

## **United Nations global counterterrorism strategy: achievements and challenges**

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The unprecedented events of 9/11 presented a new face of terrorism with a magnitude that required a great collective response from the world. They also presented the United Nations, as the single largest international organization, with its biggest challenge yet. The sympathies and support that was behind the people and the government of the United States was also demonstrated by resolutions 1368 and 1373 (both in 2001) of the UN Security Council (UNSC), which were adopted in the wake of the attacks. Resolution 1373 called upon all states to combat terrorism by working together and established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor its implementation.

However, the preemptive and unilateral military initiatives taken by the U.S. placed the UN in an awkward position. This study analyses the role of the UN in terms of the geographical elaboration of the work it has done so far to counter terrorism after 9/11 through its global counterterrorism strategy framework that was adopted in 2006. Achievements are tabulated and analyzed as we look into the following topics and sub-topics.

- 1) Role of Security Council
- 2) United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy
- 3) Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force
- 4) Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Committee work
- 5) Discussion
- 6) Conclusion

### **Role of the Security Council**

Terrorism has been on the UNSC agenda since the early 90s when sanctions were imposed against States that were allegedly involved in certain acts of terrorism; these included Libya (1992), Sudan (1996) and the Taliban in Afghanistan (1999 - expanded to include Al-Qaida in 2000 by resolution 1333).<sup>1</sup> Resolution 1269 (1999) called on countries to work together to prevent and suppress terrorist acts; this was, in effect, a precursor to the intensification of counterterrorism that is now in place.

Prior to 9/11, the most visible tool of counter-terrorism was the 1267 Committee (1999) to monitor sanctions against the Taliban regime.<sup>2</sup> Following

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the attacks in 2001, the UNSC established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) comprising all members, under resolution 1373.<sup>3</sup> The most significant aspect of this resolution was that it made it obligatory upon all member States to take a number of specified measures to prevent terrorism. They were to criminalize various forms of terrorist actions, and promote global cooperation, which also included adherence to international counterterrorism instruments. It is a requirement for member States to report regularly to the CTC on the measures they have taken to implement resolution 1373.<sup>4</sup>

### **United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy**

The UN global counterterrorism strategy was adopted on September 8, 2006. In the form of a resolution and an annexed plan of action (A/RES/60/288), this is a unique instrument that will enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism.<sup>5</sup> It is also very important since this is the first occasion that all member States have agreed to a common strategic approach towards this cause. This was a clear message against all forms of terrorism and expressed the commitment to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent, resolve and combat the phenomenon. These agreed-upon practical steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity for countering threats, to better coordination in counterterrorism activities. The adoption of this strategy fulfils the commitment made by world leaders at the 2005 September summit and is based on many of the elements proposed by the Secretary General in his May 2, 2006 report entitled “Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.

In its own words, “the Strategy also gathers all the various counter-terrorism activities of the United Nations system into a common strategic framework and builds on the consistent, unequivocal condemnation of terrorism by Member States.”<sup>6</sup> The focus is on strengthening individual as well as collective capacities of countries along with the UN to prevent and combat terrorism while ensuring the protection of human rights and upholding the rule of law. The Strategy clearly affirms that terrorism can, and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.<sup>7</sup>

### *Highlights of the global counterterrorism strategy*<sup>8</sup>

The main points of the strategy are as follows:

- Improving the coherence and efficiency of counterterrorism technical assistance delivery so that all states can play their part effectively.
- Voluntarily putting in place systems of assistance that would address the needs of victims of terrorism and their families.
- Addressing the threat of bioterrorism by establishing a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, focusing on improving States' public health systems, and acknowledging the need to bring

together major stakeholders to ensure that biotechnology advances are not used for terrorist or other criminal purposes but for the public good.

