

Specifications of Nunn-Lugar programme: A case study of Pakistan

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Abstract

The paper aims to partly explore the role of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme in the former Soviet Union and its applicability in case of Pakistan's nuclear programme. CTR has enabled the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and elimination of thousands of nuclear weapon systems to reduce the threats posed to U.S. national security. The expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction type programmes is to secure and abolish nuclear materials and other potential WMD ingredients. The paper will also highlight, in response to CTR, Pakistan's stance over the nuclear concerns of the Western world.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace—based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned.

John F. Kennedy

Introduction

The Nunn-Lugar Act sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn, is also known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme (CTR). Its prime objective was to assist former Soviet Union countries in controlling and protecting their nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and delivery systems. To aid in the implementation of arms control agreements, CTR also contributes to the dismantling and destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. It facilitated FSU (former Soviet Union states) to dismantle Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, weapon related materials, and delivery systems, in order to reduce the emerging threats posed to U.S. national security and the security of its friendly partners. American policy makers have now planned to reintroduce the CTR

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programme in other states more effectively in order to curb the current and future WMD threats as mentioned in the nuclear review posture (NPR) of 2010.

Since its inception, CTR has been a key aspect of U.S. WMD and non-proliferation policy in the former Soviet states. The U.S. believes that there is a dire need for the CTR programme to control the emerging WMD proliferation and terrorism threats elsewhere. For this reason, in the revised policy from 2000-2010, it was mentioned that it will spend \$1 billion per year on the CTR programme. This project included strategic offensive arms elimination, nuclear warhead dismantlement, nuclear weapons storage security, chemical weapons destruction, biological weapons proliferation prevention; reactor core conversions, nuclear material protection, control and accounting; export control initiatives and defence conversion.¹

According to the Review Panel report, CTR would expand geographically to play a significant role in all three mainstays of the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), namely, prevention, protection and response.

In 1991, the Nunn-Lugar concept addressed global threats by applying CTR programmes at bilateral levels but in the 2010 nuclear review posture it is proposed to implement it on a multilateral or regional basis. Such programmes could help countries in developing sustainable momentum for threat reduction activities, and increasing capacity to participate effectively in international endeavours such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI). According to the Review Panel report, CTR would expand geographically to play a significant role in all three mainstays of the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), namely, prevention, protection and response.

Pakistan has taken an active part in worldwide efforts towards arms control, counterterrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The western world wants clarification on the status and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, chemical weapons precursors, and pathogen samples.² This paper will highlight the comparison of CTR-type programme in the shape of an aid bill introduced by the U.S. for Pakistan. This study is an attempt to answer the following question: Is S.1707 -

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 acting as another sequel to target Pakistan's nuclear facilities/capabilities? The authors of the CTR and S.1707 - Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009³ are the same; these two bills are introduced by senator Lugar and senator Nunn. The study will explore the purpose of introducing S-1707 act to Pakistan.

Historical background

In November 1991, Senators Lugar and Nunn authored the Nunn-Lugar Act termed as Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme. CTR is an essential component of U.S. legislation entitled "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991".⁴ Then President George Bush provided assistance to FSU in the dismantling of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon facilities with the consent of Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and this concept was endorsed by the Soviet Union Government. In the 1990s, approximately \$400 million was assigned to CTR-related programmes from the U.S. defence budget. The Departments of Defence (DOD), Energy (DOE), Commerce, and the Department of State were authorized to administer it.⁵

The focus of the Nunn-Lugar programme was on the U.S. and USSR working together aggressively around the world to pursue any non-proliferation opportunities. Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 was part of the FY94 National Defence Authorization Act. The main objectives of the program were:

- Warhead removal from the Soviet successor states to Russia.
- Destruction and dismantling weapons systems.
- Chain of custody projects.
- Chemical weapons destruction assistance.
- Demilitarization support.⁶

Senator Nunn realized that unilateral efforts were not enough to cope with the threats of WMD, so it was a challenge for the U.S. to work with its former rival in this programme. The CTR Programme was expanded in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and succeeded in dismantling all of their nuclear weapons. In 2002, the Albanian government provided full cooperation to the programme and revealed 16 tons of chemical weapons, all of which were destroyed.⁷ Even during periods of tension between the U.S. and USSR, both countries remained consistent with the Nunn-Lugar programme to safely demolish nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals.

