

South Asian nuclear equation: a perspective

Zulfqar Khan *

Abstract

The paper argues that the existence of an ambiguous nuclear deterrence capability since the first half of the 1980s had emphasized the significance of nuclear weapons in South Asian geopolitics. However, lately, the geo-economic and geopolitical developments, and the growing military asymmetry have enhanced Pakistan's vulnerabilities against India. In such an environment, Pakistan is constrained to induct a host of measures, including induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to counterbalance India's offensive strategy to enforce its primacy. The pragmatic approach for Pakistan is to move vertically from its posture of a minimum credible deterrence to robustly reinforced offensive-deterrence policy in order to effectively handle the multidimensional threats and challenges to its security. Pakistan's induction of TNWs would augment its defensive capabilities, thereby considerably reducing the prospects of employment of a proactive strategy by India.

Introduction

The international political structure revolves around the pivotal concept of centrality of states' geo-economic and geopolitical interests, their quest for survival,¹ and the absence of fear.² Their behaviour is also determined by the emergence of a plethora of non-traditional challenges to security in the post-Cold War globalized world.³ In this context, Pakistan and India are no exception. Pakistan perceives India as its peer competitor. On the other hand, India considers China and Pakistan as its rivals. In this triangular strategic equation, Pakistan is at a disadvantage, militarily, economically and politically.

Conversely, India being a predominant state is further enhancing the weaker player's security concerns. Pakistan's security dilemma since independence has revolved around its perpetual quest to balance its foreign and security relations with India. This struggle to establish a stable balance-of-power equation was motivated by its efforts to secure its continued existence.⁴ It is argued that

* Dr Zulfqar Khan is Professor and Head, Department of Strategic & Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Pakistan desired to be left alone,⁵ and to let it coexist peacefully⁶ as a viable state well beyond the outreach of hegemonic tendencies of its neighbour.

In a transformed landscape of the present day world politics, the potent military capability, especially the nuclear weapons, still retains its traditional significance and resilience for being an absolute weapon.⁷ Since the 1980s, nuclear weapons are considered as a potent armour in the foreign and security calculus of Pakistan. It was after the existence of an ambiguous nuclear deterrence capability that accentuated the significance of absolute weapon in South Asian geopolitics.

The South Asian regional security complex (RSC),⁸ after the imperial decolonisation and emergence of autonomous states, had impelled both the countries to head toward divergent poles. India, during the formative period of its post-colonial history, pursued a neutral foreign policy; and in the late 1960s and the early 1970s it tilted toward the then Soviet bloc, which ultimately culminated in signing of a defence treaty between India and the Soviet Union in 1971. The emerging superstructure under the predominant influence of the bipolar world politics, made both countries subordinate to the Asian security super complex.⁹

Although the Cold War and the bipolar rivalry between the two power blocs have now receded into the annals of history, still the smaller state, Pakistan, and India; an emerging economic and military power-house; are associating themselves with the multi-polar dynamics of the altered geostrategic landscape of the globalized world in the 21st century. Though both countries tend to profess that their foreign and security policies are based on a neutral stance, but since 9/11, the United States and India have strategically come much closer to each other due to multiple factors, including to contain the rising China, and to control the onslaught of militancy and terrorism.¹⁰

In addition, the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement of 2008 in Pakistan's perspective is the biggest destabilising factor in the South Asian nuclear equation, which had accorded India a de facto legitimacy as a nuclear weapon state (NWS).¹¹ On the contrary, Pakistan was erroneously lumped to a failed state – Afghanistan – under unilaterally prescribed label of Af-Pak to fight the 'War on Terror.'¹² The unilateral employment of forces in the 'mindsets of the US War on Terror,' writes Ken Booth, are 'ratcheting up world insecurity.'¹³ This surely is true as far as South Asia of post-9/11 is concerned.

Besides, the Indo-U.S. strategic and nuclear partnership along with scores of other science and technology transfer agreements, are expected to qualitatively

and quantitatively increase India's nuclear and scientific research and development potentials and, conversely, enhance Pakistan's insecurity and fear of a predominant power that had formalized well-knit strategic, economic and political arrangements with the leading world powers, including the U.S., Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany.¹⁴ In such a constraining and challenging environment, it is believed that for Pakistan a robust nuclear capability has now become a much more critical element of its foreign and security policy. The subsequent paragraphs will outline the multi-dimensional contours of South Asian nuclear equation in the dramatically changed world political structure after 9/11.

