

Civil-military relations in India: 'riding the tiger'^{*}

Shamsa Nawaz^{**}

Abstract

The dismissal by the Indian military of two political decisions mutually agreed upon between Pakistan and India on the demarcation of border at Sir Creek and phased withdrawal of forces from the frozen heights of Siachen area at the borders of China and Pakistan, demonstrates an alteration in the moods of the Indian military. Its posture was always balanced and it remained politically indoctrinated unlike its counterparts in the region for long. The frequent statements by Indian generals and incidents followed by these assertion is accompanied by a gradual procedural and structural transition in the Indian military. This shift in the nature of relationship between civil and military necessitates a review. The conventional socio-economically and socio-politically disintegrating factors are already dismantling the democratic procedures and its spirit in India. The paradox is further accentuated by religious marginalization, giving space to radicalism followed by overindulgence of paramilitary forces to maintain law and order. The impediments created by Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA), Armed Forces Special Powers Act AFSPA and other black laws have evolved a new mindset in the Indian military which could be challenging for the organization itself. The possible electoral victory in the Indian general elections in 2014 of either Nirendra Moody of Bharatiya Janata Party or Rahul Gandhi of Indian National Congress substantiate the possible change in prevalent paradigm and raise a few questions. Though the investigation is based mainly on the evaluation of literature, due to the sensitivity of the subject, however it is supported by theory and analysis of the history of Indian military and its relationship with the political governments and their leaders since 1947.

Introduction

Historically, South Asia has seen two contradicting models of military professionalism: one remaining completely within the parameters of its specific

^{*} Chief Field Marshal Philip Chetwode elaborated in 1932 while talking about Civil-Military relations in India and the role of the government.

Hussain Basharat Qazilbash, "The Army remains the final arbiter", November 29, 2012, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/?p235723.

^{**} Shamsa Nawaz is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. She wishes to thank Mr. Hassan Raza (Internee at the ISSI) for providing her assistance in the collection of material and compilation of references.

career traditions, while the other has believed in its contribution to the political realm. Both of the paradigms, as seen in the cases of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and to some extent in Sri Lanka, have often appeared poles apart, but their complex and even tense relations with their civil counterparts necessitate more than cursory surveys that we have seen so far. In that vein, the militaries of India and Pakistan in particular have been posited as two different models altogether where one remains subservient to civilian authority, whereas the other overtakes it, or even subverts it. That is how the two different kinds of generals—political versus the fighting—become familiar images of two South Asian case studies.

Other than dissecting the symbols such as what khaki is and what civil is, we need to locate the grey areas where two echelons could even feed into each other through sheer expediency and dependency and thus, understandably, not be devoid of mutual contests. Civilian and military bureaucracies under both these models share ambiguities when it comes to the issues of decentralization, restoration of law and order and dealing with insurgencies. Their relations with the external forces, through training programmes, joint exercises and sharing of technical know-how, posit them in an almost not too dissimilar context.

This historical module of convergence of civil-military policies, in the absence of land-based warfare, and in the wake of concepts such as deterrence and peace time strategies, also seem to have initiated a debate on the levels of intervention by the military in developed political cultures like that of India, which is the second largest democracy. The co-existence of Indian military with other weakened institutions of parliamentary democracy** is treading tightly. On the other hand, the recent pronouncements of the Indian generals on Sir Creek and Siachin, who represent a relatively secure and autonomous Indian military, both constitutionally and organizationally, necessitate an answer. Is it a press forward to dominate the foreign policy? Is this pressure motivated by the desire to defend its authority or to dominate the civil authorities? The sense of overwhelming power and dissimilarities between the military and the civilian organizations and the military and the corporate organizations are the supportive paradigms to the changing moods of the Indian military. For, what could be the

** "India's agenda for socioeconomic change has evolved into a reactive state. This state is omnipresent, but feeble: it is highly centralized and interventionist, and yet seems powerless,"

Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*, Cambridge University Press, 1990. p6.

