Keynote Address by Lt. General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai – Seminar on “Strategic Stability in South Asia: Is India a Responsible Nuclear State?”



  1. Ambassador Khalid Mahmood Chairman ISSI, Ambassador Aizaz Chaudhry, Director General ISSI, members of the Islamabad Strategic Studies Institute, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank you for inviting me to talk on this currently pertinent topic which carries serious implications for not only strategic stability in South Asia but also has much wider ramifications for peace and security in the larger Asian region and indeed the world. I shall express my views broadly taking into account two time frames on the Seminar question: Is India a Responsible Nuclear State? First, the immediate time frame of India’s irresponsible conduct as a nuclear state during and after the Pulwama stand-off, and second, reflecting back in time over the past decades to trace India’s conduct history sheet as it sought to become a nuclear power over the years.
  2. Recklessness, immature and irresponsible conduct of foreign policy by a nuclear power anywhere in the world is a threat to world peace. When combined with aggressive operational deployment of military power, followed by the physical employment of the military instrument against a fully armed nuclear power like Pakistan which has strong and well balanced conventional forces as well, in order to achieve domestic electoral objectives, the conduct goes way beyond the domain of irresponsibility; I think it falls in the category of insanity. When that happens there are consequences.
  3. Nuclear India’s conduct of an air strike in February earlier this year against mainland nuclear Pakistan, driven by delusions of Israeli style air power tactics against Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, but disconnected from the realities of a dominant air supremacy operational and threat environment in which Israel operates, was poorly planned and executed by the Indian Air Force, almost Quixotic. It was playing with fire at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum and Armageddon at the upper end.
  4. It was critical and timely that Pakistan Air Force’s carefully calibrated professional response resulting in the humiliation of the numerically larger IAF brought the Indian politico-military leadership, its turbo-charged media and, more importantly, India’s international patrons down to the realities of the earth very quickly. Barring additional chest thumping and seeking refuge in lies and self-deception, quite in line with Chanakya teachings, nuclear India was left with no choice but to climb down and now has to live with the humiliation for an indefinite time; the consequences as I said. Interestingly, one hasn’t heard much since then from the usually vocal Indian Army Chief.
  5. It is clear that the strategic and military consequences of an irresponsible political decision for achieving domestic political and electoral advantages supported by poor professional military advice were not thought through or war gamed to their logical conclusion. If they had been, which they ought to have been, not only in the 12 days between Pulwama and Balakot but indeed as a peacetime contingency planning for years earlier, nuclear India, and international actors who gave a blank pass to India, should have concluded that in an active military conflict situation, especially a limited one with nuclear armed Pakistan, while it may be relatively easy to climb the first rung on an escalatory ladder, the second rung would always belong to Pakistan, and that India’s choice to further up the ante by moving to the third rung would invariably be dangerously problematic in anticipation of the fourth rung response by Pakistan.
  6. Also that the escalatory rung climbing could not be so neatly sequenced and choreographed but could very quickly get out of hand and morph into a major war which perhaps nobody wanted but whose outcomes could be disastrous for the region and the globe. This was muddled strategic thinking at its worst. In the process, it challenged the very foundation of strategic stability in South Asia which is premised on the time tested concept of restraint and responsibility ever since the two countries opted to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. The strength of this foundation was put to test by India on 26th February but it had to beat a hasty retreat in the face of a determined Pakistani response on 27th February; status quo ante was restored and no new normal was established.
  7. One would like to hope that India would learn appropriate lessons and desist from shaking these foundations again. However, it will be wise for Pakistan not to live by hope given India’s irrational, erratic and delusional decision making. Hope is not policy; we need to factor in the reality of an erratic adversary in our national and military plans.
  8. As opposed to India’s recklessness and irresponsible behaviour, it was Pakistan’s restrained and measured response at the politico-military level deliberately avoiding blood and dead bodies and following up with mature statesmanship that saved the day for South Asia and by extension for the world. It is not difficult to imagine the political and military pressures on Pakistan if India, as it intended to, had actually killed 300-400 Pakistanis during its ill-conceived air strike at Balakot, or thereafter, as intelligence reports suggested, continued on a war seeking trajectory and carried out operations which the Indian Prime Minister has most gallantly termed as a possible ‘Qatal Ki Raat’ on the following night.