Security environment

Since 1947, the South Asian security paradigm has been overshadowed by India- Pakistan's perpetual state of antagonism against each other, which created a fragile relationship that increasingly became susceptible to eruption of crises. But, since the 1980s, their troubled relationship has a raised number of pertinent questions concerning the viability of deterrence in such a tension- and mistrust-ridden security environment. Because of this state of mutual animosity, both countries have persistently achieved the capabilities to cause unacceptable damage to each other.

For example, during the 2001-2002 crisis, India's then defence minister had made a belligerent statement that: "We could take a strike, survive, and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished."¹⁵ In the heightened state of tension, both the countries enhanced their nuclear and missile programmes, which further added lethality to their military capabilities and credibility. India is much superior in conventional forces to Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan considers the nuclear weapons as an indispensable part of its defence system to offset Indian conventional dominance.¹⁶ In addition, India has an edge in geo-economic and geopolitical realms as well. The Indian military planners naively believe that they can "engage in and win a limited conventional conflict without triggering a nuclear exchange even though the Pakistani army's strategy relies on nuclear weapons to offset India's overwhelming conventional superiority."¹⁷

This perception gives rise to a number of relevant questions concerning the viability of bilateral deterrence in the wake of India's growing economic, industrial, diplomatic, and strategic and non-strategic capability to dilute Pakistan's potential to counterbalance India's apparent plan to enforce its primacy.

The relationship between the two countries is ostensibly premised on a perception of mutual vulnerability – to avert war. However, now it appears to be shifting toward the policy of pre-emption based on a possible victory in a limited war under the nuclear umbrella, as observed by an Indian writer, Gurmeet Kanwal.¹⁸ The aggressive posture of India and the absence of arms control mechanisms between the two have created a security dilemma for Pakistan,¹⁹ which is compelling it to calibrate a strategy to counter the adversary's unilateralist tendencies. In fact, India and Pakistan are fine-tuning offensive and defensive strategies respectively to counter each other.

To explain such a phenomenon, Scott Sagan has devised a 'three lenses' perspective to elucidate states' behaviour and their motivation to calibrate such doctrines. These lenses include: "Organization Theory... Realism Doctrine... Strategic Culture Theory,"²⁰ which in the theorist's view, largely determine "new proliferant' states" various offensive or defensive strategies and behaviour.²¹ Furthermore, such divergent plans ostensibly possess an inbuilt propensity to escalate a strategic arms race, which in the absence of confidence and security building mechanism would continue to keep their deterrence posture on a very slippery footing. Additionally, their bilateral "mirror-imaging",²² that the other state would behave in a same way, is quite a perilous and complicated proposition. Their nuclear postures and assumptions that the other party would behave in an identical way cannot of course be taken for granted in the existing asymmetrical strategic and political equation between the two.

Moreover, states do not necessarily possess a set pattern of behaviour in a crisis situation.²³ Therefore, formulating aggressive doctrines and making statements about their intents or capabilities are only expected to further dilute the effectiveness of their deterrent. In addition, the organizationally bias military-doctrine is invariably in favour of pre-emptive strategies and triggering of an action-reaction process, that would be prone to accidents, like India's calibration of the so-called 'Cold Start Doctrine,' (CSD) to fight a limited war.²⁴ Ostensibly, the conception of such a plan to deliberately initiate a conflict has inherent potentials to increase the propensity to take competitive "risking-taking, characterised not so much by tests of forces as by tests of nerve."²⁵ One is mindful of the fact that the two South Asian rivals have consistently triggered a series of crises on various rationales since the mid-1980s, which can be classified as a perilous risk taking and tantamounts to testing the nerves of the other state. The initiation of such crises is increasing the dynamics of "stability/instability paradox"²⁶ in South Asia that is contrary to the principles of stable nuclear deterrence. Hence, frequent escalation of crises would continue to undermine the

deterrence, strategic stability, and increase the prospects of inadvertent conflicts in South Asia.²⁷

The supposed Indian adoption of an offensive military doctrine of CSD – to initiate a deliberate and well-calibrated provocative attack scheme with its conventionally superior forces against Pakistan – is likely to trigger an appropriate response from the latter as well. However well planned and calibrated Pakistan's response may be, it can still quite conveniently spiral out of control. As India and Pakistan have divergent offensive and counter-offensive strategies, respectively, it would increase the probability of escalation at a time of crisis. Therefore, the prospects of risks would be high on both sides,²⁸ and thereby further intensifying the fog of unpredictability.

