

Report

**A two-day Conference
on
*“Contemporary Social Movements
and Social Order in Pakistan”***

February 10-11, 2014



**THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES,
ISLAMABAD**

A two-day Conference on "Contemporary Social Movements and Social Order in Pakistan"

A two-day National Conference on *Contemporary Social Movements and Social Order in Pakistan* was held at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI) in collaboration with Hanns Seidel Foundation in Pakistan, from 10-11 February, 2014. The objectives of the Conference were to provide a forum to exchange scholarship and research on the current social movements, and their streams in political, ethnic, social, cultural, and religious realms. It was meant to analyze their contribution to, or undermine social order in Pakistan. The conference was designed to help produce system and objective knowledge on social movements, and social order by exploring the relationship between the two, and to provide a forum for exchange of scholarship and researches. It was attended by a galaxy of scholars, academicians, researchers, students, and dignitaries. The conference was inaugurated by Federal Minister and Deputy Chairman for Planning, Development, and Reforms and Commission, Ahsan Iqbal.

While welcoming the guests, Chairman ISSI, Ambassador (r) Khalid Mahmood thanked Hanns Seidel Foundation for collaborating with the Institute in organizing this event. He briefly spoke about the importance of the subject and said that there cannot be any subject more strategic and important than the vast array of internal social challenges that Pakistani society faces today. Social forces both visible and invisible produce social consequences for societies - good or bad, peaceful or violent, democratic or undemocratic. Pakistan has witnessed a number of social movements that speak volumes about the energy and openness of the society as well as about the uncertain issues and conflicts. Population of Pakistan has grown exponentially in the last 60 years with the large number of unskilled youth that present a wide range of social and political problems. Radical and extremist ideas have taken roots and sectarian and ethnic movements are on the rise. Whereas, on positive side, there have been many democratic movements with the objective of building or restoring democracy like the movement for the women's rights which has made considerable progress but still has to go a long way. He said that the main purpose of the conference is to discuss and map out the social movements in Pakistan and how they undermine the social order in this country.

Kristof Duwaerts, Resident Representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation said that ISSI was the oldest partner of Hanns Seidel Foundation having signed an MoU back in 1993. In fact, this conference is a continuation of the MoU signed between the two organizations some 20 years back. He said that the topic of the conference is very important as academic investigation of this topic is even more pertinent today than it was twenty years ago. He was of the view that having more than 60% of population made up of young people and a vast ethnic diversity, Pakistan has immense resilience against extremism. However, Pakistani society is not aware of its own potentials. He hoped that this conference will go a long way in bringing that awareness. He also highlighted the importance of education as key to success of social movements and in bringing awareness into the societies to realize its potential.

Addressing the august gathering, Ahsan Iqbal, Federal Minister & Deputy Chairman, Ministry of Planning, Development & Reforms highlighted the importance of the topic which relates to the present and the future of Pakistan. Pakistan, with its 60% population comprising younger people cannot be indifferent to social change. He was of the view that the new social media has provided powerful tools for social mobilization. This power of technology will be shaping the future of societies.

He said that Pakistan today faces multiple challenges and in order to deal with these challenges, political stability, and social solidarity are imperative. In this regard, he regretted the

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fact that Pakistan witnessed more years of Martial Law rule and democratic values were not allowed to take root. Similarly, in the past, Pakistan has focused more on economic development related to infrastructure etc. Social sector did not get its due share of attention. This is the reason why Pakistan is seen as a middle income country as far as economic development is concerned but is considered to be a least developed country when it comes to social indicators.

He also spoke about Pakistan's development plan "Vision 2025". He informed the audience that the human and social capital is one of the main pillars of this plan. He said that the main challenge is to create unity in diversity and to make sure that the society is inclusive. He urged all the political parties to find common grounds and work together for the betterment of the country and people.

Towards the end of his speech, Ahsan Iqbal highlighted extremism as a main challenge that Pakistan is facing, and it needs urgent attention of politicians, academicians, intellectuals and members of the civil society for its amicable solution. He hoped that the proceedings of the Conference would help achieve that goal.

The first session of the Conference was chaired by Saeed Shafqat, Director, Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore and was dedicated to comment on "*Contemporary Social Order in Pakistan: Continuity & Change*". Speaking on the issue of "*Labour Unrest, Internal Migration and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Rural Sindh*". Rashid Memon, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences shared his experience of visiting Ghotki for his research projects. He said that at that time the local factory workers were agitating against migrants as it was felt that the local people were being denied of their right in job share. These agitations were mainly non violent but, also very violent at times. Couple of years later, situation remained same as protests were going on against low wages and jobs. At the same time it was observed that the surrounding districts, which were rich in natural resources, such as Badin, saw lower level of violence. How this difference in level of violence can be explained? A detailed study of a dataset of different violent movements throughout Sindh later revealed that the correlation between migration, and violence was completely insignificant. The number of migrants in Sindh stands at about 10%. Members of the labour Union in Sindh, and Sindhi separatists think that the first right of a job belong to the people living in that area. Memon also found out in the field that there was a perception in the minds of many people that Pakistan was being dominated by one big ethnic group, and others didn't really matter much. His conclusions were that as the share in income of locals goes up, violence goes down. The more the area is linguistically diverse, the more violent it is. Per capita income in the area is insignificant. Furthermore, Punjabi speaking presence in Sindh is hardly related to violence whereas, Urdu speaking presence is slightly related to violence. He also pointed out that at times, through violence, ill practices in the society can also be set right. He suggested that all these unrests should not always be dealt in terms of law and order situation by the government. It is sometimes a distributional issue, and need political negotiation, and resource sharing instead.

While talking on "*Demographic and Social Transformation*", Zeba Sathar, a renowned demographer and Country Director, Population Council, Islamabad, highlighted the overpopulation issue, and gave brief but illustrated introduction on the composition of Pakistan's demography. She lamented that many social issues have erupted due to the failure of

birth control policies, mainly taken in 1980. The population has soared from 30 million at the time of the inception of Pakistan to 180 million in 2010. She analyzed that Pakistan has high fertility rate as compared to the rest of the Muslim world by giving an example of Bangladesh where NGOs have contributed significantly through birth control program, and today fertility rate in Bangladesh is reduced from 5 to 3 percent within 30 years.

Furthermore, she urged the planning commission to take concrete decisions to accommodate a large number of vibrant youth of Pakistan which has appeared as a strong power group. Sathar said that every year 3 million youth is being added into the job market, and projected that by 2050 there will be 200 million work force available in Pakistan. Only correct and consolidated decisions on the part of the planning commission, and the government can ensure a prosperous Pakistan.

While comparing the declining trend in the birth rate among the affluent class with poor segment of the society, she expressed her confidence in awareness programmes, and proper education, particularly of women. Although, female participation in jobs and education has increased, which is an encouraging development for the betterment of society however, societies are transformed by the 'visible' participation and contribution of women only, was the emphasis laid by Sathar.

