the continuing rationale for NATO. NATO began to seek new validity almost immediately with the setting up of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council as a forum for consultation between the NATO states, East European, and former Soviet republics. Since then, NATO has begun to focus, as Ambassador Simmons also pointed out, more on bringing into its fold the Eastern European states, initially through its partnership for peace initiative in 1994 as well as providing a certain limited access to Russia, through the NATO-Russia permanent joint council, which was set up in 1997. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were the first East European states to join NATO in 1999, which meant that since then NATO's border extended 400 miles towards Russia.

Despite all these developments and efforts by NATO to find a new relevancy, the debate about its continued validity had not intensified by the time NATO reached its fiftieth year in 1999. There is a bureaucratic organizational momentum that sustains big organizations, and this has been the case, at least in part, with NATO. One of the reasons that it is very difficult to end such an organization is the sheer size of its bureaucracy and organizational structures. So it survives. It is difficult for large organizations, as one writer put it, "to fade away, unlike all soldiers who do fade away". That is why NATO has been looking for political rationalizations for its existence. In the process, it is undergoing a transformation from its original shape and purpose into a wider politico-military institution that seeks to encompass a wide range of agenda, from peace-keeping to anti-proliferation of WMD, even to disaster relief.

NATO may well prove to be very effective in complying with these new multi-tasking agenda, but there is a shift in its basic collective defence identity, which raises some very serious issues, in terms of basic international law, international relations, international norms, and the principles that govern international relations. Firstly, while the NATO agenda has expanded, its membership remains confined to Europe and the US and Canada. It is a sort of bridge between the North Atlantic states and Europe. If it represents collective interests, these are primarily the interests of its member states, belonging to these two geographical entities. It may have partnerships with non-European states, but they are

not members and they do not have a say in NATO's agenda. Yet, NATO's theatre of operations has become increasingly Asian, a region that has little say in NATO's agenda or its functioning. Unless NATO alters its very identity through Asian membership, by definition it will be pursuing European and American agendas in Asia. NATO's presence in Afghanistan also raises a number of questions, including whether this presence is going to be a permanent one. If the answer is yes, then it will raise security concerns in countries like Pakistan, Iran, and China. Our national interests may not always coincide with the US; they definitely do not coincide in the case of China and Iran. NATO interests will be more coincidental with the US in the region. Even more troublesome at the basic conceptual level is the idea that NATO is being transformed from a collective defence organization, relating to collective defence of its member states: that is the rationalization of NATO offering assistance to the US after 9/11, that it is within the concept of collective defence since the US is a member of NATO. But its transformation from that limited entity to a collective security organization, to serve the interest of future coalitions of the willing arouses my concern. There is no legitimacy for any collective security organization, other than the UN with its universal membership. Therefore, unless the UN charter is altered, and international laws are altered, the expansion of NATO's agenda—no matter how they may be implementing it—is going to be in conflict with basic international law. Will NATO push itself as a collective security organization, as some have suggested it should do, promoting the values of the Atlantic-European community? Well, internationally, there is no legitimization for such a community, because article 5, chapter 7 of the UN charter provides a very clear and limited framework for regional defence organizations. More important still, chapter 8 of the UN charter, article 52, which talks about regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security states: "as are appropriate for the regional action". The clear understanding is that the regional organization with regional membership operates within the membership's region. This does not mean that NATO goes hopping into Afghanistan and anywhere else for military peace and security action. That is not permitted under the UN charter. Even more interesting is article 53 of the UN charter, which says that, even in case of regional actions for peace and security, no action can be taken without the authorization of the UN Security Council, except against an enemy as defined in article 53 (2) and if that enemy state is an enemy against one of the major parties during the Second World War. My question simply is: Is NATO going to be a part of a new security arrangement, which is going to bolster the notion of coalitions of the willing? If so, it means that they will work as a counter or an alternative to the UN collective security system and to the UN universal membership. If that is the case, then we have some very serious issues

with the new role of NATO, because NATO would then function in a legal and moral void, especially given its continuing limitations in terms of membership, as the membership defines its agenda and functioning.

### **Concluding remarks**

***Mr Inam ul Haque***

Let me try to sum up the discussion. We have had some excellent presentations on the changing role of NATO as well as some expression of apprehensions about how this changing role will affect certain countries. Let me start by saying that at least some of us are of the opinion that, with the end of the cold war and with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has diversified its activities and it has expanded its areas of operations. The question that has been asked is whether NATO is promoting the Western and the US role in the region. Every organization and country has its own interests and the ambition to promote that interest by different means: by persuasion, by dialogue, and perhaps by any other option.

So, if we begin to say that NATO should expand because it helps the Western nations, what we have to see is whether NATO's actions have harmed the sovereignty of other countries, whether NATO steps into situations where it is not wanted. Is NATO taking the role of replacing of United Nations or is it working on the mandate given by the United Nations to NATO? We have to look at this issue from different angles. NATO does not necessarily pose a threat to the rest of the world. Of course, Pakistan has great regard for NATO as it came to Pakistan's help in the earthquake disaster. Again, I recall the statements of some people who questioned why NATO has stepped into Kashmir and what the major agenda of NATO in Kashmir is. The departure of NATO from Kashmir has set at rest most of these questions.

We have talked about terrorism in depth. I believe that all individual countries and international organizations have a key role to play in co-operating with each other against international terrorism. But then there are problems with the definition of terrorism and problems with addressing the symptoms of terrorism and addressing the causes of terrorism. For the time being, it seems that the role Western nations, particularly that of the United States, does not address the root cause of terrorism. These root causes pertain to political oppression, occupation, indoctrination, and also economics. As Ambassador Simmons said, NATO was a political organization and it could not answer legal issues; but, in my opinion, the political root causes are more responsible for international terrorism than the economic root causes. Economic causes spread dissatisfaction within



societies, but usually do not spill over the borders. Political root-causes, however, do spill over international borders and it is our joint responsibility to address them to resolve those conflicts in a just and equitable manner. President Musharraf gives an apt analogy of terrorism: individual terrorism he says are the branches and terrorist organizations are like the trunks and the roots of a tree; the roots of the tree are the real causes that have to be addressed and it is the responsibility of the international community to do so.

