Modern attacks do not aim to annihilate, but to bring about “functional paralysis”. Resilience works because the attacker cannot cripple all the systems at once. Strategic debates about missile defence are usually started with technology – the interceptor, radar, detection networks, to name but a few – but crises rarely develop as engineering problems. Modern missile threats haunt societies. They test the communication systems and the administrative continuity and the confidence of members of the public in these things as much as they test military readiness. The efficiency of missile defence cannot only be determined by the number of projectiles intercepted. It needs to be judged by what it can do more widely for the maintenance of institutional stability and social composure in the face of stress. This argument put forward in this brief is that missile defence should be part of a multi-domain resilience architecture that secures state functioning in any crisis. The discussion approaches systemic effects, the pathway of resilience and areas for improvement.
