

REFLECTIONS

The Challenge of FATA and Security of Pakistan*

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THE CHALLENGE OF FATA AND SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Background

خزانې د هندوستان دي را خورې شوې
سره مهران دي ننوځي پهکوهسا ر

The treasures of Hindustan have been spread out before us:
The red gold mohurs have been engulfed in the hill¹

(Khushal Khan Khattak)

This is how the celebrated Pakhtun warrior-poet, Khushal Khan Khattak, mused in one of his epic poem at the time when about forty thousand² of the Mughal army was routed at Khyber during the reign of Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, in 1672 in one of the daring ambushes of tribesmen under the leadership of Aimal Khan³ and Darya Khan, while son and son-in-law of Mughal *Subedar* (governor) of Kabul Province, Mohammad Amin Khan, were killed and his wife, daughters and sisters were also made prisoners on their way back to Kabul from Peshawar. If Khushal were alive today he would have rhymed this couplet as:

خزانې د درست جهان دي راخوړې شوې
شنه ډالران د دي ننوځي په کو هسار

The treasures of the whole world have been spread out before us

The greenback dollars have been engulfed in the hill (country)

When the Mughals, who remained in constant warfare with Pakhtuns, met one of the biggest reverses at the hands of Pakhtuns, they naturally reverted to the time-tested tactics of buying off the recalcitrant elements and re-establishing the authority. The same tactics are now being employed by the international community and the states concerned, in the modern context of political empowerment, economic welfare, social security, and the overall human development of the Pakhtuns. Up till now, the tactics are not working as the opposite side also enjoys the provision of funds in one way or the other plus the lethal force of their faith.

Geographically, historically, politically, culturally, ethnically and socially, this area cannot be studied in isolation from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In short, geo-political, geostrategic and ethno-political factors have to be dealt with to shed any light on the present state of affairs. The written history of the area can be traced back to the Achaemenid Empire. We would skip over the long history of Greco-Bactrian, Mauryans, Kushans, Kabul Shahi, Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, and Mughals who ruled here directly and indirectly. But one thing is sure. The area under discussion never came under effective central authority, though it remained at various phases in history, the recruiting ground for mercenaries. The Mughals tried to establish their effective rule; they failed and resorted to indirect methods by using other tribesmen of the Peshawar Valley as intermediaries, especially in relation to Afridis. The same can

be said of their co-ethnic Durrani who also kept a loose control over them and kept them quiet by bribing their chieftains with allowances. The Sikhs tried to emulate the Mughals and failed. Only the British, initially emulating the Mughals and Durrani by paying allowances to the chieftains through intermediaries, established indirect, but relatively effective and steady, control through the system of ingeniously-designed Political Administration to which they brought modifications in the course of their interaction with the tribesmen. However, this system only temporarily served their purpose, but not the purpose of the people therein. Nor can it be considered a model system to be replicated time and again. Had they remained there a little longer, they would have definitely brought changes to the system of Political Administration ruling through a special set of laws known the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).

All invaders from the north right from Alexander to Nadir Afshar of Persia required tribal help to pass through their areas and conquer India. Living in their mountain fastnesses, the tribesmen naturally needed to eke out existence by looting or taxing the invaders or by joining them. They did so even with their own King Ahmad Shah Abdali, but instead of paying them toll, he was forced to enlist the Afridis in his force while attacking India. The policy worked and many of them died in the battle against the Marhattas in Panipat, while they also got a good share of the loot.

In history, the area has been named differently: *Yaghistan* (land of rebels), *Allaqa-i-Ghair* (alien land), *Azad Qabail* (free tribes), *Azad Pakhtunistan* (named free Pakhtunistan by successive governments of Afghanistan) *Qabaili Patti* (tribal belt), CATA (Centrally Administered Tribal areas) and now FATA (Federally Administered Tribal areas) after the enactment of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which generally is referred to as Tribal Territory bordering Afghanistan. During the First and Second World Wars, the Central and the Axis Powers, as well as Entente or Allied forces, including initially the Soviets, called this belt the wounded finger of the British Empire. And any power intending to damage Britain tried to put pressure on this finger. But, it has proved to be the wounded toe of Afghanistan, too. In the early twentieth century, Waziristan proved to be the king-maker in Afghanistan. Initially Afghanistan, and then Pakistan after the Soviet intervention, used this territory against each other

Geography, history, faith and warlike predatory tribal character of the people are intertwined here. Revenge, disputes, conflicts, *jirgas*, attacks on settled and prosperous population, especially non-Muslims, had marked their existence. "Because the hills were too poor to maintain their inhabitants and, if there was no alternative source of income, their only choice was to carry out raids or to starve."⁴ Another trait of their character has been setting aside their differences while fighting against a common enemy. "Here dwell in rocky and desolate fastness, a number of warlike tribes who eke out the meager subsistence their land affords by raiding their most prosperous and peaceful neighbors... Their martial spirit, and their fierce devotion to what they understand of the Muslim faith, makes them formidable antagonists, while their barbarity and savage independence constitute a standing menace to the security of India."⁵ Even Gandhi added his voice to eliminate this vice of raiding and plundering and requested the Viceroy to let him go to the tribal areas in order to persuade them not to raid and plunder the settled areas, especially Hindus – as they were more prosperous.⁶

In the traditional structure of the tribes, the *malik* actually wielded power, but inciting the tribe against any outside authority had been the task of the mullah. In a traditional set up, the mullah and *malik* must be understood as concurrent and the overlapping realm that turn to each other for legitimization. Mullah usually confirmed the authority of the *malik* and the institutional integrity of the *jirga*, while *malik* legitimized the directives of the mullah.⁷ The role of political intriguers referred to above usually lied with mullah, who in the course of history established his authority by artfully exciting the passions of the tribesmen. And if the intriguer was not a religious authority, then he had to resort to religion and find allies within the clerical class.

Before shedding light on the present state, one must go back to the recent history of the area under discussion to find some answers. The classic Great Game is generally regarded as running approximately from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813,⁸ to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The Centre of activity of the said game was Afghanistan, while the tribal belt played a supporting role. But the Great Game in which London was one of the partners never actually ended for the people. British colonialism was replaced by the Americans, and Russia had given way to the Soviet Union. Today, the game has become overcrowded. The nuisance value of FATA poses a threat to the security of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region, as well as world at large.

The famous German philosopher, social scientist and one of the founders of Marxism in 1858, while portraying the Afghans, had some classical comments on the character of the people, which to this day can be applied to the tribal territory. "The Afghans are divided into clans, over which the various chiefs exercise a sort of feudal supremacy. Their indomitable hatred of rule, and their love of individual independence alone prevents their becoming a powerful nation; but this very irregularity and uncertainty of action makes them dangerous neighbors, liable to be blown about by the wind of caprice, or to be stirred up by political intriguers, who artfully excite their passions."⁹ Due to the rise of modern terrorism, the role of chieftains has been replaced by the gun-wielding warlords, called the Taliban. We will look at different episodes to testify this statement in the course of this write-up, as the tribal uprisings were never aimed at capturing power like the Afghan Taliban or TTP. They just fought against their common enemy which was bent upon or seemed to be bent upon depriving them of their traditional independence. It cost Britain huge amounts of money to maintain peace and keep the tribes peaceful. Only between 1849 and 1878, British India incurred 58 million rupees on expeditions against the tribes.¹⁰ The figures of 1947 showed that the Central Government of British India had been spending some 4 crore rupees annually (forty million) on the Ward and Watch of the tribes, which included Rs. 900,000 as allowances and only one crore for welfare related activities of the area.¹¹

The appearance of Napoleonic threat provoked the British to send emissaries to the tribes for the first time. The launch of Shah Shuja with the help of Sikh power in 1839 was basically meant to stem the threat of Russia via Persia and it prompted Simla to reinstate this rightful successor to the throne of Ahmad Shah Abdali, his grandson. The exercise apparently failed with the uprising of Afghans in 1841-42, yet it had an impact over the Russian power to rethink over expanding beyond certain limits. The second Anglo-Afghan war also had the same purpose to achieve by bringing the foreign policy of Afghanistan under control, which ultimately paved the way to fix the present boundaries of British India sometimes later. The Gandamak Treaty signed with Amir

Mohammad Yaqub Khan in May 1879 in which the Afghan Amir ceded his districts of Pishin, Sibi, Harnai, and ThalChotiali to the British, was a precursor to the Durand Agreement of 1893.

The British policy toward the tribal peoples on the northwest frontier vacillated between caution and adventurism during the latter half of the nineteenth century¹² after the British had incorporated the North West Frontier, today renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), in its Indian domain in 1849. However, this area remained a battleground not only for the British, but also for those powers bent upon weakening and wresting India from their clutches. One is astonished by the fact that apart from Imperial Russia and then Soviet Union, all the major powers participating in the two world wars have tried their luck in the tribal region on which the British never exercised direct administration. They did so with those elements who were opposed to the British rule. So much so, that apart from Italy, Turkey, Germany, even Japan ventured to use the area to weaken the British authority in India by trying to pin down its major part of military might therein.¹³

Religion and Tribalism

In this short article, one cannot refer to all the phases of Pakhtun history as to how they were converted to Islam during the periods of Ghaznavids as their inner promptings and the message of Islam were almost compatible with each other and they readily accepted it. The writings of Al Biruni in about 1000AD, suggest that Pakhtuns were Hindus before conversion. Their traditional might and new faith were used by all post-Islamic invaders, be they Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Mughals, Persians or Durranis, as a lethal force to attack India, while in this course of history, they even themselves decided to be the rulers in India. But the advent of British colonialism turned the tide against them. The Pakhtuns of KP as a whole readily accepted the British authority because it freed them from the atrocities of the Sikh rule.

But the Muslims of India did not easily conform to the British masters and they decided to break the shackles at different times. The 1857 uprising in which the Muslims, especially the Rohilas (Indianized Pakhtuns) played a prominent role is a case in point. The history of the Tariqah-i Muhammadiyyah, particularly its origins in the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya revivalism and the reformism of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi (1703-1762) and his son, Shah 'Abd al-Aziz (1746-1824) also found their adherence among the Pakhtuns. This reformist and revivalist movement was carried forward by Sayid Ahmad (1786-1831), a Sufi *murid* of Abdl al-Aziz and his associate Shah Mohammad Ismail (1779-1831), a grandson of Shah Wali Allah, who chose the Pakhtun tribesmen to fight against the Sikh rule and then their adherents among the Pakhtuns used their philosophy of revivalism to fight against the British rule from the mountain fastness of the Pakhtun region, including the tribal areas. They were called Hindustani Fanatics by the British, and are remembered as Indian mujahideen by Muslims. They continued their jihad after the two stalwarts, Sayid Ahmad and Ismail, were killed in Balakot engagement in Hazara, by the Sikh army in 1831, who carried on fighting against the British afterwards and found a sanctuary in Chamarkand in Bajaur Agency in early twentieth century. They were remembered as *Wahabis* continuing the mission of Bareilvi mujahideen.

Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiya revivalism was afterwards augmented by Deobandi School of thought and found its way to FATA and also Afghanistan. Mullah Abdul Ghafur of Swat and Najmuddin of Hadda near Jalalabad and their line, themselves Pakhtuns, culturally engaged with Pakhtun society and participated in *Pakhtunwali*.¹⁴ They and their adherents played their part in the tribal areas against the British. Although, this revivalist movement also produced people like Keramat Ali, and later, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who looked to the British rule with some favor, and opposed those who propagated India to be Darul Harb (land of war) necessitating jihad and emigration, as these adherents called India Darul Aman (land of peace) and even Darul Islam (land of Islam), yet the diehard message impacted the Pakhtuns to oppose the British by taking up arms against them.

There is a litany of religious personalities and followers of the revivalist movement who basically were using tribesmen opposing and fighting against the British. They were operating from across the Durand Line or within from the settled areas, yet their main base remained the tribes of FATA. If we just glance over the twentieth century, then they included Mullah Babara (died 1927), Badshah of Islampur (died 1928), Mullah Chaknawar (died 1930) Mullah Mahmud Akhundzada (died 1931), Haji Turangzai (died 1937) and SandakiMullah (died in 1939). Then there remained the other standard bearers like Faqir of Alingar in Mohmand, in Tirah the successors of Mullah Sayid Akbar took the line forward, Mullah Powenda Fazal Din and then his successors adopted the line of Lala Pir of Khost until the rise of Shewa Mullah. And one must not forget the celebrated Faqir of Ipi (Amir Mirza Ali Khan) who continued his fighting against the British and then against the Pakistan Government from 1937 to 1961. His son Amir Niaz Ali Khan continued his line in league with Afghanistan, but not so aggressively. The three sons of Haji Turangzai continued, but his eldest son, Badshah Gul, was enlisted by the British in their service during the Second World War. He settled in Afghanistan and led the Bajaur operation in 1961 against Pakistan.

All these Mullahs were not directly attached to one another, but had indirect connection through their counterparts in Afghanistan. Disunity and factionalism of tribes and individualism of their leaders were hurdles in the way of unified organization. Some of them, or their successors, then remained on the payroll of Afghanistan and were used by Afghan authorities against Pakistan after the British left the subcontinent. Nowadays, the main hurdle to mainstreaming FATA is the resistance of clergy, especially domestic and foreign extremists.

Foreign Interference

Without the provision of funding, not a single movement can sustain itself and the Pakhtuns' love of money is legendary. But the geographical location of the tribes as a gateway to India (now Pakistan) attracted/attract the outside powers to destabilize and damage the integrity of the South Asia. During the early period, when Tsarist Russia and Britain were at loggerhead they paid special attention to this area. The anomaly was created by the British side by imposing the Durand Line which was, to all intent and purpose, not in accord with the geographical reality. To quote a British writer and former colonial diplomat: "The British in refusing to obey the law of political and strategic development by a physical occupation of the natural frontiers of India had to take consequences of such refusal."¹⁵

Initially, the Russians and British were at loggerhead over Afghanistan and Russia did take interest in the tribal territory as the weakest link of the British authority in India, but by signing the 1907 Convention, Russia formally recognized Afghanistan within the sphere of British influence and the conditions improved till they became allies in the First World War against the Central powers headed by Germany. But for the Germans, the key to the British downfall lay in British India, which could only be weakened and defeated either by using a willing Afghanistan led by Amir Habibullah Khan, or replacing it with a sympathetic monarch, as a stepping stone through arousing the north-western tribes of India in rebellion for expansion towards India.

When the First World War started in July 1914 and Turkey was dragged into war to join Germany after Russia declared war on Turkey, the Germans started to utilize their pre-war links with the Indian nationalists fighting against the British Empire. The Indian freedom-fighters used Germany, Turkey, Persia, USA and Afghanistan as base for anti-colonial struggle. Germans formed the Berlin Committee which was afterwards renamed as India Independence Committee. Germany was already contemplating efforts to threaten India via Afghanistan. Amir Habibullah Khan declared neutrality in the war, while Turkey's entry into war aroused the widespread nationalist and pan-Islamic feelings in Afghanistan, India and Persia.

It was here that Germany decided to send Niedermayer-Hentig expedition to Afghanistan via Persia. The mission was accompanied by Mehendra Partap, Champakaran Pillai and Maulvi Barkatullah, who were also joined by some Pakhtuns from the prisoners-of-war camp at Zossen. They were also accompanied by other Germans like Niedermayer and von Hentig, who were well-versed with the region and Persian language. They came to Turkey before entering Persia and Envar Pasha gave them a *fatwa* of jihad of the Sultan and deputed Kasim Bey with the mission along with a letter addressed to the Amir. They were harassed by the British and Russian agents in Persia and one of their parties was intercepted and annihilated on the way. However, in 1915, the mission reached Herat and then to Kabul as guests of honor.¹⁶

They met Amir on October 26, 1915 and tried to win over his acquiescence. Maulvi Barkatullah who was already acquainted with the anti-British brother of Amir, Nasrullah Khan, proposed that he allow Turco-German forces to cross Afghanistan towards the Indian frontier and thus gain the lost territory. But Amir was constrained by geographical logic as both the Entente powers, British India and Russia, were his immediate neighbors. The feelings were running high against the British in the public and the mission had the sympathies of Nasrullah Khan and the third son of Amir, Amanullah Khan.

On December 1, 1915, the Provisional Government of India was formed with Mehendra Partap as its President, Barkatullah as Prime Minister, Ubaidullah Sindhi its Minister for India, Maulvi Bashir its War Minister and Pillai its Foreign Minister, in Kabul. But Amir was dithering, and he called a *Loya Jirga* (grand assembly) which endorsed his stance of neutrality despite a draft military treaty agreed with the German mission before. The mission started thinking about a coup, assassination or internal revulsion and the message of asking for thousand Turkish troops for internal revulsion was

intercepted by Russians and passed to the British Viceroy in India, who in turn warned Amir of the consequences of hosting a hostile group.

In the meanwhile, the mission tried to raise the tribes against the British by using the Provincial Government of India and the *fatwa* (religious decree) of jihad. Haji Turangzai crossed over to Mohmand territory in 1915 and established a jihad centre in Ghaziabad.¹⁷ He also issued call of jihad from Hadda (Jalalabad) in 1915 in favor of the Turkish Caliphate. He started raids on the settled areas and check posts of the security forces in the district of Peshawar. The mission naturally wanted to engage the armed forces of India in tribal areas so as to prevent them to fight in the European theatre. The British and Russians were pressurizing the Amir to expel the Germans. In May 1916, the expedition apparently failed and they decided to leave, or expelled, under pressure. The British increased subsidy to Amir as compensation.

The mission had an impact on the Afghan political scene. In 1919, the Amir was assassinated in dubious circumstances in Laghman during a hunting trip, most probably with the connivance of Amanullah Khan, who was the head of military force in Kabul. Immediately thereafter, Amir's brother, Nasrullah Khan, was enthroned, but Amanullah had the army and the main support of the crucial arm of the state, as well as popular support. So he seized power and executed his uncle on the charge of killing his brother, father of Amanullah Khan. By that time, the October 1917 revolution in Russia had taken place and the Tsarist policy was no more geared in relation to Afghanistan and the East.

Amanullah Khan came to power just as the entente between Russia and Britain had broken down following the Russian Revolution of 1917, and he soon embarked on military adventure against British India and thus the third Anglo-Afghan War began on 6 May 1919. This war was also the result of the impact of German mission on Afghan political scene. The Afghan military forces were weak, but with the support of the tribesmen, Nadir Khan-led force successfully fought in Kurram and Waziristan and wrest back Tall post from the British in Kurram Agency. The hostilities came to an end on August 8, as Afghanistan sued for peace. As a result Afghanistan got independence and the Durand Line Agreement was reaffirmed. The Soviet Russia was the first country to recognize its independence. It opened its embassy in Kabul on August 21, 1919, when Afghanistan had already signed a peace treaty with British India. This had somewhat created problems for smooth functioning of the embassy with regard to exporting revolution to India.

The Bolsheviks in Russia inherited the Germans designs to weaken and subvert India through Afghanistan by using the tribesmen. Trotsky was a theoretician like Lenin expounding the cause of permanent revolution and considered Britain as the bastion of capitalism in Europe, which could only be defeated in India by using all available resources, including bribing and arming tribesmen on the Indo-Afghan border. Raja Mehendra Prasad had already met him in Petrograd in 1918, and the Afghan independence had created conditions whereby the Provisional Government of India formally asked Soviet Russia in 1919 for help against British occupation.

The brief which Lenin gave to the first Bolshevik ambassador and plenipotentiary representative for Afghanistan and other regional countries, Yakov Zakharovich Surits, did not mention his diplomatic duty regarding his interaction with Afghanistan, but all he

was to do was aimed at facilitating the revolution in India in which the tribesmen could play the role of a detonator. He in actual fact became the representative of Comintern (3rd Communist International). The Comintern, based in Turkestan with its office in Taskent, was assigned the task to work for an Indian revolution. For this purpose, Lenin had invited Mehendra Nath Roy,¹⁸ a Bengali Indian Communist, from Mexico to lead such efforts from Turkestan through Peoples Commissariat of External Affairs.

On December 14, 1919, Surits reached Kabul along with Mehendra Partap, Abdul Rab and Acharia. His immediate goal was to unite the anti-British Indian freedom-fighters in one organization and start subversive activities in the tribal belt by using Afghanistan as medium and thus pave the way for a revolution in India. For this purpose, they needed Afghanistan as a corridor and tried to prevail upon the King to sign a military pact. On the other hand, the Amir (not yet King) was in negotiations with the British, so he was cautious. Amanullah Khan was a maverick character and his relations with both Soviets and British fluctuated.¹⁹ In May 1921, the Afghans and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship

The British succeeded in the efforts to propagate through their own mullahs in the tribal belt, that Bolsheviks were enemies of Islam. It was not easy for them to work with the tribes by using their own address. In order to reconcile communism with Islam, they introduced their agent Jamal Pasha in July 1920 to Afghanistan to help Soviet Russia in the garb of Islam.²⁰ The tribes were happy to receive money and weapons from a Muslim rather than *kafir* Bolsheviks. He soon established contacts with the head of mujahideen fighting in Waziristan and began fulfilling the monetary and weaponry requirements of Abdul Razzaq Khan, head of the mujahideen.