level of intervention? Influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment?¹ (The term is explained in the Appendix)

Just as "India's size and diversity pose considerable difficulties for any study attempting to generalize about the polity as a whole,"² the Indian military, and especially the army, also encapsulates an equally baffling collage of ethnicities, caste and creed based identities where there are lingual, religious and regional proclivities. They spawn their own trajectories while interacting with the Indian overarching nationalist paradigm. They are multi-layered and multi-dimensional, forming diverse cultures and religions serving together the cause of one composite dispensation. So far, its academic and media portrayal has been of a well assimilated and cogently incorporated establishment. But, how random is this collection in the backdrop of the multi-coloured realities of separatism, communalism and other intangible factors? The 'unity in diversity' is as fragile as the battlefield between the 'unity' and 'diversity' wherein politicization, and even its formulations, may underlie several contrasts within these given compositions. Or, is there more of a flamboyant illusion creating a mythical monolith overriding conflictive and competitive primordial identities? Jawaharlal Nehru had himself admitted: "When we talk loudly of our nationalism, each person's idea of nationalism is his own brand of nationalism. It may be Assamese nationalism, it may be Bengali, and it may be Gujrati, Uttar Pradeshi, Punjabi or Madrasi. Each one has his own brand in mind. He may use the word nationalism of India in mind, {but} he is {still} thinking of that nationalism in terms of his own brand of it. When two brands of nationalism come into conflict, there is trouble."³

The rise of Hindu radicalism, with greater intensity ever since the Temple-Mosque conflict in Ayodhya in 1992 contemporaneous with coercive role in the Indian Occupied Kashmir Valley and earlier in Punjab, has certainly raised serious issues about the presumed internal secularity of the Indian military and the assumption of this extra role that pits it against the forces from within. At a generalist and idealised level, being an Indian military person, over and above these proclivities, will be viewed as a given fact. Yet, in practical terms, as in the case of Indian Muslims and Sikhs, it could also create fears and apprehensions at various levels. Amidst a global discourse of Islamic terrorism since the 9/11 incidents and its attendant geo-political legacies, Muslim Indians within the Indian forces could be viewed both as exceptional assets, or elements worth watching. The Muslims all over the world are largely accused of/associated with extremism and terrorism. Their presence as a part of Indian military composition, for Islamophobic elements, could easily attract divisive forces. Furthermore, the region of South Asia is entrenched deep in terrorism, multiple forms of violence

and such other security challenges which can add strains on this apparently secularized plurality.

The overbearing presence of the military in certain states of India is compounded with several intricate sensitivities, particularly in their interface with the local politics. An excessive use of paramilitary for the maintenance of law and order, sometimes condescending into blatant use of force, may lead to a further conflagration in an existing conflict where democratic forces may suddenly find themselves on the proverbial back foot.

The dynamics of economic development within the contours of capitalism have more often engendered societal chasms leading to discrimination at several levels which may pit the have-nots against the haves, especially when the recruits come from a large section of underprivileged clusters. Such discriminatory dictums certainly lead to grievances, and their ethnic, communal and caste based identities may come in handy to cause “a million mutinies”. The effects and imprints of such unevenness and hierarchical identities turn even graver with fewer outlets and ventilating mechanisms such as within the Indian military, which is itself rooted in one of the world’s most stratified societies. In the same context, trajectories such as tradition and modernity unleash their own ambitions and anxieties, which could turn into collective grievances, and not remain merely confined to a few individuals of “a particular type”. Such notions and commotions pose serious challenges to a transitional society such as India, especially owing to the presence of an independent media and an interdependent global village. Besides, due to the economic neglect of certain regions such as Kashmir, Assam and the North-East, a revered and assured sense of eternal unity with India cannot be objectively visualised.