- Involving civil society, regional and sub-regional organizations in the fight against terrorism and developing partnerships with the private sector to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets.
- Exploring innovative means to address the growing threat of terrorist use of the internet.
- Modernizing border and customs controls systems, and improving the security of travel documents, to prevent terrorist travel and the movement of illicit materials.
- Enhancing cooperation to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

### **Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)<sup>9</sup>**

In an attempt to ensure coordinated and coherent efforts across the UN system to counter terrorism, the Secretary General established the CTITF in July 2005. The counterterrorism strategy gives support to the practical work done by the Task Force and welcomes the Secretary General's intention to institutionalize it.

The CTITF includes representatives from:

- Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
- Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
- Department of Public Information (DPI)
- Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
- Expert Staff of 1540 Committee
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
- Monitoring Team of 1267 Committee
- Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

### *Strategic Studies*

- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- World Customs Organization (WCO)
- World Bank
- World Health Organization (WHO)


For its practical work, the Task Force currently has nine Working Groups:

- Preventing and Resolving Conflicts
- Addressing Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism
- Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism
- Preventing and Responding to WMD Attacks
- Tackling the Financing of Terrorism
- Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes
- Facilitating the Integrated Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
- Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets
- Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism

### **Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Committee work**

Five core areas of legislation, counter financing of terrorism, border control, domestic security and law enforcement agencies and international cooperation are being worked upon by the UN in its counterterrorism endeavors.

### *Model for study*



The following tables have been prepared on the basis of survey reports and texts to briefly present the factual position of all five core areas. These tables and the charts have been prepared in different ways to examine progress from different perspectives.

**Table 1.1<sup>10</sup>**

***Legislation***

Country-group <sup>11</sup>	No. of Countries	Complete implementation	Partial implementation	No implementation
North Africa	7	7	-	-
East Africa	13	2	6	5
South Africa	9	2	4	3
West & Central Africa	23	-	16	7
East Asia	5	2	2	1
Pacific Islands	11	-	10	1
South-East Asia	11	5	3	3
South Asia	8	1	5	2
Central Asia & Caucasus	8	7	1	-
Western Asia	12	2	8	2
Central America & Caribbean	21	-	21	-
South America	12	5	4	3
South Eastern Europe	9	4	5	-
Eastern Europe	11	6	5	-
Western Europe & Other States	30	30	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>27</b>

**Table 1.2**

***Counter Financing of Terrorism***

	No. of Countries	Complete implementation	Partial implementation	No implementation
North Africa	7	3	4	-
East Africa	13	2	5	6
South Africa	9	2	2	5
West & Central Africa	23	1	7	15
East Asia	5	1	2	2
Pacific Islands	11	2	4	5
South-East Asia	11	5	6	-
South Asia	8	-	8	-
Central Asia & Caucasus	8	3	3	2
Western Asia	12	3	9	-
Central America & Caribbean	21	1	14	6
South America	12	2	4	6
South Eastern Europe	9	5	4	-
Eastern Europe	11	4	5	2
Western Europe & Other States	30	11	19	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>49</b>

**Table 1.3**

***Border Control***

	No. of Countries	Complete implementation	Partial implementation	No implementation
North Africa	7	3	3	1
East Africa	13	1	9	3
South Africa	9	1	8	-
West & Central Africa	23	-	13	10
East Asia	5	3	2	-
Pacific Islands	11	6	2	3
South-East Asia	11	8	2	1
South Asia	8	3	2	3
Central Asia & Caucasus	8	6	2	-

Western Asia	12	6	5	1
Central America & Caribbean	21	-	11	10
South America	12	5	6	1
South Eastern Europe	9	6	1	2
Eastern Europe	11	9	2	-
Western Europe & Other States	30	25	1	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>39</b>