Moreover, she emphasized on women empowerment, and stated that ultimate social transformation will occur only when girls and women will enter public spaces in larger number. Her presentation was followed by the presentation of the Director General of the ISS, Rasul Bakhsh Rais.

Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Director General, ISSI dealt with the issue of "*Changing Social Order in Punjabi Villages*". In his view, there were six changes which were taking place in the rural Punjab. Firstly, a new middle class is emerging in the villages of Punjab, despite noticeable poverty and inequality. This transition from poverty to middle class is mainly due to capitalization of agriculture, introduction of new professions, and migration to foreign countries particularly to Middle East. Secondly, there is enormous inter-city migration. Pakistan is becoming exceedingly an urbanised country. People are migrating to big cities or sub divisions for education as well as employment purposes. Marketization of villages is yet another vital factor. Many traditional things are being replaced by new modern things. Fourthly, villages are now being developed, and becoming more modern. They now have schools, roads, medical facilities and electricity. Unlike the past practices, parents now feel compelled to educate their daughters for their better future. This development is transforming villages. Media is also playing an important role in this regard. The images transmitted by the electronic media are no more used solely for the entertainment purposes. People are receptive to the social and political developments also which are taking place around them. Sixth factor is parochialism. Kinship relations are still there but due to factors like the role of media, the voting blocs have been able to create space for themselves.

During the question answer session, while responding to a question on females in education, Rasul Baksh Rais regarded more than 70 percent female population in the University of Gujrat, and the University of Sargodha, as positive. He opined that it will create new opportunities for women to get more public and private jobs.

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Answering to the question on the role of *Madaris* in villages, Rais said that majority of population in villages dislike the role of Mullahs but is reported on the contrary by the media. In fact, people living in the villages are keen on sending their kids to the modern education system, and not to *Madaris*. This reflects positivity along with the aspiration for peace and belief in the modern system for prosperity. There is an evident rejection of extremism and terrorism among them. Furthermore, he said that role of media is very important in the making of public opinion.

Replying to a question on tribal violence, Rashid Memon said that Punjabi population did not involve in any kind of violence in Ghotki. They are even facing a lot of criticism as migrants to Punjab. In fact, it is the role of military in gas fields which has created great misunderstanding among the local people because military personal are permanent employees to the gas fields and civilians are taken on contract basis. This creates an unfriendly environment and people are basically reacting to this disparity.

Responding to a question on family planning, Sathar regretted that the programme started for family planning by the government has not yielded desired outcome. However, the realization is observed now, since the couples prefer not to have more than two to three children, both in urban and in rural areas. She also highlighted the socio-cultural psyche of the society for sending their children to modern schools, especially girls, in pursuit of rich, and financially well placed life partners.

The second session of the Conference planned on the "*Political Movements*" in Pakistan received an enthusiastic participation both by the audience and the participants. It was chaired by Tahir Amin, Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies (NIPS), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. The session commenced with the presentation on "*Impact of Lawyers Movement on New Legal & Social Order in Pakistan*", by Shahzad Akbar, Director, Foundation for Fundamental Rights, Islamabad.

Akbar highlighted the "*Legal and social impact of 2007 Lawyer's Movement*" against the dictatorial regime of General Musharraf, who sacked Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan. He briefly identified two phases of that movement which asserted Supreme Court to gain independence, and credibility, and a broader coalition of lawyers, political parties, and other groups who supported judiciary in large-scale. Nationwide protests were seen to bring changes in the Pakistani political system. Akbar highlighted the impact of Lawyer's Movement in two directions; the legal impact, and the social impact of the movement.

While elaborating the legal impact of the movement, Akbar said that when this movement ended with unexpected victory, it set the precedence of supremacy of constitution, and blocked the ways of future interference by other elements. He explained that in the past, judiciary followed the dictates of military rulers, and allowed them to subvert constitution, e.g., in Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs. Chief of Army Staff case the Supreme Court allowed martial law to conquer constitutional norms on the sly premise that the efficacy of change required a new legal order. Similarly, in Pakistan vs. Dosso, it was maintained that a victorious revolution or coup d'état was an internationally recognized legal method of changing a constitution. In Zafar Ali Shah vs. Musharraf case, the Supreme Court validated the doctrine of "State Necessity." He argued that after the emergence of an independent judiciary no future military dictatorship will get an approval stamps from the Supreme Court.

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Judicial activism in terms of *suo moto* actions was identified as a next legal impact by Akbar. The Chief Justice took hundreds of *suo moto* actions against corruptions of high officials, against the killings of innocent people in Karachi; against issuing of license to foreign companies in "Reko Diq" case, and in many other cases. Akbar also quoted a few examples in his presentation. He argued that the lawyer's movement provided a legal base to defend, and form legislation against abuse of human rights. The *suo moto* actions against abuse of women rights, and in missing person case highlighted the need for some legislation to control human rights violations. The Supreme Court gave a strong judgment on fundamental human right cases which will pave the way for new legislation. Talking on the petition of drone strikes in Waziristan, Akbar, appreciated the decision of the Supreme Court on drone attacks which have violated fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, and which have also breached several domestic and international laws. The Court held the Government of Pakistan responsible for failing to stop them or take steps against them. He also added that in 2010, a detailed judgment on National Reconciliation Order (NRO) by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, declared that no law could be made which perpetuates corruption, and corrupt practices. This has also strengthened the role of judiciary to undo many wrongs in the mainstream political system of Pakistan.

Talking about social impacts, Akbar stated that Lawyer's Movement has solidified the legal platform for the common citizen of Pakistan. This movement has enhanced the political awareness of common man on the meaning of their constitution, the potential role of the courts, and the legal profession in interpreting and defending it. It now provides a venue for Pakistani civil society to work together to achieve nationwide judicial, and political reform with a desire for social change. This movement helped to reduce corruption in the country, especially in the *suo moto* reign after the movement. Corruption cases, such as Pakistan Steel Mill privatization, National Insurance Company Limited (NICL), Hajj arrangements and Rental Power Plants (RPPs), were some of the examples quoted by the speaker. He also added that media played very effective role in communicating the movement's ideas across Pakistan, and it helped to strengthen the emergence of a new legal and social order in Pakistan through freedom of expression.

Akbar concluded that the Lawyer's Movement has created a rippling effect in the country, especially in legal and social arenas. Pakistan's political state of affairs, he said, certainly needs a lot of work, and improvement. It remains to be seen whether human rights issues will still dominate politics, and legislators will refrain to make amendments in the constitution according to their wishes. But the Lawyer's Movement at least released a genie from the bottle which cannot be put back as conveniently as was done earlier on. There is a collective consciousness prevalent where an ordinary man at least knows what he wants, and is willing to fight for the rule of law to reign, and for him to have a better life.