Last, but not least; the canvass is also blurred by the uncomfortable relations of India with its non-Indian states neighbours in general, and with Pakistan in particular. The relations could be more manipulative, particularly in the wake of reactionary policies. Tit for tat is the national psyche inculcated on both sides of the Pakistan-India border, consciously woven while dealing with the civilian prisoners or on issues as strategic as nuclear proliferation. The repressive and directed policies are already vulnerable to social outbursts, particularly for societies divided by the geographical boundaries, as is seen in the past as well. Organizations, which are components of the societies, are walking on as tight a rope as the nations.

Nonetheless, despite having variant active disintegrating forces, cohesion in the Indian military is a rich model to learn from.

Historical background

The opposing reality of civil military relations, particularly in a large standing army and democracy, makes negotiations with power a placid and a compulsive dictum. In the words of Alfred Stepan, “the armed forces ability to control and exact violence makes them a critical member of the elite.”⁴ The limitations due to lack of connect with the society is understandable. However, it does not legitimize the notion of absolute civilian control; although the responsibilities become more difficult when policy problems are not exclusively civilian or military.

Historically, the British had looked up to the Indian army as an “oasis in the desert of chaos”,⁵ who had laid emphasis on the ‘separate spheres’ of influence contrary to Clausewitz, who had emphasized the combination of both which was further expanded by Lenin and Mao.⁶ However, this division of roles, in terms of British philosophy, remained critical for they were vulnerable to deep embitterment of relationship between the two (civil and military) as was seen during the times of Lord Clive. The last such conflict seen in the British India was between Kitchener and Curzon, which began on a low level but was later fuelled by a combination of high principle and even higher ambition, eventually forcing Curzon to leave.⁷

Underlined by the separation between responsibility and control, the military, though it had an internal autonomy, was subject to civilian scrutiny. Heterogeneous in its character, the British were eventually able to create a stable military organization for the pluralistic society of India, by the beginning of the 20th century on account of:

- a. The introduction of technology to assist in quick decision making.
- b. Organizational integrity through professionalism.
- c. Administrative and financial checks were made through civil supremacy.⁸

On the other hand, for the Indians to accept the military as a final protector was an edged tool, to be used for ends in the prevalent politico-strategic and geo-economic compulsions.

Post-colonial Indian military

Born with an inherent xenophobia, the Indian military manifested allegiance to the idea of state and nationhood, after having navigated between the pathway

of Tilak's strong traditional political philosophy and Subhas Bose's modern militarism. Even Gandhi's pacifism was neglected as 'cowardice'. Respected as a founder of the civil-military relations in India, Nehru abandoned 'the military and militarism as viable instruments or target for the national government.'⁹ He believed that "the soldier is bred in an atmosphere where authority reigns and criticism is not tolerated. So he resents the advice of others, and when he errs, he errs thoroughly and persists in error. For him the chin is more important than the mind or brain."¹⁰

Confining the professional legacy of the British Army to purely British institutions, such as the officer's mess and selection, Nehru wanted to make it a uniquely Indian Army. He agreed to Sir Roy Bucher, a British officer, who stayed on in 1947, after the partition of the subcontinent, as Commander-in-Chief, while speaking to the cadets of the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, in 1948, saying that "no army which concerns itself with politics is ever of any value. Its discipline is poor, its morale is rotten and its reliability and efficiency is bound to be of the lowest order."¹¹

Nehru had adopted a three-pronged strategy, in order to keep the calm of the gun:

- a. Keep its budget low, in the name of economy.
- b. Exhibit peaceful relations with the neighbouring countries. The concept of *Pancheela* (peaceful co-existence) was the reference used to further Gandhi's philosophy in this perspective.
- c. Avoid an extravagant army in numbers and keep it mobile.