Fyodor Fyodorovich Raskolnikov (July 16, 1921 - February 6, 1924), the new ambassador, was trying to establish contacts with Haji Turangzai and one man with the name of Mohammad Ali who was Comintern representative working with Chamarkand *wahabis* through Maulvi Bashir and giving them one thousand rupees per month at last succeeded in establishing relationship with Haji Turanzai who agreed to work with Bolsheviks in 1922. He was being provided with money then onward.²¹ The support of Faqir of Alingar was also enlisted.

After the 1921-22 Peace and Friendship Agreement with British India, Amanullah Khan started a witch-hunt and expelled all agents of Comintern, including *Khilafatists*,²² and the underground Bolshevik work was paralyzed. So they turned their attention to Pamir and Tibet. The most loyal Indians based in Kabul were sent to study in Moscow. In 1925 the Turkestan office of Comintern was closed down and shifted to Baku. After change in Moscow and the death of Vladimir Lenin, the policy towards the East also came under review.

In 1924, there was a rebellion of the Khost tribes in which the tribes within FATA also participated. The rebellion was triggered by the reformist policies of King Amanullah. The rebellion was launched by religious clerics in Khost. The Soviets and Germans both helped the monarchy to crush the rebellion by providing air power and even using their pilots. The Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union provided technical, monetary and political help to the regime of Amanullah Khan despite the lingering mistrust between the two.

Between the two world wars and during the 30s, the 'British imperial policy found itself between two extreme options: a more reasonable one which dictated a retreat to the Indus and a more aggressive one which demanded the incorporation of all Pathans by pushing steadily forward to the Hindu Kush; but under the circumstances chose the more difficult course.²³ So the neo-forward policy induced Russians to change tactics and revive the old Tsarist connections. Thus an old spy, Losev, was selected along with eight member team, including another old hand Bashley, and they entered KP clandestinely in 1923 and tried to establish a network of spies. He went to Lahore and established contacts with Akalis and Ghaddarists.²⁴

Soviet Union under Stalin adopted a policy more attuned to the national interests of the country than working for a permanent revolution. He tried to have contacts with King Amanullah and not allow him to be dependent solely upon British despite facing difficulties. So the stress was on Afghanistan by providing it with material and military support. There was no longer the demand of a corridor towards India. But when the conditions deteriorated in Afghanistan for King Amanullah because of his reformist policies which alienated the clergy and conservative tribal society, it was the Soviet Union which extended him the hand of assistance. The forces of Habibullah Khan Kalakani nicknamed Bacha Saqao (son of water-carrier) advancing on Kabul were bombarded by Soviet planes. The tribes of the east and south of the country were already on rebellious course against him and the King had no choice but to flee to Kandahar, the hometown of his ancestors, leaving in charge his brother, Inayatullah Khan, but he also had to abdicate after three days.²⁵

The ascendancy of Nadir Shah to power became possible only when he enlisted Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen from Waziristan with secret connivance of the British authorities and with their active participation in war along with other Paktia²⁶ tribes that he captured the throne from his predecessor in October 1929. Therefore, he compensated them by allowing them to loot and providing land and honorific military titles with all the privileges entailed to some of the chieftains or their relatives of these Indian tribesmen, some of whom got settled in Kabul and became Afghan supporters in their policy vis-a-vis FATA. The rise to power of Yahyakhel dynasty coincided with the rise of Nazis in Germany. They considered Britain as their main enemy; therefore, their eyes were turned towards Afghanistan - gateway to India - whom they considered and propagated as the land of Aryans²⁷ like themselves.

The war clouds were looming large over Europe. After the assassination of Nadir Khan in 1933 by a youth related to Charkhi family, his young son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, was enthroned. But the real power of the state vested in his Prime Minister and uncle, Sardar Mohammad Hashem Khan. This corresponded with the assumption of total powers of Germany in the hands of Adolf Hitler. On the other hand, the freedom movement in India was gaining momentum, while the tribes remained restless as ever. The public opinion in Afghanistan and in the tribal belt was against the British and there were sympathies with Germany and its allies.

Two things happen on the eve of the Second World War in the tribal territory: The rise of Faqir of Ipi in 1937 and then a year later the appearance of Shami Pir in South Waziristan. Faqir of Ipi was a daring, wily and superb guerrilla leader who revolted

against British in an episode remembered in history as a result of Islam Bibi affair.²⁸ He incited Dauris among whom he was living in Ipi as a saintly figure, and Wazirs, and started a bloody campaign against the British posts and pickets. Many expeditions were initiated against him, but every time he eluded the British forces and even an attempt on his life were thwarted. He took refuge in a remote place called Gurwek near Afghan border and continued his jihadist activities from there.

Shami Pir (Mohammad Saadi al Gilani) belonging to the holy Gilani family and much revered by the Pakhtun tribes, especially Mahsuds, Wazirs and Ghiljis, was relative of the wife of ousted King of Afghanistan. He was actually sent by Abwehr (German Intelligence) on behalf of Amanullah and his supporters. But the British were unaware, they issued him visa and he somehow entered Waziristan and started settling intra-tribal disputes, while Afghan government was vehemently protesting. At last in June 1938, he collected tribesmen in Kaniguram on June 15, 1938 and declared Zahir Shah as usurper of the throne of rightful monarch, Amanullah Khan. The tribesmen of Waziristan, who had enthroned Nadir Khan, again acquiesced to his call for acting again as king-makers and they flocked to his call and started raiding Afghanistan.²⁹

To pacify the Afghans, the British sent Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, to Kabul and Government of India prevented the Shami Pir from entering Afghanistan with a tribal *lashkar* to restore Amanullah. To use Caroe's expression by 'force and cajolery' he was sent back, using air power against the *lashkar* and bribing him with 25000 Sterling Pounds.³⁰ Historians are unanimous that this was unique opportunity for the Third Reich to restore Amanullah through the combined forces of Ipi and Shami Pir, which was lost. The tribesmen had more fire-power than the entire Afghan army. The Soviet secret record shows that Metcalfe bought Afghan PM, Hashem Khan, by depositing five million rupees annually in his current account held in the Imperial Bank of India in order to help keep the tribes peaceful on the Indian border.³¹ So as a corollary, Afghanistan declared neutrality at the outbreak of war in 1939.³²

The British were concerned about the restive Tribal areas and they resorted to 'stick and carrot' policy. They bought leading members of *Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam* and bought the son of Haji Turangzai, Badshah Gul, by paying him fifty thousand rupees annually. On the other hand, the Axis Powers were bent upon disturbing the peace in the tribes and helping the nationalists in India. Ribbentrop-Molotov pact had created problems for international communist movement. And Indian communists and nationalists mainly were coming to Kabul to seek Soviet help and training. An interesting Indian communist character belonging to Kirti Kisan Party of Punjab, Bharat Ram Talwar (pseudo-name Rehmat Khan), with Hemender Singh Soodi (pseudo-name Mohammad Khan) and Gul Khan (pseudo-name Sher Zaman) came to Kabul in the beginning of 1941. Soodi being Comintern representative in India, wanted to go to Moscow to apprise them of Indian situation and get instructions, while Gul Khan was to be trained by Italians. But due to Soviet-German agreement, Soodi and other Kirti were instructed to contact Signor Pietro Quaroni, Italian ambassador. These Kirtis apparently became agents of Italians and then Germans.

Talwar was instrumental in bringing former President of Indian National Congress (1938-1939), Subhash Chandra Bose to Kabul via Mohmand Agency through Kodakhel³³

centre in early 1941. He then became Bose's representative in Afghanistan. Bose wanted to go to Moscow, but Moscow hesitated.³⁴ So after waiting a couple of months in Kabul, he was transported on an Italian diplomat's passport through Soviet Union to Berlin. Meanwhile, Italian secret service agent Anzilotti visited Faqir of Ipi in June 1941 with money and small weapons.³⁵ In this meeting Faqir had demanded of him half a million pounds per month for the operation 'fire eater' in the tribal areas leading to operation 'tiger' as full scale uprising against British in India. The plan was to drop paratroopers in Waziristan in the rear of fighting tribesmen. The 1941 attacks on British military pickets and posts by Faqir was the result of the money received from Italians. Faqir opposed the proposition of dropping weapons for him from the planes. He knew the sensitivities and never wanted to alienate the Afghans. So the Axis Powers thought to use the services of young prince Daoud who was Central Garrison Commander at Kabul and in sympathy with them.³⁶ In the meantime, Talwar proposed KodaKhel for an air operation. The tribal leaders receiving money did not know that they were pawn in the greater game. They were just fulfilling their religious and moral duty of opposing the British. The main aim of the Axis Powers was to engage the British forces on the Afghan-India frontier so that they might not go to Africa to fight the Allies' war

After Anzilotti successful return in July, the German agents, Professor Manfred Oberdorffer and Dr Fred Brandt on their way to Waziristan were ambushed by Afghan security forces at Logar, killing the former and wounding the latter on July 19, 1941. The Government captured money worth 300,000 Afghanis, pistols, 10000 papers and maps. Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 changed the balance of forces. Now British and Soviets became allies.³⁷ The invasion of Iran (August 25 to September 17, 1941) by Anglo-Soviet forces had unnerved the Kabul regime. The expectations of the young Turks like Garrison Commander and King's cousin Sardar Daoud and Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid Zabuli, , and others within the Kabul regime and outside, who pressed for siding with the Axis against the British, about an expected German victory, soon receded at time when after fierce battle the Soviets successfully aborted the German siege of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) from (August 23, 1942 – February 2, 1943) and repelled the fascist attack on trans-Caucasian region.

The Soviet and the British both mounted pressure upon Hashem Government to expel the Axis colony in Afghanistan. Initially, the regime dithered, but seeing the reverses suffered by the Nazis, they caved in and expelled about 206 of them in October 1941.³⁸ These men included those who apparently worked for Siemens and German Air Company also. They did not pressurize the government to shut down the embassies of Italy, Japan and Germany because of Talwar, who regularly reported every move of Nazis to the Allies, especially the Soviets.³⁹ Another defeat suffered by the Axis was the arrest of Utham Chand, the Kabul shop-owner and centre-point of meeting of Indian émigrés with Germans and Italians. In this way, the plan to drop communication experts and paratroopers on Indian border within the tribal areas coordinated by Bose through Talwar was thwarted.⁴⁰

On the other hand, the constitutional developments in India had also unnerved the Afghan authorities and they started raising the issue of Pakhtuns living in British India and demanding free access to the sea. The Afghan claim over Pakhtuns stemmed from historical and ethnological factors. Long before transfer of power and partition, when as an Indian nationalist Bacha Khan stood for a unitary and undivided India dominated by

Congress, the Afghan government had expressed their desire of reintegrating these areas into Afghanistan or forming a separate state.⁴¹ Raising this issue during the War was not considered as an inimical act by the British, because of pressure faced by Afghans.