Nunn-Lugar programme

Lugar Record on the Nunn-Lugar Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye



The CTR Programme Provided Equipment to Dismantle Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines⁸

The following are the details of the progress of Nunn-Lugar Programme on a yearly basis from 1992 to 2010.

Years	Progress of Nunn-Lugar Programme
1992	Pentagon requested Nunn-Lugar Programme to address threats posed by chemical weapons.
1993 – 1996	Nunn-Lugar cooperated with Russia identifying location and technology to be utilized in destruction of chemical weapons.
1996	The Pentagon chose Parsons as main contractor for CWDF (Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility).
1997	Senator Lugar efforts to achieved Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. And opposed an amendment to impose limitations on the use of Nunn-Lugar funds for the destruction of chemical weapons.
1998	Russian economy collapsed, Russia stopped contributing to chemical weapons destruction.
1999	House of Representatives looked for to prohibit the construction of the CWDF and Lugar requested not to stop its construction
2000	Russia identified Shchuchye as site for CWDF and provided land use document.

Strategic Studies

2001	Bush Administration launched a review of the Nunn-Lugar programme.
2002	Lugar provided the President with a waiver for congressional conditions relating to the CWDF. Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Powell endorsed the Lugar's efforts on contributions to the CWDF.
2003	Lugar worked with House and Senate Members on the need to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye. Nunn-Lugar started constructing the CWDF.
2004	Lugar appeared before the National Security Subcommittee of the House Policy Committee on non-proliferation to discuss the importance of Nunn-Lugar and the CWDF project.
2005	Lugar wrote a letter to Secretary of State Rice urging the Administration to support his efforts to eliminate the destruction equipment and the Shchuchye certification requirements.
2006	National Security Advisor Steve Hadley endorsed Senator Lugar's bill. Senate Appropriators cut \$8 million from the Bush Administration's Supplemental request of \$45 million for the Nunn-Lugar programme.
2007	Lugar and Nunn were in Russia celebrated the 15th anniversary on the success of Nuclear Threat Initiative and the CWDF construction of the Nunn-Lugar Programme.
2008	Lugar testified before the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism and outlined the threat posed by the chemical weapons awaiting destruction at Shchuchye and The Senate and House Armed Services Committees were authorized \$1 million for Shchuchye.
2009	The CWDF ran several tests on live chemical weapons at Shchuchye to ensure that the process works as designed. The tests were successful. ⁹
2010	The CWDF remained as a paramount project for the Department of Defense (DoD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. It supported the Russian Federation's Chemical Weapons Convention requirement and eliminated its 32,500-metric-ton stockpile of chemical nerve agent. Furthermore the CTR has expanded its mission from securing and dismantling WMD but also protecting and enhancing land and maritime border security in the former Soviet Union. ¹⁰

CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) specification


Cooperative Threat Reduction Programmes have been considered as the most effective tools of the non-proliferation policy. Under the 108th Congress (2003-2004), the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act (Section 1308 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, PL 108-136) allowed the Department of Defense to spend up to \$50 million on CTR measures outside the former Soviet Union. Under the Bush administration, \$38.5 million was designated for CTR programmes to dismantle chemical weapons-related items in Albania, but supporters of expanding CTR mentioned many other countries as possible recipients. These included India, Pakistan, China, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, to name a few.¹¹ The 9/11 Commission also called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) away from terrorist groups.

Under START-I, USSR was under compulsion to destroy its strategic delivery vehicles and dismantle the resulting surplus nuclear warheads. Furthermore, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan had destroyed their large numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 1990, the USSR went through financial and political turmoil and faced the challenge of ensuring the safety and security upgrades of weapons, weapons delivery systems, and weapons-related materials located at dozens of sites. START-I provided foreign assistance to meet foreign and domestic commitments. Likewise, Russia asked for assistance from U.S., i.e. the CTR programme and the G8 Global Partnership.¹² The CTR programme deals with WMD-related facilities and provided assistance to the former Russian scientists for peaceful research initiatives.