There is an apprehension that since more and more countries are joining NATO and perhaps Pakistan, India, and China will join the Alliance in the times to come. I think we should not be overly concerned with the expansion of NATO and should more invest more in the United Nations to strengthen that organization. If the United Nations is strong enough and had the financial power and sufficient political clout, and if nations were ready to give a part of their sovereignty to the United Nations, I think it could become more effective. In any event, I think we should look to the United Nations and work in accordance with its charter; regional organizations—either security organizations or economic organizations—should co-operate with the United Nations for international peace and security. I am confident that NATO will continue to act within the charter of the United Nations. Finally, a reference was made by one of the speakers to the different kind of relationships that NATO has; of course, there are members, then there are partners, there are dialogues, and the last category is its contact functions.

Finally, I would like to thank you for the excellent presentations and for the very good discussion that we have had in this session. The second session will be on disaster management.

## Session Two

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### NATO's Role in Disaster Management

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#### Chair

*H.E. H. Kemal Gur, Ambassador of Turkey*

I would like to introduce the programme about disaster management.

#### **NATO's Role in the Earthquake Relief Effort in Pakistan**

*Ambassador Maurits Jochems*

Thank you Ambassador, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: it is always a hard task to speak immediately after lunch but let me try to be brief in my introductory remarks because I would like to leave more time for discussion and perhaps also more time for the next subject which will give even more room for discussion. Let me say from the outset that the NATO contribution for the earthquake relief efforts has been a relatively modest one, relative to what the Pakistani authorities have done themselves. Farooq will be in a better position to assess the overall contributions made by other international organizations, nations on a bilateral basis, and non-governmental organizations.

Essentially, NATO's contributions consisted of a significant share in the air-bridge, medical hospitals, engineers to make provisional shelters to help the local population to get through the Himalayan winter and to clear roads, helicopters, and water purification units. The NATO military personnel on the ground focused their activities on areas in line with the priorities set by the Pakistani authorities. Andrew Walton was the commander of the NATO disaster relief team for most of the period, so he would be in a position to help me out if there are more specific questions on the military side of the operation. A more detailed list will be made available by the NATO contribution. I will not read out entire used number of flights etc. Let me draw my views on NATO's contribution to the earthquake relief efforts in Pakistan in a broader perspective.

It should be clear that NATO is not primarily a disaster relief organization. In most NATO countries, as also in non-NATO countries, the armed forces have two or three main tasks in order of importance: First, defence of the country or of the allies; second, contribution as needed to

peace-keeping operations; and third, to support civil authorities in case of large-scale disasters, etc. Very much in line with these three tasks in the national context, one can perceive the role for NATO in international humanitarian disaster relief. If the scale of the disaster is such that the first responders are the national or local authorities and international relief organizations, which, as the first responders, could not handle the disaster by themselves, then there may be a role for NATO. I say on purpose that one could perceive such a humanitarian relief task for NATO, since there is as yet no agreed position among the NATO countries about such a role.

The NATO nations fortunately were able to quickly reach a consensus to respond positively to the request of Pakistani government for assistance. However, this does not mean that NATO now has an agreed policy that the Alliance will always contribute to international disaster relief efforts whenever there is a request by the stricken nation or the United Nations. The NATO countries are still in the process of learning lessons, as we call it, of the disaster relief contributions to Pakistan. We should not forget the United States either, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, because there as well we became more active than we were before in disaster relief. The best I can say about the possible NATO contribution to a future disaster relief operation is that there should be a consensus among the allies.

I will explain that with the means and capabilities available, you will recall that in the very early days of the relief operations, one of the elements greatly needed was helicopters; but we had NATO's helicopters deployed in Afghanistan and in the Balkans. We can expect, therefore, that NATO will not take the lead in any humanitarian disaster relief operation but will always follow the guidance of the government of the stricken country and, where appropriate, the relevant United Nations agencies.

In the case of NATO's contributions in Pakistan, it was clear that it was started by a request from the Pakistani government very soon after the earthquake and after consultations, both diplomatic and military, with the Pakistani authorities. As I have already indicated, NATO's military and civil representatives in Pakistan made it a point to sit in at the initially daily co-ordination meetings, jointly led by the Pakistani authorities and the United Nations resident representative officer. It is obvious that some military capabilities are very well suited to relief operations, dealing with the consequences of disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, etc. One could think in particular of big transport aircraft, rapidly deployable helicopters, military hospitals, engineers, and the like. I mentioned the relief period and in that sense, I am referring to the first period after the

disaster, during which the stricken population had to receive health care to survive the direct consequences of the disaster. As the next step, the population should be slowly but surely prepared for the phase of reconstruction. In the case of the Pakistani relief operation, it was obvious that the relief phase would take many weeks because the population had to be prepared for the Himalayan winter.

The reconstruction phase after the natural disaster may begin in Pakistan's stricken area any moment now. This is a phase where NATO is not in a position to make contributions: we do not have money for that. The question then arises about why the NATO countries provide assistance. Why do they not let that be on a bilateral basis? Why do they use the NATO umbrella? To be fair, you may be aware that some NATO nations did provide assistance very quickly on a bilateral basis. I mention, by way of example, that the United States and Canada were quickly here and they worked on a bilateral basis. Canada subsequently put its contributions under the NATO flag, once there was a NATO-led operation. But the United Nations made its contributions on a bilateral basis with Pakistan.

The answer to the question regarding NATO co-ordination is a relatively simple one. Simply, few NATO nations are capable of deploying significant relief contributions by themselves and over a great distance. Another advantage of the NATO umbrella is that smaller NATO nations will also be in a position to contribute. Personally, I do not think that we would have the Dutch-led medical hospital here or the Lithuanian water purification units, if we did not have the logistical command, the umbrella of the NATO organization here. Also, at the receiving end (in this case, the Pakistani side), I would imagine that for the local authorities, it is more practical to deal with only one commander or point of contact, and only one embassy for the details of operations, rather than with ten embassies or commanders of national contingents. For NATO, which deployed units for the humanitarian disaster relief operations outside its territory for the first time, there are surely some lessons learned about what we can do diplomatically and also militarily. But all in all, I have the impression that within the means and capabilities available, we have made a useful contribution.

The co-operation with the Pakistani authorities, as far as we are concerned, is a good one. The host was always very clear about its priorities, which, in every aspect, proved to be the right ones; Pakistan was very open to co-operation with the UN, NATO, and others. I understand from UN colleagues here in town that the relief work after the disaster, compared with other natural disasters in other areas of the world, has been

a very successful one, mainly due to strong Pakistani leadership. In closing, Mr Chairman, I cannot resist the temptation to describe on a personal basis a more specific lesson learned about this operation. Almost historic for NATO was to request its United Nations friends to help airlift some of their relief goods, like tents and so on. There should be no misunderstanding: the tents were provided by UN and not NATO, but we transported them. Some NATO nations also provided aid bilaterally and we transported it.