Nehru insisted that their business is more to deal with the military tactics, and not the policy. He however emphasized more on the mechanized and improved paramilitary forces to challenge the internal threats.¹²

The civilian autocracy of Nehru was regrettably exhibited during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when the deployment of troops was interrupted by him and his Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon. According to Lt. Gen. Menezes (Retd.), Nehru even "threatened court martial to the concerned and genuine military officers, during the defence briefings."¹³ The role of the then Defence Minister was also pertinent in the promotions of the officers, because of which General K. S. Thumaya had resigned in 1950, but was restored by Nehru. There were also occasions when the inviolable operational domain was intruded. Both Nehru and Gandhi saw use of armed forces as normatively flawed and practically

costly for India. In fact, they did not want the military spending to be more than two per cent of the GDP.¹⁴

The strategic and military resolve of India has always been dependent on its political/civilian decision makers, with 'civil' being interpreted as the bureaucracy and civil-military relationship been looked from the bureaucratic lenses. "The Government of India Allocation of Business Rules", published in 1961, suggests that the three Services Head Quarters are only the 'Attached Offices' of the Department of Defence, with no mention of their chiefs in the rules, neither of their responsibilities. The Department of Defence, the Department of Defence Production and Supply, the Department of Research and Development and the Department of Ex-servicemen Welfare, along with the Finance Division, are all headed by civilian officers of the rank of Secretary.¹⁵ This gave a subsidiary role to the military in India.

Theoretically, the military has never been supported as an appropriate instrument of policy. Though during the British times, there was little control of the military by politicians, the objective was different. They had to compete with the foreign as well as the indigenous forces. The internal dissensions also had to be met. But, after the partition, the same model could not have been carried on with the military as a created group which is meant to extend the policies for the protection of the civil society with the coordination of political and bureaucratic forces and not as subservient to the bureaucracy. Thus, it has as much an independent status as that of any other organ of the government, and its opinion must not be frustrated. Or else, the system could derail under any ambitious general or ambitious politician, or for that matter, even an ambitious bureaucrat, should the slavish model continues under different masters. The bridge provided by the bureaucracy remains bumpy, along with other several loopholes, "impatient for its results and fearful of a decline in its resource base (or its reputation), the military steps into politics in order to save itself by saving the nation."¹⁶

The Indian milieu

In order to keep the Indian army apolitical and uncontaminated, the military in India is educated about the socio-political milieu, including democratic governance through the curriculum in the military academy which eventually enhances the understanding of the innate role of the military. So far, the troika of military, political office and bureaucracy have upheld the constitutional authority. The respect for/of welfare of the people is maintained through institutionalization. Direct contact with the political offices has been avoided, and

consensus was reportedly built pertaining to issues of national security and foreign policy.

This equipoise was maintained during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's times as well when she surrendered to the Chief of Staff Sam Manikshaw's decision to postpone military operations against Pakistan in 1971 for nine months.¹⁷ On the other hand, anguished and bruised by the political decision of 'Operation Blue Star', (the storming of the Golden Temple by the Indian military in 1984) the decorated Sikh General Aurora, hero of the 1971 Bangladesh operation, resented and said "army is used to finish problems created by the politicians."¹⁸ Similarly, Colonel Gorinder Singh Ghuman, appointed as commander for the operation, in his interview after retirement, highlighted the agony experienced by the Sikh soldiers, saying that "it was a time when Sikh troops in some other units were revolting" and there was a question mark on their loyalties. They were not trusted and felt betrayed.¹⁹ But, India has sailed through these storms. Reportedly, this balance was strived through uniformity in pays and allowances of both the civil and military organizations, and they are on a par with in all the facilities as well.²⁰ However, in recent history, the prism is has become foggy and deceptive, with the schisms becoming open, unlike the earlier paradigms when generals never were as public and vocal on their differences as would be seen in the following explanation.