**Table 1.4**

*Domestic Security & Law Enforcement Agencies*

	No. of Countries	Complete implementation	Partial implementation	No implementation
North Africa	7	3	-	4
East Africa	13	-	5	8
South Africa	9	2	3	4
West & Central Africa	23	2	14	7
East Asia	5	4	1	-
Pacific Islands	11	3	3	5
South-East Asia	11	6	4	1
South Asia	8	2	5	1
Central Asia & Caucasus	8	7	1	-
Western Asia	12	6	5	1
Central America & Caribbean	21	6	9	6
South America	12	6	6	-
South Eastern Europe	9	2	7	-
Eastern Europe	11	10	1	-
Western Europe & Other States	30	30	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>37</b>

**Table 1.5**


*International Cooperation*

	No. of Countries	Complete implementation	Partial implementation	No implementation
North Africa	7	2	5	-
East Africa	13	1	1	11
South Africa	9	2	7	-
West & Central Africa	23	2	17	4
East Asia	5	3	1	1
Pacific Islands	11	4	5	2
South-East Asia	11	5	5	1
South Asia	8	4	4	-
Central Asia & Caucasus	8	7	1	-
Western Asia	12	3	6	3
Central America & Caribbean	21	6	7	8
South America	12	6	6	-
South Eastern Europe	9	7	2	-
Eastern Europe	11	11	-	-
Western Europe & Other States	30	28	2	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>30</b>




**Chart 1.1**

**Total 190 States Data**




**Chart 1.2**

**Data for 52 States of Africa (North, East, South, West and Central)**




**Chart 1.3**

*Data for 55 States of Asia (East, South-East, South, Western), Pacific Islands & Caucasus*




**Chart 1.4**

*Data for 83 States of Europe (South Eastern, Eastern, Central), the Americas (Central America, South), Caribbean & Other States*



**Chart 1.5**

**Comparative Chart of Legislation implementation for 190 states  
(52,55 & 83)**



**Chart 1.6**

**Comparative Chart of Counter Financing of Terrorism for 190 states  
(52,55 & 83)**




Chart 1.7

Comparative Chart of Border Control implementation for 190 states (52,55 & 83)






Chart 1.8

Comparative Chart of Domestic Security & Law Enforcement Agencies for 190 states (52,55 & 83)



**Chart 1.9**

**Comparative Chart of International Cooperation for 190 states  
(52,55 & 83)**



1) Discussion

The data presents a brief picture of UN response, particularly but not solely through its global counterterrorism strategy. Before going into an analytical discussion, we need to look into a relevant conceptual point. It is generally agreed that the response of terrorism can be divided into two major streams i.e. national and international response.<sup>12</sup> Our study is based on the UN strategy which is essentially a consensus-based counter strategy falling into the latter stream. Having said that, the need and importance of domestic response to terrorism is given much greater weight and there are valid reasons for that. After discussing the actual situation of UN implementation, we shall also analyze the importance of domestic responses in the conclusion of this study.

We will analyze the implementation progress of all five core areas in order to study the achievements of the UN strategy; this is done in a three dimensional manner.

- A) Dimension-I: Five areas of implementation, 190 states performance.
- B) Dimension-II: Country-group study of all areas of implementation.
- C) Dimension-III: Independent comparative analysis of three country groups.

**A) Dimension-I<sup>3</sup>**

Legislation: This area is very important as it relates to the basic framework of the strategy and yet in comparison with the other four areas, complete implementation is second to last. Nevertheless, the chart also shows that partial implementation or ‘implementation in pipeline’ rate is very high i.e. 90. That leaves 27 states with a no implementation status, which is the lowest in all five areas of the strategy.

Counter-financing of terrorism: According to the data in Chart 1.1, only 45 states have complete implementation whereas 96 have undergone partial implementation of the strategy. However, 49 states are left with no implementation at all. Keeping in view the importance of this area, this figure is too high and risky for the success of the overall counterterrorism strategy.

Border control: This is important for the sake of on-ground implementation and the results so far are balanced.

Domestic security & law enforcement agencies: This can be referred to as the “capacity building” area and is important for a long-term and sustained strategy to be successful. The chart shows that the outcomes so far are positive.

International cooperation: This is the cornerstone of the UN strategy if it is to truly become global, and so far the performance in this aspect can be termed positive.