So the task of the UN was a historic one, but fairly speaking, NATO was faced with a funding problem with regard of the running cost of the aircrafts and the helicopters that was most important. In most NATO nations and other countries, it is not the defence ministry which is primarily responsible for international disaster relief; it is not their function. In most countries, it is the responsibility of the department of development co-operation and of international humanitarian relief organizations, such as the Red Cross and the United Nations. I will support the approach of some of the NATO countries that funded parts of the military equipment, such as helicopters, out of the development co-operation budget. So in practice, the ministry of development co-operation gave some money to their colleagues in defence to operate the helicopters. It seems appropriate certainly in cases in which the United Nations also receives special donations to handle the consequences of this specific disaster. We also have to make a plea and to change some international rules. There are some international bureaucratic impediments for such easy transfer of money.

I will be happy to take comments and questions after the General's presentation. Thank you very much.

**Pakistan's Experience with Disaster Management, Working with NATO and other International Organizations**  
***Brigadier Farooq***

Mr Chairman, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I am here to cover up for General Farooq but I am using my own shirt. Whatever I say has been approved by the General; however if you find it interesting, just be sure I worked very hard after 11'o clock, when I was given this task. In case you find anything contradictory or unappealing, unfortunately generals do not listen to their subordinates.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will be touching upon the disaster response aspects of the earthquake that hit the northern part of Pakistan, leaving widespread destruction, killing thousands of people and vulnerable groups in this mountainous region which bore the brunt of the disaster. The devastation spread over thirty thousand square kilometres in the Himalayan range. It has affected half a million households, destroyed most of the educational institutions, killing over eighteen thousand students who were in school at the time. The greater part of the health care units and hospitals collapsed; the communications infrastructure was unusable, while all essential utilities and services were destroyed. The area is strewn with two hundred million tons of debris, most of it still to be removed. This was the worst natural calamity in our history and it is going to cost billions of dollars before situation returns to normal.

My talk will focus on Pakistan's experience with disaster management in the wake of the devastation, working with NATO as well as other military contingents that came to support us. The misery did not end with the earthquake: hundreds of post-earthquake tremors and constant landslides multiplied the shocks and trauma. The onset of the harsh Himalayan winter threatened the lives of survivors. Coupled with the trauma, there was the absence of a disaster management authority to handle a relief operation of this magnitude. The scale of devastation warranted an organized but swift response, while the existing infrastructure was either very poor or had been completely destroyed. Realizing the gravity of the disaster, the government immediately formed a federal relief commission (FRC), with a mandate to manage the entire spectrum of the relief effort. The insistence of the political leadership ensured a very robust mandate for the FRC which made all the federal institutions concerned with relief work, including the armed forces, function through the FRC. In fact, it turned the FRC into a one-window operation and this proved to be one of the major reasons for the success of relief efforts and whatever was achieved, though with great co-operation from international players as well.

Shortly after the establishment of the FRC, we took charge of the situation. A massive response was also mounted by the civil society. The FRC functioned as the main interface between the government and international organizations, as well as national authorities and philanthropists, focusing on the relief and rehabilitation of the stricken area, under a national plan of action. Financial support amounting to several billion rupees was approved to compensate survivors for loss of life, injuries, and damage to houses. The distribution of the compensation money was assigned to the relevant government agencies, assisted by the

Pakistan army, while the FRC closely monitored and scrutinized the process. The FRC worked with two distinct wings: military and civilian. The military wing was responsible for the operationalization of the rescue and relief operation, while the civilian wing comprised of ministerial representatives and co-ordinators who looked after inter-departmental and inter-agency co-ordination issues. At the operational level, Pakistan armed forces mechanism, supplemented by a vast number of international organizations, NGOs, philanthropists, and foreign support, implemented relief operation and managed successfully what was considered to be a nightmare at the outset.

Some of the main challenges that we faced in the immediate aftermath of the disaster were institutional vacuum, information vacuum, search and rescue, rapid induction of forces, reaching out to the remote villages, management of chaos, and immediate provision of half a million tents or temporary shelter. I will briefly touch upon some of the methods used to overcome impediments and achieve the objectives set during different stages of the operation, covering all stake-holders, i.e., international organizations, NGOs, and donors through a strategic leaders' forum. I attribute the success entirely to the functioning and the performance of the strategic group leaders, where every major organization was represented. The co-ordination at national and operational levels, the one-window operation, and accessibility to all was the basic principle on which the FRC functioned. Systematic, timely, and equitable provisioning of relief goods and services was ensured through the mechanism and smooth functioning of the logistics chain, right up to the forward-most places remained our foremost objective. Reaching out to all the affected areas though can be questioned and we still accept a margin of ten to fifteen per cent in that regard. The strategy of speedy construction of a warm, dry room or a temporary shelter from retrievable material was also implemented side by side. We did put into practice—probably for the first time—a UN-sponsored cluster approach, with a view to helping various international organizations and donors to use a platform for better strategic direction and a coordinated response.

Coming to working with NATO and other relief organizations, this was the second time that I was able to work with NATO, first time being more academic in nature. I remember going for an international seminar somewhere abroad; I ultimately became the head of one of the military planning components of NATO. I attribute the success of the operation in the earthquake-stricken region first of all to B. G. String who came with the advance party of the joint task force, under the command and leadership provided by then Air Commodore, who today is Air Vice Marshal. Anyway,

what we saw in the end was great co-operation and body was not only able to make decisions but also to take the lead. That is one of the reasons, as the speaker before me mentioned, that the Canadian and British UK high altitude teams came here, because he shaped the environment for them.

I will now focus on to the contribution as briefly as I can, regarding all the military contingents linked with NATO which came to help us. First of all, the NATO Response Force Five, comprising the NATO hospital, with personnel of various nationalities; the engineers too were from four or five nations. When I talk of various nationalities, I would like to make it very clear how things happen and how long they may take to happen when there are people of different nationalities involved. However, they were very efficient and they were able to respond immediately; I will come to the timeframe and I hope to be able to prove to you how astonishing it was to see people from various backgrounds, various cultures, and with differing political and military practices and equipment were able to do this.