Flawed and perilous strategies

The U.S.-India nuclear energy agreement and the increasing Indian military capability²⁹ are potent factors enhancing Pakistan's insecurity and impelling it to strengthen its resolve to sustain a qualitative and quantitative development in its nuclear programme. According to one estimate, the deal is expected to increase India's capability to produce upto 240 nuclear weapons in a year.³⁰ Besides, in the post-9/11 world, the concept of security is also being reconceptualised by the powerful states and that is increasing the sense of insecurity in other states.³¹ The cardinal principles of state sovereignty, norms of diplomacy, international relations, and non-intervention that were in vogue since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, subtly began to dilute in the post-9/11 world. India, due to the international fixation on the concept of a War on Terror, meticulously tried to align its foreign and security policy with the U.S. and its allies in order to nurture its inherent ambition to impose its dominance on the South Asia. For this objective, India is persistently modernizing its military equipment. It has already reportedly signed \$42 billion worth defence deals with different countries and the amount is expected to exceed \$100 billion in the next decade.³² This procurement plan would be considered by its neighbours, especially Pakistan, as an aggressive development and India's scheme to coerce and occupy its territory in a blitzkrieg-type conventional attack under its apparent offensive operational and delusional plan of CSD.³³

According to Robert Jervis, excessive military capabilities are dangerous and can lead to conflicts.³⁴ The dramatic weaponisation of India is expected to accord a sufficient rationale to Pakistan to appropriately perceive Delhi's weapons procurement spree as a negative security development. Jervis further writes, "Every war involves at least one serious misperception." Similarly, in the context

of South Asia, it is impacting Pakistan's security concerns, which is constrained to remould its perceptions regarding India.³⁵ In such circumstances, states have a propensity to "Choose war because of consideration of honour, domestic politics, or international reputation."³⁶

In the case of Pakistan, as reasoned earlier, its very survival is at stake. Therefore, it is likely to consider taking measures to explore all available contingencies, including harnessing of strategies of wholesome nuclear deterrence, for its defence. The wholesome strategy may incorporate the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons into its calculus in parallel with maintenance of an adequate conventional force ratio in order to hold India's plan of CSD, or proactive strategy, at bay.

In Pakistani perspective, India's proactive strategy is amounts to a provocative strategy. Therefore, such destabilising tendencies could lead to nurturing of a strategic culture based on the risk of a surprise attack.³⁷ Obviously, such cultural lens would be perilous and destabilising. It could escort both the countries to a misperceived war on various rationales, including through CSD's punitive design to attack with a view to attain escalation dominance, and to induce compellence.

In the neorealist perspective, "Competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under condition of anarchy." Therefore, if a stronger state amasses instruments of war, including crafting of offensive doctrines and procurement of state-of-the-art weapons for different stated underlying principles and objectives, then it is expected to evoke appropriate response from the other state as well.³⁸ The factors impinging on the state's security are of paramount significance in comparison to specific relations among the states. "In reality," writes Waltz, "everything is related to everything else and one domain cannot be separated from the others."³⁹ Thus, Pakistan cannot afford to neglect its critical national security interests, since 'inattention or miscalculation is often paid in blood' by the other state.⁴⁰ Pakistan's appropriate response cannot be classified as a miscalculation or overreaction.

Rather, it would be a realistic, flexible, and a balanced counter-strategy in order to counteract the stronger state's miscalculated and flawed plan.⁴¹ For that reason, any inattention or miscalculation would be costly for state security.⁴² As observed earlier, in the present situation, an offensive-defensive strategy of Pakistan would persuade⁴³ the stronger state not to go to war on perilously misconceived strategies. In the Pakistan-India equation, nuclear weapons are expected to "Reverse or negate many of the conventional causes of war."⁴⁴

Hence, a robust counter approach in amalgam with nuclear weapons would be a favourable strategy to stabilise strategic stability, and to sustain a viable deterrence posture against India. In Pakistan's armoury, there is insufficient conventional power to effectively counter the offensive plans of the adversary. Therefore, nuclear power is the best strategy to hold adversary from pursuing provocative strategies.⁴⁵ In anarchic world, conflicts abound once there is no appropriate force to stop them.⁴⁶ As the world system is so unpredictable,

Pakistan would tend to formulate its counter-strategy, and other relevant policies in the light of the statements emitted by policymakers of its adversary. Since 9/11, fear and insecurity too have increased due to different developments discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and as mankind is influenced by "three fundamental passions – interest, pride, and... fear" writes Robert Gilpin, and for that reason it attempts to increase...power in order to contain the offensive policies of the opponent.⁴⁷ Therefore, Pakistan should realise that the "fear of suffering is worse than the suffering itself."⁴⁸ Therefore, the only pragmatic option for it would be to enhance its military and non-military elements of security with the intention of effectively safeguarding its critical national security interest.