The paradox

Though the armed forces in India are consulted, they are not an essential part of defence policymaking. The Defence Staff is unrepresented. Therefore, reconciliation of demands remain uncoordinated. "India's current rearmament efforts lack clear political guidance, and the imbalance in India's civil-military relations means that reforms necessary for the effective use of force have failed to proceed."²¹

On the strategic front as well, "even after a decade of nuclear blasts by India in 1999, the hardliners in India's strategic thinking are sidelined, in BJP as well, which is considered as a home for them. India lags behind Pakistan in nuclear readiness, in the number of strategic weapons, the delivery systems and command and control mechanisms, is unattended by the political stalwarts. India has still not been able to make an appropriate missile to challenge any of Chinese vital installations in all these years of much resounded armament",²² is a general concern for Indian policy makers.

The strategic tectonics of India is therefore seen as vulnerable to a conflict between complacent politicians and annoyed and so far consistently obedient strategic/military thinkers. And, military adventurism rises high under aggravation if accompanied with/or faces conservatism and extremism. The predicted electoral victory of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Indian general elections in 2014 under the leadership of Modi, who holds a distressful record in the background of massacre of Gujrati Muslims, the paradigm is more fearful.²³ To sustain the consistency in the behaviour of the institutions/organizations, for no matter how well founded and crystallized they are remain susceptible and subjective under the as circumstances analysed above

The divide between civil and military pundits was exposed in January 2012 when a mechanized infantry unit, part of the 33rd Armoured Division, based in Haryana, started moving towards Delhi, without a prior notification given to the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, on the same day, a large number of troops, based in Agra also started moving towards Delhi, which embarrassed the Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma, who was visiting Malaysia. The response of the Director General Military Operations, A. K. Chaudhary, to test the ability of troops in times of fog,²⁴ obviously remained unconvincing. The incident also substantiates the stance that any serving general, like the Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh, who had moved the Indian Supreme Court, for the first time in the history of India, could throw ripples in a system which is maintaining a façade, successfully though, for so many years.

The Indian military is also despondent on ad hoc decisions taken unilaterally by the Defence Ministry on Defence Procurement. "Indian Military hierarchy is beholden to the idea that they should have a greater say in formulating the national security doctrine."²⁵ They feel that despite doing the staff and war courses, they are ignored "while bureaucrats and politicians decide how to run military affairs."²⁶ Reportedly, there has also been resentment by the higher military brass on the institutionalization of the military under strict civilian control.²⁷

The intricate but peculiar composition of the Indian military in terms of its ethnic and communal accommodation is yet another aspect which has active anxious ingredients for civil-military relations. Although there is an apparent secrecy retained on the ethnic and religious composition of the Indian military, the column for 'Religion' in the recruitment form does speak for the account maintained. Related information is never released either by the military or by the Ministry of Defence, but the logical inferences can be derived from the discussion in Lok Sabha in early 1997, when the government disclosed that

“there were religious teachers of the following categories: Hindu Pandits, 1,568, Sikh Granthis, 194; Muslim Maulvis 54; Christian padres, 27 and 11 Buddhist monks.”²⁸ These figures give a rough idea of the formula by which the soldiers are inducted in the military, on the one hand, and also confirm the discrimination impact in the texture of the Indian military.

The backdrop becomes even more interesting when seen from the perspective of attitudes (reflecting bias and prejudice) which clearly challenges the democratic beliefs of equality and respect for human rights. The core of secularity is also wavered by such remarks made by men of as high a rank as that of Lt. Gen. M. I. Chibber, the Adjutant General in 1980-82, saying that Muslims would fight “for Allah and not for the country.”²⁹ Similarly, a handout issued by the Army on April 1, 2001, through the defence wing of the Press Information Department, stated that “No vacancy for Muslims and Tradesmen.”³⁰ That substantiates their arrogant viewpoint and is exasperating for the soldiers of the military serving the cause of “Nationhood”. This mindset conveys the unpronounced psyche of a Hindu state which has predominant population of Hindus in both the bureaucracy and politics. The turf is simmering for a showdown in civil-military relations.