**B) Dimension-II<sup>4</sup>**

Africa (North, East, South, West and Central) (52 States in all):

This region has the lowest number of complete implementations and the highest number of ‘no implementations’ in all five areas. Keeping in view the domestic political situation in many countries of the continent, this is understandable but at the same time, an obstacle to complete success of the counterterrorism strategy.

Asia (East, South-East, South and Western), Pacific Islands & Caucasus (55 States in all):

Significant achievements are evident from the data and these can best be termed as balanced. In the areas of counter-financing and border control, Asia surpasses Europe and although the data on complete implementation is not encouraging in all five core areas, partial completion compensates for this deficiency to some extent.

Europe (South Eastern, Eastern, Central), the Americas (Central & South), Caribbean and Other States (83 States in all):

With developed countries making up this group, it is not surprising that the greatest number of complete implementations lies here. Counter-financing and border control are two weak areas where 'no implementation' figures are the highest and need immediate attention.

*C) Dimension-III<sup>15</sup>*

*Legislation for three country-groups:* The pattern here is straightforward and goes from the highest in EU and America's country-group towards Africa at the lowest end. Here the characteristics of development have visible and prominent effects. The complete implementation ratio for Europe is 54% compared to 31% for Asia and 21% for Africa. Our analysis reveals that the major future push lies in the partial completion rate, which is 50% for Africa and 53% for Asia in comparison to 42% for Europe. This is a strong trend and shows an optimistic pattern for counterterrorism legislation.

*Counter-Financing for three country-groups:* A strong negative outlook is seen in the figures for Africa where there is 50% 'no implementation' as opposed to figures of 17% each for Asia and Europe. It is notable that such a high percentage of 'no implementation' does not exist for Africa in any other dimension of the strategy. Partial implementation percentage is at 35% for Africa, 58% for Asia and 55% for Europe. This shows a strong and much-needed future trend for Asia. As far as complete implementation is concerned the ratio is 15% for Africa, 25% for Asia and 28% for Europe. A mixed response from Asia and Europe as well as the lack of clear domination from Europe in this dimension shows that much more needs to be done even in developed countries.

*Border control for three country-groups:* The case of border control has shown an unexpected response in both developed and developing countries. The percentage of 'no implementation' in Europe (21%) is higher than Asia (15%) but lower than Africa (27%). Again, in the partial implementation scenario, the ratios are 63% for Africa, 27% for Asia and 25% for Europe. The same trend continues in complete implementation where Africa is at 10%, Europe at 54% and Asia has the highest ratio of 58%. This points to further careful review of the counterterrorism strategy.

*Domestic security & law enforcement agencies for three country-groups:* The trend in this dimension is regular and less surprising with a 13% complete implementation ratio for Africa, 51% for Asia and 65% for Europe, while partial implementation is 42% , 34% and 28% respectively. The 'no implementation' ratio for Europe is 7% in comparison to 15% for Asia and a high 45% for Africa, apart from which the trends in this dimension are quite positive.

*International cooperation for three country-groups:* Complete implementation ratio for Africa is only 13% in comparison to 47% of Asia and 70% of Europe in this important area of the strategy. Partial implementation at 58% for Africa is highest among the three areas, compared to 40% in Asia and 20% in Europe. The ‘no implementation’ ratio is 29% for Africa, 13% for Asia and 10% for Europe. The trend is positive and strong for the future and especially the low percentages of ‘no implementations’ are a good sign for success of the strategy.

## **Conclusion**

The discussion exposes many important achievements and challenges relevant to the UN counterterrorism strategy. While terrorism is not an especially novel phenomenon, the events of 9/11 have not only served as a catalyst for stronger action but also changed the face of the threat. Terrorism is a global problem requiring a global response, justifying the need for a UN counterterrorism strategy since keeping in view the dimensions and magnitude of the problem, no institution apart from the UN could come up with a suitable response. The real question is how successful it has been and how the future looks from here on.