Overestimation and misjudgement

According to Robert Jervis, "although war can occur even when both sides see each other accurately, misperception often plays a large role." He argues: "Particularly interesting are judgements and misjudgements of another state's intentions." Above all, "overestimates and underestimates of hostility have led to war in the past." This "perceptual dynamics" could still "cause statesmen to see policies as safe when they actually were very dangerous," and thereby seeing war "inevitable" impels them to strike first in order to "limit destruction."⁴⁹ This statement of Jervis has a lot of relevance for South Asia as well.

For instance, India, due to its huge conventional, geo-economic and geopolitical power, could overestimate its potentials and plan to induce compliance from Pakistan without crossing the latter's threshold. Alternatively, Pakistan can also misjudge the Indian intentions by perceiving that, with a view to limit the destruction of a looming war, it may resort to first-strike in a crisis. Actually, it is a simple analogy, but has inbuilt prospects of triggering a catastrophic crisis merely on misperceptions, misjudgements, or overestimations leading both states unwittingly to uncontrollable escalation.

Naturally, escalation has its own triggers, which becomes difficult, if not impossible, to control once it crosses the “rung of intense crises.” It could be from severance of diplomatic relations to other punitive actions like embargoes.⁵⁰ Fortunately, the previous crises between the two countries have been limited to hardening of confrontational postures to signalling of “dramatic” military preparedness.⁵¹ Hence, both parties were deterred from any misadventure.

Since the mid-1980s, both countries have displayed an excessive belligerent resolve for a possible showdown with the apparent intent to coerce and compel the other party. Excessive rhetoric, especially during the crises, can emit mixed signals that can be wrongly interpreted by the rival state. Such behaviour of statesmen can obviously be quite dangerous for peace and stability of South Asia. Unfortunately, the policymakers of both countries have tendencies to indulge in nuclear threats that negate the very spirit and principles of deterrence.

Deterrence’s viability has more credibility in possession of a capability instead of threatening to use nuclear weapons in a rhetorical fashion.⁵² In actual fact, the threat of use of force and credibility of deterrence are linked to the rationale that the rivals would avoid display of offensive military capabilities to achieve their political objectives, or to employ asymmetrical forces for such goals. According to Kenneth Boulding, “Little threats that are fairly sure to be carried out are much more effective in deterring adverse human behaviour than large threats that are unlikely to be carried out.”⁵³ Although large threats are not expected to be employed by the rational actor; in extreme coercion or plan to use asymmetrical conventional force against the weaker adversary; it is likely to push the latter category of state to employ all the available forces to neutralize the perceived threat.

For instance, when a state is confronted with an alternative that is suicidal in their national perspective – like allowing adversary to attack and occupy its territories – then, in such a desperate situation, history shows that the weaker state, in spite of being rational, cannot be discounted from employing suicidal pre-emptive or retaliatory measures: to strike first against the stronger adversary. In this context, Sagan writes that the “theme of Japanese irrationality” in starting the Pacific War in 1941 against the U.S., in his perspective, is quite “misleading”. In Sagan’s view, it was Japanese “agonizing” dilemma between two conflicting “alternatives” that led the then Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to advise the emperor that, “our Empire has no alternative but to begin war.”⁵⁴

This was a “mutual failure of deterrence” in view of both countries’ conflicting policy perspectives on Japanese government’s plan to expand its area of influence and to establish the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty-Sphere’ in Southeast Asia versus the U.S. endeavour to prevent Tokyo from expansionist designs.⁵⁵ Therefore, “Deterrence failed in 1941,” concludes Sagan, “despite the anticipated ‘unacceptable’ costs of war to Japan, because the costs of *not* going to war were considered even higher.”⁵⁶ Such a security dilemma needs to be avoided for a smooth functioning of a viable deterrence posture in the subcontinent. Naturally, sovereign states consider survival as their primary existential condition⁵⁷ and, that in order to safeguard their interests; they can resort to even extreme decisions, like the one Japanese took in 1941.