Zafarullah Khan, Executive Director, Centre for Civic Education, Islamabad, in his paper titled, "*Youth & Social Change*" gave a comprehensive analysis of literacy rate, and youth bulge in the country. He also highlighted the impact of social change in terms of past and present student movements in Pakistan with special reference to different regimes. Khan said that 56.4%, around 107.3 million of Pakistani youth are below the age of 24 year. This includes 51.46% males, and 48.54% females, and a combined 34% literacy rate depicts a limited youth capital. There are only 17.5 millions Pakistani youth below the age of 25 who have a right to vote, which accounts for only 20.35% of total youth in this age group in Pakistan, whereas 24.2

million almost 28.10% of youth below the age of 35 years have the right to vote. He further divided this total youth bulge as 30-40% urban and 60-70% rural youth in Pakistan. The rural youth, he said, has always been neglected in Pakistan's policy maker radars.

Khan stated that only 135-139 (March 2012 HEC figure – Figure from Economic Survey 2013) public and private sector universities, mainly located in urban or semi-urban areas, were catering to the education needs of these youths. However, government has failed to pay attention to 60-64 percent of rural youth. Only 1.6 million students were enrolled in the universities, 0.55 million students are enrolled in professional colleges and 1.6 millions are enrolled in normal colleges. He noted that at the time of admission to these universities and colleges, it is mandatory to give an affidavit that they will not participate in any politics. He further divided this youth bulge in term of modern education in schools, colleges, and universities, and religious education in *Madaris*. Khan stated that according to different Pakistani estimates, there are 11491 *Deeni Madaris* (estimates of 16808 *Deeni Madaris* by State Bank of Pakistan are much higher) in rural areas. They were educating 1.5-1.6 million students. Since these *Madaris* are organized along sectarian lines and the students of *Madaris* are directly connected to religious parties. Therefore these *Madaris* do not require any affidavit from students to stay away from politics. As a result, youth of Pakistan become a sandwich between the influence of modern education, and religious education.

Khan briefly discussed role of student movements especially the 1952 student movements over Bengali language issue, and the 1954 student movement in East Pakistan. He held the view that Bhutto generation was influenced by democracy, and was focused on democratic struggle but ended with nostalgia and frustration. The Zia's generation was glorified by *Jihadi* culture, proliferation of *Madaris*, single narrative text books, and ban on students unions. As a result, that generation was co-opted by jihadist and sectarian outfits, and they ended up leading this approach of jihad and sectarianism. The Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz sharif generations were influenced by weak democracy, corruption, economy of chaos, and proliferation of private education. However, these generations lost confidence in the country, and ended up in militancy. Whereas Musharraf generation was influenced by enlighten moderation, a divided society, powerful media, and economy of chaos. This generation ended up becoming suicide bombers, cyber *Jihadis*, and a generation of modern outlook with medieval mindset.

Khan concluded that Pakistan must harness its youth potential by providing them a civic and democratic education. He stressed that government should cater for needs of its 56.4% youth population.

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Asistant Professor, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in his paper titled "*The More Things Change, the More they Stay the Same: Observations on Agrarian Politics, Past, Present and Future*", discussed the peasantry and agrarian societies, and varying trends. He expressed doubts on the perceptions that rural areas are not hotbeds of insurgencies. He argued that the concept of the peasantry itself needs to be reconsidered in the wake of dramatic social changes over the past few decades. He quoted Eric Hobsbawm's idea of peasants 'pre-political' i.e. peasants uprisings or insurgencies are not political. He said that Eric's idea was challenged initially by Mao in China, and successively by series of rural insurgencies across much of the Third World including Cuba, Vietnam, and Congo.

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In addition, he said that it became quite oblivious in 1960s and 70s that in fact the peasantry could be vanguard of the revolutionary politics by the use of old Karl Marx's system. Then in late 1970s and early 1980s in India there emerged a particular brand of historiography which became known as "Subaltern Study". Subalterns were essentially taking issues with the dominant brand of nationalist historiography in India, but also the failings of the Indian left, and also perhaps at that time some of the immediate disillusionment with very radical brand of peasantry politics which was Naxalbari. He said that the Indian Prime Minister still consider that the Naxalites are the single biggest security threat to Indian state.

He said that Subalterns argue the questions about peasantry, and politics are not limited to the spectacular episodes of revolutionary violence. Subalterns argue that there are forms of politics which require attention, and they don't necessarily confine to the perceptions of peasantry as a coherent class entity. These brands of political mobilization in rural areas can revolve around anything like cast to religion to gender. And so, the "Subaltern Study" became famous in world as a brand of historiography that at least challenged a lot of conventions about peasantry politics.

Furthermore, he said that in recent years demographic changes have changed, or challenged the very notion of the peasantry itself. It is a rather insular or autonomous thing called the peasant household which is tied to the land, and therefore whether it is daily engagement with the state or markets or anti-systemic politics, revolve entirely along this question of land, acquiring it or keeping control of it. He said that many people argue that the classic peasant household has disappeared into the dustbin of history partly because of migration, changing patterns of land used, changing tenure relations, and rural societies becoming urban etc.

He also discussed the recent agrarian struggles in Pakistan to underline the extent to which 'traditional' peasant mobilizations have indeed been confined to the dustbin of history. In addition, he made some observations on the two major insurgencies in Pakistan at the present time, those of the Taliban and the Baloch freedom fighters, both of which are based largely in rural areas but are not exclusively concerned with the class concerns of the peasantry. He said that in case of Baloch insurgencies it's not necessarily class based; the target is not to take land from landlords and redistribute it; but the target was to take independence from the state of Pakistan in terms of separatists. Contrary to what we might think actually, that movement more and more generates support from urban educated middle class students, professionals in particular especially from the southern part of Balochistan. Furthermore, the other segment i.e. tribal leaders managed to mobilize the locals. But the symbols of mobilization are less class based or broader question of nationalism, and more about tribal affiliations. Either way this insurgency has significant rural component without necessarily delving into the question of the peasantry.

On the other hand, with regard to the insurgencies in the Pukhtun areas, one of the big rhetorical claims of the Taliban movement in Swat was the beheading of the Khawaneen (feudal lords). The rhetorical claim could easily be rejected. The objective of Taliban movement was the imposition of religious law. He said that the brand of politics that we observe that can be 'ethno-nationalist' in one way and, the other can be 'religious'. Their relation to state is very distinct.

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He said that the sociological content of those movements, in terms of particular constituencies are targeted or attempts to mobilize those constituencies. They lack message. This allows political movements of very differing types of ideologies to go into the rural areas, and generate support.

He concluded by saying that there is a lack of integration. To a certain extent the rural areas can become hotbeds of insurgencies even if there is no class content, and are not organized on classic Maoist mainlines to be precise. There is already an alienation from the state. Under the circumstances, it is easy to mobilize the people against the state, whether it's because a state is inaccessible, downright brutal, or law enforcement agencies are weak. Whatever the reason may be at the level of rhetoric or substance, we have to focus on why there is a similar sociological content for such diverse movements. If state makes better efforts to integrate them, then the objective space for the militancy or insurgency is more likely to reduce.