Afghan Claim: The Indian Factor

The enigma of the tribal question cannot be solved with all its complexities without going into the details of the birth of the present crises. If one considers partition and the birth of Kashmir issue as the legacy of imperialism, this issue also relates in one way or another to the pre-partition and post-partition Afghan irredentist claim in which the tribal areas played central role. "Shortly before the Declaration of August 1940, the Afghan Government evinced nervousness on the issue of Dominion Status. The Minister of War, Shah Mahmud Khan, reminded that treaties are with British Government not India, and that grant of independence to India, and failure to guarantee the rights of the Muslim minority, would lead to change in Afghan policy. The Afghan Foreign Minister said that the question of direct access to sea would become prominent if control of ports passed to India's hands."⁴² The same attitude of the Kabul authorities continued during the Cripps Mission to India in March 1942. Before that the political horizon was still unclear, the Afghans felt nervousness over the prospects that tribesmen might pass under a Hindu-dominated administration in India. But as the events were taking different shape within India vis-à-vis Britain and the internal Congress-Muslim League polarization deepened, the Afghans concern also fluctuated, but overall remained the same.

Even before there were any prospects of British withdrawal from the region, the two divergent views dominated with regard to the tribal region between the Congress and the Muslim League. "The session of All India Muslim League is firmly of the opinion that the time now has come for the British government to reconsider its Frontier policy... based in the universally recognized principle of self-determination. It further condemns the policy and activities of the Congress in the NWFP by which they have given indication that the tribal areas should become part of the administered territory."⁴³ The Congress allies ruling the province at that time wanted to take the administration of the tribes into their own hands, while the intentions of their central party were different. "I suspect that All-India Congress leaders fully intend to try to get the future direction of Frontier Policy into their hands, but are avoiding the issue as long as a Congress Government is in power in NWFP."⁴⁴

One of the most reputable and informed colonial administrator, Sir Olaf Caroe, always lamented about the neglect of the tribal areas in the 1940 Declaration, Cabinet Mission Statement, June 3, 1947 partition plan as he considered it vital for the integrity of India or for that matter, Pakistan. This was because the British considered this area not an integral part of British India, but only India. "...the tribesmen are not British subjects but British protected persons and do not reside in British India. The tribal areas are also a statutory part of India but not of British India under the 1935 Constitution."⁴⁵ The Afghan authorities could have legally manipulated the annexation of this area on the eve of partition, had they known the legal status of this area, by inviting a representative *jirga* of the tribesmen declaring incorporation within Afghanistan.⁴⁶

Because the tribesmen remained in legal limbo on the eve of partition before they declared unanimous support to join Pakistan with Quaid-e-Azam in a jirga, in 1948.

Caroe understood the precarious position of Tribal areas and was cautioning the Delhi Administration. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Congress ally in KP, had visited Kabul in August 1946, and Nehru, the head of the interim government since September 2, 1946 and in charge of external as well as tribal affairs, was openly repudiating the Afghan claim as interference in the internal affairs of India, yet duplicitously encouraging Afghanistan and their Congress allies in KP to create problems for nascent Pakistan. In August just before the formal independence of Pakistan, Congress sent one of their reputed representatives, Girgari Lal Puri, to hobnob with Afghanistan on matters disquieting for Pakistan. "Arrival of Dr Puri, Deputy Speaker of the North West Frontier Province Legislative Assembly, and staunch supporter of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, lends further support to the view that there is collusion between Afghan Government and Congress Party for a renewed campaign for an independent Pathanistan."⁴⁷

Strange as it may look, yet India considering itself the rightful inheritor of the treaty obligations of British India, had been all along supporting Afghan policy towards the tribal areas and KP and was providing funds for the Pakhtunistan campaign. So much so that the term Pakhtunistan was first coined by Congress press and was adopted and Pakhtunized by Afghanistan. "It was inevitable that the Afghans would bring their weight to bear in this matter and raise the cry of Afghanistan irredenta, but it is interesting that they should have timed it and brought it into line with the Congress theme of Pathanistan."⁴⁸

Despite the 1893 Durand, 1919 and 1921-22 agreements, the Afghans never stopped interference in the tribal areas. The proximity of the tribes to all main centres of commerce and to the principal highways of southern and eastern Afghanistan, and their comparative strength in relation to the military forces of the country, had all to be taken into consideration by the Afghan rulers. On the other hand, to the rulers of Afghanistan, interference meant armed interference. They did not consider themselves debarred in any way from sending emissaries across the line to maintain Afghan influence throughout the tribal areas, or from inviting *jirgas* of tribesmen.⁴⁹ To believe that to let tribes undisturbed will lead to peace has been a wishful thinking, "When a frontier between civilization and barbarism stands still, time always works in the barbarians' favor."⁵⁰ The British had conceded the genuine interest of Afghanistan in the conditions of the tribes, yet the Afghan claim on the eve of partition has all along added complexity to the tribal question and soured the relations between the two countries.

The misfortune that accompanied the partition was the issue of tribes and Pak-Afghan relations, as well. The referendum in the then NWFP in which the people were asked whether they wanted to join Pakistan or remain in India, which the Congress ally party in the province boycotted as they wanted a third option of independence, had a negative effect on tribes and they started behaving differently because of the Congress and Afghan machinations. No sooner did the contention on referendum accentuate than the activities of Faqir of Ipi also gained momentum. Congress was providing him monetary support, which continued through Afghans after Pakistan came into being. Therefore, the British cognizant of the precarious position of the tribes were pressurizing Pakistan to act immediately.

Whereas the International Treaty subsists after the transfer of power, the Tribal Agreements, like the Indian States Treaties, lapse, and in default of some interim arrangements there would be vacuum pending negotiations for new Agreements with the Tribes. The Secretary of State recommended a broad outline to Pakistan with regard to tribes, "...the continuation of allowances... the maintenance of political control in the agency areas... the organization of forces (scouts and militia formations backed by regular ground troops with air support) to provide for watch and ward and frontier defense... the Pakistan Government should approach the tribal *jirgas* with an offer of some form of association with the new Dominion corresponding to the approach which is being made by the successor authorities to the Indian States, 'standstill' being concluded to cover the interim period."⁵¹ This outline was acted upon and Quaid-e-Azam concluded agreement with a representative *jirga* held on April 17, 1948 in which he once more reiterated that "Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom" and thus ordered the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and definite gesture on our part. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had already indicated as to where the future policy would lead by saying that Pakistan had 'no desire whatsoever to interfere, in any way, with the traditional independence of the Tribal areas'.⁵²

Tribes After Independence: Afghan and the Indian Factor

The British did not solve the problem of the tribes, and when in August 1947 they handed over control of north-western defenses to the united Government of Pakistan, they handed over likewise a fluid, difficult situation, fraught with much danger to the future of Pakistan.⁵³ It inherited the wounded finger, which could be used by any outsider to push its agenda in Pakistan and the region.

Though Britain, apparently the Congress India and nascent Pakistan all repudiated Afghan irredentist claim, as peace treaty of 1919 and friendship agreement of 1921 and 1922 signed with the independent monarch had reaffirmed the Durand Agreement, yet the Afghan claim was based on ethnological and cultural basis and they continued to harp on it even after British left the scene. India surreptitiously kept intact their pre-partition contacts with the tribes and utilized it against Pakistan, while Afghans also became more belligerent.

Two things happened after the establishment of Pakistan: One, the tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 in which the tribesmen of Afghanistan also participated and which signaled the future orientation of Pakistan policy toward FATA – the continuation of pre-partition status quo and hereafter referring euphemistically to the tribes as *Bazoo-e-Shamzan* (sword bearing wing) for the defense of Pakistan and the paid tribal *maliks* calling the tribes as unpaid army of the State. This molded the mindset of the establishment that proxies can be used against a powerful enemy. Second, the initiation of the Pakhtunistan movement inspired from the Bannu Resolution of *Khudai Khidmatgar*-cum-Congress party in June 1947 demanding a free and independent Pakhtun State. And subsequently the Tribal *Jirga* held in Tirah on August 12, 1949 which at the instance of Afghan government, with the participation of some other tribesmen, issued a declaration for the formation of independent Pakhtunistan. The Afghan Government declared its support for it and decided to mark August 31, of each year as Pakhtunistan Day and to issue postal tickets on the occasion each year. Faqirof Ipi

became the first President of the tribal gathering. Thus, the Afghan government reared a group of *maliks* called *Pakhtunistani maliks* and paid to them regular allowances, while using them against the Pakistani state from time to time. In this connection, they formed the Tribal Department directly under the Prime Minister to direct the affairs of FATA and then upgraded it into the Frontiers Ministry in 1973. They also founded Khushal Khan Lycee in Kabul to educate and train the FATA youth and sometimes later in 1963, the two middle schools in Jalalabad and Khost meant for the FATA students were constructed.

The unilateral annulment of 1893, 1905, 1921, 1922 and 1930 agreements reached with the British India on the part of Afghanistan in 1949 and then its endorsement by the Loya Jirga of 1955 further complicated the situation in FATA and with Afghanistan. Now, Afghanistan created an atmosphere whereby the Kabul intellectuals started portraying Pakistan their enemy and so the interference in tribal areas was legitimized. The propaganda unleashed by Kabul in the FATA was that Pakistan was the illegitimate child of an un-Islamic British system bent on depriving the tribes of their hard-earned independence. Kashmir and Pakhtunistan put Pakistan between the two sides of a nutcracker and shaped its security policy internally and externally. Its drift to the right and reaction started in 1949 when Objective Resolution was incorporated in the constitutional framework because of pressure from India and Afghanistan. The start of Pakhtunistan movement especially left Pakistan with no choice but to search for its identity in further Islamization, stressing on being part of Muslim Ummah than rely on geographical nationhood.

Another factor which evolved during the course of time and which contributed to the present status of the FATA opposing any modification in the Political System was the creation of myriad stake holders until 9/11. The tribal trading (smuggling) class, whose untaxed wealth investing in the settled districts has been the result of this system whereby no law of the land regulated their earnings, and so they are/were opposed to the changes in the system. Most of the rich in FATA were the bosses of criminalized economy engaged in all sorts of shady businesses and smuggling of every kind. The paid *maliks* whose writ ran over the tribesmen and get paid for it on behalf of political administration, while getting share in funds meant for developmental activities. Then there was the tribal intelligentsia who themselves lived outside FATA, but availed all the privileges granted to their tribes in the shape of quota system within the provincial and central professional colleges and jobs. The Pakhtun nationalist parties always considered this area to be the bulwark of their future freedom struggle, so, in line with Kabul's policy, they also opposed integration of this area in the state structure. This situation has given birth to a borderland mafia thriving on smuggling between the two states.