Indian conventional weapons procurement

Essentially, the South Asian nuclear equation is already under considerable over-shadow of India’s excessive procurement of conventional weapons, flawed doctrines, which in the absence of arms control and conflict resolution mechanisms and inadequate confidence and security building measures, are destabilising developments. The improvement of bilateral foreign and security policy relations would go a long way in positively securitizing the South Asian structure.⁵⁸

However, India’s aggressive and flawed perspectives concerning the formulation of offensive military doctrines in view of its conventional weapons procurement spree, is directly undermining the strategic stability of the region. In fact, India is one of the largest buyers of sophisticated conventional weapon systems in the world. In this connection, India has a plan to spend \$80 billion by 2015 on its armed forces modernisation programme in accordance with its Defence Procurement Plan of 2002.⁵⁹

Additionally, India possesses the capability, technology and indigenous resources to manufacture various types of defence equipments and weapons. Incidentally, India is already working on a programme to manufacture light combat aircraft Tejas, which is expected to be inducted in the Indian Air Force.⁶⁰ Moreover, France is also assisting India in missile development and up-gradation of its mirage fleet. In 2012, India signed a contract with the French Dassault Aviation for the purchase of Rafael fighter aircraft.⁶¹

Similarly, Russia is India’s another traditional supplier of sophisticated weapons. Nowadays, Moscow is also cooperating in the production and development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, 250-300 stealth fighters, 82

Sukhoi-30 MKI combat aircrafts, T-90 tanks In 2001 Russia had agreed to supply 80 Mi-17V-5 transport helicopters to India.⁶² Besides, India and Israel too have established a research and development programme to manufacture medium-range surface-to-air missile systems. India has already reportedly procured three Phalcon airborne early warning radar systems (AWACS) and A-50 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft from Israel.⁶³ For its blue water navy, India has earmarked \$11 billion for the construction of six new generation diesel electric submarines.⁶⁴

Apparently, these submarines would be equipped with air independent propulsion system (AIP) with stealth and land attack capabilities, which would qualitatively enhance its military capability at sea, and enable it to secure a second-strike nuclear capability. The Indian acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system reflects that its ultimate goal is to acquire Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT) system to enhance its space assets and security in the space vis-à-vis China.

All these programmes are expected to tremendously boost India's conventional capabilities and enhance its strategic outreach in the coming years. Consequently, for a country like Pakistan, it would be a huge challenge and burden for its struggling economy to compete. Therefore, the only rational approach left for Islamabad is to strengthen its strategic-cum-tactical arsenal on offensive-defence model in order to face the emerging challenges to its security.

India's access to dual-use technologies would augment its space programme, and consequently negatively impact regional stability, increase insecurity for the weaker states and further erode the bilateral deterrence architecture. In such an environment, the regional states would be forced to take requisite measures to improve their defence systems to enhance their national security. The countries that are most affected by this inflow of high technology to India are primarily Pakistan and China. However, in the case of China, it already had tested its BMD system in 2010, which has enabled Beijing to be part of the elite club of BMD possessing countries.

In the case of Pakistan, its vulnerabilities against India would constrain it to induct a host of measures, including induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and the TNWs to counterbalance Delhi's offensive strategy.⁶⁵

Viability of deterrence

Presently, Pakistan's socio-economic, law and order and political situation is so fragile that it would be almost attrition for Islamabad to engage in an arms race, or to participate in weapons acquisition programme to counterbalance India's quest to attain primacy. The dual-use technological acquisition plan of India suggests that it is replicating the U.S. policy of "regional security architectures."⁶⁶ That would facilitate India in expanding its strategic outreach beyond the frontiers of South Asia,⁶⁷ and as a result put the regional states under a perennial disadvantage. It would lead to a relationship of inequality based on a paradigm of compellence.

Therefore, deterrence stability is the only viable and rational key to ensuring strategic stability. Conversely, the Indian overwhelmingly dominating posture would continue to generate instability, insecurity, and enhance the prospects of conflicts. Likewise, the regional states would too be constrained to engage in an arms race, or to take counter-measures, including revisiting their strategies in relation to India's, thereby spending less on their socioeconomic sectors that would eventually generate more poverty, illiteracy and other socioeconomic ills.