There was also the US contingent: I know that the US chooses to join forces with NATO, while at other times they do not. This time they did not, but they contributed two field hospitals, which did a great job. They also had an engineering attachment and there is no doubt about their overwhelming aviation support. The Australians contributed a military hospital in the Neelam valley— probably the hardest hit area—and they did a great job. The Cubans also came with a large contingent, probably unprecedented, of over three thousand doctors, a whole brigade. As it turned out, they were one of the best forces available to plug gaps wherever they were. Jordanian and Iranian military hospitals were also brought in and they did a pretty good job, as did the contingent from the United Arab Emirates.

In a nutshell, contributions were confined to three sectors: aviation, medical, and engineers. The NATO contribution primarily started with the air bridge which I will talk about later; then it developed into engineering and medical support as well as aviation support within the inland transportation logistics. The NATO air bridge activity commenced on 19 October— much sooner than we expected—and the other response took its own time and was completed by 24 November. The bridge was established between Europe and Pakistan by employing tactical air transport, the mainstay of which were the C130s; other strategic aircraft were also used. Within Pakistan, they contributed a considerably number of helicopters which were employed to airlift the relief logistics to the affected areas. A total of 1788 tons of relief goods were airlifted through



one hundred and twenty sorties from abroad, which included something like seventeen thousand tents and blankets, over half a million mattresses, thirty-one thousand sleeping bags, blankets, and medical supplies. Then there was a fuel farm facility established by them in Abottabad, an extremely useful donated to us by the French government. Its tremendous flexibility enabled it not only to help NATO, but also eased and helped the UN aviation effort. Two sites were established in Abottabad: the first was the north site, with seven refuelling points, with an immense capacity. The second site was in the south which had less capacity, with only three refuelling points, but they did a great job.

Coming to the aviation effort inland: the helicopters were able to lift over one thousand seven hundred tons of relief aid as well as contributing significantly in the transportation of casualties. Considering the engineering tasks, the debris is still a challenge to us. We estimated over two hundred million tons of debris and my figures are based on only four major towns; it does not include the debris which needs to be removed from smaller towns I am sure it will be done. I would like to express my appreciation of the standard of professionalism: the standard of work and performance set by NATO is exemplary. They had undertaken road repairs at locations, stretching over fifty-nine kilometres of roads as my records show. You are all aware that the entire infrastructure had collapsed, so where a road needed restoration, it was not only road repairs, but required the building of retaining walls. At higher altitude, it was basically the UK high altitude company which wanted to come up and repair the damaged structures. Initially, they came as an independent organization, but observing the environment provided by the NATO commander, the British team joined them and were put in an area at a relatively higher altitude and difficult to access; however, they did a great job. They continued working to make temporary shelters as well as some facilities for health and education for the people. Their engineers also contributed in clearing away the ice and snow; they also set up a plant eight water purification units, which proved beneficial for a very large portion of the population.

On the medical side, the NATO hospital attended to something like seven thousand patients, while their mobile teams, initiated by the NATO commander, pushed into remote locations, and attended to more than nine thousand patients on the spot. This again was a great initiative. I understand the funding aspects, as well as other constitutional and institutional aspects, including your egos in NATO. But this was a closely co-ordinated initiative, through which they were able to muster financial support and donors for an immunization campaign, immunizing two thousand and three hundred children. It was a great contribution and your

teams going into remote areas; we understand the cultural sensitivities, but even the women folk were amenable to the initiative. In the outreach plan, again they sent out twenty-six teams, which used air transportation and visited over seventy-six sites, where they attended to over four thousand patients in remote villages. They also established a large number of schools: thirteen are recorded by me, but the fact is that they established or helped to revive a large number of schools.

I would like to highlight some of the major practices that we learnt through our experience. Ladies and gentlemen, we probably all agree that, in such a large-scale disaster, the armed forces remain the best immediate option for crisis management, as they shape the post-disaster environment, provide a stable operating platform, and a reliable, responsive, and efficient network: this is exactly what the Pakistan army did. They readily filled the void created by the collapse of civil rule and civic order and accommodated diverse and multifarious relief efforts. Foreign nations and military contributions provided the direly needed expertise, resources, impetus, and stability to the relief operations. The medical teams, field hospitals—especially from Cuba—engineers and helicopters fleets, especially from the US, ONHAS, ICRC, NATO, Australia, and Germany, ably reinforced by the Pakistan army aviation and PAF helped in achieving what was considered a very daunting task. The major practices, focusing on NATO's perspective, can be repeated here, while stressing the need for a permanent structure like a National Disaster Management Agency.

The establishment of a nucleus of relief infrastructure is unavoidable in the disaster-prone areas and in Pakistan this situation is very relevant. Mobilization and deployment of NATO needs to be addressed for timely disaster response. I understand that NATO adopted a disaster response role for the first time in 1998. It is a Europe-based kind of organization, which has probably been used once or twice. I am sure those who matter will understand that if NATO wants to go ahead with it, they need to come up with certain military procedures or whatever constitutional changes remain to be made. NATO needs to configure its capacities, capability, resources, and training aspects for immediate disaster response. I would like to highlight this observation because, while the air bridge was operative within the second week of the request, and the joint task force headquarters was also deployed pretty much in time, the mobilization, movement, and transportation component took a pretty long time. The kind of heterogeneity that exists in NATO is understandable, but if you are looking forward to disaster response, a memorandum of understanding needs to be implemented for keeping this capacity. The equipment that

has to be brought in must be compatible with the environment, else there is the danger of bringing in equipment which is heavier than needed, making it impossible to negotiate the kind of environment in which we are operating. So this again is one of the practices that we will recommend for consideration.

The air bridge was very useful; however, it was probably not optimally utilized because of the number of countries involved in the operation. So, some of the components which could have been lifted in the third or fourth week could not be lifted, because the use of the air bridge was confined to nations who were willing to co-operate with the NATO flight operations. Joint training and operating, including mock exercises for developing common standard operating procedures is something we need to consider.

In the end, I would like to thank and appreciate the role of all the key players, including the international community, organizations, governments, public, and military contingents. NATO's response and contributions, especially the standards of performance, are profoundly appreciated.