A lot has been written about the nature of tribal administration and the rule by Frontier Crimes Regulation through handpicked *maliks* and I do not want to dwell upon it. Let me add that the introduction of FCR⁵⁴ in 1901 has never been imported from Britain, but was the result of the nature of the tribal society, whereby the lack of evidence after the commission of a crime had prompted the colonial administrators to evolve this system of collective punishment. If used effectively and diligently, the results could be amazing. Like any other law, it has been time and again abused and misused and has outlived its purpose.

Synchronization of Kabul's and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's⁵⁵ stands, the former demanding a separate independent Pakhtun homeland of Pakhtunistan, while the latter apparently demanding renaming the province as Pakhtunistan, while Pakistan reaffirming its Islamic identity and centralization of powers in the capital time and again, created problems within undivided Pakistan, paved the way for independent Bangladesh and creation of problems in Balochistan and other minority provinces, including KP and FATA. These efforts from Afghanistan had the tacit support of India in the form of retaining pre-partition tribal contacts in FATA and financially supporting Afghan's Pakhtunistan stunt.

The support provided to Pakhtunistan stunt by Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin in December 1956 and its reiteration in Khrushchev second Kabul visit in 1960 added another dimension to this issue. Now it turned into three-way thrust vis-a-vis Pakistan which had tied its knot with the West in the American sponsored CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) against Indian and Afghan Non-Alignment. Twice, diplomatic relations between the two states broke down; once in 1955 when Pakistan amalgamated all four provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit scheme and when Afghanistan sent regular forces under the garb of tribal irregulars to Bajaur in 1960-61. The raid in Bajaur was headed by Badshah Gul, son of Haji Turangzai, who lavishly distributed 303 bore rifle cartridges among the tribesmen to fight against Pakistan security forces, which are still remembered in Bajaur as *Bachagulikaltus* and even found in some homes.

The epicenter of Pakhtunistan movement remained the tribal territory where Afghanistan opposed all Pakistani efforts to bring developmental projects in the shape of schools, clinics and roads through *Pakhtunistani maliks*. In the course of time, these *maliks*, Pakistanis and *Pakhtunistanis*, became supplementary and complimentary. Whenever, the Pakistani *maliks* wanted to augment their earnings, they would ask the *Pakhtunistanis* to do something malicious either in the form of firing stray bullets upon Pakistan Government-sponsored projects or houses of pro-*maliks* or threatening to collect *laskkar*. Milan Hauner is absolutely right when he says: "As a result of their dealings with the authorities on both sides of the border, the Wazirs and other Pathan tribes had, rightly or wrongly, come to the conclusion that the shortest cut to lucrative allowances was not through loyal services, but by occasional demonstration of their nuisance value." In this way, many hostile tribal chieftains shifted their loyalties according to their gains and personal enmities.

The relative calm came to the FATA when King Zahir Shah himself took reign of power after the resignation of his Premier and cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, and the launching of an era of constitutional monarchy and democracy in 1963. The last Prime Minister, Mohammad Musa Shafique, embarked on the course of rapprochement with Iran and Pakistan. He solved the Helmand Water issue with Iran and was about to do likewise with Pakistan, when his government and the monarchy were overthrown in July 1973 by Daoud Khan, cousin and brother-in-law of the King. The calm did not mean that Afghanistan desisted from meddling, but they did not incite any major conflict in FATA.

There is common perception found in Pakistan and sometimes stressed by Afghans that Afghanistan did not take advantage of Pak-India conflicts in 1965 and 1971, but conversely, it helped Pakistan to concentrate on its Eastern front. It is absolutely correct,

but one thing should not be forgotten: had Afghanistan done otherwise, its own population would have risen against the monarchy which it had tasted in 1947-48 Kashmir war that despite Kabul's opposition towards Pakistan and its casting negative vote for Pakistan to become UN member in 1947, thousands of its own tribesmen and nomads voluntarily participated along with Pakistani tribesmen in the Kashmir jihad to the chagrin of the monarchy.

The assumption of power by President Daoud Khan in July 1973 further deteriorated the tense relations between the two countries by his aggressive attitude towards Pakistan in which he reiterated the rights of the Pakhtuns and Balochs in pursuant of the National Awami Party's stance which was at loggerhead with the Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He hosted Pakhtun and Baloch militant elements, imparted them training, gave them explosives and weapons and sent them to Pakistan for sabotage in KP and guerrilla warfare in Balochistan. In response, Pakistan hosted anti-Daoud *IkhwanulMuslimeen* elements like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, and Jalaluddin Haqqani etc. They all used Tribal areas as conduit for sabotage within Afghanistan. They also termed President Daoud Khan as communist and communist agent.⁵⁶

The NAP's militant wing in Kabul was established in August 1973 under the leadership of Ajmal Khattak, of which the scribe was also one of the participants in charge of political affairs. They established a wide network of bases in FATA run by its militant wing Pakhtun Zalmay for sabotage in KP and other areas. In this connection, almost in all Agencies there were elements that cooperated with them. Those elements included the graduates from Khushal Khan Lycee and other Kabul educational institutions, tribal nationalists influenced by the National Awami Party or followers of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son Abdul Wali Khan, Pakhtun Zalmay youth, the *Pakhtunistani maliks* and their relatives and followers. One of their duty was to prevent the Bhutto's government attempts to establish military posts, build roads, establish schools, clinics and do other human development activities as manifestation of the British system.⁵⁷

The present shape of things in FATA with seven agencies and six frontier regions was structured during the Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who added two more Agencies, Bajaur and Orakzai, to the already five ones, in which only Mohmand Agency had been created after the establishment of Pakistan in 1951. Different tribes live in these agencies and their sociological and ethnological make-up and attitude differ from one another. However, they shared a common urge to be independent in their internal affairs. Bhutto's era on the one hand was marred by tense relations with Afghanistan and rise of petro-dollars in Arab Sheikhdoms, on the other, which started playing havoc with the traditional Hanafi belief of the Pakhtuns. A new element in the belief system of the people, especially of the tribesmen, starting taking shape with the money injected into madrassas by those or through those who started going to the Middle East for work in the booming construction projects in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and other Sheikhdoms. Despite a thaw in the relations with Afghanistan at the end of both, Daoud Khan and Bhutto's, reigns; first Bhutto was overthrown in July 1977 and then Daoud Khan was overthrown in April 1978, the scenario once again changed for the worst.

"The long history of each state offering sanctuary to the other's opponents has built bitterness and mistrust between the two neighbors. Afghanistan sheltered Baloch nationalists⁵⁸ in the 1970s while Pakistan extended refuge and training to the mujahideen in the 1980s and then later supported the Afghani Taliban. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan's then military ruler Zia ul-Haq promoted the jihad in Afghanistan, funded thousands of Islamic madrassas, armed domestic Islamist organizations, and in the process "militarized and radicalized the border region," says the United States Institute of Peace report.⁵⁹ But the genesis of this attitude is found in the Afghan's non-recognition of treaties reached with British India and claim over the people and territory of KP, FATA and Balochistan Pakhtun area and their initiative to host all sorts of elements opposed to Pakistan in FATA and nationalist Pakhtun and Baloch parties in the past. The negation of Durand Line was/is the mother of all interventions which paves the way for Pakistani interventions. Pakistan missed an opportunity of recognition of Durand Line during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, when USSR gave indications that Afghanistan could recognize the Durand Line if Pakistan refrained from interfering in Afghanistan by training, arming and exporting mujahideen to her soil.⁶⁰ This was an opportunity which Pakistan missed and the mujahideen's US supporters would naturally have also opposed it as their aim was never reconciliation of the two states, but defeat of their enemy, the Soviet Union.

Saur Revolution and the Soviet Intervention

The Cold War was on the high pitch and both sides of that war had locked their horns in a deadly fight that in April 1978 President Daoud along with his family, total 18 members, were killed and People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power, almost a year after Z.A. Bhutto had been toppled in July 1977. A new chapter was opened in Afghanistan. But the party in power was immature and they could not understand the objective and subjective conditions of the country and instead provoked a powerful reaction. The first to rise were Pakhtun tribes within Afghanistan on the border and in FATA. Pakistan also got perturbed and feared the influence of revolutionary ideology taking roots within Pakistan. So the immaturity of the party, the reactionary and conservative tribal environment, as well as hostile Pakistan joined hands to wreck the new power at Kabul. The immaturity displayed by the assistant sub-governor in Ziruk *Allaqadari*, Zadran area in the greater Paktia province gave birth to his assassination along with his young school going brother. This happened within days of revolution. The flames soon reached Waziristan and the Gurwek centre of late Faqir of Ipi run by his son, Amir Niaz Ali Khan, who issued fatwa of jihad within the first week of revolution. Soon after, Kunar raised the flag of rebellion impacting Bajaur. In short, people in all agencies under the influence of mullahs rose in anger for jihad. The weapon so far used by Kabul by portraying Pakistan the offspring of an alien and infidel British system soon turned against it.

The ground was already ready for insurgency as the future mujahideen leaders, harbored, trained, and equipped in Pakistan got golden opportunity to test their muscles through our tribal belt. When Soviets entered Afghanistan in December 1979, the world rushed to help Pakistan and mujahideen in their fight, which soon changed FATA into a strong base spearheading the anti-Soviet crusade. The seven parties' alliance of mujahideen cobbled together in Pakistan recruited the tribesmen with the willing support of Zia-ul-Haq's military regime and they were even joined by the cadres of the

religio-political parties in training and guerrilla fighting euphemistically called jihad. The *Pakhtunistani maliks* either got marginalized or joined the jihad. In this way, the landscape of FATA was transformed into a command-and-control zone of war whereby all sorts of weapons coming from the West and China along with Arab money and Arab jihadists accompanied by myriad jihadist outfits and jihadists of the Muslim countries found ready-made base and source of easily available recruits. Milan Hauner's observation that "Pathan tribes are the largest known potential reservoir of guerrilla fighters in the world" is not out of mark. In the process, FATA got militarized and radicalized.

During all this period, the pro-Soviet Afghan regimes were also using the tribesmen by sending money and weapons to their clients within FATA and inducing the tribal chieftains to change their loyalties. The episode of Malak Wali Khan Kukikhel in the year 1985-86, who switched sides, collected *lashkar* and received money and weapons from Kabul, is a case in point. After receiving more money and assurances from Zia regime, he again changed his loyalty.⁶¹

The mujahideen (mis)rule further complicated situation of FATA as those who had fought side by side mujahideen went to Afghanistan and joined them in their misdeeds. On the other hand, the mujahideen government naturalized about six thousand Arab fighters as Afghan citizens that soon Taliban seized power and swayed Afghanistan in 1996 and they naturally were joined by many tribal commanders. The Arabs and other outside jihadist outfits switched their loyalties to Taliban. These Taliban had recruits from Pakistani madrassas and were joined by other jobless Kashmir-based mujahideen and Pakistani sectarian organizations. Sectarian clashes- the offshoot of Saudi and Iranian proxy war - and call for jihad and its training – offshoot of Kashmir war - predate 9/11. The sectarian and terrorist killings, not on a large scale, began when there were no US soldiers on the Afghan soil and Taliban were rulers.

