The post-Cold War arms control has lost its binding framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019,[1] and the official expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 has left a governance vacuum.[2] This vacuum strongly favors qualitative nuclear modernization over transparency and restraint. With the elimination of New START’s legally binding limitations on deployed strategic warheads and the on-site verification regime, the last bilateral constraint of New START on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems has disappeared.[3] The resulting uncertainty between the parties increases the risks of capability-driven competition. Without new and technological awareness cooperative measures, the modernization might turn into a multidomain arms race that erodes crisis stability. Practical policy steps to give new impetus to arms control, such as substituting modular, technology-sensitive arms control for the traditional functional style, improving verification technology and data-sharing, providing for crisis hotlines, and achieving inclusive regional transparency, will bring about renewed predictability.