As a last speaker of the session, Saeed Shafqat, Director, Centre for Public Policy & Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore presented a paper titled "*Political Movements and Democratization in Pakistan: 2007 Lawyers Protest or A Political Movement*". Shafqat divided his paper into three parts (1). Conceptual and theoretical framework of political protest, and political movement, (2) Snapshot of various movements which took place in Pakistan, and (3) Why 2007 Lawyers protest could not become a political movement. He explained that the political protest is legitimate tool available to citizens to raise their voice, and register their concerns both with the government as well as with the civil society. He said that political protest has also been used as a vehicle to bring change in government policies, and reform societies. He further said that fewer political movements lead to democratization, and reform of societies and states.

Furthermore, he discussed the four major mass mobilizations and protests including (1) the 1967-69 student protest that became a mass movement, (2) the 1977 protest of the political parties i.e. the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), (3) the 1983-84 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), and (4) the 2007 lawyers protest. While adding to it, Shafqat said that despite all the signs of a political movement the 2007 lawyers protest could not become a political movement. Adding to it, he observed that a mass mobilization must have at least four components and these components were not available as far as 2007 lawyers protest is concerned, these are:

1. A broad goal or cause which has an appeal for a wider segment in a society,
2. Call for regime change, inclusion or representation excluded groups,
3. A framework which means ideological content, enhancing value and norms for promoting rule of law, and citizens right, and
4. Credible leadership.

He explained the nature of 2007 lawyers' movement, nature of debate, and political class, and what relevance it has today. He said that when the political class become unusually banal, violent, and Machiavellian, it became relevant then, and remains relevant even today. The structure of power depends not merely on social hierarchies like class and cast, but also on the dominant ideology of public life. Today's Pakistan and its politics fall into this category. Adding to it, he said that dominance is produced, sustained and legitimized and as sometimes

happened, subverted. Pakistan was troubled and disconcerted in 2007 as it is today. Given this kind of context, he explained the five different views:

1. Radical liberals who in some ways show courage of conviction and advocate withdrawal of military from politics, and defending human rights.
2. Constitutionalsists who were basically forcing to restore 1973 constitution, to restore the writ of state and emphasis on procedural part, and not on substantive part of how do you inculcate some degree of norms and values with regard to democracy. And their primary objective was to restore a representative form of government with some degree of democracy.
3. Islamists view that was bitten and challenged by the forces of globalization and modernization and continue to see increasing social progressiveness in the society as an undermining Islamic values and therefore would like the state to intervene, and stop this moral decadence which according to them is being promoted by the media and the liberals.
4. Al-Qaeda remnants, and the Taliban of various types and forms, there approach was to use violence and terror that they did not gain adequate attention due to lawyers protest.
5. Electronic media emerged as a potent voice, and interest group in Pakistan.

He said that in 2002 and 2005, all acts of omission, and commission conducted by General Musharaf were legitimized by the then Chief of General Staff (CGS). On the other hand, it was the time period when a number of economic policies and changes were taking place along with the rise of electronic media, opening up of banks, and manufacturers. Therefore, these were some of the developments which basically led to the rise of new groups, new alliances, and new classes of Pakistan, which were happening, and growing underneath the lawyers protest. And therefore the lawyers protest was unable to reach the masses or citizens or peasants.

The presentations were followed by a question/answer session. Aasim while responding to a question regarding Arab Spring, said that Arab Spring was totally manipulated, and there could be donors, or some segments of Egyptian society or military among them. It is unlikely that such movements remain unsponsored. To substantiate his argument, Aasim gave the example of Swat where rhetoric had succeeded to quite an extent. However, these movements can be called myths but again myths might have partial truth in them. How the rhetoric does succeed or not in case of Swat? But in Balochistan the case is little different. There are people in the society or class that can be mobilized whether rhetorically or substantially. Why they are mobilized, on what lines they are mobilized, by what rhetorics they are mobilized, what material or ideological conditions mobilize them, is the question to probe.

Saeed Shafqat while answering to a query regarding the dictatorship of the judiciary postulated that part of the solution lies in 19th amendment. He observed that today particularly Pakistani higher judiciary is most complacent, most protected, and therefore unable to deliver justice. It is more likely that the next lawyer movement would be against the judiciary since the lawyers are taking law in their own hands. One needs to look at the nature and content of the movement whether it promotes anti-democratic forces or does it lead to consolidation of norms of substantive democracy which means respect for law, tolerance for defence, accommodation, compromise, bargain and consensus. A consensus is required for the vision on Pakistan.

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Zafarullah while responding to a question regarding practicalities in the education system of Pakistan regretted the absence of serious dialogue between educational authorities and political parties. The student wings of political parties need to come up with a platform and code. On the other hand, the educational authorities should maintain a balanced approach vis-à-vis Student union, and involve the political parties in it.

Tahir Amin while concluding the session said that the dream of classless society is still not addressed. We should move into that direction where there is rule of law, democracy, harmony and peace in the society in order to move towards prosperity. The problem of Student Unions should be addressed. He observed that when we banned the student unions in the Quaid-i-Azam University, it led to the disintegration of politics along the ethnic lines. There are now Sindhi, Balochi, Punjabi and Mohajir student unions and they now have separate cultural functions. This is far more dangerous. Student unions should be legitimized in the universities, to inculcate informative dialogue and activities rather than political activities.

Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, Senior Vice President, National Party, chaired the third session on "*Ethnic Movements & Social Order*". While talking on "*Identity and Ethnic Politics*", Tahir Amin, Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Studies, Islamabad, talked about the salient issues of ethnic identity. The first example given by Amin was of *Mahajir* ethnic group which forms a major portion of Karachi's population. Since 1985, Karachi has become the most dangerous place in the world with massive records of target killings, extortion of money, and strikes featuring the constant feature of the city's turmoil. While talking about FATA he had highlighted the transformation of ethnicity into militancy by radicalism. Similarly, in many parts of Balochistan, the writ of the government is non-existent, for example according to media reports, there are no Pakistani flag seen on school buildings, the schools do not play national anthem and a site of mass graves in Khuzdar is also recorded.

In his presentation, Amin identified three main approaches followed by the scholars to explain ethnicity; pre-mordial, instrumentalist and modernist. A pre-mordial approach focuses on culture, language and religion to define the distinctness of an ethnic group. Whereas, the instrumentalists believe that nationalism and ethnicity is a recent phenomenon. The modernists however lay emphasis on the contributions of an educated middle class which forms nations. They use history, ethnicity, religion, and other symbols in the construction of nations, for example Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah used religion to mobilize the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent.

While describing about the rise and decline of the ethno movements, Amin regarded Pakistan as the best example for that. In the same vein he recorded the example of the movement by the name of *Khudai Khidmatgar*, which was completely washed away by the loss in elections of Wali Khan, head of the *Awami National Party (ANP)*, from his own constituency.