### **Concluding Remarks**

***H.E. Ambassador Kemal Gur***

NATO has been here for 90 days; I am not going into details but it has been a successful operation, covering almost every aspect. This included the diplomatic preparation of Pakistan, its government, its public, based on which NATO's strategy was calculated. This fits into the changing realm of NATO. There have been problems; still, the overall operation was successful and we should be hopeful for the future of NATO. Ambassador Maurits Joachems, you have been very precise in your remarks, as have you, General Farooq. Thank you very much for your interventions and I thank you all for your questions.

I specially welcome your remarks, Excellency, about Turkey, as you have set the record straight. I must reflect further on some points, Turkey has different role in this earthquake relief operation. The help it extended was on a bilateral basis and also within NATO. So our task was twofold. I think we did not do badly in the bilateral role or in our role within NATO to assist Pakistan. We will always appreciate the President's remarks, saying that when he first arrived in Muzaffarabad after the earthquake, he was surprised to see Turkish medical doctors and teams there. So four hours after the earthquake, our friends were ready and waiting for clearance from

neighbouring countries to come to Pakistan. We had medical doctors from the army and also from the marine corps, and engineers from the army in the first team. They dug out 11 people alive from the 78 people that were saved and rescued in the first three days. I must point out the statement by Prime Minister two weeks back that Turkey's contribution totalled US \$240 million and, by the end of the year, our contribution will be getting closer to half a billion.

I would also like to mention that the construction task that we are undertaking with close co-operation and collaboration with the Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Agency (ERRA). We are now trying to finalize our arrangements. And as for the MoU signed with ERRA, that will be an asset. We will have disaster response and management training, rehabilitation and capacity building, which is a most important aspect. On the military front, I think it will be only fair to recognize and acknowledge the efforts of the Pakistan government, army, and also federal and local institutions. With all these accomplishments, the effort of the Pakistan army should be recognized. The matter is over without any epidemics. The losses, as referred to by the Ambassadors here, were fairly low as compared to other disasters in other parts of the world. Now we are looking forward to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

I would now extend special thanks to the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Institute of Strategic Studies. This is the end of this session, and for the next session's chairman, His Excellency Ambassador Jochems, I cannot find words suitable for you.

## Session Three

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### Stabilizing Afghanistan

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#### Chair

#### *Ambassador Maurits Jochems*

It is my honour to chair this part of the meeting. It would be difficult to mirror chairs by Minister Haque and by Turkish Ambassador but I will do my best and without much further delay because we are back on schedule. We should have two presentations on stabilizing Afghanistan. I first give the floor Ms Mirella Luksik, the Political Adviser to the Minister and the special NATO representative in Afghanistan. So you have the floor.

#### **NATO's Role in the Stabilization of Afghanistan**

#### *Ms Mirella K. Luksik*

Thank you so much. I will actually make a brief presentation on this topic. Distinguished organizers, Mr Chairman, Dr Mazari, Dr Rieck, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I feel very privileged to address such a prominent forum on this first ever occasion of the NATO seminar organized in Pakistan. My topic will be NATO's role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. First, I will talk about the history of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. Secondly, I will turn to the current role of NATO, and finally I will speak about NATO's way ahead in the country. But before I start, let me say a few words about Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan case shows an international effort under a UN mandate that has removed a brutal and oppressive regime, which served as a base for extremist groups in the context of international terrorism. We cannot forget that the Taliban regime harboured al-Qaeda and that Afghanistan nearly became a terrorist state. These extremist elements have not been yet been defeated in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents are still using suicide attacks and intimidation through certain elements. These elements continue to pose a threat to security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Only five years ago, Afghanistan seemed without hope. Now, although Afghanistan still remains one of the poorest countries in the world, torn apart by decades of war, there is a visible improvement.

Once the Taliban regime was removed from power in 2001, the international community moved quickly to help improve conditions for the

Afghan people. Significant progress has been made to start rebuilding the state and security institutions. Afghanistan witnessed the successful implementation of the Bonn agreement: emergency and constitutional Loya Jirgas; a democratically elected President who appointed a government; parliamentary and provincial elections; the establishment and growth of the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Efforts to improved governance, basic services, and infrastructure such as healthcare and education in the provinces, as well as activities aiming at a larger economic reconstruction and development of the country continue. Afghanistan is working on its own national development strategy. Unity in the long-term efforts of the international community has proven successful. The Bonn Agreement of 2001 was implemented and the so-called Afghanistan Compact of January 2006, as well as numerous bilateral and regional agreements have been launched. Nevertheless, as a result of the post-conflict environment, major challenges remain: terrorism and insurgency, the drugs problem, illegal armed groups, overwhelming corruption, ethnic divides, and post-war trauma. There is a great need to keep the momentum moving forward in Afghanistan. Stability in Afghanistan cannot be reached with military means only. Efforts to provide security, the rule of law, development and reconstruction are interrelated. If any one of these is lagging behind, the progress is unbalanced or may even stop. NATO, for its part, plays a particular role in Afghanistan.

Let me review the history of the International Security Assistance Force. ISAF started its mission in Afghanistan in December 2001, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement and with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386. The UN mandate for ISAF was to provide a secure environment at that stage only in the Kabul area. NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF command in August 2003. Minister Hikmat Jateen was appointed as Senior Civilian Representative of NATO in December 2003. This was a clear manifestation of the Alliance's determination to assume a significant role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. It also paved the way for NATO's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic zone. In October 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, authorizing the expansion of ISAF mandate beyond the Kabul area of operations. Since then, this mandate has regularly been extended. In 2004, NATO expanded the ISAF presence to the North, covering nine provinces: Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan, Balkh, Sar-e-pol, Jowzjan, and Farah. In 2005, it was expanded to the west, covering four provinces: Badghis, Konar, Herat, and Faryab. Today, there are over nine thousand soldiers from twenty-six NATO nations, nine from the NATO Partnership for Peace family, and New Zealand in the ISAF force. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the major tool of NATO-ISAF

expansion. NATO–ISAF currently has nine PRTs based in Kunduz and Faizabad (German-led); Mazar-e-Sharif (now Swedish-led, previously UK-led); Poletkumery (Netherlands-led); Niemana (Norwegian-led); Herat (Italian-led); Kalino (Spanish-led); Chockchorang (Lithuanian-led); and Heart, led by the US. Each PRT comprises military and civilian components and most are multinational.