Clearly, in the emerging situation, the "most immediate threats to Pakistan's stability are domestic,"⁶⁸ that is persistently eroding the country's cohesion and undermining the socioeconomic fabric of the nation. There is another dimension to the calibration of pressure on Pakistan, as its "alleged non-proliferation record is poor, there are concerns about the security of sensitive nuclear materials, and there is no sign of a slowdown in its nuclear weapons drive."⁶⁹

Apparently, Pakistan is endeavouring to develop a second-strike nuclear capability⁷⁰ to strengthen its deterrence credentials. In the diplomatic realm, it is pursuing a holistic stance in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the proposed Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT). Pakistan's stance in the CD is being criticised on flimsy rationale, and scant attention is paid to the fact that Pakistan has genuine security concerns that require urgent attention before it could consent to the Treaty, which should possess a well-charted verification, accounting, and non-discriminatory mechanism. This disregard of Islamabad's concerns is further complicating the environment in CD and, consequently, spurring pressure on Pakistan to mellow-down its policy on these critical national security issues.⁷¹

Simultaneously, the Indian strategic enclave, including its former External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, is emphasising to re-evaluate the country's

nuclear doctrine of no first-use (NFU). He cited various security concerns confronting India to justify his suggested review of the NFU policy. In his perspective, the NFU is “antiquated.” Therefore, India should not “sit in yesterday’s policy”. However, India’s External Affairs Minister, S.M Krishna, was quick in clarifying that there was no proposal to revise the NFU Policy.⁷² Yet, this has generated a discourse that is expected to evoke multifarious reactions from its strategic community thereby influencing the perceptions of its policymakers.

Actually, some Indian scholars were already urging the government to reassess its nuclear doctrine. An Indian scholar, Reshmi Kazi, questions the “efficacy of the NFU policy, on the ground that it has little relevance as a strategic tool against Pakistan.” This in the author’s view was “considered to be a merely declaratory policy. Hence, it has no binding legitimacy.” Further that, “Pakistan’s military establishment views India’s NFU doctrine as a paper policy that cannot be depended upon in a situation where the stakes are high. Since India’s nuclear doctrine is a unilateral decision, it can be revoked anytime if the situation so demands.”⁷³

This probably is the true reflection of India’s nuclear doctrine, which on the surface is based on a declared policy of NFU and, on the other hand, its revocation, or its smart utilization in conjunction with other strategic and conventional tools during the crises, also appears to be on its cards. It suggests that India is gradually restructuring its posture of active deterrence to dissuasive deterrence with a view to build up its “infrastructure along the border and improving the surveillance and warning capabilities, the mobility of land-based missiles, survivability of the airborne retaliatory force, and increased force levels.”⁷⁴

The dissuasive deterrence posture in conjunction with its increasing economic, political and strategic clout at the dawn of the 21st century is expected to strengthen India’s potentials to sway its dominance over the region. At the same time, the way it is formalising flawed war-fighting doctrines is additionally undermining its credentials as a responsible nuclear weapon state (NWS). In reality, a NWS behaving on rhetorical whims and flawed sets of guidelines and concepts is likely to destabilise any endeavour to enhance the deterrence viability; especially during the times of crises when the situation is highly fragile, unpredictable, and laden with uncertainties.

Conclusion

Since independence, Pakistan and India have been in a perpetual state of rivalry under the South Asian regional security complex (RSC).⁷⁵ They had attained ambiguous nuclear deterrence in the 1980s, which signified the future relevance of absolute weapons toward the establishment of an effective deterrence in South Asia. Subsequently, nuclear weapons became a powerful instrument of foreign and security policy of Pakistan (as well as India) in order to hold India's huge military superiority at bay. However, the growing centrality of geoeconomic and geopolitical factors in the post-9/11 globalised world has also enhanced Pakistan's insecurity and threat perceptions against India.

That is because India had forged well-knitted strategic and science and technology partnership arrangements with different developed countries, including the U.S., the UK, France, Germany and Russia, to procure state-of-the-art weapon systems and nuclear and other conventional weapons-related technologies. This would further intensify the gulf of asymmetries, and nurture India's ostensible designs to operationalise its faulty and aggressive CSD strategy with a view to enforcing its primacy on Pakistan - thereby putting the latter's nuclear deterrence posture under tremendous stress.

This has created a precarious geostrategic environment where the prospects of overestimations, underestimations and misjudgements have multiplied, especially during the crises. In such circumstances, Pakistan's induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and TNWs to counterbalance Delhi's offensive strategy is its strategic imperative. Restructuring of Pakistan's strategy on a pragmatic and realistic path would enable it to move vertically from its posture of a minimum credible deterrence to robustly reinforced offensive-deterrence policy, which would assist it to successfully deal with the emerging multidimensional threats and challenges to its security. Otherwise, the prevalent relationship of inequality is not expected to contribute to the achievement of deterrence stability milieu in South Asia. In essence, perhaps the only viable and rational key to realising the objective of strategic stability in the absence of bilateral trust, growing military, socioeconomic and geopolitical asymmetries, non-existent conflict resolution mechanisms, and properly institutionalised confidence and security building framework, is to craft an offensive-defensive doctrine in harmony with conventional, strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces with the intent to contain the Indian scheme to operationalise its proactive/offensive strategy. Pakistan's unambiguous articulation of its doctrine and resolve to effectively harness all its resources to ward-off future emergence

of critical and perilous crises would go a long way in restraining India's huge war machine from employing it in a blitzkrieg mode against Pakistan.