  9. I don’t think a country possessing nuclear weapons can conduct itself with greater irresponsibility than India did. In an oblique way, one would also like to thank the Indian Spice Missile targeting programmers and the IAF pilots for their timely incompetence that ensured that none of the intended targets at Balakot got hit as indeed the loss of nerves by the Indian leadership and its patrons’ to carry on further.
  10. Keeping in view Pakistan’s repeatedly declared policy of ‘Quid pro Quo Plus’ in case of a limited Indian attack, it was surprising that India and its international supporters themselves ended up with surprise on the quality of Pakistan’s measured and successful response. As professional planners, the Indians also should have understood that from there on, the rush to a nuclear crisis is but a few steps away and that there would be no choice for India but to step back and look for face saving options involving international players, highlighting yet again the centrality of the core issue of Kashmir, precisely the things that India has sought to avoid for decades.
  11. In my opinion, India, and its backers in this recklessness, grossly misjudged. Retaliating to Pulwama in the manner that it was done was obviously not only an irresponsible and reckless decision in a strategic environment of prevailing strong nuclear capabilities but also poor political and foreign policy, which succeeded in bringing the Kashmir issue as a nuclear flashpoint front and center on the international stage.
  12. However, since the sole objective of the exercise was to use, or perhaps misuse, the armed forces of India to bring about an election victory for the BJP to the exclusion of all other dangerous consequences, then of course it is for India’s political system and its other political parties to examine. In that case, serious questions arise as to the real possibility of Pulwama being a false flag operation undertaken by the Indian intelligence agencies at a predictably perfect electoral time and in the process misused the Indian armed forces. This in itself raises questions on the quality, character and professionalism of the Indian military leadership which allowed itself to be misused on the domestic political chessboard and have ended up being heavily politicized and demoralized. If one notes the body language since then of the IAF Chief together with the missing in action act of the Army Chief, it says it all.
  13. Moving further from the immediate operations of February, Prime Minister Modi, while extracting full mileage from the episode during his election campaign, continued to put on public display in his election rallies further irresponsible conduct as the leader of a nuclear power by repeatedly threatening Pakistan with the actual use of nuclear weapons. His use of comical and street terminology like employing the ‘mother of all nuclear bombs’, ‘qatal ki raat’, fireworks at Diwali, would have been just that – comical – if only his rhetoric didn’t confirm that nuclear weapons in India have now indeed landed in the hands of Hindutva extremists, represented in the newly elected Parliament with 40% of the Parliamentarians reportedly having criminal or terrorist cases against them.
  14. The world, and most certainly Pakistan, needs to wake up to the transformed reality that India’s nuclear weapons are today controlled by religious fanatics. India’s nuclear weapons are no longer safe and have become a real threat to regional and world peace. They have been deployed and used to threaten Pakistan and indirectly world peace in pursuit of winning an election. The conduct unbecoming and crass language coming from the leader of the world’s largest democracy was not only in poor taste, it threw out of the window many elements of India’s carefully crafted nuclear strategy.
  15. First, it turned India’s pronounced policy of No First Use on its head not that Pakistan has ever viewed with any degree of credibility India’s No First Use policy; Mr Modi’s pronouncements were certainly not off the cuff. He knew exactly what he was doing and talking in a single-minded focus to stir up an anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim nationalistic narrative to win elections, which he has duly won. As a consequence, however, India’s much trumpeted and choreographed formal Nuclear Strategy lies in tatters upended single handedly within a very short time.
  16. Second, added to the misadventure further is the operational reality that during the crisis, India not only deployed in the Arabian Sea its conventional Naval flotilla including an aircraft carrier, conventional submarine that got detected by the Pakistan Navy, but more importantly, the nuclear submarine Arihant presumably to deter Pakistan from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons.
  17. Arihant, which had earlier claimed running deterrence patrols in a fanfare ceremony presided over by no less than the Prime Minister himself, was certainly carrying ready to go nuclear missiles. Since there were no credible reports of India’s First Strike weapons based on land and air being readied, was India considering the use of nuclear weapons from a Second Strike platform even before the First Strike options?