Achievements are both conceptual and practical. Uniting 190 nations in a particular issue is itself an achievement. It is true that the UN is a platform for such consensus-development but it is not often that we see such consensual moves. The counterterrorism strategy has effectively identified five core areas which clearly show a “forward” pattern since legislation, counter-financing of terrorism, border control, domestic law & enforcement agencies and international cooperation all shows positive trends in implementation.

We have presented a detailed discussion of the data collected for all five areas and have analyzed them in three dimensions. All the dimensions show that there are some grey areas in implementation even in the developed geographical areas such as the EU, but overall it is working out to be a good strategy. However, what we do not see is a reduction in terrorism around the world even as these strategies are being implemented.

The challenge for the UN lies in linking the strategy to results i.e. the reduction in terrorism. Terrorism hot spots around the world are not showing any visible response that could be used to validate a strategy which is still in its initial levels (even in the five core areas) and thus it is difficult to link it up with any gross achievement. One big problem is coming up with a consensus on the definition of terrorism. We do not have any “agreed” definition that could then be used to formulate relevant strategies. Every country has its own distinct social, economical and political systems and although it might be implementing the UN counterterrorism strategy, it may not be responding to the true causes of the terrorism.



Identifying the roots of terrorism in different geographic sets of the world remains a strong challenge. This strategy is too general and unable to contextualize the differences in terrorist hotspots of the world such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, all of which have different causes of terrorism and need to be dealt with accordingly. It can hence be concluded that the UN counterterrorism strategy needs to be delegated according to domestic requirements in some respects. Other reasons behind terrorism are international - for example, the political behavior of superpowers especially in issues such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and these could be targeted through more global tactics.

To conclude, the UN counterterrorism strategy is a good and much-needed initiative. However, the challenges are complex and require the strategy to be reviewed in order to achieve practical gains in the reduction of terrorism through both local and global contextualized strategies.

### **Notes and references**

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- <sup>1</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). *Role of Security Council*. Retrieved January 02, 2010, from [www.un.org: http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml](http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml)
  - <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>3</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>4</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>5</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). *Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. Retrieved January 01, 2010, from [www.un.org: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counterterrorism.shtml](http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counterterrorism.shtml)
  - <sup>6</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). *Main Page of CTC*. Retrieved December 09, 2009, from [www.un.org: http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/](http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/)
  - <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>8</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). *Strategy Highlights*. Retrieved December 05, 2009, from [www.un.org: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-highlights.shtml](http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-highlights.shtml)
  - <sup>9</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). *Coordinating CT Actions*. Retrieved December 07, 2009, from [www.un.org: http://www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml](http://www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml)
  - <sup>10</sup> Counter-Terrorism Committee UN. (n.d.). *Report on implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373(2001)*. Retrieved December 03, 2009, from [www.un.org: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/375/56/PDF/N0837556.pdf?OpenElement](http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/375/56/PDF/N0837556.pdf?OpenElement)
  - <sup>11</sup> North Africa  
(Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia),  
East Africa  
(Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania),  
Southern Africa  
(Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe),  
West and Central Africa  
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,

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Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo),

East Asia

(China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia and Republic of Korea),

Pacific islands

(Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu),

South-East Asia

(Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam),

South Asia

(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka),

Central Asia and the Caucasus

(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan),

Western Asia

(Bahrain, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen),

Latin America

Central America and the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago),

South America

(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela, Republic of Bolivia,

Europe

South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia),

Eastern Europe

(Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine),

Western European and other States

(Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America).

<sup>12</sup> Thackrah, J. R. (2004). *Dictionary of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge. p, viii.

<sup>13</sup> Refer to Chart 1.1 for graphical data representation.

<sup>14</sup> Refer to Chart 1.2 – 1.4 for graphical data representation.

<sup>15</sup> Refer to Chart 1.5 – 1.9 for graphical data representation.