Through these PRTs, NATO tries to extend the influence of the Afghan Government to the provinces, assists in creating a secure environment, and encourages international and non-governmental organizations to operate throughout Afghanistan. It also facilitates coordination of reconstruction efforts and establishes a dialogue and collaboration with local authorities and communities. It also supports the security sector reform processes led by partner nations. This is a term that has come to be used in the context of Afghanistan. Previously it was the G-8 League of Nations. I am talking here about the UK, Germany, the US, and Japan. So the Afghan national army, Afghan national police, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, disbanding of illegal armed groups, counter-narcotics efforts, justice reforms, and, last but not least, PRTs are all contributing to the regional development of Afghanistan.

Even though it is not a donor organization, yet, through ISAF, NATO has assumed operational control of the Kabul International Airport since 1 June 2004. A steering committee on the rehabilitation of the Qaya was established on the Afghan–NATO contours; senior NATO civilian representatives have trained Afghan personnel since then to monitor, coordinate, and provide oversight for the implementation of all activities and projects at Kabul International Airport. The goal is to have an Afghan-led twenty-four hour, seven days a week operational international airport in Kabul. Since then the committee's mandate has expanded to include the rehabilitation and reform of the entire civilian aviation sector. These issues are of great importance to Afghanistan because it is a land-locked country and air traffic is the only way to provide actual incentives for economic co-operation with its neighbours and other international organizations.

Let me turn to NATO's way ahead. The ISAF operation plan was endorsed during the Foreign Ministerial meeting in NATO Headquarters last December and welcomed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1659. The plan address the tasks and challenges NATO–ISAF will face as it continues to expand its area of operations to the south and subsequently to the east of the country. It provides direction for the strategic forces to further create the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction across the

country. It recognizes the primacy of the Afghan Government and the paramount importance of continued current and consistent development of Afghan political institutions and security capability. ISAF will be increased by up to six thousand personnel, potentially bringing the total number to approximately fifteen thousand soldiers. PRTs will continue to be at the leading edge of NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. As such, ISAF stability operations will be used to create the security environment required to enable reconstruction and nation-building activities to continue.

NATO-ISAF military tasks will include assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in co-ordination with the Afghan National Security Forces, assisting the Afghan government with the partner nations security sector reforms processes, monitoring and supporting the Afghan National Army, supporting the Afghan Government in disarming illegal armed groups. NATO-ISAF key supporting tasks will include supporting the Afghan Government and internationally sanctioned counter-narcotics efforts within limits, meaning that they will not participate in poppy eradication or destruction of processing facilities or taking military action against narcotics procedures. It will, on request, provide support to humanitarian assistance operations co-ordinated by the Afghan Government organizations and support the Afghan National Police. NATO-ISAF will have a larger presence across the country and will establish additional PRTs and regional commands. There will be enhanced operational training provided to the Afghan National Army and there will be additional forces and supporting elements provided to ISAF as it expands into the more challenging environments of the south and the east: the so-called east stage for expansion, and the so-called stage three expansion to the south. The stage three expansion of ISAF operations is planned for summer this year and will result in the following: the ISAF area of operations will be expanded to include six additional provinces: Daikondi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Oruzgan, and Zabol. Four regional commands will be established at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Kandahar for ISAF regions north, west, and south respectively; and one for the capital, Kabul. NATO will have four additional PRTs in Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Zabol provinces. Deployment of ISAF operational monitoring as a team will follow the enhanced ISAF involvement. They will train the Afghan National Army units, which will be attached to them at various levels. The stage for expansion to the east is scheduled to take place shortly after stage three is completed. Thus, the NATO-led ISAF mission is under permanent development, implementing an expansion process in order to cover the whole of Afghan territory.



To raise efficiency of support provided to Afghanistan, the NATO-ISAF mission will have synergy with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). ISAF and OEF, the ongoing US-led military operations in Afghanistan will continue to have separate mandates and missions. Clear command arrangements will coordinate the necessary efforts with the two missions as agreed under the auspices of the operational plan. As far as the duration of the NATO mission is concerned, it is perhaps most appropriate to quote the text of the so-called Afghanistan Compact, agreed between the government of Afghanistan and the international community.

As far as the International Security Forces are concerned, they will continue their mission through end 2010, with the support of and close coordination with the Afghan government and the NATO-led ISAF Operation Enduring Freedom. They expect that the PRTs will promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities. As far as the Afghan National Army is concerned by a nationally-respected, professional, ethnically-balanced Afghan national army will be fully established, that is democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country and increasingly funded from government revenue. Commensurate with the nation's economic capacity, the international community will continue to support Afghanistan and expanding the Afghan National Army towards the ceiling of seventy thousand personnel as articulated in the Bonn talks. The pace of the expansion is to be adjusted on the basis of periodic joint quality assessments by the Afghan government and the international community against agreed criteria which take into account prevailing conditions. The Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police, with a combine force of up to 62,000, will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable. Regarding the disbandment of the illegal armed groups, these will be disbanded by end 2007 in all provinces.

Allow me to conclude that NATO remains committed to Afghanistan and its relations with Afghanistan will likely go beyond ISAF and the current support to the civil aviation sector. Recently, talks on the Afghan Co-operation Programme have been initiated between NATO and Afghanistan and will continue. The NATO Secretary General has, on many occasions, stressed that Afghanistan is the top priority of NATO. Afghanistan's long-term stability and security cannot be looked at without the broader picture of the whole region. NATO welcomes the efforts of Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly those of Pakistan, in curbing terrorism in the vicinity of the Afghan border and those aimed at flourishing economic relations with Afghanistan. NATO hopes that as its stabilization

mission expands in Afghanistan, its relations with its Pakistani counterparts will increase in order to help ensure a stable and prosperous Afghanistan in the region.

Thank you very much for your attention.

**Pakistan's Contribution to the Stabilization of Afghanistan**  
***Mr Inam ul Haq Chairman , ISSI.***

Mr Chairman, I am going to speak about Pakistan's contributions to the stabilization of Afghanistan and what I have done is to divide my presentation into four parts. The first part will deal with the political and security efforts of Pakistan to stabilize Afghanistan. The second part will deal with the economic assistance that Pakistan is providing to Afghanistan and the projects that it is undertaking in Afghanistan. The third will deal with the cost to Pakistan of the situation in Afghanistan; and the fourth will be a very brief conclusion.