  18. Third, with reference to command and control of nuclear weapons, which institutional forum authorized the deployment of a Second Strike platform carrying nuclear weapons? Was there a secret meeting of India’s National Command Authority because none was announced formally as in Pakistan? Or was this too decided in a cavalier fashion between the Prime Minister and his Naval Chief? Or worse still, was the Indian Navy also given the proverbial free hand to do as it pleases, as Prime Minister Modi claimed to have given to his other military commanders. With what sense of political responsibility can a Prime Minister of a nuclear state delegate authority to deploy nuclear platforms and nuclear weapons to military commanders?
  19. Fourth, one wonders further whatever happened to the Cold Start Doctrine which seemed to have taken a back seat somewhere in a cold storage. Looking at the Indian Army’s deployment pattern throughout the crisis, it appears India itself did not place much faith in its much flaunted Cold Start Doctrine as a credible response option.
  20. Obviously, India’s strategic thinking cultivated over the years stood considerably confused in a moment of crisis at the altar and primacy of a political party’s electoral strategy; it conceded professional space to the whims of a heavy weight Prime Minister. And that ought to be a cause of concern for Pakistan when you are faced with a nuclear adversary whose strategic thinking and actions get muddled up even before the first shot has been fired. This was not only irresponsible conduct but also institutional failure in India.
  21. It is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing Indian strategic and operational conduct, as a case study as it were, that the Indian political leadership under the extremists of the BJP and RSS led in a gung-ho style by the Prime Minister himself falls in the category of very irresponsible and reckless nuclear custodians. And that the Indian military is either too meek, or equally reckless, or equally incompetent, or perhaps a bit of all three, to offer sane professional advice. Mr Modi’s infamous claim to order the IAF to take advantage of the clouds to beat Pakistani radars shows the IAF as a professional force in poor light. The scenario is a chilling reflection on the functionality, or more appropriately, dysfunctionality of the Indian Command and Control system and the efficacy of its National Command Authority. It’ll be important for Pakistan to take note of the trans-frontier state of affairs in its future politico-military assessments.
  22. Yet another chatter among India’s military and strategic community that needs to be addressed is regarding their gravely mistaken conclusion of having called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff by undertaking a single air strike on Balakot and that too embarrassingly unsuccessful. The reality is far from this.
  23. Like one swallow does not make a summer, one air strike, conducted most unprofessionally, does not render a robust nuclear deterrence a bluff. Pakistan’s nuclear capability operationalized under the well-articulated policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence comprises of a large variety of strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons, on land, air and sea, which are designed to comprehensively deter large scale aggression against mainland Pakistan.
  24. As things stand and as amply demonstrated during the February stand-off, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons continue to serve the purpose for which they have been developed, on a daily and hourly basis, by putting the fear of God in India’s political and military leaders. India’s foreign policy and politico-military strategy take into consideration Pakistan’s real time nuclear capability when developing contingency plans by making deliberate effort to skirt around the Pakistani nuclear capability and nuclear thresholds. Official India obviously does not take Pakistan’s nuclear capability as a bluff. It is precisely the presence of these nuclear weapons that deters, and in this specific case, deterred India from expanding operations beyond a single unsuccessful air strike.
  25. It is the Full Spectrum Deterrence capability of Pakistan that brings the international community rushing into South Asia to prevent a wider holocaust. That India chose not to proceed further to the third rung is a testimony to not only the bloody nose it got at the hands of the PAF, but also the cold calculations that nuclear weapons could come into play sooner rather than later. That, ladies and gentlemen, is nuclear deterrence at work and not nuclear bluff.
  26. Given the foregoing overview of India’s conduct as a nuclear weapons state during the Pulwama stand-off, one cannot but conclude that India’s conduct as a nuclear state led most recklessly by the Chairman National Command Authority the Prime Minister clearly bordered between irresponsible and insane.
  27. Next, I shall attempt to place Responsible Behaviour by a nuclear power in an academic and historical perspective with respect to India by reflecting back in time.
  28. Strategic stability in a crisis prone region as a concept between two Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) encompasses the prevailing political conditions, security circumstances, respective doctrines and force postures. In view of our latest experience with India, I think I would now like to add Responsible Behavior on the part of a NWS as a primary requisite for strategic stability.