On the domestic front, presently, the most potent threats to Pakistan's security and stability are from the domestic socioeconomic, law and order/terrorism, energy scarcity, political polarisation, and other institutional degeneration issues,⁷⁶ which are persistently undermining the country's capability and cohesion diametrically contrary to its national interest. Logically, internal institutional reformative measures are required on priority in order to contain, if not to eliminate, the onset of degeneration process. Otherwise, the huge geoeconomic, geopolitical, and military asymmetries are expected to negatively impact the entire structure of the state. In this context, essentially, the *polemological* (Greek word for war) causation theory of study of war elucidates a number of interrelated factors that are invariably responsible for the outbreak of conflicts and wars.⁷⁷ In this context, Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff comprehensively enumerate these causes:

The *polemological* approach to war causation represents an essentially *interdisciplinary* and *historical* approach to the study of war. It seeks to explore the interacting geostrategic, military technological, political-economic, legal (including domestic and international laws, and norms), socio-cultural (including religion and values), bio-political (including ethnic identity, age, gender and demography), ideological (including conceptions of justice and peace), dialogical (including diplomacy, media and propaganda), natural-environmental and psychological factors (including alienation) that influence and impact upon the causes of conflict and war.⁷⁸

All these factors identified by Gardner and Kobtzeff vividly demonstrate the linkages of different societal aspects upon the relative position of a state in the international system. Therefore, the required lens to understand the dynamics and causes of society's degeneration process also warrants looking beyond the military and geopolitical reasons behind Pakistan's comparative position in relation to India. Therefore, by overcoming these internal causes of decay and then restructuring and redirecting these dynamics into its advantage, would go a long way in underpinning the country's potentials at grass-root level, which would ultimately improve and influence its situation against India. However, immediate reorganization of country's strategic policy, as suggested in the preceding sections, is a critical requirement in order to confine India to its home ground, instead of providing it an opportunity to come and manoeuvre on Pakistani territory in accord with Delhi's outlined strategic dogma.

Notes & References

- ¹ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1990): p. 319.
- ² Kenneth N. Waltz, 'International Structure, National Forces, and the Balance of World Power,' in *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 304.
- ³ Emma Rothschild writes that the 'concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals;' Emma Rothschild, 'What is Security?' in *International Security: Vol. III, Widening Security*, eds. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2007), p. 2. Also see, Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 305.
- ⁷ See Bernard Brodie, ed. *Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).
- ⁸ See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.
- ¹⁰ Buzan and Waever write that the end of the Cold War affected a 'dramatic transformation in the security dynamics of South Asia;' *ibid.*, pp. 105, 106.
- ¹¹ See the statement of Raja Zafarul Haq, leader of the House in Senate, concerning the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and promotion of India in the international nuclear order; 'Speakers Highlight Reservations, Double Standards,' *The Express Tribune*, June 28, 2013.
- ¹² Satish Kumar et al., 'India's Strategic Partners: A Comparative Assessment,' *Foundation for National Security Research* (November 2011): p. 2.
- ¹³ Booth, *Theory of World*, p. 96.
- ¹⁴ For more detail on strategic, economic, political and diplomatic collaboration, see Kumar et al., 'India's Strategic.' pp. 1-15.
- ¹⁵ Quoted by Michael Krepon, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements,' *ARMS CONTROL WONK*, May 10, 2011.
- ¹⁶ Gurmeet Kanwal writes, 'If Pakistan were to...resort to the unthinkable, then India might as well insure that Pakistan finally ceases to exist as a nation state;' *ibid.*
- ¹⁷ Quoted by Daryl G. Kimball, 'South Asia is a more dangerous place after the 1998 nuclear tests,' *ARMS COTROL WONK*, May 13, 2011.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*