He regarded the role of state as pivotal in the rise and fall of the ethnic movements since any repression on their part could fuel the ethnic fire, and lead to the acceleration and intensity of the movement, like it had happened in Balochistan where the movement gained strength after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's decision of sacking the nationalist government of Balochistan. The insurgency in Balochistan is actually an aftermath of that verdict.

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Sarfraz Khan, Director, Area Study Centre (Russia, China, Central Asia), Peshawar University speaking on the topic, "*Trends in Pakhtun Ethno-Nationalism*", said that the Pakhtun ethno nationalist politics has its roots in pre-partition mobilization of common Pakhtun masses by *Khudai Khitmatgar* movement led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The social reform movement took an anti colonial bias, and also began social justice. He was of the view that the post-independence period witnessed calls for attainment of either an independent Pakhtunistan or greater autonomy for Pakhtun region within a federal structure of the state. He said that the trend of Pakhtun ethnic integration into the state of Pakistan received a further boost following the renaming of the North-Western frontier province as Khyber Paktunkhwa only recently.

He suggested that the rise of Taliban phenomenon in the tribal belt, and settled districts of Khyber-Paktunkhwa has been labelled by some scholars as a violent expression of Paktun-ethno national politics. He argued that current Islamist manifestation of Paktun ethno-politics is a product of Pakistani state attempts at subduing the irredentist Pakhtun strain through support to the Islamist movement inside Afghanistan especially in later half of 1970 and in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

While talking about the rise of Pakhtun nationalism, he postulated that the Pakhtun ethno-nationalist struggle can be traced back to 1929, when *Khudai Khidmtgar* movement was started by a social reformer and landlord of Charsada, Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The movement initially began as a social reformist movement but soon turned into a struggle for social justice and unity among the Paktun against the British imperialism. The movement immediately gained a huge traction among the Pakhtun peasants and other classes. Ghaffar Khan inspired by Gandhi's non-violent struggle, and Congress party's anti-imperialist stance, sided with the largest party in India, and worked tirelessly amongst the Pakhtun's to secure the support for their cause of anti-colonialism such as, Gadeel Khan argued that Ghaffar Khan found it more convenient to side with the Indian National Congress (INC) for practical reasons, besides ideological attachment to the call of anti-colonialists. He clearly understood that INC could not attain popularity in a Muslim majority province of NWFP. His relentless struggle and hard work resulted into getting Pakhtun votes for the Congress party in 1937 elections winning 17 out of 50 seats.

Around the same time, political developments in the Afghan state also influenced the rise of nationalistic sentiment among the Pakhtuns. Their Pakhtun nationalism also sprang from state's attempts at modernizing and building Afghan nation, which began in Abdur Rehman's reign and peaked during Amanullah's rule. Amanullah regime was dislodged at a time when nationalist movements had gripped India. In the frontier province of India, Ghaffar Khan's support to anti-colonial movement of the Congress antagonized the big landlords who as beneficiaries of British patronage were weary of Ghaffar Khan's politics of mobilizing peasants, and joined the Muslim league, allegedly prompted by the British in contrast to Congress anti-colonial stand. The British and Muslim League leaders realized that the only manner in which popular support can be diverted from the Congress, and its supporters *Khudai Khitmatgar* was to dub the Congress as a Hindu body. The services of *Mullah's* and *Pirs* were also utilized for the propaganda. Despite the campaign for the cause of Islam, Congress emerged as the majority party bagging 30 out of 50 seats in the 1946 elections. The new political reality made the Khan brothers to change their position from independence to greater autonomy for Pakhtun region. Unfortunately arbitrary interference by the Central government in post independence Pakistan not only initiated centralized authoritarian rule in the country minus demands for provincial autonomy, but also hardened the *Khudai Khitmatgat's* stand on Paktunistan issue. A move more reflecting the sense

of insecurity of the new state, and their autocratic style of governance rather than any act of treason by the Pakhtun leadership, since it is argued by many, Ghaffar Khan had given assurances in private to governor NWFP Cunningham that they would not indulge in any anti-Pakistan activity. Owing to cultural and linguist differences, as well as lack of electoral politics, the demand for separatism enjoyed considerable support among the Pakhtuns. Had there been a strong political party behind this sentiment, it could pose a serious threat, however, the state of Pakistan dealt with this perceived threat seriously. *Khudai Khitmatgar* leaders and workers were severely persecuted for being separatists, and recipient of external support from India and Afghanistan (who even claimed the territory across the Durand Line till Attock, after the independence of Pakistan).

Scholars argue that nationalistic sentiments, including its armed struggle manifestation by NAP activists, who had crossed over into Afghanistan, and raised the banner of independent Pakhtunistan in 1973, intensified among Pakhtuns after state's intrusive intervention in dismissing National Awami Party's government in Balochistan during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and resignation by NAP government in protest, in the Frontier province in 1973. Prior to this event, Pakhtun ethno nationalism had developed a definite stride towards integration through NAP's participation in parliamentary electoral process of 1970 and its coming into power as a result in Balochistan and Frontier province. This reflects the peaceful power of the ballot in democracy though, and thereby strengthen integration tendencies, the practice of extending centralized control by the state (even in the garb of emergency), and dismissal of elected local government can highlight tendencies of separatism. Akbar Ahmad, a renowned scholar, blames Pakistan's army operation in Balochistan in 1973 as a proof of Punjabi dominated government's unwillingness to allow self government to the smaller nationalities. The regional developments in Afghanistan once again helped to support Paktunistan sentiment among the NAP leadership. Sardar Daud, an ardent Pakhtun nationalist, and a supporter of Pakhtunistan issue around the same time in 1973, took over the reins of power in a coup and stepped up the Afghan rhetoric over Paktunistan issue. He also gave shelter and help to NAP nationalists from the Frontier, such as Ajmal Khattak who openly advocated Pakhtun nationalism based on Paktunistan issue and Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Ayub Khan Achakzai. Besides internal factors, some external factors especially support and sponsorship by the neighbouring state of Afghanistan has been instrumental in keeping the Pakhtun nationalistic sentiment engaged in the issues of secession from Pakistan.

Khadim Hussain, Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies in his presentation shed light on the "*Seraiki Ethnic Movement*". He said that the Seraiki belt is located in the heart of the country and comprised of 22 districts, out of which two of the districts lie in the Khyber Pukhtunkhawa province, whereas rest of the districts are situated in the province of Punjab, an area which accommodates approximately forty million people. While discussing the main markers of any movement, Hussain said that the Seraiki province has all the markers like that of a territory, statehood, culture, language, racial background, but their leading pointer is language and culture from where the whole awareness about the movement started.

Giving a brief background of the Seraiki belt, Hussain alleged that there have been independent states of Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan and others as a part of Seraiki area. In the 15th century, the area was ruled by the Langhar, and later it was partially ruled by the Afghans. It was the Sikh conquerors who took over the region till the Afghan border. As regards the culture, Seraiki movement identifies itself with three distinct cultures - Rowhee, Thal, and

Damaan. Rowhee consists of the Bahawalpur area, Thal starts from Mianwali to Multan, and Damaan is the area between the Indus River and the Suleiman Range. Feature of the Seraiki movement were identified by various organisations which included Bahawalpur Sooba Mahaz Movement, Seraiki Sooba Mahaz, Seraiki Lok Sanjh and other parties.