  29. But then we must also try and define in more tangible terms as to what is “Responsible” Nuclear Behavior? In my opinion, the criteria for defining a responsible NWS should include some of the following policy approaches: a.  A responsible NWS does not develop nuclear technology for the purposes of gaining international prestige and recognition, or for a place in the global order. Pakistan does not, India does and its leaders like Nehru and I K Gujral are on record on that. The birth of the Indian nuclear program itself is a product of the country’s desire to match the grandeur of superpowers of the world. Homi Bhabha’s announcement in 1965 that India could produce a nuclear weapon within 12 months was an attempt to show off India as a technologically advanced State. This prestige seeking obsession continues to drive India’s motives even today. b.  Far from seeking international prestige, a responsible NWS while outlining its Force Development Strategy remains focused on what it considers as a realistic and conservative threat assessment with respect to its legitimate security calculus. Hence the logic of Credible Minimum Deterrence, the emphasis being on Minimum and of course Credible. This professionally logical approach as followed by Pakistan is in contrast to an open ended pursuit of a frenetic and mindless arms build-up by India through the pursuit of every destabilizing technology in sight like Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), hypersonic glide vehicles, Anti Satellite capabilities, offensive cyber capabilities, etcetera. c.  In this respect, Pakistan has been careful and conservative. In Pakistan, strategists have firmly guided the force development needs as per its nuclear strategy and the scientists have followed successfully delivering on the identified goals. On the contrary, in India, the cart has been placed before the horse. The scientists of DRDO and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission have led the force development process without recourse to a professionally developed national nuclear strategy. It is the strategists who have adjusted their weapons needs to the scientists’ technical strategy and perhaps whims. This is lop sided, betrays lack of responsibility, professional understanding and undercuts the Indian military from the decision making loop.
  30. India, over the years, has continually justified its open and blatant disregard for responsible behaviour whether it is the case of diverting fissile materials for its so-called peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, or proliferating foreign technology for developing nuclear submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles, or the space programme, or sneaking up the Pakistani border with aggressive intent under the garb of Exercise Brasstacks in 1986-87, or the genocide and gross human rights violations it has unleashed on the hapless Kashmiris on a daily basis. This dismissive behavior towards established norms of a responsible state especially a nuclear state has already led to serious ramifications for regional peace and security.
  31. It will not be out of place to mention that some countries have been complicit in India’s disregard for responsible behavior and have encouraged its recklessness by condoning and rewarding a variety of violations of international conventions and norms. The NSG exemption, membership of arms control cartels, brutal repression in Kashmir and the latest green light to attack Pakistan at Balakot are some examples of rewarding irresponsible state conduct.
  32. Responsible nuclear behavior requires a NWS to manage and resolve its political differences vis-à-vis an adversary with maturity and restraint. While this behavior may not seek to arrest one’s political ambitions, it surely puts a check on the ways employed in their pursuit. In this context, continuously trying to test Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, planning to find space for limited war against a nuclear Pakistan, and now attempting clumsily planned and executed surgical strikes accompanied by aggressive deployment of naval assets is a testament of aggression and irresponsible behavior by India.
  33. And what is one to make of India’s stated position of retaliating through massive retaliation in case Pakistan were to hypothetically employ a Tactical Nuclear Weapon on the battlefield even on its own territory, not taking into account the disastrous consequences on India itself of Pakistan’s capacity of a counter massive retaliation. Irresponsible, ill considered, immature, perhaps a bit of all three.
  34. For Pakistan, its politico-military leadership and indeed the people of Pakistan, I think it is important to understand and grasp the psychology and frame of mind of the Hindustan of today in order to understand what’s going on. Since the advent of the religious extremist BJP/RSS Government in 2014, amongst many others, I can identify four major drivers of Hindustan’s domestic Hindutva policies and by extension its policy towards Pakistan.
  35. One, Hindutva philosophy is an effort to overcome and erase the negative psychological complexes and sense of defeat and humiliation of the Hindu nation of a thousand years of Muslim rule.
  36. Two, in order to do that, Hindutva seeks the restoration of an imagined past glory of Hindu India going back to the Vedas, Chandragupta Maurya and Ashoka of 300 BC, and hence the pathetic claims that one hears every now and then from no less a person than Mr Modi himself of Hindustan in the past having invented or discovered any numbers of cutting edge technologies much before the modern era.