“To commit genocide,” says Peter Balakian, scholar of the Armenian genocide, “you have to marginalize the sub-group for a long time.”³¹ The rise of Narendra Modi with an overwhelming majority after a few months in the elections following the genocide planned and executed by his government in 2002, is reflective of fault lines in Indian Nationalism.³² This gave him an authority to even play with the Indian Prevention of Terrorists Act (POTA), under which the immunity clause was not followed according to the democratic procedure. These joys of democracy through the extension of vote bank neither substantiate the much pronounced democratic system nor secularity in India. They challenge the cohesion required in the collectivistic orientation of military organization. The military policies as an extension/carrier of internal policies are designed to foster group cohesion.³³

The 2014 elections

Once again, the upcoming Indian general elections in 2014 present a scenario of battlefield worn out by the technocrats, with the slide of the administration and ruptured by the reputation of icons with the headlines of corruption. Sixty-one per cent of Indian youth want Modi to be the next prime minister. Hence, the future generation is alarmingly prepared with the egoistical legacy of a Hindu radical state.³⁴ This ethos is translated in the military as well which is a

combination of majority and minority while testing the fragile vulnerability of the minority. Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely for India to maintain the balance in civil-military relations.

The intolerance towards non-Hindus exhibited by paramilitary policing, and regulation policies on different occasions and at different points of time, especially with the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in 1980s, undermines the buzzword of secularism once again by contradicting its principles and divides society by inculcating prejudice. When this chauvinism creeps into the workplace, the institutional/organizational sanctities are not only threatened but also expose the farcical facade. In one of the interviews with a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) officer (whose name is not exposed in the source) on recruitment in the paramilitary forces of the Muslims, he said that the first word which comes in the mind on hearing the word 'Muslims' is "criminals" and the "Muslim community localities are mapped as criminal zones by paramilitary regiments in their deployment stations."³⁵ There have been several occasions in India where caste-based and religion-rigged partisanship has compromised the social structure of the paramilitary support services to the mainstream Indian military.

The prevalence of this political intransigence in the Indian statute restricts human rights on the one hand, and on the other, gives a free hand to heinous acts like extrajudicial killings, torture, forced disappearances, mass rape and detention without trial. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958, grants the Indian armed forces, for example, extraordinary powers such as the use of lethal force on the basis of 'reasonable suspicion'. Most of the democratic world would dub this Act draconian for security powers. Although much voice has been raised even by the United Nation Human Rights bodies for the review of the Act, especially on the 'shoot to kill' and 'immunity provisions' of the Act, it has gained permanent footings with 'emergency powers' after the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008.³⁶

The poverty explosion

The poverty graph with 29.8 per cent (2010) of the total population³⁷ living below the subsistence level in India speaks volumes on the disintegrated and discriminated Indian social structure, where corruption is death-rooted to pave the way for exploitative forces. The big fish, whether coming from political institutions, military organizations or the bureaucratic club are empowering/expanding the spheres of defined roles for personal interests, which can easily imbalance the class relations of social structure.

The region

The spill over of this imbalance would have unbearable repercussions on the regional countries so vital in the era of regionalism. That would defy the new world order, globalism and globalization. Furthermore, it would also be a blatant denial of the already defined policies of Nehru, who had emphasized friendly relations with the neighbouring countries, in order to keep the needs of the Indian military to its minimal. A military equipped with highly sophisticated conventional military technology, both quantitatively and qualitatively, would be tempted to assert itself in the wake of any repression from the bureaucracy or political dictation. The recent example of the Siachin Glacier when the generals have refused to surrender to the political decision makers, is a dichotomy well prone to favour gradual empowerment of military decisions on the one hand, and on the other, non-reliance on the wisdom of the prevalent system, which is expected to be taken over by either radicalism (Moodi) or inexperience (Rahul). India is still developing and, therefore, this delicate balance needs more efficient administration which otherwise may open other opportunities. The prism is weaker in the absence of astute actors and the rupture is evident.

The interests of international actors to grant a “pivot” role to India to maintain a balance vis-à-vis China has further complicated the collage of the region already labelled with the dictions of a ‘powder keg’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. By making the region a theatre for the global ‘War on Terror’, interaction and integration in civil-military roles is dense. In realpolitik, to stay oblivion to state craft is a tough choice.

