India’s massive military modernization over the past decade has enhanced its conventional capabilities but has also fostered a political-military culture of “strategic comfort.”[1] In this culture, the leaders believe that superior platforms, numbers or reach automatically translate into predictable control of crises. This complacency risks three connected miscalculations: (1) adversary adaptation grossly underestimated; (2) escalation advantage grossly overestimated; and (3) purchase of systems implicitly implies integrated war-fighting advantage. Left alone, these miscalculations erode the stability of the deterrent balance in South Asia and increase the likelihood of potentially dangerous crises involving Pakistan, India and China.
Since 2014, New Delhi has accelerated efforts to reform and procure to close its so-called capability gaps by purchasing additional combat aircraft, modern naval platforms, longer-range missiles, and investing in space, ISR, AI & cyber.[2] Generally, numbers or new platforms alone do not ensure crisis control; effectiveness demands doctrinal and political alignment amid institutional inertia and procurement delays.