  37. Three, the ambitious and relentless pursuit of becoming a regional and global power, oblivious of its many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, which drives Hindustan’s relationship with international powers particularly Pakistan.
  38. Four, a self-delusional one-way competition with China under the guise of standing up as western bulwark with strategic over-reach now up to the Pacific.
  39. In many ways, while Hindustan’s new found back to the roots discovery is quite in line with the current universal trend of the surge of strong nationalistic politics in countries like the US, UK, France, Italy, Israel, even the Middle East, the nationalistic politics especially those like in Modi’s India based on a vicious anti-Muslim, anti-Pakistan sentiment together with recourse to misplaced muscular policies carry far reaching consequences for regional peace and security including irresponsible conduct as nuclear state.
  40. The Indian leadership now proudly acknowledges that they were active lieutenants in the Indian enterprise to foment discord in East Pakistan leading to Pakistan’s breakup, not that it was a state secret earlier. Espousal of such an all pervasive strategic culture and mindset generates national irrationality, and that in a nuclear armed country is dangerous.
  41. Indian strategists would be well advised to get real and take into account the huge gap and imbalance that exists between their national ambition and national capacity failing which they will continue to falter and live dangerously putting the stability of the region in repeated jeopardy. With national ambition and psyche out of step with national capacity India will continue to suffer the indignities of Doklam, Balakot and Rajauri.
  42. A stable environment requires a NWS to take steps at all tiers, including political and military, to avoid confrontation. However, Indian strategic behavior persistently seeks predominance in the region by relying heavily on hard-power and hybrid tactics, particularly at the sub-conventional level. Please recall that the Prime Minister of India took pride in announcing from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi that India would pursue a Baluchistan policy in the sub-conventional sense.
  43. Pakistani conduct as a responsible nuclear power stands out in contrast. As a responsible nuclear power, Pakistan does not believe in brandishing its nuclear arsenal or coercing its neighbors. Also, Pakistan continues to abide by all the tenets of the definition of a responsible NWS. Pakistan’s policy is not driven by any delusions of international glory but is defined by restraint and responsibility in order to ensure national security.
  44. Nuclear parity and arms race has never been Pakistan’s agenda – we seek qualitative balancing.
  45. The fragile strategic stability in South Asia demands that India and Pakistan, two eyeball to eyeball nuclear powers, move beyond the notions of crisis management and pursue conflict resolution, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir, with sincerity of purpose. Responsibility on Pakistan’s part is reflected in its continued calls to engage India in conflict resolution mechanisms and numerous proposals that seek to attain durable peace through dialogue.
  46. The Indian narrative citing limited strikes against Pakistan as the “new normal” holds no ground. As demonstrated Pakistan is prepared to counter any such aggression in the future as well as it continues to reserve the right of self-defense like any other responsible and sovereign State.
  47. The recent crisis signaled that India’s attempts to exploit conventional advantages in a nuclear environment undermine deterrence stability. Yet, India remains unfazed and continues to explore space for limited war or non-contact warfare with Pakistan. While it failed to achieve any military objectives, recent Indian aggression only put regional peace and stability in jeopardy as also lowered the professional reputation of its military internationally – and simultaneously risked a nuclear catastrophe.
  48. Ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion I would like to come back to the question posed in today’s Seminar: Is India a responsible nuclear state? Having examined the political and strategic behavior of a nuclear India put on display during and after the Pulwama crisis, together with the long history of decades of devious and arrogant conduct as a state, India has risked strategic stability in South Asia and put in serious jeopardy global peace through its irresponsible and ill-considered conduct repeatedly.
  49. While there may be many more conclusions to be drawn, I would like to focus on four of these.
  50. One, that India conclusively, is not a responsible nuclear state, not today and has not been at any time in its history. There is no doubt that some in the international community bear responsibility for giving encouragement and solace at every stage to India in the pursuit of its irrational ambitions and irresponsible conduct as a nuclear state. Far from exercising caution, the world has brought India into the international mainstream of nuclear states by providing one exception after another to India in violation of their own designed conventions some of them prompted, ironically, by India’s irresponsible behaviour.