Conclusion

It is understood that the location of authority has no permanent destination. The administrative alliance between politicians and the civil servants or complete indoctrination of the civilian control over military is perhaps more unacceptable than before for the mighty army of India as a military force-in-being. The contradicting obsession of organizational integrity* and political authoritarianism has created a dilemma. Equipped with maximum authority in the wake of

* "Even in Europe, the origins of military professionalism do not go back much before 1800 and did not take a firm grip until nearly a century later, therefore social class distinction ... probably still carries some weight in most European countries," - Downey.T.J.C. McGraw-Hill book company (UK limited), Published 1977, p. 92.

opportunities in terms of individual leadership or ideology has also made them vulnerable, whereas the peripheries of behaviour necessitate professional articulation ** which is already decaying in this tug of war for power.

As observed above, the organizational structure of the Indian military has come a long way, starting from a national army and remained a model combination of conciliation between military and democracy in India for long. However, it is facing the socio-demographic non-representation in the military organization since the recent past. That is affecting the collectivistic orientation of the military as an organization by religious tagging and emotional makeup of a soldier from a secular army. Furthermore, the individualistic orientation when brought to the defence by the economists has to be compatible with the behavioural science, particularly in the military if is seen from a theoretical prism.

Such individual incentives are ruptured when the overall socio-economic factors are also broken by the overall atmosphere of both society and polity. Realistically, under such discriminatory circumstances, patriotism and nationalism hardly remain a stimulus. In India, the prevalent connect between the society, military and the state is more under the attire of 'Rising India' or 'Risen India' originally serving the happiness of economic actors, is corresponding weakly with the poverty stricken demography of India where poor is getting poorer and the rich richer giving space to anti-peace activities. The overindulgence of Indian military through paramilitary forces has further exposed them to their economic deprivation as compared to their counterparts in the corporate and the civilian sector.

Furthermore, organizations are instruments of policies which when they lose their binding gel are likely to be contaminated by riots, corruption, dissensions and discrimination. Intangible factors of socio-political and socio-economic nature which have so far been delicately poised either by a system or individuals in India are hence under threat due to several anomalies highlighted in the procedure and the spirit of Indian democracy by scholars such as Atul Kohli, Arundhati Roy, Pukhraj Misra and Khushwant in their work.

** "India does not have an explicitly articulated security policy. This is so despite the existence of a National Security Council," Col. (Retd.) Ali Ahmed, "India's Strategic and Military Doctrines: A Post 1971 Snapshot," *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*. Volume cxxxiv, October-December 2009, No.578,p. 505.


Hence, this writer's apprehensions as a Pakistani neighbour are at various levels:

- a. De-secularization of the Indian military.
- b. Changing moods of the Indian military through overt assertion on political decisions.
- c. Combination of conversion in the moods of Indian military from influence and the predictive win of radicalism in 2014.
- d. The 'pivot' role granted to a ruptured polity. Would India continue to think politically in case of any regional or global role given and retard the military adventurism having massive compilation of both conventional and strategic hoard and with reactive policies to follow through?

Appendix

- (1) The normal constitutional channels.
- (2) Collusion and/or competition with the civilian authorities.
- (3) The intimidation of the civilian authorities.
- (4) Threats of non-cooperation with, or violence towards, the civilian authorities.
- (5) Failure to defend the civilian authorities from violence.
- (6) The exercise of violence against the civilian authorities.

These six methods are specifically related to the level of intervention in question and the relationship may be expressed thus:



Source: S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics*, Middlesex, 1975. p. 127.

Notes & References

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- ²⁰ Ibid.
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- ²³ Sunil Das Gupta and Stephen P. Cohen, "Is India ending its strategic restraint doctrine?" *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Washington, Spring 2011, p. 270
- ²⁴ Ibid.
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