9/11 and the Aftermath

9/11 was a watershed. The world changed. Taliban were overthrown and all the jihadists based in Afghanistan, be they Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uigurs, Kashmiris and Punjabis and others - sneaked to FATA and they were joined by country-based terrorist outfits after the military decided to pack up from Kashmir. FATA assumed the name of "most dangerous place on earth." The sleeping cells of extremists within the FATA got activated. Pakistan had no other choice but to join the international coalition which had the UN sanction behind them. Waziristan was already infested with foreign extremist elements some of whom had married the local girls and had got naturalized. Afghan jihad had played havoc with the social fabric of society in the shape of heroin, Kalashnikov, sectarian and extremist culture that this U-turn was enough for al-Qaida and other extremist elements to target Pakistan as supporter of US policies.

Keeping the above mentioned background of the area in mind, FATA, undoubtedly, has widespread repercussions for Pakistan-Afghanistan, the region and perhaps the world. The geopolitical nexus of Pakistan-FATA-Afghanistan-India must be seen as a regional crisis that requires a holistic politico-military approach.⁶² So much so, that Indian analysts depict the area as the den of activities against India. The explosive mix of the jihadist ideology and terrorism in the tribal areas is creating a dynamic that can

potentially destabilize not only the Af-Pak region, but much of South Asia as well, creating a direct potential for escalating terrorism, supported and promoted by the Pakistani establishment, in India.⁶³

The United States went to Afghanistan without a comprehensive plan of winning the war beyond the ouster of Taliban, therefore, it immediately focused on Iraq and left socio-economic development of Afghanistan to a bunch of warlords from the Northern Alliance against whom the people of Afghanistan had welcomed Taliban. These warlords were bribed by US to join the war against Taliban, as has been amply revealed by the CIA chief operative in Afghanistan during the ouster of Taliban, Gary Schroen, in his book *First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan*. Thus these Karzai-led new rulers looted and plundered the wealth of the country, alienated the compromising elements among Taliban, plundered the property of ordinary Afghans and, according to the Karzai government estimate, grabbed four million jeribs of state land. The Taliban who approached the new government were spurned.⁶⁴ To add insult to injury, the US created another anomaly, eulogizing jihad in Afghanistan and deriding it in Pakistan.⁶⁵ Even after toppling the Taliban it continued to pay the most reactionary and die-hard extremist warlords, whose policies had paved the way of extremism in Afghanistan and beyond.⁶⁶ The US also failed to envision the fallout of their half-hearted and half-baked measures on FATA and Pakistan. Their initial euphoric 'light-footed' presence of in the shape of International Security Force based only in Kabul also emboldened Taliban in the face of a weak and faction-riddled rag tag army, whose modernization and up-gradation was never on the agenda of US-led coalition

The trouble was that not only the international community, but even within the tribesmen the perception existed that Taliban are no more than the creation of the army. This impression found in Swat, too, was done away with only when the army eliminated them in the successful operation in 2009. On the other hand, some elements within the security establishment suffered from the erroneous perception that ultimately Americans had to go back like the Soviets and the Afghan field should not remain open and free for all without a strategic asset at hand. So the concept of good and bad Taliban was born, those fighting the international coalition in Afghanistan were good Taliban to be tolerated or supported and those fighting inside the country became bad Taliban. This twisted vision did not help security of the country. The international community also did not fathom the underlying causes of the mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan and without homework plunged into the Afghan field with their hasty measures.

The terror of unimaginable proportion was born in FATA in the shape of suicide-bombers, remote control devices, IEDs, which soon turned into insurgency in some areas spreading from Waziristan to Bajaur, Khyber and Kurram, Orakzai and Mohmand and even Malakand engulfing the whole tribal society endangering the fragile security environment of the country. Thus, the militant groups soon expanded their operational space, particularly in the FATA and KP heartland, because the military – devised counter-insurgency strategies based on peace deals with elements of an umbrella organization, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan on the one hand and poorly coordinated and heavy handed operations on the other.⁶⁷ These half-baked measures did not help improve security conditions. And because of their close ties with Afghan insurgents, Pakistani Taliban groups have access to Afghan safe havens, used to launch cross-

border attacks in FATA and KP. TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah operates out of Afghanistan, mainly in Kunar and Nuristan provinces. TTP is a part of broader syndicate that includes local, regional and international jihadi groups, being a threat to Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.

The sectarian outfits aligned with TTP such as the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), have targeted Shias in Afghanistan, including in the December 2011 bombings in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif. The LeJ has also killed hundreds of Shias in Pakistan – from the southern port city of Karachi to Balochistan's provincial capital Quetta. Anti-India oriented jihadis, such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT, renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa – JD) maintain close ties with Afghan insurgent groups, particularly the al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani network. The LeT/JD and Haqqani network have reportedly conducted several attacks against Indian targets in Afghanistan, including in 2010 on guest houses used by Indians in Kabul; in 2013 on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad; and in May 2014 on the Indian consulate in Herat.⁶⁸ Now ISIL of the Middle East are thought to have found their adherents among the ranks of TTP.⁶⁹

The terrorists played havoc with the lives of Pakistani citizens, including the security forces, and with the economy. An estimated 50,000 citizens, including more than 5000 security personnel, have been killed so far in suicide attacks, explosion of remote control devices, assassinations and storming the schools and mosques. Pakistan has incurred an estimated 100 billion dollars loss to its economy.⁷⁰ All the military operations carried out in FATA before the present on-going military operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' did not fully succeed, but created problem of IDPs that is beyond the meager resources of the country and the capacity of the almost dysfunctional central and provincial governments to solve. The North Waziristan operation further compounded this problem and if, not dealt successfully similar to Swat's IDPs, then this can create another catastrophe injurious to the security of the country.

Three positive things happened in the recent past: The change of guards in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif's personal retention of the foreign policy and defense portfolios and stated desire to strengthen Pakistan's relations with its neighbors, and in the Afghanistan context to follow a "no-meddling" policy, appeared to bode well for mutual ties. Sharif's top priority - reviving a faltering economy - has motivated a rethinking of Afghan policy.⁷¹ On the other hand, Ashraf Ghani's state position to push forward and not looking back while dealing with Pakistan injected new and positive element to the equation of the two countries and improved the atmosphere for cooperation. By pursuing the geographical logic Ashraf Ghani and his team are doing that what anybody in Kabul at the helm must do. The elevation of a unique general to the post of Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, is also a breath of fresh air. Despite of misgiving expressed in some international quarters, the security establishment seems to have shed the past baggage.

'Zarb-e-Azb' launched in June 2014 after the Karachi airport attack enjoys widespread support of the people of Pakistan. Then the Peshawar school massacre on December 16, 2014 turned the table on Taliban and the whole nation along with international community raised their voice in unison to finish the menace of terrorism once and for all.⁷² Acting on General Raheel's determination to take the fight to every nook and corner of FATA against the presence of TTP, the military has also begun

'Khyber One' in the Khyber Agency. "The government's strategy (needs to) focus on providing economic opportunities and political enfranchisement for citizens in FATA, still governed under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 1901 that denies basic constitutional rights and protection. Yet, the contours of both national security policy and relations with Afghanistan are unlikely to change so long as they remain the military's sole domain."⁷³ But the Swat experience shows that civilians are unable to deal with the aftermath of operation fully without the army.

The 'wounded finger' of Pakistan has crippled its whole body. Afghanistan can also not remain immune to its pain and they are suffering. Both of the countries are culprits on this score and none can blame the other. But the onus lies with Pakistan as it is Pakistani territory in which Afghanistan has been meddling unwisely or per force. In December 2013, the political parties represented on the FATA Committee like ANP, JI, JUI-F, MQM, NP, PML-N, PML, PPP, PTI and QWP put forward a charter of eleven points for reforms in FATA. They agreed on guarantee of peace, amendment to article 247 of the constitution, local bodies' elections, infrastructure development, and extension of PEMRA jurisdiction to FATA, democratization of the *jirga* system, enforcement of inheritance law and professionalization of civil armed forces. This was a compromise documents, not necessarily the panacea.

Different pundits are putting forward different solutions. All agree that the status quo is untenable. These proposals fall into three categories:

1. Those who consider the restoration of time-tested system of political administration. Their argument boils down to the withdrawal of the army from FATA as they have occupied civilian space. Collective responsibility, tribal balance, status of traditional *maliks*, authority of Political Agent (PA) and all former institutions must be restored. The bridge between the tribes and the Government has broken down. Army has occupied schools and colleges and they have destroyed the infrastructure. The PA has now been reduced to a consultant of military and so on so forth.⁷⁴

Comment: Most of the tribesmen remain skeptical. They say that bureaucracy has changed and they no longer are trained like their former colleagues dealing with FATA. The traditional *maliks* have been killed or disempowered and replaced by the warlords who are not interested in real peace. A lot of water has flown under the bridge and the presence of military has become the reality of life.

2. The advocates of change which include the civil society and tribal intelligentsia say that the solution to the problem lies in mainstreaming the FATA, empowering the tribesmen and a creating a system elected from bottom-to-top and not the tested top-to-bottom administration. They favor a separate province. But there are those who want that tribesmen must be asked in a referendum as to what type of system they prefer to live in. Whether they want to be integrated in KP or want a separate province. Most of them would like to have separate province.⁷⁵

- Comment:*** The Agencies, though geographically connected, yet the day to day interaction and business are conducted with the adjacent cities of the KP and it would continue to depend upon the services of KP and the Agencies have no road connection with one another. Separate province would also mean that all the taxes of the province will be collected by the tribal province under the circumstance that tribesmen do not pay utility bills. To induce them to pay their bills, let alone paying other taxes, will be a herculean task. Secondly, will they easily accept the law and order procedure laid down in the constitution? Will it not remain a permanent sore to the centre by demanding money even for its daily expenditures, including the salaries? Being a separate province, it would still depend upon KP which would be injustice to KP.
3. Mainstream FATA by integrating it into the KP as advocated by civil society, tribal intellectuals and some nationalists. They argue that the idea of a separate province is unworkable because FATA wholly depends upon the province and its law and order situation directly affects KP. Therefore they say that tribes should participate in the election to the provincial assembly and must have a say in their affairs.