  51. As is the norm in the real world of statecraft, here too realpolitik is at play in that the international players are willing to look the other way and ignore India’s transgressions because of their obsession with trying to build up India as a counter weight to China and India’s attraction as an investment hub for weapons sales and for international funds. That obviously trumps everything else and that is the reality that Pakistan has to live with, and therefore take measures so as to look out for itself.
  52. Two, far more dangerous than that, Hindustan’s nuclear weapons have now well and truly fallen into the hands of religious extremists and Hindu fanatics, whose shallow knowledge base makes them seriously believe that they possess the mother of all nuclear bombs, whatever that means, that these do not need to be saved for Diwali fireworks, that Pakistani radars can be blinded in cloudy weather, that India can attack a nuclear power like Pakistan under the assumption that its nuclear capability is a bluff, that there is space for conventional limited war despite the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia, that therefore a new normal can be imposed on Pakistan, that India can block Pakistan’s rivers and render the country dry, that India is now so powerful that it can isolate Pakistan diplomatically, etc, etc. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the delusional mindset of Hindustan’s extremist and religiously fanatic nuclear custodians.
  53. Three, Pakistan, at the national, diplomatic and military levels, now needs to recognize the stark reality that with the advent of a resurgent Hindutva India, now more Hindustan than India, the nature, mindset and approaches of our adversary have changed entirely. With the elections of 2019, India has undergone a seismic change internally and that change will exert a more assertive, aggressive and arrogant policy towards Pakistan. We therefore must come up with rapid adjustments in our national, diplomatic and military calculus to the new challenges.
  54. As the old military saying goes, do not prepare to fight the last war. Ladies and gentlemen, the last war is gone, long gone. It was buried under the combined weight of Pakistan’s conventional and strong nuclear deterrence. The Indian elections of 2014 were only the harbinger of things to come; the elections of 2019 will now define a fundamentally new aggressive India which will not be shy of deploying its economic, diplomatic and military muscle including nuclear weapons, howsoever irresponsible one may label that.
  55. A new war, including what is now belatedly being recognized as Hybrid and fifth generation is already upon us and we need to stare it in the face boldly and be ready to counter it. Pakistani strategists and planners need to rapidly come out of their comfort zones. The new war focuses on Destabilization, Exhaustion and Slow Corrosion, I’ll repeat, the new war focuses on Destabilization, Exhaustion and Slow Corrosion. It is already upon us. If one cares to notice, one can discern it playing out in our national and provincial psycho-social fabric, in our politics, in our vulnerable western border areas, in our streets and cities, in our institutions of higher learning, in our print and electronic media, in fact it is in the minds and on the palms of each one of us as we play around with our mobile phones in search of Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter and fake news. Pakistan and Pakistanis need to wake up to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, recognize the games being played by our adversaries, and be prepared to not only confront it but defeat it comprehensively.
  56. While Pakistan cannot change geography and the neighbourhood, it must continue to adopt and display rational, responsible and mature state conduct when dealing with a belligerent and irresponsible Hindustan. Pakistan must remain steadfast in its firm and restrained responses as displayed with maturity during the Pulwama crisis, confident in its capabilities and capacity to deter and if need be to thwart any Indian machinations while pursuing the diplomatic path of managing and resolving disputes peacefully.
  57. And finally, ladies and gentlemen, the fourth conclusion is that the gloves are off, the mask is off, and the veneer of secularism is dead. India in 2019 is now well and truly Hindustan, of the Hindus, by the Hindus and for the Hindus. This has been validated by the landslide victory of the BJP/RSS and of the Hindutva philosophy. The transformation from India to Hindustan, over a period of 72 years, now carries the duly stamped ownership of the vast multitudes of the Hindu population which has voted for the BJP/RSS heavily – twice in five years.
  58. Let us then recall and rejoice in the great wisdom, foresight and vision of Pakistan’s founding fathers led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah who nearly eighty years ago formally declared in March 1940 that there were two nations in Hindustan: Mussalmans and the Hindus. He therefore demanded the creation of the separate homeland of Pakistan for the Mussalmans of India and won it in 1947. Ladies and gentlemen, the Indian Elections of 2019 are a landslide for Jinnah’s Two-Nation Theory all over again.

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