-
- ¹⁹ Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,' *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): pp. 167-214.
- ²⁰ Scott D. Sagan, 'The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control System,' in *Planning the Unthinkable: How new Powers will use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons*, eds. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 17-30.
- ²¹ Ibid., p. 17.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ See Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' *International Security* 32, no. 3 (winter 2007/08).
- ²⁵ See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 94.
- ²⁶ See Glen H. Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,' in *The Balance of Power*, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965).
- ²⁷ See Lynn E. Davis, 'Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine,' *Adelphi Paper 121* (1975-76).
- ²⁸ See Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 134, and 153-157.
- ²⁹ See Krepon, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements.' Incomplete
- ³⁰ Tariq Osman Hyder, 'Strategic Restraint in South Asia,' *CISS Insight* (April-May, 2013): p. 11.
- ³¹ Booth, *Theory of World*, pp. 96, 97.
- ³² Rida Zeenat, 'India-Pakistan: Deterrence to Compellence,' *Eurasia Review: News & Analysis*, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/10032011-india-pakistan-deterrence-to-compellence/> (accessed on June 4, 2013).
- ³³ See Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start,' 163-167. Incomplete
- ³⁴ Robert Jervis, 'War and Misperception,' in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 102.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Sagan, 'The Origins of Military,' p. 44. Incomplete
- ³⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,' in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 43.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 39.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 44.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 47.
- ⁴² Ibid., 44.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 49.

- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 See, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis: With a new Preface* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
- 47 Robert Gilpin, 'The Theory of Hegemonic War,' in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 17.
- 48 Paulo Coelho, *The Alchemist* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), p. 124.
- 49 Jervis, 'War and Misperception,' p. 101. Incomplete
- 50 See Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 83-93.
- 51 Ibid., 66-67, and 74.
- 52 T. V. Paul, 'Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons,' in *The Absolute Weapon Revisited*, eds. T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 27.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Scott D. Sagan, 'The Origin of the Pacific War,' in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 324-325.
- 55 Ibid., p. 325.
- 56 Ibid., p. 350.
- 57 Booth, *Theory of World*, p. 102.
- 58 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, p. 449.
- 59 See Iskander Rehman, 'The Military Dimensions of India's Rise,' <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43444/> (accessed on February 22, 2013).
- 60 Zeenat, 'India-Pakistan', pp. 1-2. Incomplete.
- 61 'India Rises quietly and steadily,' *The Nation*, , February 22, 2013, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/India-rises-quietly-and-steadily-30200484.html> (accessed on June 16, 2013).
- 62 Zeenat, 'India-Pakistan, pp. 1-2.'
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 See, Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (retired), Director General of Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan, statement cited in *IJSS news* (May 2013), p. 10.
- 66 According to 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the U.S., the "regional security architectures include effective missile defence, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control – all underwritten by strong political commitments," cited in James M. Acton, 'Low Numbers: A Practical Path To Deep Nuclear Reduction,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Washington DC., 2011.
- 67 See, David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, 'Keeping US Dual-Use Goods out of India's Nuclear Weapons Program,' *ISIS Report*, January 26, 2011.

-
- 68 Alexander H. Rothman and Lawrence J. Korb, 'Pakistan Double its Nuclear Arsenal, is it Time to Start Worrying?' www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/03/pakistan-doubles-its-nuclear-arsenal-is-it-time-to-start-worrying.html (accessed on March 23, 2011).
- 69 Ili Heinonen, 'Pakistan in Nuclear Upswing,' *HOFFPOST WORLD*, March 30, 2011. Also see, David Albright and Paul Brannan, 'Pakistan Doubling Rate of Making Nuclear Weapons: Time for Pakistan to Reverse Course,' *ISIS Imagery Brief*, May 16, 2011.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 For example, Sharon Squassoni, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, commenting on Pakistan's internal situation and terrorism, writes that in Pakistan "a disaster is waiting to happen"; Andrew Bast, 'Pakistan's nuclear Surge,' *Newsweek*, May 15, 2011, <http://www.newsweek.com/2011/05/15/fourth-nuclear-reactor-at-pakistan-s-khushab-site.print.html>, (accessed on May 30, 2011).
- 72 Quoted by Reshmi Kazi, "Why India should retain its N-First-Use Policy?" *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, April 11, 2011, www.eurasiareview.com/11042011-why-india-should-retain-its-no-first-use-policy-analysis/ (accessed on June 4, 2011).
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 See Buzan and Waever.
- 76 Rothman and Korb, 'Pakistan Double its Nuclear Arsenal.'
- 77 Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, 'General Introduction: Polemology,' in *The Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention*, eds. Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), p. 3.
- 78 Ibid., p. 4.