Comment: The sudden repeal of FCR and introduction of provincial law with all the executive, legal and judicial system entailing will create such a vacuum that would worsen the already fragile law and order situation in the province. Financially, FATA would contribute nothing to the exchequer, but will remain a burden on the provincial resources and province will need additional funds from the reluctant Centre, as well as international community.

All these options are fraught with risks. One has to accept risks if it wholly or partially solve the problem. The reforms so far introduced to the system viz., the adult franchise, representation in the country's Senate, the extension of Political Parties Act 2002 and creation of an appellate tribunal etc. have not been able to mitigate the grievances of the tribal people and discourage the scourge of terrorism. Then there is the official FATA Reform Commission headed by a former Chief Secretary of KP, Ejaz Qureshi, who are consulting the various stakeholders in the system and are in the process of formulating their own recommendations and preparing a package of reforms.

The presence of army is a fact of life and their view overrides all other recommendations. They would like a go-slow approach without bringing about any radical change which would offset the balance and lead to uncontrollable repercussions thereof. The FRC will definitely take the army's view into consideration. It seems that FRC will naturally opt for some change that would ultimately lead to some sort of a separate provincial status for FATA in due course of time.⁷⁶

You cannot fatten your horses when the war is going on, is a popular Pashto saying. All these recommendations, proposals, options and solutions will lead us nowhere until and unless the scourge of insurgency and terrorism emerging from FATA remains and the security situation poses threat to the social fabric of the country and Afghanistan along with international community consider this place safe haven of terrorists.

The armed forces are in the driving seat as the war on terror in the country is being fought by them. The central role has been assigned to the armed forces in the newly-devised National Action Plan supported by most of the political parties of the country. The 21st Amendment to the Constitution passed by the parliament has unnerved the civil society and the lawyer community. The idea of military courts is anathema to them. But the army and civilian administration seem to be on the same page on this score. This has also perturbed the international community, especially its civil society. "Was the frontier problem primarily a civil or military responsibility?" This discourse goes back to the colonial era when in early days this was considered to be the domain of civil administration. As the time went on, however, the tendency increased to militarize the civil administration and to look at it as a military problem.⁷⁷ And like the colonial period, when they said that it was hardly a military problem at all, though it often seemed like one, and its duality was both baffling and irritating.⁷⁸ We are still mired in the same discussion.

The united resolve of the civil and military administration and close cooperation and understanding with Afghanistan augur well for the peace and security of the region. In this connection, the role of India still seems doubtful and they consider themselves to be sidelined. The international community must prevail upon India to support the Af-Pak equation than playing the role of a spoiler. However, the million dollars question remains: will this solve the problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan despite the voices of approval raised by the regional and international actors?

However, skeptics do not believe that things will improve between Afghanistan and Pakistan until and unless the root causes are not addressed. I will revert back to the British author. FATA "is anachronism and a danger to the stability of northern India and the peace of Central Asia. The remedy is the fusion of the two States of Afghanistan and Pakistan in some way or other...But history suggests that fusion will take place, if not peaceably, then by force."⁷⁹ Pakistan, at one point, did try to seek this fusion by offering to Afghanistan a confederation and even the formation of one state of the two countries.⁸⁰

As a precursor to any fusion or negation of it, Afghanistan must renounce its stand about the Durand Line and recognize the geographical reality as demanded by world community time and again. To do this, they must first put an end to the political circus stage-managed by them for the last so many decades of hosting and even paying the two Pakhtun nationalist parties, who enjoy governmental perks when in power and become champions of friendship between the two countries, but play a different note in accordance with the Kabul mindset when in the opposition. This naturally creates doubts in the mind of Pakistani establishment.⁸¹

Notes & References

- ¹ Raverty, Major Henry George, *Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans*, Williams and Norgate London, 1867, p. 151
- ² People of the East, especially Pakhtuns, take liberty with figures. But in history books the numbers of army killed ranges from ten thousand to forty thousand and Khushal Khattak subscribes to the latter figure.
- ³ Aimal Khan remains controversial figure in history as in the Mughal, British and Indian literature he is portrayed as Afridi, while the renowned Pakhtun scholar, Dost Mohammad

- Khan Kamil, has disproved all these assertions and termed him Mohmand taking cue from the Khushal's poetry and the history written by Afzal Khan Khattak, his grandson.
- 4 Milan Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War*, 1981
- 5 OIOC, OIH 330 954, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress of India during 1923-24, fifty-ninth Number, p 30, cited by Juma Khan Sufi, *Bacha Khan, Congress and Nationalist Politics in NWFP*, Vanguard Publishers Lahore, 2005, p.293
- 6 Juma Khan, *ibid.*, p.293
- 7 Sana Haroon, *Frontier of Faith–Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland–Hurst and Company London*, 2007, pp. 66-7
- 8 Considered by Iranians as the most humiliating treaty signed by Qajar ruler Fath Ali Shah with expanding Russian power by ceding to it the whole Caucasian region formerly under Persia
- 9 Review of J W Kaye's *The Afghan War*, by Engels
- 10 Tikhanov, Iu.N, *Stalin's Afghan war : The Battle for Central Asia and Pakhtun Tribes, Moscow, Iauza, Eksmo*, 2008 (From its Persian Translation by Aziz Arianfar لین(نبرد افغانی استا) Maiwand Publishers, Kabul, 2011
- 11 Juma Khan Sufi, *Bacha Khan, Congress and Nationalist Politics*, op.cit. p.292
- 12 www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9766.html
- 13 Tikhanov, *ibid.*
- 14 Pakhtun code of honour, revenge, hospitality, jirga and provision of protection, even to the enemy, in his house
- 15 Fraser-Tytlar, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia*, Oxford University Press London, 1958, p.188
- 16 Tikhanov, *ibid.*
- 17 Haji was instructed by the Chancellor of Deoband Seminary, Maulana Mahmudul Hasan Madani in 1914 in Makkah to leave his village Turangzai and start jihad against the British from there with the help of the tribesmen. The first call of jihad to tribes was issued in Makkah via Abdul Rahim Lahori in 1914
- 18 M. N. Roy had an English wife and as the declassified Soviet documents and record show, she worked for the British intelligence
- 19 Amanullah was not happy with the Soviets for suppressing the Muslim population in Central Asia and occupying Merv and Panjdeh across the Amu River in 19th century. While the Soviet wanted him to suppress the anti-Bolshevik elements in Afghanistan and help it finding ways towards frontier region to subvert British rule. The British were unhappy with him for hosting Indian nationalists, not helping the Basmachis and hobnobbing with the Soviets, while he wanted to have open access to the tribesmen and to regain the lost territory.
- 20 Jamal Pasha was former defense minister of the dismembered Ottoman Empire and King Amanullah reposed confidence in him who became his military advisor. He also introduced other Turkish military men and started training the King's units. He failed to solicit enough military help from Kremlin and went back to Moscow in summer 1921 after Soviet Russia and Britain established permanent relations on March 16, 1921. The relations soured as Britain never ceased the efforts to dislodge the Soviet regime in Central Asia by providing help to Basmachis based in Afghanistan, and Jamal Pasha approached the leadership in Moscow to provide him help. He was given money and power, but was soon killed by Armenian avengers in Tbilisi on July 21, 1922 on his way back.
- 21 Yuri Tikhanov, *ibid.* (Yuri Tikhanov is one of the Great Russian experts on Afghanistan and Pakhtun tribes. For the first time he has peeped into the secret documents and declassified material in Soviet archives and has produced a picture hitherto hidden from the Pakistani or even Western writers)
- 22 The British ended the Turkish *Khilafat* in the World War I, which enraged the Muslim opinion in India. It created a *hijrat* (emigration) movement and thousands of British Muslims, mainly Pakhtuns, crossed over to Afghanistan to seek shelter and help against the *ferangi*

occupation. This created problems for King Amanullah, as he had initially consented to host and help them. In the end, he sought the Viceroy's help in stemming the tide of *muhajirs*. This movement was supported by Gandhi, while Quaid-i-Azam had vehemently opposed it and chided Gandhi of introducing unwholesome elements in the Indian politics by dabbling with religion.

23 Fraser-Tytler, *ibid*.

24 Tikhanov, *ibid*.

25 Tikhanov, *ibid*: In Kandahar Amanullah Khan collected his supporters and remnants of his army to advance on Kabul and retake it from the usurper. In the meanwhile he sent his former foreign minister, Ghulam Siddque Khan Charkhi, to Moscow to arrange with the help of Soviet authorities an attack on Mazar from the North. His brother, Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi, was ambassador to Moscow. The Soviet soldiers under the command of Premakov, former military adviser in Kabul, and with the ambassador crossed over Amu and with the support of air power occupied Mazar on April 22, 1929. But Amanullah Khan was defeated in Ghazni by the combined forces of Kalakani and the Ghilji tribes who were opposed to the King and were under the influence of Mullah Shor Bazaar and he had to leave the country. (The propaganda that Soviet forces crossed Amu for the first time in history on December 27, 1979, is belied by the secret record of Soviet Union) In the ouster of King the tribesmen of FATA had also participated. The Shinwaris of Ningrahar were joined by co-tribal Shinwaris in Khyber Agency. The same was true of Khost tribes.

26 Paktia now is divided into three provinces: Paktia, Paktika and Khost.

27 Nazis widely propagated that Afghans (Pakhtuns) are Aryans and not Semitics as was in vogue those days

28 A young Hindu girl kidnapped, converted to Islam and married to a local in Bannu giving birth to displeasure of Hindu community whereby the British administration and its judicial system sided with the Hindus and the girl was returned to the family.

29 Shami Pir used to get money through Nawab of Tank and Hindu money dealers as direct payment from the Germans was not possible.

30 "We may congratulate ourselves that with the departure of Shami Pir from India we are well out of what might have been a very awkward business indeed, and that the price paid for our escape has been very reasonable, though I must say that I dislike being blackmailed."(Linlithgow to Cunningham, July 2, 1938, OIOC: MSS EUR F. 125/72, quoted by the author in his book, *Bacha Khan, Congress and Nationalist Politics in NWFP*, Vanguard Publishers, Lahore, p.298)

31 Tikhanov, *ibid*.(Shami Pir's affair proved few other things: 1. The popularity of King Amanullah was running high. 2. The Afghan-British relations soured as Afghans considered that Shami Pir's easy entrance to the Tribal region could only be possible with the connivance of British authorities. 3. London increased subsidy by 170 thousand pounds annually and also bribing Hashem Khan. 4. British sold 20 warplanes to Kabul and spared them from European theatre. 5. Pir's incident also proved that Axis can help rise the tribal population against Afghanistan and British India.)