Hussain explained that in 1970, when the One Unit Plan came to an end, Bahawalpur Sooba Mahaz Movement started which was the beginning of a political Seraiki movement and which claimed the revival of the state. Another important Seraiki organisation – Seraiki Lok Sanjh - came into existence in 1986, and raised awareness about the Seraiki province and movement. Highlighting the deprivation, Seraiki Lok Sanjh brought forth a charter of demands. He also, pointed out that language is among the leading marker and in this case it is the Seraiki language. He identified territory and experience of statehood as the second element of the movement. According to him, Multan, Bahawalpur, Ooch, D.G. Khan, D.I Khan, Mankira, Seetpur are among the main line of Seraiki territories. Furthermore, he said that culture plays an important role in defining any movement and lastly it is heritage of the area which is a descendent of the Indus Civilization — Middle Indus, Hakra, and lower Chenab.

All along, the movement has been facing hurdles posed by the constitution of Pakistan; and the demand for a separate Seraiki province has not been realised. Hussain also shed light on the features of the Seraiki movement which lays the foundation for its survival and acknowledgment. He said that fairs, literary forums, conferences, articulations of being different through poetry and discussions have been the main features of the Seraiki movement. He explained that the main weakness of the Seraiki movement has been its peaceful means in its demand for self rule. Nevertheless, the main reasons behind the failure of ethno-national movement are internal and structural in nature and thus the peoples' aspirations remain unfulfilled. He highlighted the fact that the Seraiki movement has crossed the stages of awareness, recognition of an identity and thus has been enjoying almost all the ethnic markers in contrast to its failure in gaining itself a political status. Concluding his presentation, Hussain said that at the moment, the movement has disappeared due to the lack of interest by the political elite. Seraiki province and the movement are disenfranchised.

Mavra Inayat, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in her paper on "*Baloch Ethnic Nationalism*", explained the factors leading to ethno-nationalism in Balochistan after 9/11. She said that the factors that have led to the resurgence of Baloch nationalism after 9/11 lay in:

- i) Historical ethno-nationalistic structure
- ii) Pakistan internal policy, and
- iii) Pakistan's foreign policy

She said that the world's major powers have been competing in South Asia and Balochistan lies in the middle of the tussle. She presented two competing arguments, firstly, historical and anthropological construct of the Baloch identity, Pakistan's strategic political and socio-economic policy along with the country's foreign policy choices which led to strong ethno-nationalistic sentiments and continued insurgency in Balochistan. Secondly, the concept of new great game has redefined the US policies in the region at the international level and in Balochistan, which has resulted in increased Baloch misgivings in the post 9/11 scenario.

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Inayat delved on the fact that the new great game has defined the US policies towards Balochistan, and that it is imperative to understand the importance of the geo strategic location of the province. It easily fits into the new great game with Iran and Afghanistan at its borders, an easy access to the warm waters, land access to Central Asia, and access to the Middle East places it at the crossroads of international interests. China, US and Russia are interested in the region due to its geo strategic resources, and due to its geographical proximity to diverse regions. Balochistan lies at the centre stage of the new great game clash. Balochistan, she said, is today seen through the lens of the new great game in which all great powers are interested. It represents a tri junction for the world's competing powers conflict.

She also brought attention to the fact that not only external factors have ignited Balochistan resurgence, but Pakistan's policy after the war on terror has also played its part in recent times. She also explained how great powers manipulate the Baloch resurgence giving examples of India and US. As Balochistan blends into Central Asia it can be strongly asserted that the competition between the major powers and by extension various world orders have also been evident in Balochistan. In the post 9/11 era, there has been a strong contest between US and Chinese security interest in Balochistan. Regional organizations operating in Central Asia have also have shown interest in the region. In addition, Shanghai Corporation Organisation represents Russians and Chinese interest in the province as well as Central Asia at large, and Economic Corporation Organization advocated US and western interests in the region. The major powers have been strongly competing in Central Asia and view Balochistan as an important geo strategic prize that has to be won.

Inayat also highlighted the fact that there has been a connection between US policy towards Balochistan insurgency and its relations with Iran. US have often played the *Jundullah* card against Iran in the region. Further, Russia, India and Afghanistan also support the Baloch cause, whereas, the Baloch diaspora has been lobbying really hard in US, Europe, Australia, Russia and India, in favour of Baloch ethno-nationalism and separatism. While talking about the Baloch nationalism at the international level, she said that this issue is connected with the policies of the super powers from the Cold War era up to 2014. The under development of Balochistan has been directly related to the foreign policy of US during the Cold War era which emphasised on the containment of the Soviet communism. The infrastructural development of Balochistan could have given the Soviet Union access to the warm waters via Afghanistan and Balochistan. Within this context, US deemed it necessary not to develop the province.

The second day of the national conference started with a vision to investigate the "*Social Movements*". Salma Malik, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, chaired the fourth session.

Fayyaz Baqir, Director Akhtar Hameed Khan Resource Centre, Islamabad, presented his paper on "*Civil Society Movements in Pakistan*" by highlighting that the contemporary history of civil society movements in Pakistan can be traced back to events in 1857 with the defeat in the 'War of Independence' against the British rule in the sub continent. However, he highlighted that student movements as a part of civil society's struggle to achieve freedom and democratic ideals started before the creation of Pakistan. Since then, civil society movements have been dominated by three major trends, Radical resistance of revivalists against encroachment of social space by the state; revolutionary challenge to the legitimacy of state and market economy left by wing progressives; and reclaiming the space encroached upon the state by reformists of

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liberal secular thinking through constitutional means. He was of the view that these trends continue to this day. In his presentation he further traced the origin, development and dynamic interaction of these tendencies from the age of village republic to global village in further shaping the vision, structure and impact of civil society in defining the citizens' relationship with the state. Baqir said that a close view of civil society movements shows a rich and diverse set of citizens' organizations ranging from organizations engaged in volunteerism and counter culture to copouts and contractors. Their strengths and weaknesses define the space reclaimed by the citizens in dealing with the state and global economy.

He said that the Pakistani society has been in continuous flux in the course of past two centuries. He pointed out that some of the landmark events of this period were War of Independence in 1857, Annexation of Punjab, settlement of Canal Colonies, formation of All India Muslim League in 1906, creation of Pakistan in 1947, Separation of East Pakistan in 1971, wars with India and internal insurgencies, mechanization of agriculture, massive rural urban migration, emergence of Pakistani Diaspora as a major contributor to foreign exchange, expansion of black economy, militancy in politics, street crimes and Pakistan's role as a frontline state against the Soviet Union and later on against terrorism. According to Fayyaz Baqir, this continuous pattern of change calls for a deeper understanding of the forces which are shaping Pakistani society and determining the role of various actors in facilitating or hindering this change. Throughout these changes, Pakistan's civil society has played a key role in four areas: social reformation; freedom and social justice; socio-economic development; and provision of welfare and social safety net. Each of these themes has complimented, competed with and at times restricted or confronted the work underway under other themes.