According to the International Science and Technology Centre, the U.S. is the major sponsor in supporting 58,000 former weapon scientists in the peaceful research initiative programmes. The Nunn-Lugar CTR programme deactivated around 7,500 nuclear warheads, more than 2,000 missiles, 1,000 missile launchers, and 31 nuclear ballistic missile submarines. It was successful in securing 24 nuclear weapons storage sites and developed Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as nuclear weapons-free zones.¹³

The policy organizational charts of the CTR programme¹⁴ are shown below:

DoD CTR organization



CTR Policy Organization



Role of DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) aims to safeguard United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and tone down its

effects. The head of DTRA reports to the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics of the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programmes. The DTRA Director also serves as the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Centre for Combating WMD, in accordance with DTRA in the Defense Threat Reduction Centre.¹⁵

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Strategic Command Centre are involved in the national objectives of the DTRA, which addresses the present and future WMD threat to the U.S. There are further divisions in DTRA with their specific objectives and responsibilities; these include Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise, the Operations Enterprise, and the Research and Development Enterprise the Business Enterprise. DTRA was established on October 1, 1998 with the objective of enabling creative solutions through team work. It also ensures to reduce physical and psychological terror of WMD by enhancing the security of the world's citizens. Currently DTRA works in coordination with the military and federal agencies in security, and in disposing of chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. Its mission is to work with willing countries to reduce the threat from WMD related materials and technologies and associated delivery systems and related infrastructure. OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and DTRA are developing a prototype Black Sea regional programme to combat WMD, including nuclear smuggling.¹⁶

Lugar's concern to connect Pakistan in his programme

In 2003, Congress approved the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act and the president authorized the Nunn-Lugar programme to operate outside the former Soviet Union. Regarding Pakistan, Senator Lugar said in a statement, "This authority can and should be used to expand significantly our cooperation with Pakistan in the nuclear arena as well as in other critical areas."¹⁷

In July 2007, the Albanian government requested American assistance in destroying stockpiles of newly found chemical weapons by utilizing the Nunn-Lugar programme. In fact, it was expanded to foreign countries to identify and systematically destroy the weapons and materials of mass destruction that pose a threat to the international community and gather information of that country's number of weapons, materials, production plans. It involved DoD and other concerned U.S Government agencies, other governments, and international organizations in implementing specific CTR projects.¹⁸

CTR programmes have proved to be efficient and successful and hence there is an ongoing debate by the non-proliferation analysts and policymakers as to whether the mechanism can be functional in other regions, including Pakistan. The initial programme in FSU was administered by the U.S. Department of Defense that had been dealing with non-proliferation and denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In 2003-04, the revelation of the A.Q. Khan nuclear supply network stemmed the emergence of CTR-type programme for Pakistan.

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Therefore CTR-like assistance programme for Pakistan has been considered as an initiative to deter proliferation networks, terrorist groups, and insiders from threatening the sovereignty and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Now the Obama Administration states a new strategy to have close, mutual relations with Islamabad. Since 2001, Pakistan is the world's leading recipient of U.S. aid and by the end of FY2009 it had obtained more than \$7.7 billion, with \$4.6 billion in development and humanitarian aid and \$7.2 billion in military aid for counterterrorism efforts.¹⁹

Obama-Lugar

Obama's challenge is to restore American leadership in the world; he thus increased international efforts to control nuclear weapons. In 2005, Obama made his official tour as a U.S. senator with Lugar to the nuclear weapon storage and facilities in Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. The Obama-Lugar legislation was initiated after the successful response of the earlier Nunn-Lugar programme. Obama-Lugar co-sponsored the legislation not only to deal with nuclear weapons but all WMD and the conventional weapons. Obama said in an interview on July 15, 2008 that the intent of this programme is to "help lock down loose nuclear weapons". He strongly supported the expansion of CTR programmes as his policies were tilted towards 'global zero', or a world free of nuclear weapons.