Let us begin with the political and security aspects. I would preface my remarks with one very simple statement: stability, peace, and progress in Afghanistan are an absolute imperative for stability, peace, and progress in Pakistan. We start with this given statement. Now let us look at the specifics. Pakistan joined the international community in the international coalition, immediately after 9/11. We participated in the Bonn process and fully supported it and we are very happy that the Bonn process has passed through its different stages and is now complete. Pakistan has also consistently supported the government in Afghanistan led by Mr Hamid Karzai. In the presidential elections, Pakistan registered almost seven hundred and fifty thousand Afghan refugees and they were facilitated in casting their votes. Almost eighty per cent of registered voters cast their votes during the presidential elections. This percentage was higher by five per cent than that of Afghanistan and by about forty per cent from that of Iran. In the 18 September 2005 elections for the parliament, we were ready to make similar arrangements but the Afghan government decided that it would not be possible to arrange elections in either Pakistan or Iran. Nonetheless, on the request of the Afghan Government, we sealed the borders for the period of the elections.

Let us discuss border security next, a sensitive issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Border security is a shared responsibility between any two sovereign nations. Pakistan is doing its share and today it has eighty thousand troops and military forces to protect its borders with Afghanistan. Afghanistan does not really have any presence on the

borders with Pakistan. But there have been accusations against Pakistan, sometimes made at the highest level, that the cross-border activity from Pakistan into Afghanistan of the Taliban is continuing. In response to these complaints, Pakistan postulated two or three suggestions. One was that we could fence the border, so that illegal crossing at the borders could be stopped. The second suggestion was the need to man the border facilities properly, so that people could not cross over without legal documentation and proper visas. And the third was that Afghanistan should also place some forces on its side of the border, to protect its people from any incursions from Pakistan.

As you are all aware, this is a 2500-kilometre long border; it is very rugged at places, and it is sometimes impossible to control, as there is no way that any country can seal the border completely. What was Afghanistan's response to this proposal of fencing the borders? President Karzai was in Pakistan at the time. He went to the National Defence Collage and in his statement he said two things. He said that this border should be even more open: in fact, he said there should be no borders and there should be no passports between the two countries.

Let me also say that we do not appreciate charges or allegations that Pakistan is supporting any activity which is against Afghanistan's interest whether it be Taliban activity or extremist activity or any terrorist activity. Pakistan's record in its fight against terrorism, both internal and international, is second to none. Therefore we are doing the maximum that we can and we hope and expect that, instead of levelling baseless charges against Pakistan, our efforts to combat terrorism should be appreciated.

I come now to the economic side of the support that Pakistan is providing. So far, Pakistan has committed two hundred and fifty million dollars of financial support to Afghanistan, in the forms of grants. The cash disbursement of ten million dollars was initially made in order to tide over the Afghan government during the period of its early difficulties. The actual utilization of this aid has so far been fifty-two million dollars and the projects agreed by the Joint Economic Commission of the two countries are worth one hundred and four million dollars, which assistance is already in the pipeline.

What are the projects that Pakistan is undertaking in Afghanistan? These relate to infrastructure. Pakistan is building the Torkham–Jalalabad road which is expected to be completed by the year 2006. We have proposed the Chaman–Spinboldak rail project, which is being held up on account of there being no response from the Afghan side. In the field of

health, a kidney centre is being built in Jalalabad and we have proposed building the Jinnah Hospital in Kabul, with one hundred and fifty beds. But again, the Afghan Ministry of Health has not yet given clearance for this project. In the field of education also, Pakistan is constructing the Rehman Baba High School and the Allama Iqbal Faculty of Arts at Kabul University. In the field of broadcasting, we have procured a TV transmitter, which is being sent to Kandahar for starting television services. In the field of transport, we have provided two hundred trucks, one hundred buses, and forty-five ambulances to Afghanistan, and more buses are being sent. In the field of capacity-building, we have already trained more than two hundred Afghan police officials, in counter-narcotics, in judiciary, in diplomacy, in customs, and in the fields of agriculture, medicine, and banking training courses for another one hundred Afghan officials in different areas are expected to commence shortly.

In the field of energy also, Pakistan is co-operating with Afghanistan and I will refer only to the two major projects which are being discussed and negotiated. The first is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline; the second is Pakistan's proposal to purchase electricity from Tajikistan via Afghanistan and the building of the infrastructure for the passage of electrical lines through Afghanistan.

In the field of bilateral trade, Pakistan is the largest trading partner of Afghanistan today. The trade volume was about 1.2 billion dollars in the year 2004 and 2005 and it is increasing. In fact, twenty-five per cent of all Afghan imports and exports are from Pakistan and to Pakistan. We have established a number of new customs stations and we have also upgraded and modernized those already existing to facilitate the orderly movement of goods. In the field of transit trade, the negative list of items which was necessary because of large-scale smuggling from Afghanistan to Pakistan, has been progressively reduced and today there are only three items on the negative list: cigarettes, cooking oil, and auto parts. We are also allowing the transit of Afghan goods to India; however, some issues do remain to be resolved. The first is the Afghan demand that the three items on the negative list should be removed; the second is the Afghan demand that Afghan truckers should be allowed to go up to Karachi; the third is the Indian demand that its goods should be allowed to travel through Pakistan in transit to Afghanistan. We are sure that, with the passage of time, these issues will also be resolved.

Now I come briefly to the continuing costs to Pakistan. The last two and a half decades have been very costly for Pakistan in different ways and I will elaborate some of those. Firstly, there is the issue of refugees.

Notwithstanding the fact that many refugees have gone back to Afghanistan, some 2.5 million Afghan refugees still stay on in Pakistan and many of them do not show any desire or intention of returning to their own country. This brings in its wake a number of problems for Pakistan. I will deal with those later. The second issue is drugs. Afghanistan, as you know, produces about ninety per cent of the total world opium output; drugs provide almost 2.8 billion dollars to the Afghan economy from smuggling, which means that more than fifty per cent of Afghanistan's GDP is brought into Afghanistan through drugs. According to the UN sources, this year the area under poppy cultivation is even larger than last year. This is a matter of serious concern to Pakistan, which is one of the transit roots of smugglers and the second problem is that the number of drugs edicts in Pakistan is increasing. Pakistan is one of those countries which have eradicated poppy production from its own soil, so we are suffering passively from the production of drugs in Afghanistan. Now who is benefiting from this money, where is this money going, these 2.8 billion dollars? It is not going into the government coffers because the government is not promoting these illegal activities. So, it is going into the pockets either of the warlords or of narcotics traffickers. The linkage between narcotics money to terrorism and the use of illegal drugs is applicable in Afghanistan and poses a major threat to peace and security not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.