Baqir also talked about the role of women in social change and opined that women had very limited social space at the time of creation of Pakistan. Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah had played a leading role in the Pakistan movement, although there was no noteworthy women's organization at the time. Begum Ra'ana Liaqat Ali Khan, wife of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, laid the foundation of first charity organization for women named All Pakistan Women Association (APWA). It was not until late 1970s that a vocal women's organization for democratic rights; Women Action Forum (WAF), came into existence. WAF evolved into a very democratic, federated organization which bravely opposed retrogressive laws promulgated against women by Zia regime and fought pitched street battles against repressive anti women policies.

He said that in the early 80s Agha Khan Rural Support Programme introduced a new initiative - Women in Development in Northern Areas and Chitral. From then onwards many women organizations started working on violence against women and women's rights. Discriminatory laws against women were opposed by women. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA) started legal assistance programmes for women. Women poets and writers carved their space among intelligentsia. Business and Professional Women Society (BPWS), and numerous other women fora came into existence in 1980s. He said that during President Musharraf's era, women were given a sizable share as elected representatives from Union Governments to National Assembly. Many women entered the Assemblies through open seats as well disqualification of many potential male candidates of National Assembly due to their failure in meeting the education requirements. He said today women have a prominent place in media, academia and public life.

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Very gradually and slowly women are outnumbering and outsmarting men in institutions of higher learning in Pakistan. He said that Women’s status ranges from women observing *Purdah* to women not observing *Purdah* to women serving in very high places in public life. From scarf wearing *Al-Huda* followers to women participating in cat walks in five star hotels, women have occupied a vast social space. He was of the view that social change in Pakistan accompanied by rapid urbanization has led to fast disintegration of joint family, proliferation of nuclear family, women’s inclusion in workforce and emergence of family enterprise. Due to change in economic and educational status of women in society old bonds and male domination are being challenged and slowly and painfully women are claiming right to property, inheritance, equal treatment, and end to harassment at workplace. He said that the emergence of right based NGOs, free media, provision of credit to women, right to vote and contest election have all contributed to change in the status of women. Women movement in Pakistan has also established link with global women’s rights movements.

While talking about militancy, Fayyaz Baqir was of the view that civil society organizations by definition renounce use of coercive power and resist coercion by state or other militarist structures. However, they do lend ideological support to factions engaged in armed conflict. The same thing happened in Pakistan when in 1980s “Free World” decided to mobilize, train, arm and finance revivalist religious groups, especially seminaries to rise in “*Jihad*” against invasion of an “Evil Empire”. Mujahedeen and Al-Qaeda in 1980s and 90s and Taliban in later years emerged as militant spokespersons of an extremely intolerant and narrow sectarian section of civil society. These outfits were subsequently named as Non-State Actors (NSAs). He was of the view that in Balochistan, disillusioned Baluch nationalists also took to arms to demand independence. Emergence of such militant outfits is connected with many changes at national and international chessboard. Dealing with the challenge of these militarist outfits is a serious challenge for majority of civil society organizations (CSOs) and state. He said that there is a deep ideological and intellectual void in the social space which has led to silent acceptance of conflict generated by these organizations and failure of silent protest against them. Future path of Pakistani society will be determined by the nature of intellectual and political interaction between these revivalist and modernist civil society organizations.

He concluded by saying that civil society organizations face new challenges in present social context. Nature of relationship between voluntary organizations and communities, state and private philanthropists has radically changed during the past decades. Pluralism and conflict have emerged as serious issues as alternative development and pursuit of justice. While focused and professionally well managed work has made NGOs very effective, limited interaction between NGOs engaged on different dimensions of social change has negatively affected their capacity to respond to new challenge, especially security related concerns. CSOs have to take hard decisions in responding to emerging challenges, community priorities, and resource constraints and resist the temptation of implementing donor agenda through lucrative projects. External funding and priority setting has adversely affected the credibility and relevance of many NGOs. This has happened due to donor focus on “result based management of their own agenda” rather than supporting local institutional development for self sustaining activities. As a consequence perception of NGOs has significantly changed.

The second speaker, Rubina Saigol, an independent analyst from Lahore charted the course of the women’s movement in Pakistan in a session titled, “*Collusion, Confrontation, Capitulation: The State, Fundamentalisms and the Women’s Movement*”. Saigol outlined the trajectory of the

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movement in post-partition Pakistan and described how the movement began as one of collusion and mutual accommodation with the state during President Ayub Khan's tenure and later transitioned to a confrontational relationship during General Zia ul Haq's dictatorship. She argued that the women's movement went through these phases as the state was contouring itself to the changing demands of the global and national ruling classes.

When Ayub Khan took power in 1958, women's groups were inactive and posed no resistance to the dictatorship, despite the fact that other civil society groups including lawyers, journalists and political activists could foresee the threat posed by military rule. Women's groups did not protest against the creation of the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, nor did they come out against the centralized constitution of 1962, which introduced the concept of Basic Democracies.

This period of Pakistan's first martial law was characterized by a relationship of collaboration and collusion between the state and women's groups. One accomplishment during this time was that the All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) managed to get the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance passed in 1961, which gave women rights in matters of marriage, divorce and custody. At this point APWA had a strictly legalistic approach, which compelled it to work within the state structure. The state in turn did not see its work as threatening and therefore did not interfere, especially since APWA was decidedly non-political and comprised largely of women from the ruling classes who did not wish to upend the social order.

This relationship of accommodation between the state and the women's movement continued between 1972 and 1977 during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was perceived as a liberal and socialist. The constitution of 1973, formulated during this tenure declared Islam as the state religion, retained the Objectives Resolution as the preamble and declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims; there was no protest or outcry on the part of the women's groups against the apparent appeasement of the religious lobby by the state. The speaker explained this relationship by arguing that the personal lives of the women involved in the women's movement were not affected by these actions of appeasement and therefore there was little resistance against them.

Saigol explained how this relationship of accommodation and cooperation changed dramatically in the late 1970's when General Zia ul Haq seized power in a military coup. He turned to Islam to legitimize his rule and adopted the Islamization narrative. In the larger context of regional developments, this was a time when Iran was experiencing the upheaval of the Islamic Revolution and Afghanistan was faced with the Soviet invasion. Subsequently, the US and Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, forged a partnership to push back against the Soviets. At home, Zia instituted drastic changes in the form of new laws such as the Hudood Ordinances of 1979, the Law of Evidence of 1984 and the insertion of Article 203 in the constitution. The blasphemy laws were amended and the *Qisas* and *Diyat* laws proposed for the future. By promulgating these laws and changing the national education policy and education curriculum, the state was attempting to restructure the social order. The media was also faced with restrictions on dress and conduct.