Comparison of CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) in FSU (Former Soviet Union) and Pakistan

The CTR legislation in Russia and NIS (newly independent states of FSU) destroyed thousands tons of weapon-usable nuclear material and deactivated nuclear weapons systems, involving nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians to work for peace. The U.S. proposed cooperation on the storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons. This proved to be a great success and the U.S. hence planned to expand it in the other regions where there is high risk of weapon proliferation; these include Iran, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan in particular.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there were enhanced fears of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan and this created further misperceptions about Pakistani nuclear scientists. Recent events, such as the bin Laden operation, have also raised concerns regarding the country's control of its nuclear weapons and facilities. U.S. officials are alarmed at the cross-border infiltration of Islamist militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan and reported allegations of transfer of Pakistani nuclear technologies and materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya lead to suspicions that Pakistan is involved in illicit smuggling activities.

The uncertainty among American policy makers regarding the ability of non-state actors to take advantage of Pakistan's nuclear materials has led to their desire to extend the Nunn-Lugar programme to Pakistan in the form of KLB. The Kerry- Lugar Bill (KLB) has been a highly intrusive aid instrument and a deliberate attempt to accept U.S. demands. The Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.²⁰

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Some sections in the S-1707 Act warrant attention. Section 203, 2(A) accuses Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies for their involvement in terrorist activities whereas the role of non-state actors is clearly diminished; it directly implicates Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorists and gives unprecedented official access to the U.S. The U.S. justifies its enhanced role due to a deteriorating political and security situation in Pakistan that has led to increased potential threat of Pakistani weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands.

The Nunn-Lugar programme can help secure the pathogen strains to ensure they do not fall into the wrong hands. Equally important, the U.S. can assist Pakistan in establishing a system designed to detect, characterize and respond to the outbreaks of infectious diseases.

Senator Richard Lugar has also noted that irrespective of nuclear weapon security, there is also an immense need for collaboration in the area of infectious diseases and pathogens. The Nunn-Lugar programme can help secure the pathogen strains to ensure they do not fall into the wrong hands. Equally important, the U.S. can assist Pakistan in establishing a system designed to detect, characterize and respond to the outbreaks of infectious diseases.²¹

a) Comparative Analysis of CTR and S.1707 - Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (Kerry-Lugar Bill):

This Act is apparently for non-military assistance bill but it equally covers both military and non-military aspects.

- Under the CTR programme, the U.S. established its field offices in FSU as mention in the **section 103 (b) Authorization for In-country Presence** of the S-1707 Act.
- Inspector General of Department of State also serves as Inspector General of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as mentioned in the **section 103 (a) Assistance Authorized** of the S-1707 Act.
- CTR Programme and S-1707 Act both aim at securing U.S. national security interests.
- Under CTR Programme, USSR was to reimburse the U.S. government for the cost of such assistance from natural resources

available to the recipient country. In S-1707 **section 101 Authorization of Assistance (3)** mentioned as a sustainable management of natural resources.

- The natural resources include:
 - Oil and petroleum
 - Critical and strategic materials; and
 - Industrial goods

- The waiver given in S-1707 with reference to the Budget Function (BF) 050 is about giving the monetary aid directly to the Pakistani non-civilian authorities for nuclear energy, safety and security and other military activities. The aid referred to in BF050 is actually at the discretion of DoE, DoD and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). All these departments are involved in the Nunn-Lugar expansion programmes and in the BF050, assistance related to CTR is given special preference.

CTR and S.1707

The following is a reference to the CTR programme in the S-1707 Act:
Sec. 205. Requirements for Civilian Control of Certain Assistance.
Waiver:

- (2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

This highlighted that non-assistance payments would be released from the Budget Function and the National Defense Budget Function 050 deals with military activities of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE) and the NNSA, the national security activities of several other agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It includes training, maintenance of equipment, and facilities; health care for military personnel and dependents; procurement of weapons; research and development; construction of military facilities, including housing; research on nuclear weapons; and the cleanup of nuclear weapons production facilities rather than to emphasize on the nuclear non-

proliferation programmes at the DoE. The Budget Function (BF) Committee recognizes the importance of the Department's Environmental Management programme and that nuclear clean-up activities are a high priority. This waiver can be given within non-security related assistance if the Secretary of State finds it is in line with U.S. national interest.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) can be introduced to Pakistan because the waiver to be granted by the Budget Function 050 is giving the monetary aid directly to Pakistani non-civilian authorities. The other relevant sections of the Act having implications for the Pakistan's nuclear establishment are:

Sec. 203. Limitations on certain assistance

- d) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a Certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that —
 - (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons- related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

Sec. 302. Monitoring reports

- (12) a detailed description of Pakistan's efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;
- (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programmes and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons programme.

These intrusive clauses of the Act will have a serious impact on the development of the Pakistani nuclear programme. CTR-type programmes are originally designed to deal with proliferation threats that are to be given higher priority and funding. The budget resolution recognizes the need for DoD to cut down wasteful spending with far more thoroughness. According to the KLB, U.S. officials have the authority to monitor the progress made on the Pakistan nuclear weapon programme/facilities. The BF 050 includes the dismantling of nuclear weapons of the recipient state according to the Nunn-Lugar programme. Certain clauses in the KLB

provide American officials direct access to all Pakistan nationals associated with supplier networks or those working in the field. Furthermore, there is a condition that Pakistan cannot acquire nuclear technology from its suppliers and contractors in future.

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The ultimate objective of the S-1707 Act is to put a cap on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, thus adversely affecting the country's nuclear deterrence to counter any threats in future. This programme is in essence a replica of the CTR programme.

Policy recommendations

The Kerry-Lugar legislation was approved by the United States Senate on September 24, 2009 to triple non-military aid to Pakistan to about \$1.5 billion per year for the next five years i.e. between 2009 and 2014. However, serious conditions are attached to this aid programme and were hotly debated by Pakistanis and also presented in Parliament; the bill passed without any changes made. In this context, it is important to devise a foreign policy that redefines U.S.-Pakistan relations.

It is obvious that Pakistan is economically weak and needs aid to strengthen itself, but many analysts note that the KLB is not the only option for the "dying" Pakistani economy. The bill is acceptable if the prerequisites are amended; Pakistan should also look at the possibility of trade with other countries rather than rely on U.S. aid.

Conclusion

There has been much debate on whether the United States should provide assistance in making Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe and more secure. In the wake of September 11, 2001, suspicions about such assistance have grown for several reasons and the possibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons also seems to be higher. There is no specific information on deliberate targeting of Pakistan's nuclear facilities for proliferation or terror purposes. The U.S. is however,

creating through the Kerry-Lugar aid bill, a similar programme to the CTR for the former Soviet Union. It is not surprising that the U.S. considers Pakistan as a potential recipient of CTR-type assistance, and some informal mechanisms are already in place even as there are challenges to a more vigorous programme.

There is tremendous mistrust on the part of the recipient state about covert U.S. objectives; this doubt was gradually alleviated through a dialogue process in the case of the FSU. Working on same line of action, the U.S. is dealing with Pakistan through the KLB in order to dismantle and target its nuclear facilities.

While there are hurdles to formally materialize CTR-type assistance, the United States and Pakistan have cooperated on initiatives that work to prevent nuclear, biological and radiological materials trafficking and strengthen export controls. Linking Pakistan's political instability and terrorist violence with its nuclear programme is not a wise policy. Indeed, accepting the CTR programme is not in the national interest of a sovereign responsible nuclear weapon state because it is articulated to dismantle nuclear weapons and existing stockpiles.

On May 2005, former Senator Lugar, talking about assistance to Pakistan, said that, "We should not distance ourselves from a country that looms so large in our own strategic calculations. We should be clear-eyed about the limits of our relationship. All military and development assistance should be subject to careful review to make sure that it is serving our national security interests."²² The U.S. has a clear policy regarding its national security interests and the same should hold true for Pakistan. There is a misperception in the West that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and Pakistan needs to justify its position as a responsible nuclear weapon state. The ability to do so will end up defining the country's future.

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