We are enhancing institutional linkages and information sharing among the relevant agencies of the two countries for which a joint working group has been established; we are also helping Afghanistan in capacity building, but I do not believe that the two countries by themselves can overcome this problem. This is a problem that has international dimensions, as most of the drugs end up in Europe; the efforts of the international community are required to solve the problem. I understand that the British government has been put in charge of looking after this particular problem.

The third problem that we have is that of weapons. The free flow of weapons between Afghanistan and Pakistan has created major problems for Pakistan internally. It has fuelled violence; it has fuelled problems between various sects, sectarian harmony having been disturbed because of extremism and easy access to weapons. The environment in Pakistan has been damaged because of the large number of Afghan refugees present. There has been major deforestation, soil erosion, reduction in water resources, and increase in pollution. Our internal problems—for example in FATA and the insurgency in Balochistan—have linkages with Afghanistan. In Pakistan, we are undertaking this battle against terrorism

and extremism in which more than six hundred of our soldiers and many more civilians have lost their lives. According to our information, the insurgency in Balochistan probably has some support from Afghanistan and many terrorist acts in Pakistan have their origin elsewhere. Let me try to sum up the impact of the war in Afghanistan has had in this country. Pakistan has become a fractured society because of the insecurity in Afghanistan, because of the instability in Afghanistan, and because of the lack of control of the Afghan government over its own areas and territories.

We will continue to assist Afghanistan to the best of our capacity in stabilizing itself because we believe that it is also in the national interest of Pakistan to do so. But Pakistanis are deeply upset and offended when aspersions are cast on Pakistan's role and contributions to peace, stability, and economic progress in Afghanistan. When Pakistani visitors are rounded up and killed in fake encounters, with false allegations that they were Taliban, this is unacceptable behaviour. Let me conclude by asking a question which many people ask in Pakistan: Is there some animus in Afghanistan's ruling circles towards Pakistan? And my answer to that is a qualified "yes", because of the history of the relationship between the two countries, because of what happened immediately after 9/11, and because of the fact that those who came to power after 9/11 were not friends of Pakistan. But I believe that, over a period of time, this animus will disappear and we must continue to work together, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the help of the international community, to remove misunderstandings and to promote abiding progress, peace, and stability in Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

### **Concluding Remarks by the Chair**

I would like to conclude by making a few points. The first is that there is a substantial degree of consensus between the Pakistani side (as has been delineated by Minister Haque) and NATO, in the sense that we have a strong interest in a stable Afghanistan. NATO is there now, we have an interest in its progress. Minister Haque dwelt on this topic and said that a stable Afghanistan is a prerogative for peace in Pakistan as well and he noted some interests, which for us are very useful: the refugees, the drugs. We are aware of them and also of the strong economic interest for Afghanistan.

We also noted well the sensitivities on this side of the Afghan-Pak border and I mentioned the border security issue and the allegations that

have been made in the process are well-noted on our side. The presence of a neighbouring country in Afghanistan is well noted. Also, the issue of ethnic balance at this moment in the governance circle in Afghanistan is noted. But I think a crucial aspect has been formulated by the Minister Haque: that Pakistan should have an interest in continuing its support for Afghanistan in its current efforts in the areas where there are problems. We share this view. One of the questions that I repeat in my concluding remarks is: Is a long-term commitment by NATO? Until about 2010, as long as the AfgHanns want us, I think NATO is likely to stay. All organizations, including NATO, should share our responsibility. The UN in particular, the EU, the G-8 perhaps can help. This is what we have learned in previous discussions. Political stability is not possible if we reduce the presence of the military. Political violence may take over if we do not proceed with economic reconstruction. This is going to be launched. People should seek self-respect in Afghanistan. In that sense, we need better co-operation between NATO and other international organizations. It is not impossible; you cannot have reconstruction without a minimum degree of security. So Pakistan and NATO have a common interest and we should be in close contact about the future of Afghanistan.

#### Remarks by Ambassador Simmons

I must begin by thanking our sponsors, the Institute of Strategic Studies has given us an excellent location, and adjustable temperature and the Hanns Seidel Foundation has contributed to a very successful discussion and a very successful summary.

Let me say from the NATO side, I think two or three very good discussions have taken place. One, that we have given our friends an overview of the alliance's direction and the alliance's role. Secondly, we dealt with our good collaboration with the partner countries. Finally, the third, that we just finished, that dealt with Afghanistan. Both sides have information and material that we will have to learn to deal with after this seminar. We will see that Pakistan and our Pakistani friends understand some of the lessons that we have learned from this and I can assure you that, from our side, we have done the same.

As I said during my presentation, we hope that eventually we will evolve a better understanding of the relationship between the alliance in whatever context your government wants and this appropriate moment of partnership that we have. In Afghanistan, our operations have given assurance that all actors are trying to pursue this relation. As I said this

morning, such relations can benefit both the alliance and Pakistan itself. It is an extension of both in alliance's interest and also a measure of the confidence that Pakistan should have in its relations with a wide range of organizations. I hope this will be a step towards that end.

Let me thank you all for your hospitality. It is a great pleasure for me to be back in Pakistan and I hope this process will continue. Thank you very much.

### **Closing remarks**

***Dr Shireen Mazari DG, ISSI***

I do not have much to add but I would like to thank the Hanns Seidel Foundation for making this seminar possible. It was they who started the idea in December last year. The whole issue of NATO became the central interest of Pakistan when the earthquake relief came about and questions were raised in the Pakistani press and there was a realization on our part that perhaps we in Pakistan were not aware of what the NATO was all about. Yes, there were viewpoints and perceptions here also that perhaps that our perspective needed to be understood as well. Of course, there was a general appreciation of the aid and assistance that came from NATO, as we have been appreciative of the aid that has come from all foreign NGOs and governments. I think that Hanns Seidel has made that possible and I am grateful that the NATO team came for a short time, travelling a long distances. We hope it was worthwhile and I think it was very interesting and informative. We may not always agree but as we have picked up NATO's perspective and how NATO sees itself, it has been very informative. We hope that people and members of NATO also realize why, in the broader perspective of international relations, we still have some conceptual questions and issues that are very relevant in the long term as the new world order continues to take shape. In that sense at least, we have understood each other. I want to thank Dr Rieck once again for making it possible and also our audience, who have been present here on Saturday, 1 April 2006, but I am sure it has been interesting for them as well.