32 Initially Germans considered the consent of Soviet Union essential for the restoration of Amanullah Khan and so they wanted in 1939-1940 to provoke the tribesmen of the Tribal Territory for an uprising against ruling Yahya Khel family. They thus wanted that with the help of USSR, Amanists would cross Soviet territory, capture Mazar with their help and pave the way for the overthrow of Zahir Shah. Ribbentrop-Molotov contacts were designed to be used for this purpose. But in the end the Nazi Party head of political affairs, Rosenberg, thwarted these efforts. Otherwise, the leading Amanists and spokesman of Amanullah, Ghulam Siqqique Khan Charkhi, were ready to exchange Afghan Turkestan for Pakhtun-held land in British India, if Soviet agreed to help regain it. Rosenberg rejected and Soviets never showed interest in this project, while antennas in Kabul and London were upped.

33 KodaKhel centre in Mohmand Agency was established and led by MirajanSial, a tribal revolutionary and malik. He got settled in Afghanistan afterwards and his brother Jaffar Khan

- became Pakistani malik, while Jaffar's son, Muzaffar, educated and trained in Khushal Khan Lycee Kabul, is now malik in Pakistani maliki system.
- 34 Stalin considered Congress party a bourgeois party and was suspicious of its intentions, while he wanted communists and working class to lead Indian independence and revolution.
- 35 It is not clear that whether Germans also visited Faqir and his this time or some other time, but one of his lieutenants and his *khalifa*, late Khalifa Abdul Latif, testified to me (author) in one of the exchanges of views that Germans did come to Gurwek, imparted training as how to fire cannon and how to prepare round of equal weightage and volume cannon balls and that they also provided him with a printing press.
- 36 Daoud had agreed with the German to stage a coup on the conditions that the rule of the YahyaKhel will be allowed to continue, but Abwehr and Italian intelligence were in agreement with Amanullah Khan and had promised that they would spark Pakhtun uprising in his favour. This was another opportunity that the Germans-Italians missed.
- 37 The Soviet asked the communists working with Germans to apparently remain loyal to them and inform them of their plans. So much so that the money given to him for work among the tribes, especially Mohmands, used to be handed over to money-starved-Soviets. Talwar was receiving instructions from Abwehr representative, Lt. Wetzell, and passing it to Soviets. Talwar had even convinced the Germans that it would be advisable to drop paratroopers in Mohmand territory whereby the KodaKhel Centre and Faqir of Alingar were in the loop. (Tikhonov, *ibid*)
- 38 On November 1, 1941, the Loya Jirga endorsed the decision of expelling the Axis personnel. For purchasing the Loya Jirga participants, the British embassy had provided ten million Afghans to Hashem Khan. London had promised to provide 500,000 pounds whenever the first batch of Germans left Afghan soil. (Soviet archives)
- 39 Strange situation emerged in Afghanistan for intelligence networks of the opposing forces during the Second World War. Initially the Soviets and Germans acted on the same side, but after German invasion of Soviet Union the loyalties of the people like Talwar came under focus, but they were instructed to apparently remain loyal with the Germans, but actually worked for the Soviet intelligence. The Soviets afterwards also introduced him to British intelligence when they became allies in the war. The same is true of the Basmachis. The British had wide ranging connections in the north of Afghanistan among the Basmachis fighting against the USSR in Central Asia, but when Britain and Soviet Union became allies, the British exposed the entire network to Soviet Union. Talwar was also Bose representative and Bose connections within India were also exposed. In 1943 when Italy surrendered, then Italian ambassador, Quaroni, and others divulged all the network and plans of the Axis in Afghanistan, tribal areas and India.
- 40 One of the options contemplated by Germans during war was occupation of Kabul by dropping 4400 paratroopers and installing Amanullah Khan.
- 41 Juma Khan Sufi, *Bacha Khan, Congress and Nationalist Politics in NWFP*, 2005, Vanguard Publishers, Lahore, p.311 (The announcement of giving dominion status to India in August 1940, the Cripps Mission in 1942, Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, June 3, 1947 partition declaration - all induced Afghans to revive their claim over the people of Afghan origin)
- 42 The Viceroy Marquess of Linlithgow to Secretary of State Leo Amery, March 3, 1942, Mansergh, TOP, I, p 308 as quoted by Sufi, *ibid.*, p.306
- 43 Resolution XIII, All India Muslim League 26th Session, Patna, December 1938 (In Sharifuddin Pirzada's Foundation of Pakistan, Karachi, 1970, cit., S. Haroon, *ibid*, p. 165)
- 44 Cunningham, Sir George, *Note on Tribal Situation*, Nathiagali, June 20, 1939, DO No GH-152, OIOC: MSS EUR D670/15, cited Sufi, *op.cit.*
- 45 Caroe to Squire, December 5, 1944, OIOC: R/12/177 cited Sufi, *op.cit.*
- 46 However, money-wise Afghanistan was not able to do this because of the four crore rupees spent annually on the tribes by the British; even a fraction of it could not have been provided by her.

- 47 HM Minister of Kabul to Government of India, External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations Department, 2nd August 1947 (Received 3rd August) Mansergh, TOP, XII, p 488, cited Sufi, op.cit.
- 48 Caroe to Lord Mountbatten, June 23, 1947, OIOC: MSS EUR F203/1, cited Sufi, op.cit.
- 49 Fraser Tytler, op.cit., p.189
- 50 Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p. 299 citing A Study of History Vol. II, p. 143
- 51 Sufi, op.cit., Earl of Listowel to Mountbatten, 1st August 1947, Mansergh, Transfer of Power, XII, pp 464-65
- 52 Press release by Jinnah, July 29, 1947, cited, Sana Haroon, op.cit., p.176
- 53 Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.270
- 54 It predates 1901 and once covered even the whole Punjab province in the initial period of British occupation
- 55 Founder of Khudai Khidmatgar movement and a stalwart of Indian National Congress
- 56 A very wrong perception exists in Pakistan and the world at large, i.e., that the trouble started by Pakistan harboring and training Afghan mujahideen and sending them to Afghanistan for subversion during Daoud's era. History is testimony that first Afghans hosted Pakhtun Zalmay and Baloch militants of the Wali Khan-led National Awami Party and used them against Pakistan that forced Pakistan to retaliate in the form of harboring and training Afghan mujahideen.
- 57 Juma Khan Sufi, *Daramsaal La Khatay* (Pashto), Lahore, Sufi Publications, 2014
- 58 Pakhtun militants, too, were sheltered
- 59 <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/usip-resolving-pakistan-afghanistan-stalemate/p12037>
- 60 Juma Khan Sufie , *Daramsaal La Khatay*
- 61 The two Afridi families of MalakWali Khan Kukikhel and Malak Nadir Khan Zakhakhel had been traditional rivals and both of them switched sides in opposition to each other.
- 62 Shuja Nawaz, *CSIS Press*, Washington, 2009
- 63 Sanchita Bhattacharya, Waziristan: Terror Destination, Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management, *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 12, No.50, June 6, 2014
- 64 I am privy to the approach of Jalaluddin Haqqani in 2004 to the Governor of Khosrajuddin Pathan, who was my friend, and he wanted to have dialogue with the Government. The poor Governor appraised President Karzai and even the Americans based in Khost, but nobody cared as they were then riding on the victory horse. The same is true of the feared Taliban commander, Dadullah.
- 65 The commemoration of 8th Saur, April 28, each year as victory of jihad against infidelity (the mother of all evils), i.e., downfall of President Najibullah, with US support and even participation each year
- 66 During the scribe's visit to Kabul in 2002, the head of the German special forces operating within the framework of International Security Forces, told that the people like Abdul Rab Rasul Sif were being paid monthly by the US
- 67 International Crisis Group, *Asia Report* No. 262, October 28, 2014, p.5
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 If we draw any comparison in history, then we can say that al-Qaida is Trotskyite, believing in permanent revolution all over the world, and ISIL is Stalinist believing in establishing authority in one country and then spreading its influence to others
- 70 The estimates put forward by official and non-official sources
- 71 International Crisis Group, *Asia Report*, op.cit.
- 72 The religious parties, Jama'at-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulamai Islam, as well as some other minor parties within the Defa-e-Pakistan Council, were forced to join in condemnation of the massacre. However, the event of repeat publication of satirical cartoons of Prophet Mohammad (s.a.a.w) in France has given golden opportunity to the religious right to divert the popular anger of the Pakistani people from the Peshawar massacre.
- 73 International Crisis Group, *Asia Report*, op.cit.

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- ⁷⁴ Interview with Rustam Shah Mohmand, former ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan, home secretary of the province and Chief Commissioner of Afghan Refugees Commissionerate of KP
- ⁷⁵ Interview with the former ambassador of Pakistan and Wazir from South Waziristan, Ayaz Wazir, and others.
- ⁷⁶ Interview with FRC member and former bureaucrat from North Waziristan, Mir Laiq Shah, December 17, 2014
- ⁷⁷ Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p. 268
- ⁷⁸ Fraser-Tytler, op.cit.
- ⁷⁹ Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., pp 299-300
- ⁸⁰ Former ambassador to Afghanistan Sardar Tariq Azizuddin who replaced Rustam Shah Mohmand told a meeting of friends, the scribe included, that former King Zahir Shah told him in a meeting that during his official visit to Pakistan in February 1958, it was proposed by the President of Pakistan, Major General (Retd) Sikander Mirza, to unite the two countries into a single State to be named Pak-afghanistan, on which King Zahir Shah was taken aback. Before this, as narrated in his autobiography *A Pathan Odyssey*, Mohammad Aslam Khattak, ambassador to Afghanistan and later provincial and central minister and governor of KP, Pakistan did try to have confederation with Afghanistan and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also in favor, but that Afghanistan did not show any interest, and kept harping on Pakhtunistan. In August 1963, President Ayub Khan again proposed a confederation of Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan in one of his meetings in Quetta. Also, Bhutto and Daoud both had reached some sort of confederal arrangement, but soon after, both were toppled one after the other. Nowadays, some non-Pakhtun intellectuals also have floated this idea of confederation.
- ⁸¹ The myth of the Loya Jirga's (of 1955) decision about the non-recognition is untenable as Loya Jirga members are purchasable commodity and when the government at the helm want to manipulate its decision, they can easily do either by arms twisting or by using money as was proved during the Jirga of Hashem Khan who was paid by the British to take decision according to their wish in the Loya Jirga, and this has been time and again proved during the period of Karzai that how the opinion of the Jirga(s) were manipulated by the Americans. Loya Jirga decisions are not necessarily binding as proved recently by President Karzai who, despite the unanimous decision of a more representative Loya Jirga than the past, refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US. The Loya Jirga, if called, would only endorse that Afghanistan adheres to UN Charter and stands by all multilateral and bilateral agreements agreed by the legitimate authorities in the past.