These radical social changes that imposed restrictions on women were what spurred women to abandon their stance of complacency. The Women's Action Forum (WAF) was born in Karachi in 1981 in response. The women's movement then began to openly confront the state and

oppose the military regime and its Islamization narrative. This organization was more political and reactive than APWA and adopted various means of resistance including marches and demonstrations and theatre and dance. Saigol also pointed out that the movement was multifaceted and diverse, in that it included writers, poets, singers, writers, activists and academics.

To counter the state's religious narrative, WAF turned to modernist religious scholars to put forth an alternative religious narrative that was more tolerant. However, this strategy ultimately bore little fruit as the state had more space and power to impose its own restrictive religious narrative.

After several debates within WAF regarding the direction and framework the organization was going to adopt, WAF announced in the early 1990's that it stood for democratic and secular state which was essential pre-requisites for women's rights and equality. The political nature of the organization meant that it was highly reactive to what it perceived as attacks on women's rights. This period of confrontation with the state came to an end with the resurgence of democracy; by this time, the women's movement had succeeded in putting women's rights on the national agenda. As a result, during the subsequent period of democratic rule, political parties could not afford to ignore women's rights.

According to Saigol, in the late 1980's and early 1990's, global power shifts and the rise of civil society led to a larger role for non-government organizations (NGOs). A large number of NGOs were created to promote women's rights and empowerment and this development occurred in Pakistan as well. The Pakistan People's Party, which took power after Zia, continued a verbal commitment to women's rights and refrained from adopting any anti-women legislation. As a result, the combative nature of the women's movement's relationship with the state changed once again. During Benazir Bhutto's second term, there was an active relationship between NGOs and the state in matters of women's rights and empowerment. The activism of previous years faded as NGOs began to dominate the field and co-opted such activism as a paid profession. WAF became de-politicized and gradually became integrated with the state.

During the two terms of Nawaz Sharif's government, the women's groups once again had a more combative relationship with the state as they opposed measures such as the controversial Shariat Bill. However, the NGOs dominated the movement and eventually became the movement. The combative relationship did not reach the level it had during the Zia years and when Musharraf took power in a military coup in 1999, some of the NGOs remained silent. During this period of government, the NGOs were almost completely co-opted, with some NGOs assisting with the mobilization of women during local government elections in 2001.

By the time the fourth PPP government came to power in 2008, Saigol stated that the women's movement was no longer autonomous and described the period as one of "harmony and integration" between the social order and the women's movement. She described some positive outcomes of the working relationship between the government and women's groups, such as the law against sexual harassment in the workplace in 2010 and the anti-women practices law of 2011. The relationship, therefore, transitioned from co-operation and accommodation to open confrontation and ultimately to co-optation of the movement by the state.

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Saigol concluded that the women's movement, like all social movements, is not a social movement and has been affected by the social order of the time. Both the state and the movement re-configured itself in response to external and internal factors and became transformed in the process.

The last and the fifth session of the conference generated a considerable interest from the audience since it covered discussion on "*Religious Movement*". Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Chairman, Gallup Research Foundation, chaired the session.

Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies shared his insights on the "*Role and Trends of Political Islam in Pakistan*" by shedding light on the reality of religious discourse in Pakistan today. The premise of his argument was that religious discourse – through Islamization and religious socialization – is encroaching further into civil society jurisdiction. Political parties are actively seeking to merge religion and politics by adopting a religious platform on which to promote their individual agendas.

He also revealed that religious movements are expanding to encompass all social classes in Pakistan with notably different characteristics to appeal to the members of each respective class. He concluded by highlighting the emerging trends prevalent in the Pakistani society today, underlining the increasing lack of ethnic coherence and the gaping sectarian fissure that continue to widen.

Kashif Mumtaz, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies in his presentation on "*Sectarianism in South Punjab: A Case Study of Bhakkar*", highlighted a trend of community level acceptance of sectarian violence which is manifested in the growing radicalisation of both Sunni and Shiite communities. He pinpointed the advent of sectarian conflict in Bhakkar to the post-partition era when the identity conscious Deobandi Sunnis began migrating to the district that was at the time populated by Bareilvi Sunnis and Shiites living together in tolerance of each other's beliefs and rituals. He explained the link between the rising identity consciousnesses of the Sunnis instigated by the Deobandi Sunnis and gradually integrated into Bhakkar society, and the radicalisation of their community as a sect.

Furthermore, he maintained that the substantial Shiite population in Bhakkar responded to the anti-Shiite violence occurring all over the country. The tragedy of Hazaras in Quetta and the stories of anti-Shiite atrocities carried by migrants escaping anti-Shiite violence in D.I Khan galvanised the Shiite community to protest through reprisal sectarian violence. He concluded his presentation by establishing a link between *Madrassa* education, poverty and sectarian violence on the basis that the most violent activists of both Sunni and Shiite communities are *Madrassa* graduates and suggested the need for further study in the area.

While discussing the relationship between religion and the nature of Social Order, and whether "*Sufism*" can be a remedial for fundamentalism, Ejaz Akram, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences divided his paper into two parts, (1) Religion and the Nature of Social Order and, (2) Sufism as curative for fundamentalism. He made distinction between religion and secularism by according secularism a route through religion. He also mentioned that Sufism is a mystic thought which exist in other religions as well, which includes Judaism. In his paper, he emphasized on Islam as a religion. He also talked about

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other religions in western society especially in US and Europe. Akram gave brief explanation on societies and religions in his paper by categorizing (a) traditional religion and modern society (b) modern religion and modern societies, (c) traditional society and traditional religion and (d) traditional society and modern religion. According to him the last one does not exist in the world today. He opined that today traditional religion exists only in China and Mongolia.

According to Akram, fundamentalism is a new concept which has emerged in the recent past which has its universal existence. He postulated that fundamentalism also exists in American society. While giving an example of Sufism, Ejaz said that *Tablighi Jammāt* is basically following the Sufi tradition, whereas Taliban are neither Sufis nor religious. He however regarded War on Terrorism as incorrect.

Akram based his observations mainly on understanding the difference between Sufism and Secularism by comprehending the philosophy of Sufism, which has more of a connection with the soul of humans. It therefore cannot provide any prescription for fundamentalism which also has linkages with traditional thoughts.

The conference ended with the remarks of felicitation by Kristof Duwaerts, Hanns Seidel Foundation for its success, and rich and valuable contribution to a new perspective on security paradigm. Ambassador (Retd.) Khalid Mahmood, Chairman ISS, presented the Vote of Thanks and declared the closure of the conference.

- Prepared by:

- *Inaugural/First Session---Mahwish Hafeez/Anjum Saeed*
- *Second Session---Saba Aslam/Malik Qasim*
- *Third Session---Mahrukh Khan/Sherbaz Khetrān*
- *Fourth Session---Amina Khan/Maliha Tariq*
- *Fifth Session---Suleman Yusuf/ Saba Imran*

- Edited & Compiled by:

Shamsa Nawaz & Najam Rafique